Holding

Hatchery operations are neither industrial undertakings nor do they involve the manufacture or production of "articles or things" within the meaning of s.32A and s.80J, so the assessees are not entitled to investment allowance or the specified deductions.

Summary

The assessees operated large‑scale poultry hatcheries and claimed that they were industrial undertakings engaged in the manufacture or production of "articles or things" and therefore eligible for investment allowance under s.32A and deductions under ss.80HH, 80HHA, 80I and 80J of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Revenue argued that hatching chicks is a natural biological process and that hatcheries are not industrial undertakings. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, the legislative history of the Act, and the meaning of "articles or things" in different provisions, concluding that the words in ss.32A and 80J cannot be given the same meaning as in the Fifth Schedule. It held that the assessees merely facilitate a natural process and do not produce articles or things, nor are they industrial undertakings. Consequently, the assessees are not entitled to the claimed tax benefits. The Court set aside the Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Court judgments and allowed the Revenue’s appeal.

Issues considered

The business of hatchery – does it fall within the meaning of "manufacture or produce articles or things" under s.32A(2) and s.80J of the Income Tax Act?
Are hatcheries to be classified as "industrial undertakings" for the purposes of the said provisions?
Whether the expression "articles or things" in ss.32A and 80J should be interpreted in the same way as in the Fifth Schedule of the Act.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Act, 1961s. 10(27), s. 14(D), s. 2(45), s. 29, s. 32A, s. 33(1)(b), s. 5, s. 80HH, s. 80HHA, s. 80I, s. 80J, s. 80JJ

Subjects

industrial undertakinginvestment allowancesection 32Asection 80Jinterpretation of statuteshatcheryarticles or thingsincome taxlegislative intent

Judgment

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BANGALORE A
v.
VENKATESWARA HATCHERIES (P) LTD. ETC. ETC.

MARCH 24, 1999

(S.P. BHARUCHA, V.N. KHARE AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B

Income Tax Act 1961, Ss. 32 A and 80 J-Whether the business of
hatchery comes within the meaning of the expression ''manufacture or
produce articles or things '' in Ss. 32 A (2) and 80 J and consequently are
the assessees entitled to investment allowance and deductions-Held, no C
Interpretation of Statutes-Whether words articles or things should receive
same interpretation as when occurring in Fifth Schedule of Act-Held, no;
'Same words, if read in context of one provision may convey one meaning
and another in a different context.
D
• The assessees run hatcheries where eggs are hatched on large scale
by adopting latest scientific methods. In connection with their income tax
assessments, they claimed that they were industrial undertakings engaged
in the business of producing articles or things and therefore entitled to
investment allowance under S. 32A and deductions under Ss. 80 HH, 80
HHA, 80 I and 80 J of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ('Act'). E
-- The Bombay High Court following the decision in Commissioner of
Income Tax v. Deejay Hatcheries, 211 ITR 652 negatived their contention.
However, the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, following the
decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Venkateswara Hatcheries (P)
ltd., 174 ITR 231, upheld it. The Revenue then appealed to this Court. F
The Revenue contended that even if chicks were to be construed to be
articles or things, they were produced as a natural process of development
of eggs and the assessees could not be said to be producing them. It was
further contended that the assessees were not industrial undertakings.
G
Allowing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The assessees were neither industrial undertakings nor
did the business of hatchery carried on by them fell within the meaning of
'manufacture or produce articles or things' in Ss. 32A and 80 JJ of the Act.
The assessees were not entitled to investment allowance under s. 32A and H
177
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A deductions under Ss. 80 HH, 80 HHA, 80 I and 80 J of the Act.
(186-G; 188-G]

· ·1.2. What the assessee was doing was to help the natural or biological
process of giving birth to chicks. The chicks which otherwise could also be
'
B
produced by conventional or natural ~ethod and in that process also, same
time was taken when the chicks came out from the eggs. What the assessee '
by application of mechanical process did in the hatchery was to preserve and
protect the eggs at a particular temperature. But the coming out of chicks
from the eggs was an event of nature. The only difference seems to be that,
the application of mechanical methods, the mortality rate of chicks was less I
C and the assessee might get chicks more in number. This, however, would not ~

mean that the assessee produced chicks and that chicks were 'articles or
things'. (186-E-F)
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Deejay Hatcheries, 211 ITR 652,
approved.
D Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sri Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd.,
174 ITR 231, overruled.
•
The Incubation Book by Dr. A.F. Anderson Brown, Poulrty Hatcheries
Business by Dr. A.L. Bhagawat, Poulrty Science and Production by Robert
E. Moreng and Poulrty keeping in India by P.M.N. Naidu, referred to.
E [186-A]

2.1. The meaning assigned to word's 'articles or things' in the Fifth
Schedule could not be assigned to the words 'articles or things' used in Ss.
32A and 80J of the Act. The same word, if read in the context of one
provision of the Act, might mean or convey one meaning and another in a
F different context. The Legislature in its wisdom had chosen to place processed
seeds and fish under the heading articles or things in the Fifth Schedule
I
since it was competent to give artificial meaning to any word. [188-C] I
I
Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, [1956]
SCR 644, referred to.
G 2.2. If the expression in.dustrial undertaking for purpose of business
of manufacture or production of an article or thing was read in the context
of the provisions of the Act and with regard to legislative history of the
provisions of the act, it was clear that those who were engaged in the
business of hatcheries were neither industrial undertakings nor engaged in
H the business of producing aricles or things. [188-G]
C.l.T. v. VENKATESWARAHATCHERIES (P) LTD. [V.N. KHARE, J.] 179

CIVIL APPELLATE WRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No 5066of1996 A
Etc. Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.4.94 of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court in l.T.C. No. 1of1994.

Dr. V. Gauri Shanlrnr, R.F. Nariman, Anoop C. Chaudhury, B. Sen, Sohrab B
E. Dastur, S. Rajappa, Ms. Renu George, Nagpal, B.K. Prasad, R.B.
Hathikhanawala, Prakash Srivastava, S. Ganesh, P.J. Pardivala, Mrs. Janaki
Rarnachandran, Y. Raja Gopla Rao, Sakesh Kumar and S.K. Agnihotri for the
appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
V. N. KHARE, J. Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

In this group of civil appeals and special leave petitions the main
question that arises for consideration is whether the business of hatchery run
by the assessee comes within the meaning of the exrression "manufacture or
produce articles or things" occurring in Section 32A(2) and Section 880 J of D
the Income Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The further question
to be decided is whether the assessee is an 'industrial undertaking'. The
appeals excepting Civil Appeal No.2596 of 1997 are directed against the
judgments of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Courts whereby the two
High Courts following the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income- E
tax v. Sri Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd, 174 I.T.R. 231 rejected the
applications -of the Revenue filed under Section 256(2) Act holding that the
business of hatchery comes within the meaning of the expression 'an industrial
undertaking producing articles or things' and in one case answered the
questions in favour of assessee. Whereas in Civil Appeal No.2596191, the
Bombay High Court has rejected the application of the assessee under Section F
256(2) of the Act following the decision in the case of Commissioner' of
Income-Tax v. Deejay Hatcheries, 2111.T.R. 652 wherein it was held that the
business of hatchery cannot be termed as an industrial undertaking producing
articles or things. That is how both sets of appeals are before us. ·
G
Respondents in these civil appeals and the appellant in civil appeal
No.2596/97 (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) have poultry farms and
- .... they run hatcheries where eggs are hatched on large scale by adopting latest
scientific and technological methods. The aforesaid questions arose when the
assessees in connection with their income tax assessments for the relevant
years claimed that since they are industrial undertakings engaged in the H
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) 2 S.C.R.

A business of producing articles or things, they are entitled to investment
allowance under Section 32A ~d deductions under Sections 80 HH, 80 HHA,
80 I and 80 J of the Act.

The first contention on behalf of the Revenue is that chicks, being
animate creatures, cannot be termed as articles· or things within the meaning
B of Section 32A (2(b))(ii) or Section 80J(4)(iii) of the Act. The second contention
is that even if a chick could be construed as an article or thing it cannot be
said that the assessee is producing chicks, that being a natural process of
the development of the eggs. The third contention is that if the dictionary
meaning of the word 'articles or things' conveys different meanings, in that
C event the said words have to be interpreted in the context of the provisions
of the Act, and regard must also be had to the legislative history of the
provisions of the Act and the. scheme of the Act and the fourth submission
is that the assessee is not an industrial undertaking.

Since the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the Revenue are
D overlapping we, therefore, propose to deal them together.
The learned counsel appearing for the assessee on the other hand
maintained that hatching of eggs comes within the meaning of the expression
production of an article or thing. He contended that the word 'produce' is of
wider import and for that purpose he referred to various dictionary meanings
E of the word 'produce'.

In Webster's New International Dictionary the word 'produce' means
something that is brought forth either naturally or as a result of effort and
work; a result produced.

F In Black's Law Dictionary the meaning of the word 'produce' is "to
bring forward; to show or exhibit; to bring into view or notice; to bring to
surface".

A reading of aforesaid dictionary meanings of the word produce does
G indicate that if a living creature is brought forth it can be said that it is
produced. However, dictionary gives more than one meaning of the word
'produce'. Neither the word 'produce' nor the word 'article' has been defined
in the Act. When the word is not so defined in the Act it may be permissible
to refer to dictionary to find out the meaning of that word as it is understood
in the common parlance. But where the dictionary gives divergent or more
H than one meaning of a word, in that case it is not safe to construe the said
C.I.T. v. VENKATESWARAHATCHERIES (P) LTD. [V.N. KHARE,J.] 181
word according to the suggested dictionary meaning of that word. In such A
a situation the word has to be construed in the context of the provisions of
the Act and regard must also be had to the legislative history of the provisions
of the Act and the scheme of the Act. It is settled principle of interpretation
that the meaning of the words, occurring in the provisions of the Act must
take their colour from the context in which they are so used. In other words, B
for arriving at the true meaning of a word, the said word should not be
detached from the context. Thus, when the word read in the context conveys
a meaning, that meaning would be the appropriate meaning of that word and
in that case we need not rely upon the dictionary meaning of that word.

Viewed in this light what we find is that Section 10(27) of the Act was C
inserted in the Act through the Finance Act, 1964. The purpose of enacting
Section 10(27) was to provide incentive to poultry farming, which includes the
business of hatchery, by way of giving exemption from income tax on income
from such business. Initially, the said exemption was given for the years 1965,
1966 and 1967 and was in the following terms :
D
"any income derived from a business of livestock breeding or poultry
or dairy farming which is assessable for the assessment years
commencing on the 1st day of April 1965, 1966 and 1967".

In the year 1967, through the Finance Act No.2, the words beginning
from word 'which to 1967' were omitted. Thus exemption from income-tax wa'> E
allowed beyond the year 1967. In the year 1975, it was felt that the exemption
from income-tax on income from poultry business is capable of being abused
by unscrupulous people by showing income which would otherwise be
chargeable to tax, as exempt income. It was in this background that the
mischief was sought to be remedied by omitting Section 10(27) of the Act and
re-enacting Section 80JJ providing restricted exemption to thirty three and on F
one third percent of gross total income from livestock breeding, poultry and
dairy farming. This is also evident from the Budget Speech of the then
Finance Minister in the Parliament which runs as under :

"At present income from livestock breeding and poultry and dairy
farming is exempt from Income tax. This exemption is prone to abuse G
by showing income which would otherwise be chargeable to tax as
0
exempt income. I accordingly propose to restrict the exemption to Rs.
I 0,000 in a year".

Consequently, Section 10 (27) of the Act was omitted by the Finance
Act 1975 with effect from lst April, 1976 and Section 88 JJ was brought into H
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 2 S.C.R.

A the Act with effect from the date of omission of Section 10 (27) of the Act.
Section 80JJ as re-enacted read as thus :

"80JJ. Where the gross total income of an assessee includes any
profits and gains derived from a business of livestock breeding, or
poultry or dairy farming, there shall be allowed, in computing the
B total income of the assessee, a deduction as specified hereunder,
namely:-

(a) in a case where the amount of such profits and gains does not
exceed, in the aggregate, ten thousand rupees, the whole of such
amount; and
c (b) in any other case, one-third of the aggregate amount of such
profits and gains or ten thousand rupees, whichever is higher".

The Finance Act 1976 inserted Section 32A with effect from 1st April,
\ 1976 in replacement of development rebate. Section 32A provided investment
D allowance where an industrial undertaking has instailed new machinery or
plant after March 31, 1976 for the purpose of business of manufacture or
production of any article or thing. Relevant portion of Section 32A runs
thus :

"32A.(l) In respect of a ship or an aircraft or machinery or plant
E specified in sub-section (2), which is owned by the assessee and is
wholly used for the purposes of the business carried on by him,
there shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this
section, be allowed a deduction, in respect of the previous year in
which the ship or aircraft was acquired or the machinery or plant was
installed or, if the ship, aircraft, machinery or plant is first put to use
F in the immediately succeeding previous year, then, in respect of that
previous year, of a sum by way of investment allowance equal to
twenty-five per cent of the actual cost of the ship, aircraft, machinery
or plant to the assessee.
(iii) in a small-scale industrial undertaking for the purposes of
G business of manufacture or production of any other articles or things".

Relevant portion of Section 80 J runs as under : •
"( 1) Where the gross total income of an assessee includes any profits
and gains derived from an industrial undertaking or a ship or the
H business of a hotel, to which this section applies, there shall, in
C.l.T. v. VENKATESWARAHATCHERIES(P)LTD. [V.N.KHARE,J.] 1.83
accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be A
allowed, in computing the total income of the assessee, a deduction
from such profits and gains (reduced by the deduction, if any,
admissible to the assessee under section 80 HH of so much of the
amount thereof as does not exceed the amount calculated at the rate
of six per cent. per annum on the capital employed in the industrial B
undertaking or ship or business of the hotel, as the case may be,
computed in the prescribed manner in respect of the previous year
relevant to the assessment year (the amount calculated as aforesaid
being hereafter, in this section, referred to as the relevant amount of
capital employed during the previous year).

4(iii) it manufactures or produces articles, or operates one or more
c
cold storage piant or plants, in any part of India, and has begun or
begins to manufacture or produce articles or to operate such plant
or plants, at any time within the period of thirty-three years next
following the 1st day of April, 1948, or such further period as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, D
specify with reference to any particular industrial undertaking".

As noticed earlier, the omission of Section 2(27) and re- enactment of
Section 80 JJ was done simultaneously. It is a very well recognized rule of
interpretation of statutes that where a provision of an Act is omitted by an
Act and the said Act simultaneously re-enacts a new provision which E
substantially covers the field occupied by the repealed provision with certain
modification, in that event such re-enactment is regarded having force
continuously and the modification or changes are treated as amendment
coming into force with effect from the date of enforcement of re-enacted
provision. Viewed in this background, the effect of re-enacted provision of F
Section 80 JJ was that profit from the business of livestock and poultry which
enjoyed total exemption under section 10(27) of the Act from assessment
years 1964-65 to 1975-76 became partially exempt by way of deduction on
fulfilment of certain conditions.

This matter may be examined from another angle. As noticed earlier, G

,
Section I 0(27) specifically excluded poultry income from being included in
total income. The meaning of total income in Section 2(45) of the Income Tax
Act is as follows :

" 'Total income' means the total amount of income referred to in
section 5, computed in the manner laid down in this Act". H
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A Section 14(D) of the Income Tax Act deals w~h one part of the total ,
income, namely, profit and gains of business. Section 29 of the Income T.lX
deals with deductions from the profit and gains. Section 32A is one of the
sections dealing with such deductions. Therefore, the income from poultry
being outside the scope of total income by virtue of omitted-Section 10(27)
B of the Act, there was no question for application of Sections 32A and 80J
to them at least when we find that Section 80JJ was consciously
simultaneously re-enacted on the omission of Section I 0(27) of the Act
specially for those who were engaged in the business of poultry. If omitted
Section I 0(27) and Sections 32A, 80J and 80JJ are read together along with
the legislative history it is evident that the provision giving benefit to those
C who were engaged in running poultry farming was separate and distinct from
the provisions which provided incentive to industrial undertakings engaged
in the business of manufacturing or producing articles. Thus, if the expression
industrial undertaking for purpose of business of manufacture or production
of an article or thing is read in the context of the provisions of the Act and
D with regard to legislative history of the provisions of the Act, it is abundantly
clear that those who are engaged in the business ofhatcheries are neither
industrial undertakings nor engaged in the business of producing articles or
things.

It was then urged that the assessee has been running a business where
E eggs are hatched on large scale by adopting the latest scientific technological
methods. Learned counsel for the assesse~ referred to the various steps taken
by the assessee in producing chicks, as noticed in the judgment of the
Tribunal on the basis of written note submitted by the assessee, which runs
as under :-

F '(I) The farm and hatchery are kept strictly under quarantine.

(2) The eggs are collected from the breeding farm frequently and
hygienically. Then they are transported to the hatchery. Before
admitting the eggs into the hatchery they pass through the fumigation
chamber. Once the eggs are fumigated they become free from most of
G the micro organisms which are pathogenic and present on the surface
of the egg shell.

(3) Storage of eggs is a must because we cannot incubate and get a
hatch every day due to .economical reasons. The technique of storing
eggs without affecting the hatchability has been evolved after many
H experiments. A cold room having 60-65 degrees fahrenheit temperature
C.I.T. v. VENKATESWARA HATCHERIES (P)LTD. [V.N. KHARE,J.] 185

and 75 per cent humidity is considered ideal for optimum results, if A
your storage does not exceed a couple of weeks. Once we store the
eggs in the above temperature, 60-65 degree fahrenheit, we just cannot
take out and load them in the incubation immediately. We take out the
eggs 12 to 18 hours before the loading time.

(4) The incubation period of the eggs is 21 days. Even by the natural B
process it takes the same time, but there are certain research works
which show that the incubation period of broilers, particularly, can
be reduced to 18 days. Not only in India, but even in other parts of
the world, the complicated technology for reducing the incubation
period is not economical and viable. Hence, we follow the same 21 C
days incubation period. The incubation period can be divided into
two stages : (a) First 18 days, and (b) last 3 days.

For the first 18 days, the eggs are incubated in a large scale in
_automatic machines where the temperature, humidity and changing of
position of the egg every hour is done automatically. After completion D
of 18 days the same eggs are transferred to another machine in which,_
except turning, the rest are the same like the above machine. On
completion of 21 days, the chicks will be out from the eggs.

(5) Once the chicks are out the male and female are separated. This E
process is called sexing. Two methods are in existence. One is the
Japanese event method and the second is by a machine. In both the
methods accuracy remains almost the·same. In case of machine sexing,
the chick mortality will be about 2 per cent whereas in the Japanese
method this mortality does not occur. Once the sexed females (in case
of layers) have been vaccinated against various diseases they are F
sent to the farmers.

(6) It is also stated that in modem hatchery operations there is a
pooling of the following factors: (I) Capital, (2) Labour, (3) Power, (4)
Plant and machinery, (5) Artificial hatching, (6) Research, (7) G
Technology, (8) Large-scale production, (9) Prevention of diseases,
(l 0) Quality of chicks : (a) Protection against diseases - less mortality,

, (b) Chicks - better yield, larger number of eggs, size of eggs, (c) Less
feed consumption.'

Learned counsel for the assessee also referred to various passages from H
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R.

A several books, i.e., The Incubation Book by Dr. A.F. Anderson Brown, Poultry
Hatcheries business by Dr. A.L. Bhagwat, Poultry Science and Productbn by
Robert E. Moreng and Poultry Keeping in India by P. M. N. Naidu and on the .
strength of those passages it was emphasized that chickens are produced by
mechanical process and, therefore, the assessee is producing articles or
B things. It was also urged that better and larger number of eggs and chickens
are not possible by conventi6nal method, namely, through broody hens. It
was stated that under natural conditions the broody hen produces about 6
to 8 eggs, then stops laying, sits on the eggs, incubates them for 3 weeks
and hatches the chicks by natural methods. She then takes care of the young
chicks for 2 to 3 weeks, till they are able to pick up independently. This
C conventional method produces only 68 to 80 eggs in a year, whereas by
employing modem scientific methods assessee produces about 280 eggs in
a year and is capable of producing 220 to 230 chicks in a year through artificial
incubation. For the larger growth of eggs and chicks, it is necessary that
incubation has to be mechanical as the broody hens are now virtually
D unobtainable from the commercial world.

From a perusal of the self-stated steps taken by the assessee for the
alleged production of chicks it is clear that the assessee does not contribute
to the formation of chicks. The formation of chicks is a natural and biological
process over which the assessee has no hand or control. In fact, what the
E assessee is doing is to help the natural or biological process of giving birth
to chicks. The chicks otherwise can also be produced by conventional or
· natural method and in that process also, same time is taken when the chicks
come out from the eggs. What the assessee by application of mechanical
process does in the hatchery is to preserve and protect the eggs at a particular
F temperature. But the coming out of chicks from the eggs is an event of
nature. The only difference seems to be that, by application of mechanical
methods, the mortality rate of chicks is less and the assessee may get chicks
more in number. This, however, would not mean that the assessee produces
chicks and that chicks are 'articles or things'. We are, therefore, of the
G opinion that the assessee is neither an industrial undertaking nor does the
business of hatchery carried out by the assessee fall within the meaning of
Section 32A and Section 80JJ of the Act.

It was then urged by the learned counsel for the assessee that the Act
uses the words 'articles or things' at several places and the meaning assigned
H to them in other places of the Act should also be assigned under Section 32A
C.I.T. v. VENKATESWARAHATCHERIES (P) LTD. [V.N. KHARE,J.] 187

and Section 88J of the Act. Fifth Schedule of the Act sets out a list of items A
which are treated as articles or things manufactured or produced for the
purpose 0fSection 33(l)(b) of the Act. In this Schedule we find that processed
seeds which are products of plants have been shown as 'articles or things'.
Similarly, item No.(30) of the said Schedule is 'fish', which is an animate
object, it has been shown under heading 'articles or things'. On the strength B
of the meaning assigned to articles and things in the Fifth Schedule of the
Act, it was urged that hatching of chicks is also production of 'articles or
things'. It is, no doubt, true that processed seeds and fish have been described
under the heading 'articles or things' in the Fifth Schedule. Generally, the same
words in a statute have the same meaning whenever used in that statute, but
they may also have a different meaning in different provisions of the same C
statute. In Shamrao Vishnu Parulekar and another v. The District Magistrate,
Thana and others, [1956] SCR 644, it was held, thus :-

"But it is c·ontended by Mr. Chatterjee that the expression 'grounds
on which the order has been made' occurring in S.3(3) is, word for D
word, the same as in S. 7, that the same expressi9n occurring in the
same statute must receive the same construction, that what S.3
requires is that on the making of an order for detention, the authority
is to formulate the grounds for that order, and send the same to the
State Government under S.3(3) and to the detenu under S.7, and that E
therefore it was not sufficient merely to send to the State Government
a report of the materials on which the order was made. Reliance was
placed on the following passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of
Statutes:

--
l "It is, at all events, reasonable to presume that the same meaning
is implied by the use of the same expression in every part of
an Act."
F

The rule of construction contended for by the petitioners is well-
settled, but that· is only one element in deciding what the true import
of the enactment is, to ascertain which it is necessary to have regard G
to the purpose behind the particular provision: and its setting in the
scheme of the statute. "The presumption," says Craies, "that the same
words are used in the same meaning is however very slight, and it is
proper 'if sufficient reason can be assigned, to construe a word in one
part of an Act in a different sense from that which it bears in another H
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 2 S.C.R:

A part of an Act." And Maxwell, on whose statement of the law the
petitioners rely observes further on:
-
"But the presumption is not of much weight. The same word
may be used in different senses in the same statute, and even in
the same section."
B
The same word, if read in the context of one provision of the Act, may
mean or convey one meaning and another in a different context. The
Legislature in its wisdom had chosen to place processed seeds and fish
under the heading articles or things in the Fifth Schedule as Legislature is
C competent to give artificial meaning to any word. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the meaning assigned to words 'articles or things' in the Fifth
Schedule cannot be assigned to the words 'articles or things' used in Sections
32A and 80J of the Act.

Learned counsel for the assessee relied upon several decisions under
D the Sales Tax Acts, Central Excise Act and the provisions of other statutes
for the contention that 'article' includes goods and goods could be an
animate object and, viewed in this light, the hatching of eggs would _come
within the meaning of the word 'produce' which is of wider import than the
word 'manufacture'. No doubt, several Sales Tax Acts have included animate
things for the purpose of levying tax on sales. But the meaning assigned to
E a particular word in a particular sta~te cannot be imported to a word used
in a different statute.

We, therefore, reject the submissions of the learned counsel for the
assessee. For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the decision by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sri
F Venkateswara Hatcheries (P) Ltd (supra) does not lay down the correct view
of law, whereas we approve the decision of the Bombay High Court in the
case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Deejay Hatcheries, (supra).

The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the assessee is neither an
G industrial undertaking nor is it engaged in the business of producing 'articles
or things'. Consequently, the assessee is not entitled to investment allowance
under Section 32A of the Act and deductions under Sections 80 HH, 80 HHA,
80 I and 80 J of the Act.

For the feasons stated above the judgments under appeal, except Appeal
H No. 2596of1997, are set aside. All the civil appeals, except Civil Appeal No.
C.I.T. v. VENKATESWARA HATCHERIES (P) LTD. [V.N. KHARE, J.) 189

2596of1997 are allowed. Appeal No. 2596of1997, are allowed. Appeal No. A
2596 of 1997 is dismissed. There shall, h~wever, be no order as to costs.

S.M. Appeals allowed.