Holding

A right to receive the variable net income of a trust, subject to the trustee's investment powers, does not qualify as an annuity under section 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.

Summary

The appellant, Commissioner of Wealth Tax, challenged the assessee P. K. Banerjee's claim that his right to receive the net income of a family trust fund was an annuity exempt under section 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The trust, created by Banerjee's father in 1937 and modified in 1950, paid the net income of government securities to Banerjee for life, with the trustee retaining power to reinvest proceeds, making the amount variable. Lower authorities rejected the exemption, but the Income‑Tax Appellate Tribunal directed valuation of only the life interest, and the Allahabad High Court held the right to be an annuity. The Supreme Court examined the definition of annuity under the Act, emphasizing that an annuity must be a fixed, predetermined periodic payment and must preclude commutation into a lump sum. It found that Banerjee's entitlement was to the fluctuating net income of the trust, subject to the trustee's investment discretion, and therefore not an annuity. Consequently, the exemption under section 2(e)(iv) was denied and the High Court judgment set aside.

Issues considered

Whether the right to receive the net income of the trust fund constitutes an annuity within the meaning of section 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.
Whether the terms of the trust preclude commutation of the benefit into a lump‑sum grant.

Legislation cited

Finance Act, 1894s. 1
Indian Trusts Act, 1882
Wealth Tax Act, 1957s. 27(1), s. 2(e)(iv), s. 2(m), s. 3

Subjects

Wealth TaxAnnuityTrustNet IncomeSection 2(e)(iv)Life InterestValuationCommutation

Judgment

65 7

A

COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, LUCKNOW
v.
P. K. BA~ERJEE (DEAD) BY LRS.
B
September 9, 1980
[P. N. BHAGWATT, E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J
Wealth Tax Act, 1957, Section 2(e)(iv), scope of-Annuity-Nature of the
amount to fall under the annuity, to claim exemption under the Wealth Tax
Act, exp/ai117d.
The respondent assessee, under a deed of trust dated October 26, 1937
c
executed by his father Pyarey Lal Banerji which was modified by another trust
'deed dated April 28, 1950, received "the net income of the trust funds" after
the death of his father. The assessee treated this amount as an annuity and
claimed exemption under section 2(e)(iv) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The
claim for exemption was negatived by all the authorities including the Appel·
late Tribunal, Allahabad Bench. The Tribunal, however, holding that the D
inclusion of the en titre. value of the corpus in the computation of net wealth
was not correct as the assessee had merely a life interest in it, direcled' the
Wealth Tax Officer to modify the assessments valuing the life interest of the
assessee according to recognised principles of valuation. On a reference, i1t
the instance of the asseseee, the High Court held the interest of the assessee
in the trust fund amounted to an annuity exempt under section 2(e)(iv) of
the Wealth Tax Act. E
Allowing the appeal by special leave and answering against the assessee,
the Court
, HELD : (l) In order to claim that an item of property should not be
treated as an asset for purposes of the Wealth Tax Act, by virtue of sub-
clause (iv) of section 2(e)(I), it has to be established (a) that it is an annuity
and (b) that commutation of any portion thereof into a lumpsum grant is
precluded by the terms and conditions thereto. [663 CJ F
(2) It is true that the word "annuity" is not defined in the Act. In order
to constitute an annuity, the payment to be made periodically should be. a
fixed or pre-determined one and it should not be liable to any variation depend·
ing upon or any ground relating to the general income of the fund or estate
which is charged for such payment. The intention of the settlor must be seen,
whether he wanted that the assessee should get a pre-determined sum every
year or whether the assessee should get the whole net income of the trust fund.
[665 C, 671 G] .
In the instant case, since the interest of the settlor was that the whole
net income of the trust fund should go to the assessee, the right of the assessee
cannot be treated as an annuity. The fact that under the trust deed the trustee
had been given the power to reinvest the proceeds of the Government securities
leads to the possibility of variation of the income and consequently of the
amount to be received by the assessee, make it clear that it was not an
annuity. The fact that no such reinvestment had taken place during -the rele·
vant year is immaterial. [671 H-672 B]

.. i
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A Ahmed G.H. Ariff & Ors. v. Commissioner of Wealth·tax, Calcutta, (1970)
76 I.T.R. 471; Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat II v. Mrs. Arundhati Bal-
krishna, (1968) 70 I.T.R. 203, explained and applied.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Rajasthan v. Her Highness Maharani Gayatri
Devi of Jaipur (1971) 82 l.T.R. 699, followed.

Commissioner of Wealth-tax, A.P. v. Nawab Fareed Nawaz J11ng & Ors.
B (1970) 77 I.T.R. 180, overruled.
In re Duke of Norfolk: Public Trustee v. Infond Revenue Commissioners
(1950) Ch. 467 distinguished.

C1v1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Ci:vil Appeal No. 1163-1167
of 1973.
c Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order, dated
15-3-1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Wealth Tax Reference
No. 232 of 1964.
S. T. Desai and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appellant.
S. N. Kacker, V. K. Pandita and E. C. Agarwala for the Rcspon-
D dent.
VENKATARAMIAH, J.-These appeals by special leave under
Article 136 of the Constitution are directed against the judgment,
dated March 15, 1971 of the Allahabad High Court in Wealth Tax
Reference No. 232 of 1964.
E The facts of the case may be briefly stated thus : The Income-
tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad referred under
section 27 (1) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (herein.after referred to
as 'the Act') ttJ the High Court of Allahabad for its opinion the
following question of law arising out of the assessment orders made
under the Act in respect of the assessment years 1957-58 to 1961-62:
F "Whether the interest of the assessee in the trust fund
amounted to an annuity exempt under section 2 (e) (iv) of the
Wealth-tax Act?"
The assessee concerned in this case is Shri P. K. Banerji'.
Under a deed ·of trust, dated October 26, 1937 executed by his
G father, Shri Pyarey Lal Banerji (hereinafter referred to as 'the settlor')
the assessee became entitled to receive the income arising out of
the trust fund during his (assessee's) life-time allter the death of the
settlor subject to the liability to pay, out of such income certain
specified sums periodically as mentioned in the deed to two other
persons. Aliter the death of the assessee, the income of the tmst
H fund was directed to be paid in equal shares to the two other
persons referred to above and if either of them should die before
the death of the asessee then the whole of such income had to be paid

•
c. w. T. v. P. K. BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 659

to the survivor of them during his or her life. There were certaiJU A
other directions in the trust deed with regard to the disposal of th~
income arising out of the trust fund with which we are not concerned
in this case. The trust fund consisted of oertaio, Indi'a Government
loan bonds or securities issued from time to time under which
certain specjfied interest was payable. The tlotal face value of
.such bonds amounted ,to Rs. 10 lacs. The Imperial Bank of India, B
Calcutta (hereinafter referred to as 'the trustee') was appointed as
the trustee under the trust deed and the Goverlnment loan bonds or
-securities referred to above were trainsfer!red and endorsed in favour
of the trustee with a direction to discharge the obligations referred
to in the trust deed. Under clause (1) of the trust deed, the settlor c
.directed the trustee to retain with it the said Government loan
bonds or securities and upon redemptiOiII of any of them to invest
the prooeeds thereof in the purchase of three and a half per cent
-Oovernment promiissory notes {old issue) or if this was not practi-
cable in any other security of the Government of India or if this
too was not practicable then in any other securities authorised for D
the investment of trust funds by the Indian Trusts Act, 1:982 or
any statutory modificatioo. thereof and to hold and stand po•ssessed
-0f the Government loan bonds or securities referred to above or any
other investments representing the same as the trust fund to be used
in acwrdance with the directions contained in the deed. The
following are the relevant recitals of the trust deed, dated October E
26, 1937 containing directions regarding the manner in which the
-.income arising from the trust fund should be appropriated or spent: -
"Qa) The Bank shall pay the net income of the Trust Fund
to the settlor durilng his life and may instead Of paying the same
to him direct, credit the same to the current account of the F
settlor with the Bank, so long as there shall be any such current
account.
/

(b) From and afte11 the death od' ithe settlor, the Bank
shall pay the net income of the trust ftind to the settlor's son
Pranab Kumar Banerji during his li!fe, if he should survive the ,G
.settlor ,:subject to the payment there out every six months on the
thirtieth day of April and thirty first day of October in every
year of a sum of Rupees Nine hundred to the settlor's son
'Sunab Kumar Banerji and a sum of Rupees six hundred to the
seltlor'1s daughter-in-law Purnima Banerji during his or her
life, If he or she shall survive the settlor. H
'{c) If the said Pranab Kumar Banerji shall predecease the
settlor or if he should die after having survived the settlor, then
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R...

A in the former case on and from the death of the settlor and in
the latter case on and from the death of the said Pranab Kumar
Banerji, the income of the trust fund shall be paid in equal
shares to the said Sunab Kumar Banerji and Purnima Banerji
(if he or she should be then alive) or the whole of such income
to the survivor of them during his or her life.
B
(d) If the :said Pranab Kumar Banerji, Sl!nab Kumar
Banerji and Purnima Banerji shall predecease the settlor or if
they or any one or more oJ1 them shall die after having survived
the settlor then in the former case on and from the death of
the settlor and in the latter case on and from the death of the
c survivor of the said Pranab Kumar Banerji, Sunab Kumar Banerji
and .Purnima Banerji, the Bank sha:ll stand possessed of the
trust fond and the income thereof UPON SUCH TRUSTS as
the said Pranab Kumar Banerji by any deed or aeeds with or
without power of revocation may app6int or by will or codicil
shall ait any time or times appoint AND IN DEFAULT of and
D so far as any such appoiint:ment shall not extend IN TRUST
for the settlor's nephew Manoj Kumar Banerji and the .settfor's
niece Jhuni Banerji (now minors), if they are both alive, or such
one of the two as may be alive and in default of both for the
person or persons who under the law relating to intestate
succession would on the death of the settlor have been entitled
E thereto, if the settlor had died possessed thereof and intestate."

In exerdse of the power that he had reserved to himself unde11
the trust deed, dated October 26, 1937 to. modify the terms thereof,
··'t
the settlor executed ai11other trust deed, dated April 28, 1950 by

i
which clauses (b) and (c) of the trus.t deed, dated October 26, 1937
F extracted above were substituted by the following clauses:
(b) From and after the death of the settlor the Bank
shall pay the net income of the trust funds to the settlor' s son
Pranab · Kumar Banerji during his life time: if· he should
survive the settlor. .
G (c) If the said Pranab Kumar Banerji shall predecease the
testator or if he should die after having survived the settlor
then in the former case on and from the death of the settlor and
in the latter case on and from the death of the said Pranab
Kumar Banerji, the income of the trust funds should be paid
in equal shares to my son Sunab Kumar1 Banerji and my oaughter-
H in-law Shakuntala Banerji (if he or she should be then alive)
or the whole of such income to the survivor of them during
his or her life."
c. w. T. v. P. K:. BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 661

The name 'Punrlma Banerji' occurring in clause (d) of the trust A
ueed, dated October 26, 1937 was substituted by the name 'Shakuntala
Banerji' by the trust deed, dated April 28, 1950. The resulting
·.. ~ position was that the trustee was obliged to pay the net income of
the trust fund to the settlor during his life time and after his death
the trustee had to pay the net income o~ the trust fund to tlhie
assessee during his life time if he should survive the settlor. If th~ B
assessee should pre-decease the settlor then on and from the death
·Of the settlor and if the assessee should die after the settlor on and
from the death of th.e assessee, the income o£ the trust fund had to
be paid in equal shares to Sunab Kumar Banerji, the other son of
the settlor and Shakuntala Banerji, the daugther-in-law of the settlor c
(.i,f he or she should be then alive) and the whole of such income
had to be paid to the survivor of them during his or her life. We
are ·concerned in this case prlncipal!y with the character of the
benefit conferred on the assessee by clause (b) of the trust deed as
substituted by the trust deed dated April 28, 1950. The settlor
di1ed sometime in 1952 and since tqen the assessee. was receiving the D
pet income from the trust fund in accorda>nce with the said clause
as the sole benefidary.
During the assessment proceedings under the Act relating to
the assessment years i,n, question, the assessee contended before the
Wealth-tax Officer, Allahabad that since the corpus of the trust fund E
was vested in the trustee and not in him, the value of the trust fund.
should 111ot be included in his total wealth and that in any event as
he had only the right to receive an annuity under the trust deed,
the trust fund should not be taken i'n~o account by reason of section
2 (e) (iv) of the Act. The Wealth-tax Officer rejected the conten-
tions of the assessee and included the full market value of the trust F
fund in the .trJtal wealth of the assessee in all the five a1ssessmen.t
. orders passed by him. The appeals filed by the assessee before the
·Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Allahabad were
dismissed. On further appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal,
Allahabad Bench, Allahabad confirmed the orders passed by the
Wealth-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of G
Wealth-taix in so far as the question of non-applicability of section
2 Ce) (iv) of the Act wa1s. concerned bi.tt it held that the iindusion
of the entire value of the corpu~ in the computation of net wealth
was not correct as the assessee had merely a life interest in it.
Accord~ngly it directed the Wealth-tax Officer to modify the assess-
ments valuing the life interest of the aissessee according to recognised H
·principal of valuation. Thereafter a.t the ilnstance of the assessee
the cornmam question of law set out above was referred to the High
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] t S.C.R.

A Court of Allahabad under section 27 (l) of the Act. All the five
references relating to the five assessment years were heard together by
the High Court in the year 1970. Since the High Court was of the
view that it was necessary to direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal
to submit a supplementary statement of the case on the following
questions:
B "(1) Whether the right of the assessee to receive the
amounts in terms of the deeds of trust, referred to above is an
annuilty" wi~hin the meaning of section 2 (e) (iv) of the Act?
and
(2) if so, whether the terms and conditidns relating to such
c annuity preclude the commutation of any portion thereof into
a lump sum grant?"
it directed the Tribunal by its order, dated February 27, 197(}
to submit a supplementary statement of the case on the above
que>Stions. In accordance with the di:rections of the High Court,
the T~ibunal submitted a supplementary statement of the case Lili
D August, 1970 stating that .the asset in question was not an annuity
referred to in section 2 (e) (iv) of the Act. The cases were there-
after heard by the High Comt. By its judgment, dated March 15,
1971, the High Court answered the common qJ.1estion of law referred
to it in the affirmative' in favour of the assessee, holding tlhat the
interest of the assessee in the trust fund' amounted to an annuity
E exempt under section 2 (e) (iv) of the Act. Dissatisfied with the
judgment of the High Court, the Department ha.s come up in appeal
to this Court.
There is no dispute that iin the case of assets chargeable to
tax under' the Act which are held by a trustee uJnder a duly executed
F instrument in writing whether testamentary or otherwise, wealth ··~
tax can be directly levied upon and is recoverable from the person
on whose behalf the a>ssells are held. Seation 3 of the Act create&
the said charge in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding
valuation date of every individual, °HindJ.1 undivided family and
Company at the rate or rates specified .in Schedule I to the Act.
G 'Net wealth' according to section 2 (m) of the Act means the amount
by which the aggregate value compUlted in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of all the assets, wherever located, belonging;
to the a!lsessee on the valuation date, including assets required to
be included in his net wealth as on. 1Jhat date unider the Act, is i111
excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee
H on the valuation date other than those debts referred to in sub·
clauses (i) to (iii) thereof. In section 2 (e) of the Act, the expres-
sion "assets" is defined as including ,property of every description.
c. w.. T. v. P. K. BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 663

movable or immovable but not including in relation to tbe assess- A
ment year commencing on the 1st April, W69 or any earlier assess-
ment year tbose items which are mentioned in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of
section 2 (e) (1). Sub-clause (ivA of section 2 Ce) (1) o£ the Act
which is relevant for the purpose oil this case excludes from the
defi'llitio;n of the word 'assets' a right to an annuity in ·any case
where the terms and conditions relating thereto preclude the B
commutation of any portion thereof into a lump sum grant. In
order to claim that ain item of property should not be treated as
a.n as.set for purposes oJ1 the Act by vir1tue of sub-clause (iv) of
-section 2 (e) (1), it has to be established Oi) that it is an annuity
and (ii) that commutation of any portion thereof into a lump sum c
grant is precluded by the terms and coo.ditions relating ther,eto.

The property in question is tbe right of tbe asseissee to receive
the net income of the trust funds during his life-time. The
primary fucts that emerge . from tbe orders of the Tribunal are (1)
thait under the trust deed, the settlor intended that after the settlor's D
death, the assesee should be the sole beneficiary of the net income
from the trust fund during his -Oa!!sessee's) life-time (2) that the
assessee had been treating himrelf, as tbe owneJ.1 of tbe trust fund
for purposes of income-tax payable by him and had been declaring
the income of the trust as his own income and claiming in his own
income-tax returns deduction for tax paid at source by the trust; E
(3) tibat in fact the assessee was tll.e sole beneficiary of the net
income derived from trust fund; (4) that he ]]ad under, the trust
deed the right of appointment of his successors Ulllder certain. circums-
tances and (5) that the tnistees bad the power to invest the
proceeds of the Government loan bonds or securities which consti-
tuted the trust fund upon their redemption as provided in the deed F
and that therefore the net income realisable from the trust fund was
·subject to variation. One of the significant features of the trust
deed, dated October 26, 1937 is that what was payable to tibe
assessee wa,s not a periodical payment of a definite predetermined
sum of money but only the net income of the trust funds, although
it was possible to predicate at any given point o~ time such income G
with some c.er1tainty having regard to the faat that the trust fund
in the instant ca.se consisted of Government loan bonds or securities',
the proceeds of which on redemption were liable to be invested illl
other securities as indicated in the trusit deed, dated October 26, 1937.
The principal reason given by the High Court to arrive at the H
conclusion that the property in question was ah annuity is set out
in its judgment thus:
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 1 S.C.R.

A "In the case before us the property settled under the trust
deed 'consists of Government securities, and it is apparen:t
from the schedule appended to the deed thait they bear interest
at a fixed and determined rates. The settlor conferred upon
the trustee the power to redeem the government securities and
to invest the proceeds in the purchase of 3}% Govemmen:t
B promissory notes (old issue) or in any other securities of the
Government of India, or that if that was not practicable then
in any other securities authorised for the investment of the
trust fund by the Indian Trusts Act. There is nothing on the
record before us to show that the original securities comprising
the trust property were converted or replaced by securities not
c bearing a fixed rate of interest and returning a fixed and
definite income. Prooeed.1!1'.g, therefore, on the basis that a
definite and certain income is yielded by the securities, we have
no hesitation in holding that what the assessee received was an
amount which did not depend upvn or was related to the
D gener!al income of the estate i:n the sense that it fluctuated
with a fluctuating income. Having regard to the character and
nature of the property settled under the trust, no question arises
of a rise or fall in the amount of income produced by the trust
' property and, therefore, in a real sense what the a1ssessee is
ero,ititled to is a definite and certain sum. Also, having regard
E to the terms of the trust deed it is not possible to say that the
interest of the assessee constitutes an interest iin the capital of
the trust fund. Therefore, upon the test laid down by Jenkins
L. J. in Duke of Norfolk : In re : Public Trustee v. · Inland
Revenue Commissioner (1950) I Ch. 467, it cannot be '1described
as a Jrne interest. We are fortified in the view we are taking
F by the decision. on somewhat comparable faces. of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Nawab
Fareed Nawaz lung & Ors., (1970) 77 I.T.R. 180.
It is true that the as1sessee is entitled to the net income
only and that because the trustee has the right to deduct from
G the gross income its remuneration, its a111nual income fee and
the expenses i'n managing the trust estate, the net income may
vary from year to year. Yet even hiere the remuneration aind
the annual income fee can be charged by the trustee at a fixed
rate only, and any varnation in uhe net income may be attributed
to the varying expenses from year to year in managing the trust
H estate. We have already poilllted out that freedom from varia-
tion is not an absolute test determining the character of an
annuity. We are of opi!nion that wherfe it varies merely because
c. w. T. v. i>. K. BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 665

of the charges and expenses payable on account of the adminis- A
tration of the trust it does not lose i~s character as an !!Jn:nuity.
Upon the aforesaid consideration, it seems to us that the
j ..
right of the aissessee to the net income from the trust property
under the trust deed ca:n be described in law as a right to an
annuity." B
The High Court appears to have felt that the facts of the case
were distinguishable from the facts in Ahmed G. H. Arif] & Ors. v.
,Commissioner of Wealth-;tax Calcutta( 1) and the facts in Commis-
sioiner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat II v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishna(2).
-we shall presently deal with these two cases.
c
The word 'a:nnuity' is not defined in the Act. In one of the
e.arliest legal compilations of the English law, the term 'annuity'
has been explained as a:n yearly payment of a certain sum of money
: granted to another in fee or for lit1e or forl a term of years either
payable under a personal obligation of the grantor or charged upon
his pure personality, although it may be made a charge upon his, D
freehold or leasehold lend in which latlter case it is commonly called
·a rent-charge (See Co. Litt 144b). lin Halsbury's Laws of England,
·Third Edition (Vol. 32, page 534 para 899), the meaning of the
said expression is given1 as a certain sum of money payable yearly
either as a personal obligMion of the grantor or out of property not
·consisting exclusively of land; it differs from a rent-charge in that E
: a rent-charge issues out of land. In Bignold v. Giles.(3) 'annuity'
. iS described thus:
,,
"An annuity ·is· a right to receive de anno in· annum a
certain ,sum; that may be given for life, or for a series of years
it may be given during any particular period, or ~n pef!petuity; F
and there is also this singularity about annuities, that although
payable out of the personal assets, they are capable of being
given for the purpose of devolution, as real estate<; they may
be given to a man and his heirs, a:nd may go to the heir as
real estate; so an annuity may be given ~o a ma:n and the heirs
of his body; that does not, it is true, constitute. an esta.te tail, G
but thart: is by reason of the Statute De Donis, which contains
only the word 'tenements' and an annuity, though a heredita-
ment, is not a tenement; and an annuity so given is• a base
fee."
{I) [19701 76 I.T.R. 471. H
(2) [1968] 70 I.T.R. 203.
(3) (1859) 4 Drew 345; 113 Revised Reports 390.
666 SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R..

A It is further observed in the above deci;sion thus:
"But this appears to me at least clear, that if the gift of·
what is called an annuity is so made, that, on the face of the·
will itself, the testator shows hls intention to give a certain
portion of the dividends of a fund, that i1s a very different thing;
B and most of ihe cases proceed on that footing. The ground
is, that the court construes the intention of the testator to be,.
not merely to give an annuity, but to give an. aliquot portion
of the income arising from a certain capital fund".

The three illustrations given under section 173 of the Indian·
c Succession. Act, 1925 dealing with bequests Otf annuities also refler·
to the payment of certain definite sums periodically and they do·
not refer to periodical payments of income arising out of any trust
fund.

It is against this background ~hat this. Court proC(leded to
D decide the case of Ahmed G. H. Arifj (supra). In that case, the Court:
was called upon to determ±ne whether the benefits conferred on the
appellants under a deed creating a waldl-alal-aulad were annuities.
or not The relevant part of the deed, which declared that the
ultimate benefit in the case of complete intestacy of the descendants.
of the settler was reserved for poor Musalmans of Sunni community·
E deserving help, read thus:
"AJiter payment of all necessary outgoings such as establish--
ment charges, collections charges, revenue taxes, costs of repairs,.
law charges and other expenses for the upkeep and management
of the said wakf property, the mutawalli or mutawallis shall
apply the net income of the said wakf property as follows, viz.:
F
(a) in payment to me during the term of my life of·
one-fifth of the said net income by monthly instalments;
(b) in payment to each of my sons during the respec-- _
live terms of their live.s one-sixth of the said net income
by monthly instalments;
G
(c) in payment to my wife, Aisha Bibi, during the·
term of her life one-tenth of the said net income by monthly·
instalments.
The moneys payable as aforesaid to such of my sons as
are minors shall until they attain the age of majority be·
H respectively invested (!after defraying the expenses of their main--
tenance and education) · in proper securities or in landed
property in Calcutta and such securities or property shall be·
I

c. w. T. v. P. K. BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 6 67

made over to the said sons on their respectively attaining the A
age of majority."
This Court held that the .right of the beneficiary to receive an
aliquot share of the oot income of the properties was an asset
covered by the definition of section 2(e) of the Aat and not a mere
'annuity' and affirmed the decision of the Calcutta High Court in B
Ahmed G. H. Arifj v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax Calcutta.( 1)

l'
~'
In the ca1se of Mrs. Arw1dhati Balkrishna (supra) to which one
of us was a party, under two trusts created by the father of the
assessee and one trust created by her mother-illl-law, she was to be
paid annually the net income of each of the trusts after deducting c
costs· and expeaJ1>es or administration of the trust. Under the terms
of the trusts, after the life time -of the assessee, the corpus of the
trust in each case had to be dealt with as proviaed in them. Since
the assessee wais entitled to the whole residue of the income from
the trust funds available aliter de.fraying expenses of the trust and
not any specified or pre-determined amount, the High Court of D
Gujarat held that the right of the assessee under each of the trust
deeds was not an annuity but only amounted to a life interest. The
decision of the High Court of Gujarat was later affirmed by this
Court ·in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat v. Arundliati
Balkrishna(2) in which it was observed thus :
E
"On an analysis of the relevant clauses in the three trust
deeds, it is clear the assessee was given thereunder a share of
the income arising from the funds settled. on trust. Under
those deeds she is not entitled to any fixed sum of money.
Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the payments that she
is entitled to receive under those deeds are annuiities. She has F
undoubtedly a life interest in those funds. In Ahmed G. H.
Arif] v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (1966) 59 I.T.R. 230 (Cal.),
a Divisim Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the
right of a person to receive . under a wakf · an aliquot share of
the net income of the wakf property is an "asset" withiin the
meaning of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, and the capital value of G
such a right is assessable to wealth-tax. Therein, the Court
repelled the contention that the right in question was an
"annuity". This decision was approved by this Court in Ahmed
G. H. Arifj v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (1970) 76 I.T.R.
471 (S.C.) Civil Appeals Nos. 2129-2132 of 1968 decided on
H
(1) (1966) 59 I.T.R. 230.
(2) (1970) 77 I.T.R. 505.
66 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A August 20, 1969) and the same is bil!lding on us. A similar
view was taken by another Bench of the Calcutta High Court
in Commissioner of Wealth-tax v. Mrs. Dorothy Martin (l.968)
· 69 I.T.R. 586 (Cal.). Jin, that case under the will of the assessee's
father the assessee was entitled to receive for her life the
annual interest accruing upon her share in the residuary trust
B fund. The Wealth-tax Officer included the entire value of the
said share in the assessable wealth of the assessee and subjected
the same to tax under section 16 (3) of the Wealth-tax, 1957.
That order was confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commis-
sioner but the Tribunal in appeal excluded the same in the
computa,tion of the net wealth of the assessee. On a reference
c made to the High Court, it was held that, on a construction
of the various clauses in the will, the assessee was entitled to
an aliquot share iin, the general income of the residuary trust
fund and not a fixed sum payable per:iodically as "annuity"
and, therefore, the value of her share was an asset to be included
D in computing his net wealth. These decisioos in our view
correcily lay down the legal position. In this view, it is not
necessary to consider wheth,er the income receilvable by the
assessee under those deeds, either wholly or in part, is capable
of being commuted into a lump sum grant.
For the reasons mentioned above, we agree with the High
E Court that payments to be made to the assessee under the three•
trust deeds cannot be considered as annuities, and, hence, she is
not entitled to the benefits of section 2 (e) (iv)."
It is, however, contended on behalf of the assessee in this case
that since the trust fund consisted of Governmern.t securities which
F were yielding definite annual income by way of ilntereist and there
was no evidence of the said securities having been converted into
other securiti~s yielding higher or lower income, it should be assumed
that the benefit confe1Ted On the assesee was only an 'annuity' and
not a life interest. Thi1s com.tention has to be rejected for the very
reason for which a ;similar contention was rejected by this Court in
G Commissio.ner of Wealth-tax, Rajasthan v. Her Highness Maharani
Gayatri Devi of Jaipur(') in the following words:
"From these clauses it is clear that the intootion of the
Maharaja was that the assessee should get a half share in the
income of the trust fund. Neither the trust fund was fixed
H nor the amount payable to the assessee was fixed. The only
thing certain i~ that she is entitled to a, 15 /30 share from out
(1) (1971) 82 I.T.R. 699.
c. w; T. v. P. K.' BANERJEE (Venkataramiah, J.) 66 9

of the income oil the trust fund. That being so, it is evident A
that what she was entitled to was not an annuity but an aliquot
share in the income of the trust fund.
Mr. Setalvad, learned counsel for the aissessee, co•ntended
• the year with which we are conoerned, there was
that during
no change in the trust fund and in view of that fact and as we
are considering the liability to pay wealth-tax, we would be
justified in holding that the amount receivable by the assessee
in 1the year concerned was an annuity. We see no force in
this contenti'on. The. question whether a particular income is
an annuity. or not does not depend on the amount received in
a particular year. What we have to see is what exactly WlllS . c
the intention of the Maharaja in creating the trust. Did he
intend to give the assessee. a pre-determined sum every year or '
did he intend ·to give her an aJrquot share in the income of a
_ fund? On that question, there can be only one answer and
that is that he intended to give her an aliquot share in the
in.come of the tmst fund. An income cannot be annuity in
one year and an aliquot share in another year. It cannot
change its character year after year. From the facts found,
it is clear that the assessee has life interest hi the trust fund."
I

Tt;e decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in, Commis-
E.
sioner of Wealth-tax, A. P. v. Nawab Fareed Nawaz Jung & Ors.( 1)
on which the High Court has relied in this caise to the extent it
takes a con~rary view must be held to be incorrect.

We may now to considen the decision iin In re Duke of Norfolk:
Public Trustee v. lnla'llld Revenue Commissioner( 2) on which the
High Court relied heavily in arriving at its conclusion. The point F
which arose for consideration in the above case was whether, where
one continuing atll!nuity for two or more lives was given to two or
more persons in succession and charged on property, on the death of
any annuitant, other than the last to die, estate duly was payable under
section 1 of the Finance Act, 1894 oo the footing that it was the G
annuity whkh passed on the annuitant's death. The esf\ite duty
authorities claimed estate duty on the death of an annuitant, who
was not the last of the annuitants to die on the slice of the capital
required to produce the annuity, on the footing that as annuitant,
the deceased had an interest on the capital charged with the annuity
and that cesser of that interest gave rise to a benefit taxable under
(1) (1970) 77 I.T.R. 180.
(2) (1950) Ch. 467.
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 1 S.C.R.

A section 2(1Xb) of the Finance Act, 1894. The Public Trustee, in
whom the estate vested, claimed that estate duty became payable
on the value of a cootinuililg annuity for the life of the annuitant
who succeeded to the annuity on the death of the deceased annit-
ant. Jenkins L.J. in the course of his judgment in the above case
explaililed the difference between an annuity and a life interest thus:
B
"An annuity charged on property is not, nor is it in any
way equivalent to, an interest in a proportion of the capital of
the property chaI1ged sufficient to produce its yearly amount.
It is nothing more or less than a right to receive the stipulated
yearly sum out of the income of the Whole of the property
c charged (and in many cases out of the capital in the event of
a deficiency of income). It confers no interest in any parti-
cular part of the property charged, but simply a security
extending over the whole. The annuitant is entitled to receive
no less and no more than the stipulated sum. He neither gains
by a rise nor loses by a fall in the amount of income produced
D by the property, except in so far as there may be a deficiency
of income in a case in which recourse to capital is excluded.
On the o1her' hand, a life initerest in a share of the income
of property is equivalent to and indeed constitutes, a life
interest in the share of the capital corresponding to the share
of income. The life tenant enjoys the share of income whatever
1

it may amount to, and his interest, viewed as a· 1ilfe interest in
capital, consists of a constllillJt proportion of the whole property,
whether the income is great or small, and whether ~he capital
value of the property rises or falls. The property which
changes hands on his death (or in other words passed under s. 1)
.F thus clearly consists of the designated share of capital, which
then passes from his beneficial enjoyment to that of another,
an annuity cannot be so related to any fixed proportion of capital :
See De Trafford v. Attorney-General (1935) A. C. 280."
Evershed M. R. who delivered a separate judgment agreed with
the observation and stated thus:
G
"Jin the case of one who has enjoyed for his life (say) one-
fourth of the income of an estate, it seems to me in accordance
with common sense and a natural use of language to say that
he enjoyed for his life, that he was life tenant of, a fourth part
of the (corpus of the) estate; and, accordingly, that upon his
H death a fourth part of the estate passed to the next successor.
But no such language can, in my judgment, appropriately be
used in the case o~ an annuitant. He is in no way concc:rne<i
c. w. T. v. P. K. BANERJEE (Venkaiaramiah, J.) 6 71

with changes in the yield of the estate; his right to his annuity
will continue whatever income the estate may produce or A
(unless he has a right to look income oniy) though the
estate produce no income at all."
The learned Master of the Rolls distinguished the cases of
:Jn re Northcli'ffe( 1) and Christie v. Lord Advoeate(F) from the case
lJefore him thus:
B
"Both the two last-mentioned cases were instances of dis-
positions of aliquot shares of tlhe general income of an estate
to be enjoyed in succession, as distinct from an annuity or yearly
sum, which, even though variable (as Io. the case of In re
Cassel (1927) 2 Ch. 275) is in no way dependent upon or related
to the general income of the estate." c
Accordingly the contention of the Crown was rejected. On
:going through the above decision carefully, we do not find any
·support for the contention _urged on behalf of the asses'See in the
present case. The decision is quite clear on the point that when
1he payment is dependent upon the income of the corpus, it cannot D
be called an annuity and that an annuity even though it may be
-variable as in the case of In re Cassel(3) can in no way be depen-
dent upon or related to the general income of the estate. The High
·Court was, therefore in error in relying upon the decision in Duke
.of Norfolk: In re. Public· TrYStee (supra) for holding that notwith-
standing the existence of the possibility of variatibn in the payment E
to be made in the above case to the· assessee depending upon the
income of the fresh securities to be acquired by the trustee on the
redemption of any o1l the se.curities transferred at the time of the
·execution of the trust deed, the payment would amount· to an
annuity.·
F
On a ci:>ttsideration of the deci'sions cited before us, we feel that
in order •to constitute an annuity, the payment to be made periodi-
·cally should be a fixed or pre-determined one, and it should not be ·
liable to any variation depending upon or on any ground relating
to the general income of the fund or estate which is charged for
such payment. In the instant case, as observed in the case of Her G
Highness Maharani Gayatri Devi of Jaipur (supra) what we have to
see is the intention of 1lhe settlor, whether he wanted that the a•ssessee
should get a pre-determined sum every year or whether the assessee
(1) [1929] 1 Cr. 327.
(2) [1936] A.C. 569. H
(3) [1927] 2 Ch. 275.
[1981] 1 S.C~R~
672
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
- ... '-·.
,-- ::.

A should get the whole net i;:icome of the trust fund. Since the, inten-
tion of the settlor was indisputat'y the latter one, the right of the
assessee cannot be treated as an annuity. An additional factor
which requires us to take the same view is that under the trust deed
the trustees had been given the power to reinvest the proceeds of
the Government secmities which leads to the possibility ·of variation
B of the income and consequently of the amount to be received by the
assessee. The fact that no such reinvestment had taken place
during the relevant years is immaterial.
In view of the foregoing, the appeals are allowed, the judgment
of the High Court is set aside and the question referred to the High
Court under section 27(1) of the Act is answered in the negative and
c against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, the assessee \
shall pay the costs of tile Department. (Hearing fee one set).
Appeal allowed. ,

V.D.K'.
!
."'· '
;

•

'

GIPN-Sec. ~47 S. CJ?;.iia/80-S-5-81~2500.
•• t

\
-' ~ ' ...