Holding

No referable question of law arose from the Tribunal’s order, and the profit‑earning method is the proper valuation method for a going‑concern private limited company, as established in Mahadeo Jalan.

Summary

The assessees, a private limited investment company, claimed that the value of their shares should be determined by the profit‑earning method prepared by chartered accountants, while the Gift Tax and Wealth Tax officers used the break‑up method, resulting in a higher tax liability. The Tribunal accepted the profit‑earning method and rejected the Revenue’s appeal. The Revenue sought a reference to the High Court, which was denied, and the Supreme Court was asked whether a referable question of law arose from the Tribunal’s order and which valuation method was appropriate under the Gift Tax and Wealth Tax statutes. The Court held that no question of law arose because the issue was not raised before the Tribunal, and that the method of valuation had already been settled by the earlier Mahadeo Jalan decision, which favoured the profit‑earning method for a going‑concern private company. Consequently, the Tribunal’s decision was affirmed and the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a question of law concerning the method of valuation of shares in a private limited investment company arose out of the Tribunal's order, thereby necessitating a reference to the High Court.
Which method of valuation—profit‑earning method or break‑up method—is appropriate for determining the value of shares under the Gift Tax Act and the Wealth Tax Act, particularly in view of Rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules and the precedent set in Commissioner of Wealth‑Tax v. Mahadeo Jalan.

Legislation cited

Gift Tax Acts. 5(1), s. 6(1)
Gift Tax Ruless. 10(2)
Wealth Tax Acts. 7(1)

Subjects

Gift TaxWealth Taxvaluation of sharesprofit‑earning methodbreak‑up methodreference to High CourtTribunalRule 10(2) Gift Tax Rulesprivate limited companyinvestment company

Judgment

35'7

COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX, BOMBAY ETC.
I'.

SMT. KUSUMBEN D. MAHADEVIA ETC.
December 5, 1979
JP. N. BHAGWATI AND R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J B

Gift Tax and Wealth Tax Act-The Tribunal refused to refer the case to
the High Court and the High Court refused to call for reference on the ground
that the question was decided by the Supreme Court-Question of law not raised
before the Tribunal and not dealt with by it-if could be said to arise out of
Its order.
c
,. The Chartered Accountants of the assessee company, which was an invest-
ment company, valued its shares by applying the profit earning method of valua-
tidn of shares without making any adjustment in the profits of the company.
The Gift Tax and '\'ealth Tax Officers did not accept this method and valued
che shares by applying the break-up method. The Appellate Assistant Com-
missioner applied a different method called "the rule of three" and reduced the l>
valuation of the shares; but the figures determined by him were still higher
than those clain1ed bv the """e':oee. The Revenue preferred an appeal against
the ordei of the Appe11ate Assistant Commissioner becaqse the valuation of the
shares ma.de by the Gift Tax and Wealth Tax Officers was reduced by him :
the assessee preferred an appeal against the order of the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner becau.;:e he did not accept the valuation put forward by the
assessee. E
The Tribunal accepted the valuation made· by the <:::bartered Accountants and
rejected the Revenue's appeal. The Department's request for n1aking refereflce
to the High c·ourt wa~ rejected on the ground that no referable question of law
arose out of the order of the Tribunal. TueHigh Court refused to call for a
reference.
F
It was contended on behalf of the assessee before this Court that the deter-
inination of this question was completely covered by the decision of this Court
in Comn1fa5ioner of JVealth Tax v. Mahadeo JaJan and no µseful purpose would
be served by calling for a reference.

On. the other hand the Revenue contended that ( 1) the decision in Mahadeo
Jalan's case laid do"'n no more· than broad guidelines which did not eliminate G
the necessity of finding out the appropriate method of valuation in each case

..
,
and therefore it was necessary to make a reference so that the proper method
tof valuatiQn of shares could be determined by the High Court. (2) The
' break up method according to rule 10(2) of the Gift Tax Rules is the primary
method to be applied for arriving at the valuation of the shares and since in
this case the articles of association contained a restrictive provision as to the
alienation of the shares, the Tribunal was wrong in determining the value of H
the shares by applying the profit earning method so far as the valuation under
the Gift Tax Act was concerned.
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19801 2 S.C.R.

A Dismissing the appeals,

HELD : 1. It is not every question of law that is required to be referred by
the Tribunai to the High Courl Where the answer to the question of law is
self-evident or is concluded by a decision of this Court no reference would be
justified. [J61C-D]

The answer to the question of law relating to the method adopted for
valuation of shares in the company was clearly concluded by the decision in
Mahadeo Jalan's case and the High Court was justified in refusing to call for
a reference on this question. [367 A-B~

Jn the instant case the assessee was a private limited company which was
a going concern. It was neither ripe for liquidation nor ·,vere there any ,-I.
exceptional circnmstances which should attract the applicability of the break
up method. Tho profit earning method was, therefore, the only method which _
could properly be applied for arriving at tho valuation of the >hares in the/ '[
comp3.ny and the Tribunal was right in accepting the figures of valuation in the -i
report of the Chartered Accountants based on the application of the profit '""-..
\ earning method. [366G-H, 367A]

2. It is well settled that no question can be referred to the High Court unless
it arises out ·of the order of the Tribunal. A question of law can be said to
arise out ,of the order of the Tn"bunal only if it is dealt with by the Tribunal or
is raised before it, though not decided by tho Tnbunal. A question of law not
-raised before the Tribunal and not dealt with by it in its order cannot be saidt,
to arise -out of its order, even if on the facts of the case stated in the order, the ,
question fairly arises. [368C·D] '
'
'
J

In the instant case the question sought to be raised by the Revenue was
neither raised before the Tribunal nor decided by it ana the only argument
advanced before the Tribunal was that the mean of tho values arrived at on an
application of the profit earning method and the break up method should be
taken to be the ,..uue of the shares. No argument was addressed to the Tribu·
• nal that the break-up method should be adopted because that was the primary
method prescribed by rule 10 (2) and the Tribunal had no occasion to deal
'F
with such argument. The question did not arise out of the order of the Tribu-
nal and it could not be required to be referred to the I-Iigh Court. f36SJ?-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 129 and 512
of 1976. ·
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
19-6-1975 of the Bombay Hi~h Court in Gift Tax Application Nos. 1
and 2 of 1975.
AND \
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 755-756 OF 1976
'11 Appeals by Special LeiiVe from the Judgment and Order dated
8-12-1975 of the Bombay High Court in W.T.A. No. 15/75.
AND
COMMISSIONER OF OIFT TAX v. KUSUMBEN (Bhagwati, J.) 359

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1787 OF 1977
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order datod
18-12-1976 of the Bombay High Court in W.T.A. No. 24/76.
AND

CIVIL APPEALS NOS. 1639-1645 OF 1977 B
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
3-11-1976 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 16, 17
and 21/76 and Judgment and Order dated 4-11-1976 in W.T.A.
~ .. Nos. 20 and 23/76.

S. T. Desai, S. P. Nayar and Miss A. Subhashini for the Appel- c

I lants.

,N. A. Palkhiwala, S. P. Mehta, H. P. Raina, Ravinder Narain,
Mrs. A. K. Verma, Talat Ansari and A. N. Haksar for the Respon-
dents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, J. These appeals by special leave raise a short ques-
ticin as to whether a ·reference should have been called for by the
High Court in each of these cases. Some of these cases are under
the Gift Tax Act while others under the Wealth Tax Act. They all E
relate to the valuation of the orc'inary shares of a private limited com-
pany called Mafat!al Gagalbhai Pvt. Ltd. which is admittedly an
investment company. The .assessee in these cases claimed in the
course of assssments to gift tax or wealth tax, as the case may be, that
the value of the shares should be taken to be the figure arrived at by
M/s. C. C. Chokay & Co., Chartered Accountants, by applying the · F
protit earning method of valuation of shares without making any adjust-
ment in the profits of the company. It is not necessary for the purpose
of these appeals to set out the different figures of valuation given in
the report of M/s. c. C. Chokay & Co. and claimed by the assessees
as representing the correct value of the shares on the material dates, •
because the question with which we are concerned is one of principle and
G I
the actual figures of valuation are not relevant. The Gift Tax and the
1' Wealth TaJi Officers did not accept the figures of valuation given by the
· assessees on the basis of the profit earning method and valued the
shares at much higher figures by applying the break-up method. This
naturally involved the assessees in higher tax liability and hence they H
preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Ap-
oellate Assis'ant Commissioner applied what has been described in
'
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198\l] 2 s.c.R.

the record as 'rule of three· and reduced the valuation of the shares
but the figures determined by the Appellate Assistant Com- ;\,
missioner were still higher tlurn those claimed by the
assessees, Since the valuation of the shar~• made by the Gift Tall.
and the Wealth Tax Officers was reduced by the Appellate Assistant
Commissioner, the Revenue was dissatisfied and it, therefore, pre-
B ferred appeals against the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commis-
sioner to the Tribunal. The assessees were also unhappy . with the
valuation made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner since he did
not accept the valuation put forward on their behalf and hence
they too preferred cross objections in the appeals .filed by the Revenue.
The appeals and the cross objections in :he cases forming the subject ..)
c matter of Civil Appeal No. 129 /76 were heard together by the\
,'

Tribunal. The only controversy before the Tribunal was as to which \
method should be followed for valuing the shares of the company. \
The Revenue contended that in the case of an investment company 1
like M;afatlal Gagalbhai Pvt. Ltd., the proper method of valuation \
D would be to take the mean of two values, one arri>ved at by applying
the profit earning method and the other by applying the break-up
method, while the assessees pleaded for adopting only the profit-
earning method, since in their submission that was the only method
which could be applied for valuation of shares of a· going concern. -:!!
The Tribunal by a common judgment accepted the contention of the
E assessees and adopted the valuation of the shares made by M/s.
C. C. Chokay and Co. by apolying the profit earning method and
, in the result rejected the appeals of the Revenue and allowed the
cross objections of the assessees. We shall discuss in some detail
the reasons which weighed with' the Tribunal in coming to this deci- ·~
sion, when we deal with the arguments of the parties, but suffice it
F to state for the present that in taking this view, the Tribunal followed
the recent decision of this Court in Commissioner of Wealth-Tax v.
Mahadeo Jakin & Ors.(') Similar orders wrre passed by the Tribu-
nal in the appeals and cross-objections relatipg to the other assessees. J
The Revenue was obviously aggrieved by the orders of the Tribunal
and, therefore, it made appkaticns to the Tribunal for referring to
G t'he High Court the folbv:ng qu?stion cf law, namely,
'

"Whether the Tribunal is right in holding that the shares
of an investment company has to be valued only on the
basis of the yield without taking into account the assets
H owned and reflected in the balance shee:."

(1) 86 l.T. R .. 621.
COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX v. KUSUMBEN (Bhagwati, J.) 36 I

could be said to arise out of the orders of the Tribunal. The applica- A

.; lions for reference were rejected by the T ribuna! on the ground that no
referable question of law arose out of the orders of the Tribunal. The
Revenue thereupon made applications to the High Court for calling
for a reference but those applications also met wit!; the same fate.
Hence the Revenue preferred petitions for special leave to appeal in
the case of all the assessees ard special leave having been granted in B
some of the petitions, the present appeals have come up for hearing
before us.
The sole question that arises for determination in these appeals
is whether any question of Jaw arises out of the orders of the
Tribunal which needs to be referred to the High Court. It is trne c
that there must be a question of law arisiog out of the order of the
Tribunal before a reference can be made, but it is not every ques-
tion of Jaw that is required to be referred by the Tribunal to the
High Court. Where the answec to the question of Jaw is self-evident
or is concluded by a decision of this Court, it would be futile to
make a reference and io such a case the Tribunal would be justified D
in refusing to refer the question to the High Court vide C.l.T. v.
Chander Bhan;(') Mathura Pr,1sad v. C.l.T.( 2 ) and C.l.T. v.
Indian Mica Supply Co. Ltd.(') Now there can be no doubt tha'
in the present case the question as to which method should bf' ' '."l''-
•• ed for valuation of the shares of Mafatlal Gagalbhai Private Ltd., a
' private limited company which was an iovestment company and at E
all material times a going conc·ern-whether it should be the profit
' earning method or a combination of the break-up method and the
profit earning method-is clearJy a question of Jaw. But the argu-
ment of the assessees was that the determination of this question
••• was completely covered by a r·ecent decision of this Court in Com-
missioner of Wealth Tax v. Mahadeo Jalan & Others(') in favour of
F
the assessees and no useful purpose would be served by calling for a
referece. The Revenue conceded that the decision in Mahadeo
Jalan's case did lay down certain principles for valua.tion of shar?s
in a limited company, bnt its o:ontention was that these principles
were no more than broad-guidelines and they did not eliminate the G
necessity of finding out the appropriate method of valuation in each
•
case which came before the taxing authority and hence i1 was neces- I
\:
sary td make a .reference so that the proper method for valuation of
~ the shares: M MafatlaL Gagalbhai Pvt. Co. Ltd. could be determined !
' ell 6b ttX' ms /
' (~160J!!i'..R. 428 ·,1,, H
(3J,.17r W:. R. ~ ·
(4},.~~,,,T.~. 62),,
2-21 SCI/80

- -- -- ....,,.----------·
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A by the High Court. The controversy between the parties thus oentred
round the question os to what was decided by this Court in Mahadeo
Jalan'.i case and whether it laid down what method should be applied
for valuation of shares of a private limited company which is an
investment company carrying on business as a going concern. If the
method to be applied in such a case could be found to have been
B judicially laid down by this Court in Mahadeo JalaJZ't, case, all that
would be. necessary to be done for arriving at the valuation of the
shares in Mafatlal Gagalbhai Company Private Lim:ted would be to
apply that method and it would be wholly unnecessary to call for
a reference. Let us, therefore, examine the decision in Mahadeo
Jalan's case and see whether any principle of valuation of shares is
c laid down in it which would be applicable in case of a company
like Mafatlal Gagalbhai Private Limited.
The decision in Ma/wdeo Jalan's case was rendered unde.r the
Wealth-tax Act and the question was as to what was the apprapriate
method for valuatfon of shares of a private limited company for the
D purpose of wealth tax. The Tribunal adopted the break-up method
and arrived at the valuation of the shares on that basis, but on a
referel!.ce, the Hi~h Court took the view that in case of a company
which is a going concern the only proper method of valuation of
shares is the yield valwe method and not the break-up method. The
Revenue carried the matter in appeal to this Court and in a judg-
E
ment delivered by Jaganmohan Reddy, J. this Court examined the
question of valuation of shares in depth and after referring to various
decisions of the English, Trish and Australian Courts, laid down the '
following principles for valuation of shares in a limited company :
"(!) Where the shares in a public limited company are
F quoted on the stock exchange and there are dealings
in them, the price prevailing on the valua.tion date
is the value of the shares.
(2) Where the shares are of a public limited company
which are· not quoted on a stock exchange or of a •
G privats limited company the value is determined by
~ reference to the dividends if any, reflecting the profit-
~ • earniug capacity on a reasonable commercial basis.
J But, where they do not, then the amount of yield
i~

" on that basis will determine the value of the shares.
Jn other words, the profits which the company has
,
1
H been making and should be making will ordinarily
determine the value. The dividend and earning
method or yield method are not mutually exclusive;
' 4
COMMISSIONER OF GIFT TAX v. KUSUMBEN (Bhagwati, J.) 363

both should help in ascertaining the profit earning A
capacity as indicated above. If the results of the
I two methods differ, an intermediate figure may have
to be computed by adjustment of unreasonable ex-
penses and adopting a reasonable proportion of
profits.
B
( 3) In the case of a private limited company also where
the expenses are incurred out of all proportion to
the commercial venture, they will be added back to
the profits of the company fill, computing the yield.
In such companies the restriction on share transfers
will also be taken into consideration as earlier indi- c
cated in arriving at a valuation.
( 4) Where the dividend yield and earning method break
down by reason of th.e company's inability· to ·earn
profits and declare dividends, if the set-back is tem-
porary then it is perh2.ps possible to take the esti-
D
mate of the value of the shares before set-back and
discount it by a percentage corresponding to the
proportionate fall in the price of quoted shares of
companies which have suffered similar reverses.
(5) Where the company is ripe for winding'up then the
break-up value method determines what would be E
realised by that process.
(6) As in Attorney-General of Ceylon v. 1'vlackie [1952]
2 All. E.R., 775 (P.C.) a valuation by reference
to the assets would be justified where as in that
case the fluctuations of profits and uncertainty of the F
conditions at the date of the valuation prevented
any reasonable estimation of prospective profits and
dividends."
4 Since the company involved in this case was a private limited com-
pany which was a going concern, the Court following the above
principles, negatived the applicability of the break-up method for G
valuation of the shares and upheld the view taken by the High
Court that the yield method was the proper method for arriving at
) th!IO valuation of the shares.
It is clear from this decision that where the shares in a public
limited company are quoted on the stock exchange and there are H
dealings in them, the price prevailing on the valuation date would
represent the value of the shares. But where the shares in a public
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A limited company are not quoted on the stock exchange or the shares
are in a private limited company the proper method of valuation to
be adopted would be the profit earning method. Thi~ method may
be applied by taking the dividends as reflecting the profit earning
capacity of the company on reasonable commercial basis but
if it is found that the dividends do not correctly reflect
B the profit earning capacity because only a small propor-
tion of the profits is distributed by way of dividends and a large
amount of profits is systematically accumulated in the form of reserves,
the dividend method of valuation may be rejected and the valuation
may be made by reference to the profits. The profit-earning
method takes into account the _profits which the company has been
C making and should be capable of making and the valuation, accord-
ing to this method is based on the average maintainable profits. Of
course, for the purpose of such valuation, the taxing authority is not
bound by the figure of profits shown in the profit and loss account
because it is possible that the amount of profits may bave suffered
D diminution on account of unreasonable expenditure or the directors
having choi;en to take away a part of the profits in the form of
remuneration rather than dividends. The figure of profits in such a
case would have to be adjusted in order to arrive at the real profit
earning capacity of the company. It would, thus, be seen that in the
case of a company which is a going concern and whose shares are
I not quoted on the stock exchange, the profits which the company
has been making and should be capable of making or in other
(
words, the profit-earning capacity of the company would ordinarily
determine the value of the shares. That is why in Mahadeo Jalan's
case the Court quoted with approval the following observations cl.
Williams, J. in M1;.Sa~hie v. Federal Commissioner , of Taxation(')
F . ". . . . the real va!tie' of .shares which a deceased person holds in a
cornparW on :thed~t~' of' liis cleath win depend more on the profits
1

which tlie'c6iiipany has been making and should be 9apable of making,
having regard to the nature of its business, than Uptlrdhe amounts
which .tMJShatesrwould be likely to ~ealise iup<lln1a liquidation,'.'ilJ a:nxm;:;
slated-: in no mn~ertaili · temISJ that "The ' gencrabp~ciple of ;Valhati\'.)n::·~
G;;
ima. going: •conccp:n .is· the ·.yield -on •il!M .b~i~ of averagll.. mllintaiil!ible·1 1 ·
profits! subject Ml_ adjustment eltr vt.hiel;l: t!te"cireumlitandts1,,of,,'run!)'r..
particJ1lar; rease- •tn2by.rl'allr flil"rl1, '" ·TMr break+upl rmetfuld 'WO!lildl rnbt ;-lIJe;) '
appropriate for valuation of shares of a compll!Jlhy '.Vlhi¢.h risia,,goin~r''
con~e~, b_ecausl'. ~~poili'~ed _o~,t1 ~1,,)ih~, {:pUJ1 ~ Mah~de(), Jala11's
caSe~r ''itmcJ' i' tll'C factors: wbiC ' gOV~t ''ilie· 1cOnsldgra'HOn· Of llie ..i u 'er .
1
1 T
a '"the'~e~ 1(,'l:ier~"lli~"&'e
~~,.,,,,., r
,,1·.Y 'Jrn li'e~1re"f;tb''
nr1111 '.ifr;·1 r1r;
titchise'"arid'l;(t~e
qr~1~1i:·i'..'1q P,,)qq ';dt ~n:i1!~
'~\~'J.!'
<_irJ;r,,)!,
(if
1
-,;irf(r\-) 'iP 1Ho111wprweii!!\1I,~'ltill. 0 PIJ!llrll.,,n-r!,- ·orh 11, dr..· .,, u 1.;,·,:·:,,
I ..,
COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX v. KUSUMBEN (Bhagwati, !.) 365

wishes to sell, the factor or break-up value of a share as on liquida- A
tion hardly enters into consideration where the share~ are of a going
concern". It is only where a company is ripe for winding up or the
r situation is such that the fluctuations of profits and uncertainty of
conditions at the date of valuation prevent any reasonable estima-
tion of the profit earning capacity of the company, that the valuation
by the break-up method would be justified. The Revenue leaned B
heavily on the observation in Mahadeo Jalan's case that the factors
likely to determine the valuation of a share include "in special cases
such as investment companies, the asset-backing" and urged on the
strength of this observation that .in the case of an investment com-
pany, the asset-backing was a relevant consideration and the break-
up method could not, therefore, be considered as totally irrelevant.
c
This contention, we are afraid, is based on a wrong reading of the
observation of the Court. When the Court said that in case of an
investment company, the asset-backing is a relevant factor in deter-
mination of the value of the shares, what the Court meant was in
order to determine the capacity of the company to maintain D
its profits the asset-backing would be a relevant consideration. The
profit-earning capacity of the company which would determine the
valnation of the shares would naturally have to takie into account not
only the profits which the company is actually making but also the
' profits which the company should be capable of making and in order
to arrive at a proper estimation of the latter, the asset-backing would E
be a relevant factor in case of an investment company. It would not
be right to read the observation of the Court as suggesting that valua-
tion of the assets would be a relevant factor in determining the
valuation of shares. The Revenue, of course, did not plead for
exclusive adoption of the break-up method and wanted the mean of
the values arrived at by applying the break-up method and the profit F
earning method to be taken as representing the valuation of the
shares, but we do not see on what principle can a combination of
the two methods be justified. There is no authority either in any
judicial decisicm or in any standard text book on valuation of shares
which recognises the validity of a combination of the two methods,
G
}hough it may sound acceptable as a compromise formula. In fact,
Adamson has criticised this combination of the two methods as
T unscientific in his book on "The Valuation of Company Shares and
Bu~inesses", {Fourth Edition) at page 55, where he has said :

.. \ "The mere averaging of two results obtained by quite H
different basis of approach can hardly be said to represent
any logical approach, whatever its merit as a compromise.
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R.

A Despite ·its evident popularity in many quarters, it has not
been given judicial recognition in decisions involving the
fixation of a value by the Court."
The combination of the two methods advocated on behalf of
the Revenue has, thus, no sanction of any judicial or other authority
B and cannot be accepted as a valid principle of valuation of shares.

The Revenue than pointed out that the principles of valuation set,
out by the Court in Mahadeo Jala11's case were merely broad-~1
guidelines and they did not obviate the necessity of considering each ·
case on its own facts and circumstances and in support of this
c contention the Revenue relied on the observation made by the Court
that in setting out these principles, !he Court had not "tried to lay
down any hard and fast rule because ultimately the facts
and circumstances of each case, the nature of the busi-
ness, the prospects of profitability and such other considerations will
have to be taken into account as will be applicable to the facts of
D each case." Now it is true, as observed by the Court, that there
cannot be any hard and fast rule in the matter of valuation of shares
in a limited company and ultimately the valuation must depen<l upon
the facts and circumstances of each case, but that does not mean
that there are no well settled principles of valuation applicable in
E specific fact-situations and whenever a question of valuation of shares
arises, the taxing authority is in an uncharted sea and it has to
innovate new methods of valuation according to the facts and circums-
tances of each case. The principles of valuation as formulated by ..,..---
the Court are clear and well-defined and it is only in deciding which
partkul~r principle must be applied in a given situation that the
F facts and circumstances of the case become material. It is significan~
to note that immediately after making the above observation the
Court hastened to make it clear, as if in answer to a possible argu-
ment which might be advanced on behalf of the Revenue on the
basis of that 9bservation that the yield method is the generally appli-

G
cable method while the break up method is the one resorted to in l'
exceptional circumstances or where, the company is ripe for liquida-
tion." ' .'>

Here in the present case Mafatlal Gagalbhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. was
a private limited company which was a going concern and it was
H neither ripe for liquidation nor were there any exceptional circums- t
lances which should attract the applicability of the break-up method.
The profit earning method was,· therefore, the only method which
COMMISSIONf.R OF GIFT TAX v, KUSUMBEN (Blwgwati, J,) 367

could properly be applied for arriving at the valuation of the shares A
in the company and the tribur.al was right in accepting the figures of
valuation in the Report of M/s. C. C. Choksy & Co., based on the
application of the profit earning method. The answer to the ques-
tion of law relating to the method to be adopted for valuation of
shares in the company was clearly concluded by the decision in
Mahadeo Jalan's case and the High Court was, therefore, justified B
in refusing to call for a reference on this question.

It is true that in the present appeals, the question of valuation
arises not only under the Wealth Tax Act but also under the Gift
Tax Act, but since the provision for determining the value of an
asset is the same in section 6 sub-section (1) of the Gift Tax Act
c
as it is in section 7 sub-section (1) of the Wealth Tax Act, the
prini:iples of valuation laid down in Mahadeo Jedan'< case mu>t apply
equally in relation to valuation of shares to be made for the purpose
, of the Gift Tax Act. It was, however, contended on behalf of the
Revenue that there is a vital difference between section 6 sub-section D
(1) of the Gift Tax Act and section 7 sub-section (1) of the Wealth
Tax Act in as much as section 5 sub-section (1) of the Gift Tax
Act is subject inter alia to the provision of sub-section (3) of that
section and this latter sub-sec1ion provides that where the value of
• any property cannot be estimated under sub-section ( 1) because it
is not saleable in the open ma,:ket, the value shall be determined in E
the prescribed manner and Rules 10 sub-rule (2) of the Gift Tax
,, ·..--'
Rules prescribes the manner of valuation of shares in a private
limited company where the Articles of Association contain restrictive
provision as to the alienation of shares, by providing that in such
a case, the value of the shares "if not ascertainable by reference to
the value of the total assets of the company, shall be estimated to be F
what they would fetch if on the date of gift they could be sold in th<"
open market on the terms of the purchaser being entitled to be
registered as holder subject to the articles, but the fact that a special
buyer would for his own special reasons give a higher price that the
price in the open market shall be disregarded",
G
The argument of the Revenue was that Mafatlal Gagalbhai Pvl
Ltd. w~s a private limited company and its Articles of Association
admittedly contained restricti>ve provision as to the alienation of
shares and, therefore, Rule 10 sub-rule (2) was applicable and
' \
according to that sub-rule, the value of the shares was required to be n
ascertained by reference to the value of the total assets of the com-
pany and it was only if the value was not so ascertainable that
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R.

A it could be determined in any other manner. The break-up method
was thus, according to this sub-rule, the primary method to be applied
for arriving at the valuati(ln of the shares and in the circumstances
the Tribunal was wrong in determining the value of the shares by
applying the profit earning method, atleast so far as the valuation
under the Gift Tax Act was concerned.
B
Now it is difficult to see how the question whether the valuation
of the shares should have been made on the basis of the break-up
method by reason of Rule 10 sub-rule (2) of the Gift Tax Rules
can be required to be referred by the Tribunal to the Hi•gh Court.
It is well settled that no question can be referred to the High Court
c unless it arises out of the order of the Tribunal and, as pointed out
by this Court in Conuniss!oner of lncon1e-tax v. Scindia Stean1 Nai·i-
gation Co. Ltd.('), a question of law can be said to arise out of the
order of the Tribunal only if it is dealt with by the Tribunal or is
raised before though not decided by the Tribunal and a question of
law not raised before the Tribunal and not dealt with by it in its'
0 order cannot be said to arise out of its order, even if on the facts
of the case stated in the order the question fairly arises. It is
obvious that this question sought to be raised on behalf of the
Revenue was neither rai·sed before the Tribunal nor decided by it
and the only argument advanced before the Tribunal was that the
E mean of the values arrived at on an application of the profit earning
method and the break-up method should be taken to be the value
of the shares. There was no argument addressed to the Tribunal
that the breakup method should be adopted becausz that was the
primary method prescribed by Rule 10 sub-rule (2) and the Tribunal
had, therefore, no occasion to deal with such argument. This
F question obviously, therefore, does not arise out of the orders of
the Triobunal and it cannot be required to be referred to the High
Court.
These were the only contentions urged on behalf of the Revenue
and since there is no substance in them, the appeals fail and are
G dismissed with costs.
I

N.K.A. Appeals dismissed.
•

(!) 42 l.T.R.