Holding

Section 4’s levy measure, including the defined "transaction value", is not controlled by Section 3; both sections function in their own fields, and "transaction value" merely incorporates the additions to "normal price" permitted in Bombay Tyre International, so there is no conflict with Acer India.

Summary

The Supreme Court answered three questions referred by a larger bench concerning the relationship between Sections 3 and 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the definition of "transaction value". It held that Section 4’s levy measure, including the statutorily defined transaction value, is not subordinate to Section 3; both sections operate in their respective fields. The Court clarified that the concept of transaction value merely incorporates the permissible additions to the erstwhile "normal price" as affirmed in Bombay Tyre International, and that the limited context of Acer India does not conflict with that view. Consequently, ancillary charges such as packing, handling, and marketing expenses are includable in the transaction value for excise duty computation. The appeal was disposed of in accordance with these findings.

Issues considered

Whether Section 4 (as amended) and the definition of "transaction value" are subject to Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944?
Whether Sections 3 and 4, though interlinked, operate in different fields and what is their respective scope?
Whether the concept of "transaction value" represents a material departure from the earlier "normal price" concept under the erstwhile Section 4(1)(a)?

Legislation cited

Central Excise Act, 1944s. 3, s. 4, s. 4(3)(d)
Finance Act, 2000

Subjects

Central ExciseTransaction valueSection 3Section 4CENVATValue added taxExcise duty levyNormal priceAncillary chargesStatutory interpretation

Judgment

[2018] 6 S.C.R. 1099 1099

COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE A
v.
M/S GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD.THROUGH ITS SECRETARY
(Civil Appeal No. 3159 of 2004)
MAY 11, 2018 B
[RANJAN GOGOI, N. V. RAMANA, R. BANUMATHI,
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Central Excise Act, 1944 – ss.3 and 4 – Whether s.4 of the
Central Excise Act, 1944 (as substituted with effect from 1-7-2000) C
and the definition of “transaction value” in clause (d) of sub-section
(3) of s.4 are subject to s.3 of the Act – Held: The observations
made in Acer India Ltd. to the effect that ‘transaction value’ defined
would be subject to the charging provisions contained in s.3 of the
Act will have viewed in the context of a situation where an addition D
of the value of a non-dutiable item was sought to be made to the
value of a dutiable item for the purpose of determination of the
transaction value of the composite item – This is the limited context
in which the subservience of s.4(3)(d) to s.3 was expressed and has
to be understood – If so understood, the views expressed in that
paragraph of Acer India Ltd. case cannot be read to be in conflict E
with the decision of Bombay Tyre International Ltd..
Central Excise Act, 1944 – ss.3 and 4 – Whether ss. 3 and 4
of the Act despite being interlinked, operate in different fields –
Held: The measure of the levy contemplated in s.4 of the Act is not
controlled by the nature of the levy – So long a reasonable nexus is F
discernible between the measure and the nature of the levy both ss.
3 and 4 would operate in their respective fields – The view expressed
in Bombay Tyre International Ltd. is the correct exposition of the
law in this regard.
Central Excise Act, 1944 – ss.3 and 4 – Whether the concept G
of “transaction value” makes any material departure from the
deemed normal price concept of the erstwhile s.4(1)(a) of the Act –
Held: “Transaction value” as defined in s.4(3)(d) brought into force
by the Amendment Act, 2000, statutorily engrafts the additions to
the ‘normal price’ under old s.4 as held to be permissible in Bombay
H
1099
1100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A Tyre International Ltd. besides giving effect to the changed
description of the levy of excise introduced in s.3 of the Act by the
Amendment of 2000 – There is no discernible difference in the
statutory concept of ‘transaction value’ and judicially evolved
meaning of ‘normal price’.
B Answering the referred issues, the Court
HELD: 1. The amendment to Section 3 of Central Excise
Act, 1944 by substitution of the words “a duty of excise on all
excisable goods” by the words “a duty of excise to be called the
Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT) on all excisable goods” is
C conspicuous. The amendment of Section 3 to the Act not only
incorporates the essentials of a changed concept of charging of
tax on additions to the value of goods and services at each stage
of production but also engrafts in the statute what was judicially
held to be permissible additions to the manufacturing cost and
manufacturing profit in Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. This
D fundamental change by introduction of the concept underlying
value-added taxation in the provisions of Section 3 really find
reflection in the definition of ‘transaction value’ as defined by
Section 4(3)(d) of the Act besides incorporating what was explicitly
held to be permissible in Bombay Tyre International Ltd.. Section
E 4(3)(d), thus, defines ‘transaction value’ by specifically including
all value additions made to the manufactured article prior to its
clearance, as permissible additions to be price charged for
purpose of the levy. [Para 21][1119-B-F]
2. Considering the decision in Acer India Ltd. in the said
F case, softwares which were duty free items and could be
transacted as softwares came to be combined with the computer
hardware which was a dutiable item for purposes of clearance.
The Revenue sought to take into account the value of the
computer software for the purposes of determination of
‘transaction value’ with regard to the computer. This Court
G negatived the stand of the Revenue taking the view that when
software as a separate item was not dutiable its inclusion in the
hard-disk of the computer cannot alter the duty liability of the
software so as to permit the addition of the price/value of the
software for the purpose of levy of duty. It is in the above context
H
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1101
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY.

that the decision of this Court in Acer India Ltd. has to be A
understood. The observations made in paragraph 84 thereof to
the effect that ‘transaction value’ defined in Section 4(3)(d) of
the Act would be subject to the charging provisions contained in
Section 3 of the Act will have to be viewed in the context of a
situation where an addition of the value of a non-dutiable item
B
was sought to be made to the value of a dutiable item for the
purpose of determination of the transaction value of the composite
item. This is the limited context in which the subservience of
Section 4(3)(d) to Section 3 of the Act was expressed and has to
be understood. If so understood, the views expressed in Acer
India Ltd. can be read to be in conflict with the decision of Bombay C
Tyre International Ltd. [Para 22][1119-F-H; 1120-A-C]
3. The measure of the levy contemplated in Section 4 of
the Act will not be controlled by the nature of the levy. So long a
reasonable nexus is discernible between the measure and the
nature of the levy both Section 3 and 4 would operate in their D
respective fields. The view expressed in Bombay Tyre
International Ltd. is the correct exposition of the law in this regard.
Further, “transaction value” as defined in Section 4(3)(d) brought
into force by the Amendment Act,2000, statutorily engrafts the
additions to the ‘normal price’ under the old Section 4 as held to
be permissible in Bombay Tyre International Ltd. besides giving E
effect to the changed description of the levy of excise introduced
in Section 3 of the Act by the Amendment of 2000. In fact, there
is no discernible difference in the statutory concept of ‘transaction
value’ and the judicially evolved meaning of ‘normal price’. [Para
23][1120-C-F] F
Union of India and Ors. v. Bombay Tyre International
Ltd. and Ors. [1984] 1 SCR 347 : (1984) 1 SCC 467 –
affirmed
Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry v. Acer
India Ltd.[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 676 : (2004) 8 SCC 173; G
C.C.E. Indore v. Grasim Industries Ltd. [2009] 12
SCR 204 : (2009) 14 SCC 596; C.C.E. Indore v. Grasim
Industries Ltd. (2016) 6 SCC 391; The Province of
Madras v. Messrs. Boddu Paidanna & Sons A.I.R. (29)
H
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A 1942 Federal Court 33 (from Madras);Governor-
General in Council v. Province of Madras [A.I.R. (32)
1945 Privy Council 98]; R.C. Jall Parsi v. Union of
India and anr. 1962 AIR 1281 : [1962] Suppl. SCR
436; A.K. Roy and Another v. Voltas Limited [1973]
2 SCR 1089 : (1973) 3 SCC 503; Atic Industries Limited
B
v. H.H. Dewa, Asstt. Collector of Central Excise and
ors. [1975] 3 SCR 563 : (1975) 1 SCC 499 – referred
to.
Case Law Reference
[1984] 1 SCR 347 affirmed Para 3
C
[2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 676 referred to Para 3
[2009] 12 SCR 204 referred to Para 3
(2016) 6 SCC 391 referred to Para 4
A.I.R. (29) 1942 Federal Court 33 referred to Para 10
D (from Madras)
A.I.R. (32) 1945 Privy Council 98 referred to Para 11
[1962] Suppl. SCR 436 referred to Para 12
[1973] 2 SCR 1089 referred to Para 14
[1975] 3 SCR 563 referred to Para 20
E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3159
of 2004.
From the final Order No.672/2003-NB(A) dated 10.12.2003 of
the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in
Appeal No.E/1370/2003-NB(A).
F WITH
C.A. Nos. 3455/2004, 7272/2005, 2982-2985/2005, 2986/2005,
7143/2005, 2261/2006, 2246-2247/2008, 2934-2935/2008, 3528/2008,
4820/2008, 6695/2008, 2534/2009, 253/2010, 8541/2009, 445/2010, 1382/
2010, 2003-2004/2010, 2430/2010, 2363/2010, 7174-7175/2010, 4696/2011,
G 6984/2011 and 2705/2012.
Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG, K. Radhakrishnan, S.K. Bagaria,
V. Sridharan, Sr. Advs., Rupesh Kumar, Arijit Prasad, Ritesh Kumar,
Mrs. Rashmi Malhotra, B. Krishna Prasad, Balendu Shekhar, Sumit
Teterwal, Ms. Saudamini Sharma, Hemant Arya, Ms. Snidha Mehra,
H Ms. Kirti Dua, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Ramesh Singh, Nikhil Goel,
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1103
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY.

Ms. Naveen Goel (for Mrs. Sheela Goel), S. Sukumaran, Anand Sukumar, A
Bhupesh Kumar Pathak, K. Rajeev, Mrs. Meera Mathur, Kumar Ajit
Singh, L. Badri Narayanan, Aditya Bhattacharya, Victor Das,
Ms. Apeksha Mehta, M.P. Devanath, Joseph Pookkatt, Prashant Kumari,
Dinesh Kumar (for M/s Ap & J Chambers), Ravinder Narain, Ajay
Aggarwal, Ms. Mallika Joshi, Ms. Ruchika Singh, Rajat Gava, Rajan
B
Narain, Rajesh Kumar, Ms. Chandani Patel, S. Nandakumar,
M.S. Sarankumar, Ms. Deepika Nandakumar, Suba Somu,
V. N. Raghupathy, Nikhil Nayyar, N. Sai Vinod, Dhananjay Baijal,
Ms. Smriti Shah, Divyanshu Rai, S. Jaikumar, B. Venugopal, Kartik Jindal,
Ajinkya Tiwari, Rajendra Singhvi, K.K.L. Gautam, Ms. Arundhati
Chakraborty, Brij Bhushan, Advs. for the appearing parties. C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RANJAN GOGOI, J. 1. First, the facts:
The respondent – Assessees are manufacturers of dissolved and
compressed industrial gases, liquid chlorine and other allied products.
Cotton yarn and Post Mix Concentrate manufactured by two other D
individualassessees are also in issue. These articles are supplied to the
customers in tonners, cylinders, carboys, paper cones and HDPE bags,
BIBs, pipeline and canisters, which may be more conveniently referred
to as “containers”. In some cases the containers are provided by the
Assesseesto the customers on rent whereas in others the customers E
bring their own containers. For making available or for filling up the
containers provided by the customers the Assessees charge the
customers certain amounts under different heads viz. packing charges,
wear and tear charges, facility charges, service charges, delivery and
collection charges, rental charges, repair and testing charges. The
Assessees treat the said amounts as their income from ancillary or allied F
ventures.
2. The issue arising is whether the aforesaid charges realised by
the Assessees are liable to be taken into account for determination of
value for the purpose of levy of duty in terms of Section 4 of the Central
Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) as amended G
with effect from 1st July, 2000.
3. Perceiving a conflict between the two decisions of this court
inUnion of India and Ors.v.Bombay Tyre International Ltd. and Ors.1
and Commissioner of Central Excise, Pondicherry v.Acer India
1
(1984) 1 SCC 467 H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A Ltd.2,a two judge Bench of this Court by order dated 30th July, 20093
referred the following questions for an answer by a larger bench:
“1. Whether Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (as
substituted with effect from 1-7-2000) and the definition of
“transaction value” in clause (d) of sub-section (3) of Section 4
B are subject to Section 3 of the Act?
2. Whether Sections 3 and 4 of the Central Excise Act, despite
being interlinked, operate in different fields and what is their real
scope and ambit?
3. Whether the concept of “transaction value” makes any material
C departure from the deemed normal price concept of the erstwhile
Section 4(1)(a) of the Act?”
4. As the decisions in Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (supra)
and Acer India Ltd.(supra) were rendered by Benches of Three Hon’ble
Judges of this Court, the above questions were referred by order dated
D 30th March, 20164 to an even larger Bench. This is how we are in seisin
of the matter.
5. What is excise duty and what is the relationship between the
nature of the duty and the measure of the levy are the two precise
questions that would arise for determination in the present reference.
E
6. On first principles, there can be no dispute. Excise is a levy on
manufactureand upon the manufacturer who is entitled under law to
pass on the burden to the first purchaser of the manufactured goods.
The levy of excise flows from a constitutional authorisationunder Entry
84 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The
F stage of collection of the levy and the measure thereof is, however, a
statutory function.So long the statutory exercise in this regard is a
competent exercise of legislative power,the legislative wisdom both with
regard to the stage of collection and the measure of the levy must be
allowed to prevail. The measure of the levy must not be confused with
the nature thereof though there must be some nexus between the two.
G
But the measure cannot be controlled by the rigors of the nature. These
are some of the settled principles of laws emanating from a long line of
decisions of this Court which we will take note of shortly. Do these
2
(2004) 8 SCC 173
3
(2009) 14 SCC 596
4
H (2016) 6 SCC 391
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1105
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

principles that have withstood the test of time require a rethink is the A
question that poses for an answer in the present reference.
7. At this stage, it may be necessary to specifically take note of
the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 as originally enacted and as amended
from time to time.
Section 3 B
Section 3 of the Act in force prior to Relevant portion of Section 3 as
amendment by Finance Act 2000 (Act substituted/amended (with effect from
10 of 2000) 12 th May, 2000) by Section 92 of the
Finance Act, 2000 (No.10 of 2000)
3. Duties specified in the First 3. Duties specified in [the First Schedule
Schedule to be levied. – and the Second Schedule] to the Central
C
Excise Tariff Act, 1985] to be levied.-
(1) There shall be l evied and collected in
such manner as may be prescribed,-
There shall be levied and collected in such
manner as may be prescribed,-
(a) a duty of excise on all excisable
goods which are produced or D
manufactured in India as, and at the rates,
(a) a duty of excise to be called the
set forth in the First Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985; Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT) on all
excisable goods which are produced or
manuf actured in India as, and at the rates,
set forth in the First Schedule to the
Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of E
1986);

(b)………… (b)………….

Section 4
Section 4 as originally enacted Section 4 as amended by Section 4 as amended by
(in the Central Excise and Amendment Act No.22 of Finance Act, 2000 with F
Salt Act, 1944), 1973 effect from 1.7.2000
Determination of value for the Valuation of excisable goods Valuation of excisable
purposes of duty – Where for purposes of charging of goods for purposes of
under this Act any article is duty of excise.-(1) Where charging of duty of excise.
chargeable with duty at a rate under this Act, the duty of - (1) Where under this Act,
dependent on the value of the excise is chargeable on any the duty of excise is
G
article, such value shall be excisable goods with chargeable on any excisable
deemed to be the wholesale reference to value, such value goods with reference to
cash price for which an article shall, subject to the other their value, then, on each
of the like kind and quality is provisions of this section, be removal of the goods, such
sold or is capable of being sold deemed to be- value shall -
H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A for delivery at the place of (a) the normal price thereof, (a) in a case where the
manufacture and at the time of that is to say, the price at which goods are sold by the
its removal therefrom, without such goods are ordinarily sold assessee, for delivery at
any abatement of deduction by the assessee to a buyer in the the time and place of the
whatever except trade discount course of wholesale trade for removal, the assessee and
and the amount of duty then delivery at the time and place the buyer of goods are not
payable. of removal, where the buyer is related and the price is the
B not a related person and the sole consideration for the
price is the sole consideration sale, be the transaction
value;
for the sale:
(b) in any other case,
including the case where
Provided that- the goods are not sold, be
C (i) where, in accordance with the value determined in
the normal practice of the such manner as may be
prescribed.
wholesale trade in such goods,
such goods are sold by the
assessee at different prices to
(2) The provisions of this
different classes of buyers (not section shall not apply in
D being related persons) each respect of any excisable
such price shall, subject to the goods for which a tariff
existence of the other value has been fixed under
circumstances specified in sub-section (2) of section
clause (a), be deemed to be the 3.
normal price of such goods in
relation to each such class of
E buyers; (3) For the purpose of this
section,-

(ii) where such goods are sold (a) "assessee" means the
by the assessee in the course of person who is liable to pay
wholesale trade for delivery at the duty of excise under
the time and place of removal this Act and includes his
F agent;
at a price fixed under any law
for the time being in force or at
a price, being the maximum, (b) persons shall be
fixed under any such law, then, deemed to be "related" if -
notwithstanding anything
contained in clause (iii) of this (i) they are inter-
proviso, the price or the connected undertakings;
G
maximum price, as the case (ii) they are relatives;
may be, so fixed, shall, in
relation to the goods so sold, be (iii) amongst them the
deemed to be the normal price buyer is a relative and
thereof; distributor of the assessee,
or a sub-distributor of such
H distributor; or
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1107
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

A
(iii) where the assessee so (iv) they are so associated
arranges that the goods are that they have interest,
generally not sold by him in directly or indirectly, in the
the course of wholesale trade business of each other.
except to or through a related Explanation. - In this
person, the normal price of the clause-
B
goods sold by the assessee to
or through such related person (i)“inter-connected
shall be deemed to be the price undertakings” shall have
at which they are ordinarily the meaning assigned to it
sold by the related person in in clause (g) of section 2 of
the course of wholesale trade at the Monopolies and
the time of removal, to dealers Restrictive Trade Practices C
(not being related persons) or Act, 1969 (64 of 1969);
where such goods are not sold and
to such dealers, to dealers
(being related persons) who
sell such goods in retail; (ii)“relative” shall have the
meaning assigned to it in D
clause (41) of section 2 of
(b) where the normal price of the Companies Act, 1956
such goods is not ascertainable (1 of 1956);
for the reason that such goods
are not sold or for any other
reason, the nearest (c) “place of removal” E
ascertainable equivalent means –
thereof determined in such
manner as may be prescribed. (i) a factory or any other
place or premises of
production or manufacture
(2) Where, in relation to any of the excisable goods; F
excisable goods the price (ii) a warehouse or any
thereof for delivery at the place other place or premises
of removal is not known and wherein the excisable
the value thereof is determined goods have been permitted
with reference to the price for to be deposited without
delivery at a place other than payment of duty, from G
the place of removal, the cost where such goods are
of transportation from the place removed;
of removal to the place of
delivery shall be excluded from
such price.
H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A (3) The provisions of this (d) “transaction value”
section shall not apply in means the price actually
respect of any excisable goods paid or payable for the
for which a tariff value has goods, when sold, and
been fixed under sub- section includes in addition to the
(2) of section 3. amount charged as price,
B any amount that the buyer
is liable to pay to, or on
(4) For the purposes of this behalf of, the assessee, by
section,- reason of, or in connection
with the sale, whether
(a) " assessee" means the payable at the time of the
C person who is liable to pay the sale or at any other time,
duty of excise under this Act including, but not limited
and includes his agent; to, any amount charged
(b) " place of removal" means- for, or to make provision
for, advertising or
(i) a factory or any other place publicity, marketing and
D or premises of production or selling organization
manufacture of the excisable expenses, storage, outward
goods; or handling, servicing,
warranty, commission or
(ii) a warehouse or any other any other matter; but does
place or premises wherein the not include the amount of
excisable goods have been duty of excise, sales tax
E permitted to be deposited and other taxes, if any,
without payment of duty, actually paid or actually
payable on such goods.

from where such goods are
removed;
F
(c) "related person" means a
person who is so associated
with the assessee that they
have interest, directly or
indirectly, in the business of
G each other and includes a
holding company, a subsidiary
company, a relative and a
distributor of the assessee, and
any sub- distributor of such
distributor.
H
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1109
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

Explanation.- In this clause" A
holding company"," subsidiary
company and" relative" have the
same meanings as in the Companies
Act, 1956 ; (1 of 1956 )
(d) "value", in relation to any
excisable goods,- B
(i) where the goods are delivered at
the time of removal in a packed
condition, includes the cost of such
packing except the cost of the
packing which is of a durable nature
C
and is returnable by the buyer to the
assessee.

Explanation.- In this sub- clause,"
packing" means the wrapper,
container, bobbin, pirn, spool, reel D
or warp beam or any other thing in
which or on which the excisable
goods are wrapped, contained or
wound;
(ii) does not include the amount of E
the duty of excise, sales tax and
other taxes, if any, payable on such
goods and, subject to such rules as
may be made, the trade discount
(such discount not being refundable
on any account whatsoever)
allowed in accordance with the F
normal practice of the wholesale
trade at the time of removal in
respect of such goods sold or
contracted for sale.

G
(e) “wholesale trade” means sales to
dealers, industrial consumers,
Government, local authorities and
other buyers, who or which
purchase their requirements /
otherwise than in retail. H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A 8. It may be appropriate, at this stage, to make a brief narration of
the developments in the particular branch of fiscal jurisprudence which
is in issue in the present cases. The Central Provinces and Berar
Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, (Central
Provinces and Berar Act No.XIV of 1938) authorised the levy and
collection from every retail dealer, as defined by the Act, a tax on the
B
retail sales of motor spirits and lubricants at the rate of five per cent on
the value of such sales. The levy was challenged and what arose for
decision before the Federal Court on a reference, made by the Governor
General under Section 213 of the Government of India Act, 1935 (often
referred to as “the Constitution Act”) is the question whether the said
C levy was a duty of excise under Entry 45 of List-I in the Seventh Schedule
to the Constitution Act or a tax on sale of goods under Entry 48 of List II
of the said Schedule. While the eventual answer in the reference holding
the levy to be a tax on sale of goods and therefore within the competence
of the Provincial Legislature is of no consequence to the present issue,
what may require a specific notice is that Entry 45 which empowered
D
the Federal Legislature to make laws with respect to “duties of excise
on tobacco and other goods manufactured or produced in India;
except…” corresponds to Entry 84 of List-I of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution of India.
9. Some extracts from the opinion rendered by Chief
E JusticeGwyer(all the Judges on the Bench gave their own opinions while
agreeing to the eventual conclusion) would throw light on the nature of
the levy of excise and is therefore being recollected below:-
“The federal legislative power extends to making laws with respect
to duties of excise on goods manufactured or produced in India.
F “Excise” is stated in the Oxford Dictionary to have been originally
accise”, a word derived through the Dutch from the late Latin
accensare, to tax; the modern form, which ousted accise” at an
early date, being apparently due to a mistaken derivation from the
Latin excidere, to cut out. It was at first a general word for a toll
G or tax, but since the 17th century it has acquired in the United
Kingdom a particular, though not always precise, signification.
The primary meaning of “excise duty” or “duty of excise” has
come to be that of a tax on certain articles of luxury (such as
spirits, beer or tobacco) produced or manufactured in the United
Kingdom, and it is used in contradistinction to customs duties on
H
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1111
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

articles imported into the country from elsewhere. At a later date A
the licence fees payable by persons who produced or sold excisable
articles also became known as duties of excise; and the expression
was still later extended to licence fees imposed for revenue,
administrative, or regulative purposes on persons engaged in a
number of other trades or callings. Even the duty payable on
B
payments for admission to places of entertainment in the United
Kingdom is called a duty of excise; and, generally speaking, the
expression is used to cover all duties and taxes which, together
with customs duties, are collected and administered by the
Commissioners of Customs and Excise. But its primary and
fundamental meaning in English is still that of a tax on articles C
produced or manufactured in the taxing country and intended for
home consumption. I am satisfied that that is also its primary and
fundamental meaning in India; and no one has suggested that it
has any other meaning in Entry (45).
xxx xxx xxx D
xxx xxx xxx
…There can be no reason in theory why an excise duty should
not be imposed even on the retail sale of an article, if the taxing
Act so provides. Subject always to the legislative competence
of the taxing authority, a duty on home produced goods will E
obviously be imposed at the stage which the authority find
to be the most convenient and the most lucrative, wherever
it may be; but that is a matter of the machinery of collection,
and does not affect the essential nature of the tax. The ultimate
incidence of an excise duty, a typical indirect tax, must always be F
on the consumer, who pays as he consumes or expends; and it
continues to be an excise duty, that is, a duty on home-produced
or home-manufactured goods, no matter at what stage it is
collected. The definition of excise duties is therefore of little
assistance in determining the extent of the legislative power to
impose them; for the duty imposed by a restricted legislative power G
does not differ in essence from the duty imposed by an extended
one.
It was argued on behalf of the Provincial Government that
an excise duty was a tax on production or manufacture only
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1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A and that it could not therefore be levied at any later stage.
Whether or not there be any difference between a tax on
production and a tax on the thing produced, this contention,
no less than that of the Government of India, confuses the
nature of the duty with the extent of the legislative power
to impose it. Nor, for the reasons already given, is it possible
B
to agree that in no circumstances could an excise duty be
levied at a stage subsequent to production or manufacture.”
(Underlining and bold is ours)
10. The issue was considered further in The Province of
C Madrasvs.Messrs. BodduPaidanna& Sons 5. The following
observation would be relevant.
“In 1939 F.C.R. 18 the opinions expressed were advisory opinions
only, but we do not think that we ought to regard them as any less
binding upon us on that account. We accept, therefore, the general
D division between the Central and Provincial spheres of taxation
which commended itself to the majority of the Court in that
case…………….. They recognized that the expression ‘duty of
excise’ is wide enough to include a tax on sales ; but where power
is expressly given to another authority to levy a tax on sales, it is
clear that “duty of excise” must be given a more restricted meaning
E than it might otherwise bear. On the other hand the fact that “duty
of excise” is itself an expression of very general import is no
reason at all for refusing to give to the expression “tax on sales”
the meaning which it would ordinarily and naturally convey. In
these circumstances the question at issue in the present appeal
F appears to us to lie within a very small compass.
The duties of excise which the Constitution Act assigns exclusively
to the Central Legislature are,- according to the 1939 F.C.R 18,
duties levied upon the manufacturer or producer in respect of the
manufacture or production of the commodity taxed. The tax on
G the sale of goods, which the Act assigns exclusively to the Provincial
Legislatures, is a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of the
goods. Plainly a tax levied on the first sale must in the nature of
things be a tax on the sale by the manufacturer or producer ; but
5
A.I.R. (29) 1942 Federal Court 33 (from Madras)
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COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1113
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

it is levied upon him qua seller and not qua manufacturer or A
producer.
……………If the taxpayer who pays a sales tax is also a
manufacturer or producer of commodities subject to a central
duty of excise, there may no doubt be an overlapping in one sense
; but there is no overlapping in law. The two taxes which he is B
called on to pay are economically two separate and distinct
imposts.There is in theory nothing to prevent the Central
Legislature from imposing a duty of excise on a commodity
as soon as it comes into existence, no matter what happens
to it afterwards, whether it be sold, consumed, destroyed,
or given away. A taxing authority will not ordinarily impose C
such a duty, because it is much more convenient
administratively to collect the duty (as in the case of most
of the Excise Acts) when the commodity leaves the factory
for the first time, and also because the duty is intended to
be an indirect duty which the manufacturer or producer is D
to pass on to the ultimate consumer, which he could not do
if the commodity had, for example, been destroyed in the
factory itself.It is the fact of manufacture which attracts the
duty, even though it may be collected later ; and we may
draw attention to the Sugar Excise Act in which it is specially
provided that the duty is payable not only in respect of sugar E
which is issued from the factory but also in respect of sugar
which is consumed within the factory.In the case of a sales
tax, the liability to tax arises on the occasion of a sale, and
a sale has no necessary connexion with manufacture or
production. The manufacturer or producer cannot of course F
sell his commodity unless he has first manufactured or
produced it; but he is liable, if at all, to a sales tax because
he sells and not because he manufactures or produces; and
he would be free from liability if he chose to give away
everything which came from his factory.”
G
11. The early views on the nature of excise duty as a levy and the
stage of collection thereof would make it clear that though the impost is
on the manufacture of an article the point of collection of the same need
not necessarily coincide with the time of manufacture. The stage of
collection can and usually is a matter of administrative convenience and
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1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A such stage, normally, is the stage of clearance of article when it, for the
first time, enters the trade for sale. The above position was affirmed by
the Privy Council in Governor-General in Council v. Province of
Madras6 wherein it was, inter alia, held as follows:
“The term “ duty of excise “ is a somewhat flexible one: it may, no
doubt, cover a tax on first and, perhaps, on other sales: it may in a
B
proper context have an even wider meaning. An exhaustive
discussion of this subject, from which their Lordships have obtained
valuable assistance, is to be found in the judgment of the Federal
Court in 1939 F. C. R. 18. Consistently with this decision, their
Lordships are of opinion that a duty of excise is primarily a duty
C levied upon a manufacturer or producer in respect of the
commodity manufactured or produced. It is a tax upon goods not
upon sales or the proceeds of sale of goods. Here again, their
Lordships find themselves in complete accord with the reasoning
and conclusions of the Federal Court in the BodduPaidanna case.
The two taxes, the one levied upon a manufacturer in respect of
D
his goods, the other upon a vendor in respect of his sales, may, as
is there pointed out, in one sense overlap. But in law there is no
overlapping. The taxes are separate and distinct imposts. If in
fact they overlap, that may be because the taxing authority,
imposing a duty of excise, finds it convenient to impose that duty
E at the moment when the exciseable article leaves the factory or
workshop for the first time on the occasion of its sale. But that
method of collecting the tax is an accident of administration; it is
not of the essence of the duty of excise, which is attracted by the
manufacture itself.”
F 12. The above views received the consideration of this Court in
R.C. Jall Parsi v.Union of India and anr7. wherein this Court held
that while excise duty is essentially a duty on manufacture which is
passed on to the consumer, the stage of collection, subject to legislative
competence of the taxing authority, could be at any stage convenient so
long the character of the levy i.e. duty on manufacture is not altogether
G lost. The further view expressed was to the effect that “the method of
collection does not affect the essence of the duty, but only relates to the
machinery of collection for administrative convenience.”
13. It will hardly be necessary to reiterate the long lines of
pronouncements that have consistently followed the above view,except
6
[A.I.R. (32) 1945 Privy Council 98]
H 7
AIR 1962 SC 1281
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1115
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

to make a little detailed reference to Bombay Tyre International A
Ltd.(supra), not only because the true ratio of the decision in the said
case has to be understood for the purpose of this reference so as to deal
with the perceived conflict with Acer India Ltd. (supra) but also on
account of the fact that the subject in issue had received a full and
detailed consideration of this Court.
B
14. In Bombay Tyre International Ltd. (supra) the issue, shortly
put, waswhether determination of assessable value for thelevy of excise
duty can be only on the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit.
It was contended before this Court, by relying on the decision of this
Court in A.K. Roy and Another vs. Voltas Limited8, that having regard
to the character of the levy the measure must be restrictedthereto. The C
contention was rejected by referring to a long line of precedents including
those referred to herein above to hold that “the levy of a tax is defined
by its nature, while the measure of the tax may be assessed by its
own standard. It is true that the standard adopted as the measure
of the levy may indicate the nature of the tax but it does not D
necessarily determine it.”. The further view expressed in Bombay
Tyre International Ltd. (supra)is that merely because excise is a levy
on manufactured goods the value of the excisable article for the purpose
of levy cannot be limited to only the manufacturing cost plus
manufacturing profit. This Court went on to hold that “a broader based
standard of reference may be adopted for the purpose of E
determining the measure of the levy. Any standard which
maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be
regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the levy.”
15. A reading of Section 4 of the Act, as originally enacted; as
amended by 1973 Amendment; and as further amended by 2000 F
Amendment would clearly show that the value of the article for the
purposes of levy of ad valorem duty was with reference to the price i.e.
‘normal price’ prior to the 2000 Amendment and thereafter with
reference to the ‘transaction value’ which has been defined (already
extracted) to mean “the price actually paid or payable for the goods, G
when sold, and includes in addition to the amount charged as price……”
16. The measure for the purpose of the levy is, therefore, essentially
the price charged in respect of a transaction which must necessarily be
at arm’s length. Inclusions and additions that enrich the value of the
8
(1973) 3 SCC 503
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1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A Article till its clearance are permissible additions to the price that can be
taken into account to determine ‘value’ under the old Section 4 (prior to
2000) as well as the ‘transaction value’ under the amended section
effective from 1.7.2000. While such additions have been judicially held
to be permissible under the old Act inBombay Tyre International Ltd.
(supra) the very same heads have been statutorily engrafted by the
B
amendment made in 2000.
17. The price charged for a manufactured article at the stage
when the article enters into the stream of trade in order to determine the
value/transaction value for computation of the quantum of excise duty
payable does not come into conflict with the essential character or nature
C of the levy. The measure is the value and value isrelated to price. The
price charged at the stage of clearance, in addition to manufacturing
cost and manufacturing profit, can include certain value additions and
inclusions which enrich the value of the product to make it suitable for
sale or to facilitate such sale. At this stage, imposthas nothing to do with
D the sale. The impost is on manufacture. But it is the value upto the
stage of the first sale that is taken as the measure. Doing so does not
introduce any inconsistency between the nature and character of the
levy and the measure adopted.
18. The above aspect had been considered in Bombay Tyre
E International Ltd.(supra) on a specific contention advanced on behalf
of the Assessees that the deductions under the following heads should
be made from the sale price in the following terms:
“48. We now proceed to the question whether any post-
manufacturing expenses are deductible from the price when
F determining the “value” of the excisable article. The old Section 4
provided by the Explanation thereto that in determining the price
of any article under that section no abatement or deduction would
be allowed except in respect of trade discount and the amount of
duty payable at the time of the removal of the article chargeable
with duty from the factory or other premises aforesaid. The new
G Section 4 provides by sub-section (2) that where the price of
excisable goods for delivery at the place of removal is not known
and the value is determined with reference to the price for delivery
at a place other than the place of removal, the cost of transportation
from the place of removal to the place of delivery has to be
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COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1117
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

excluded from such price. The new Section 4 also contains sub- A
section (4)(d)(ii) which declares that the expression “value” in
relation to any excisable goods, does not include the amount of
the duty of excise, sales tax and other taxes, if any, payable on
such goods and, subject to such rules as may be made, the trade
discount (such discount not being refundable on any account
B
whatsoever) allowed in accordance with the normal practice of
the wholesale trade at the time of removal in respect of such
goods sold or contracted for sale. Now these are clear provisions
expressly providing for deduction, from the price, of certain items
of expenditure. But learned counsel for the assessees contend
that besides the heads so specified a proper construction of the C
section does not prohibit the deduction of other categories of post-
manufacturing expenses. It is also urged that although the new
Section 4(4)(d)(i) declares that in computing the “value” of an
excisable article, the cost of packing shall be included, the provision
should be construed as confined to primary packing and as not
D
extending to secondary packing. The heads under which the claim
to deduction is made are detailed below:
(1) Storage charges.
(2) Freight or other transport charges, whether specific or
equalised. E
(3) Outward handling charges, whether specific or equalised.
(4) Interest on inventories (stocks carried by the manufacturer
after clearance).
(5) Charges for other services after delivery to the buyer. F
(6) Insurance after the goods have left the factory gate.
(7) Packing charges.
(8) Marketing and Selling Organisation expenses, including
advertisement and publicity expenses.
G
(Underlining is ours)
19. The above issue was answeredby saying -
“50. We shall now examine the claim. It is apparent that for the
purpose of determining the “value”, broadly speaking both the old
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1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A Section 4 (a) and the new Section 4(1)(a) speak of the price for
sale in the course of wholesale trade of an article for delivery at
the time and place of removal, namely, the factory gate. Where
the price contemplated under the old Section 4 (a) or under the
new Section 4(1)(a) is not ascertainable, the price is determined
under the old Section 4(b) or the new Section 4(1)(b). Now, the
B
price of an article is related to its value (using this term in a general
sense), and into that value have poured several components,
including those which have enriched its value and given to the
article its marketability in the trade. Therefore, the expenses
incurred on account of the several factors which have contributed
C to its value upto the date of sale, which apparently would be the
date of delivery, are liable to be included. Consequently, where
the sale is effected at the factory gate, expenses incurred by the
assesseeupto the date of delivery on account of storage charges,
outward handling charges, interest on inventories (stocks carried
by the manufacturer after clearance), charges for other services
D
after delivery to the buyer, namely after-sales service and
marketing and selling organisation expenses including advertisement
expenses cannot be deducted. It will be noted that advertisement
expenses, marketing and selling organisation expenses and after-
sales service promote the marketability of the article and enter
E into its value in the trade. Where the sale in the course of wholesale
trade is effected by the assessee through its sales organisation at
a place or places outside the factory gate, the expenses incurred
by the assesseeupto the date of delivery under the aforesaid heads
cannot, on the same grounds, be deducted. But the assessee will
be entitled to a deduction on account of the cost of transportation
F
of the excisable article from the factory gate to the place or places
where it is sold. The cost of transportation will include the cost of
insurance on the freight for transportation of the goods from the
factory gate to the place or places of delivery.”
(Underlining is ours)
G
20. We find no room whatsoever for any disagreement with the
above view taken by this court in Bombay Tyre International
Ltd.(supra). It is a view consistent with what was held by the Federal
Court and the Privy Council in Central Provinces and Berar
(supra),BodduPaidanna(supra) and Province of Madras (supra) and
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COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE, INDORE v. M/S GRASIM 1119
INDUSTRIES LTD.THR. ITS SECY. [RANJAN GOGOI, J.]

the decisions that followed thereafter including the decision in Voltas A
Limited(supra) and Atic Industries Limited vs. H.H. Dewa, Asstt.
Collector of Central Excise and ors9 the true purport of which was
explained in Bombay Tyre International Ltd.(supra). Both the above
opinions were clarified to mean that neither of themlay down any
proposition to the effect that the excise duty can be levied only on the
B
manufacturing cost plus the manufacturing profit only.
21. At this stage, the amendment to Section 3 by substitution of
the words “a duty of excise on all excisable goods” by the words “a duty
of excise to be called the Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT) on all
excisable goods” is conspicuous. The amendment of Section 3 to the
Act not only incorporates the essentials of achanged concept of charging C
of tax onadditions to the value of goods and services at each stage of
production but also engrafts in the statute what was judicially held to be
permissible additions to the manufacturing cost and manufacturing profit
inBombay Tyre International Ltd.(supra). This fundamental change
by introduction of the concept underlying value-added taxation in the D
provisions of Section 3 really find reflection in the definition of ‘transaction
value’ as defined by Section 4(3)(d) of the Act besides incorporating
what was explicitly held to be permissible in Bombay Tyre International
Ltd. (supra). Section 4(3)(d), thus, defines ‘transaction value’ by
specifically including all value additions made to the manufactured article
prior to its clearance, as permissible additions to be price charged for E
purpose of the levy.
22. This would bring us to a consideration of the decision of this
Court in Acer India Ltd(supra). The details need not detain us.
Softwares which were duty free items and could be transacted as
softwares came to be combined with the computer hardware which F
was a dutiable item for purposes of clearance. The Revenue sought to
take into account the value of the computer software for the purposes
of determination of ‘transaction value’ with regard to the computer. This
Court negatived the stand of the Revenue taking the view that when
software as a separate item was not dutiable its inclusion in the hard- G
disk of the computer cannot alter the duty liability of the software so as
to permit the addition of the price/value of the software for the purpose
of levy of duty. It is in the above context that the decision of this Court in
Acer India Ltd.(supra)has to be understood.The observations made in
9
(1975) 1 SCC 499
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1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 6 S.C.R.

A paragraph 84 thereof to the effect that ‘transaction value’ defined in
Section 4(3)(d) of the Act would be subject to the charging provisions
contained in Section 3 of the Act will have viewed in the context of a
situation where an addition of the value of a non-dutiable itemwas sought
to be made to the value of a dutiable item for the purpose of determination
of the transaction value of the composite item. This is the limited context
B
in which the subservience of Section 4(3)(d) to Section 3 of the Act was
expressed and has to be understood. If so understood, we do not see
how the views expressed in paragraph 84 of Acer India Ltd. (supra)
can be read to be in conflict with the decision of Bombay Tyre
International Ltd. (supra).
C 23. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that the
measure of the levy contemplated in Section 4 of the Act will not be
controlled by the nature of the levy.So long a reasonable nexus is
discernible between the measure and the nature of the levy both Section
3 and 4 would operate in their respective fields as indicated above.The
D view expressed in Bombay Tyre International Ltd.(supra) is the
correct exposition of the law in this regard. Further, we hold that
“transaction value” as defined in Section 4(3)(d) brought into force by
the Amendment Act,2000, statutorily engrafts the additions to the ‘normal
price’ under the old Section 4 as heldto be permissible in Bombay Tyre
International Ltd. (supra) besides giving effect to the changed
E description of the levy of excise introduced in Section 3 of the Act by the
Amendment of 2000. Infact, we are of the view that there is no discernible
difference in the statutory concept of ‘transaction value’ and the judicially
evolved meaning of ‘normal price’.
24. The above answers would comprehend the issues specifically
F arising in all the three questions that have been referred for our opinion.

Ankit Gyan Referred issues answered.

G

H