COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAL-II COMMISSIONERATE, CHENNAIversusM/S. AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD., CHENNAI

                         [2013] 1 S.C.R. 932

A     COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAl-11
               COMMISSIONERATE, CHENNAI
                              v.
      M/S. AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD., CHENNAI
               (Civil Appeal No. 2826 of 2006)
B                        JANUARY 14, 2013
        [D.K. JAIN AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR .. JJ.]

        Excise - Cookies sold by assessee at its outlet - Use of
C brand name "cookie man" on sale of cookies in plastic
  pouches/containers - Entitlement of assessee-respondent to
  benefit of small scale exemption in respect of cookies sold
  loosely from the counter of the retail outlet - Held: Not entitled
  - It is not necessary for goods to be stamped with a trade or
o brand name to be considered as branded goods under the
  SS/ notification - A scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances
  is not only permissible, but necessary to decipher the same
  - One fails to see how the same branded cookies, sold in
  containers, could transform to become unbranded ones, when
E sold from the same counter, or even from an adjoining
  counter, without packaging carrying the brand name - The
  cookies were sold from a dedicated outlet of "Cookie Man"
  where no other products but those of the assessee were sold
  - The invoices carried the name of the company and the
F cookies were sold from a counter of the store - The store's
  decision to sell some cookies without containers that were
  stamped with its brand or trade name did not change the
  brand of the cookies - The cookies sold even without
  inscription of the brand name, indicated a clear connection
  with the brand name, in the course of assessee's business of
G manufacture and sale of cookies under the brand name
  "Cookie Man" - They continued to be branded cookies of
  "Cookie Man" and hence could not claim exemption under


H                                932
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 933
      AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD.
the SS/ Notification - S.S./. Notification No. 1193-C.E., dated   A
28th February, 1993, as amended.

     Respondent-assessee was engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cookies from branded retail
outlets of"Cookie Man". The brand name used the words             B
"Cookie Man" accompanied with a logo. The assessee
was selling some of these cookies in plastic pouches/
containers on which the brand name described above
was printed. No brand name was affixed-Or inscribed on
the cookies. Excise duty was duly p'id, on the cookies            C
sold in the said pouches/containers. However, on the
cookies sold loosely from the counter of the same retail
outlet, with plain plates and tissue paper, duty was not
paid. The retail outlets did not receive any loose cookies
nor did they manufacture them. They received all cookies          D
in sealed pouches/containers. Those sold loosely were
taken out of the containers and displayed for sale
separately.

     Notice was issued to the a.ssessee by the
Commissioner to show cause as to why (i) the cookies              E
sold by the assessee at its outlets be not classified under
Chapter sub-heading 1905.11 as biscuits and (ii) in view
of their use of brand name "Cookie Man" on sale of
cookies in plastic pouches/containers, S.S.I. exemption
should not be disallowed. Upon consideration of the               F
explanation furnished by the assessee, the
Commissioner inter-alia came to the conclusion that
unless the specified goods or the packaging in which
these are sold, bear the brand name or the logo,
prescribed S.S.I. exemption cannot be denied. Thus, the           G
Commissioner held that since there was neither any
material evidence nor averment to prove that the brand
name was embossed on the cookies, the assessee was
~ligible to avail of the benefit of small scale exemption in
respect of cookies sold loosely from the counter of the           H
    934      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A retail outlet. Aggrieved, both the Department and the
  assessee filed cross appeals before the Customs, Excise
  and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal which affirmed the
  decision of the Commissioner, and therefore the present
  appeal by the revenue under Section 35L(b) of the
B Central Excise Act, 1944.

       The question which arose for consideration was,
  whether the manufacture and sale of specified goods
  that did not physically bear a brand name, from brt1nded
  sale outlets, disentitled the assessee from the benefit of
C S.S.I. Notification No. 1/93-C.E., dated 28th February, 1993,
  as amended from time to time.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

0      HELD: 1.1. If a final product is marked or stamped
  with a brand name, it is clearly a branded good; to stretch
  this principle to imply that one not marked by any brand
  is an unbranded good, is untenable. In case a scrutiny
  of the good itself fails to reveal a brand name then the
E search must not end there; one ought to look into the
  surrounding circumstances of the good to decipher, if it
  is in fact branded or not. Such an approach is necessary
  to maintain the essence of the concept of a brand name.
  A brand/ trade name must not be reduced to a label or
  sticker that is affixed on a good. The test of whether the
F good is branded or unbranded, must not be the physical
  presence of the brand name on the good, but whether it,
  as Explanation IX of the S.S.I. Notification No. 1/93-C.E.,
  dated 28th February, 1993, reads, "is used in relation to
  such specified goods for the purpose of indicating, or so
G as to indicate a connection in the course of trade
  between such specified goods and some person using
  such name or mark with or without any indication of the
  identity of the person." Therefore, whether the brand
  name appears in entirety or in parts or does not appear
H
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 935
      AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD.
at all cannot be the chief criterion; primary focus has to     A
be on whether an indication of a connection is conveyed
in the course of trade between such specified goods and
some person using the mark. [Paras 14, 15] [946-E-H;
947-A-B]
                                                               8
     1.2. Once it is established that a specified good is a
branded good, whether it is sold without any trade name
on it, or by another manufacturer, it does not cease to be
a branded good of the first manufacturer. Therefore, soft
drinks of a certain company do not cease to be
manufactured branded goods of that company simply              C
because they are served in plain glasses, without any
indication of the company, in a private restaurant. The
good will continue to be a branded good of the company
that manufactured it. The same principle would apply in
the case of potato chips, chocolates, biscuits, wafers,        D
powders and other such goods often sold from various
locations. [Para 17] [948-F-H]

     1.3. In case of goods sold from exclusive single
brand retail outlets or restaurants or stores, the fact that   E
a good is sold from such a store ought to be a relevant
fact in construing if the good is its branded good or not.
In the case of such goods, perhaps a rebuttable
presumption arises in favour of such goods being
branded goods of the specified store. Such a                   F
presumption can be rebutted if it is shown that the
specified good being sold is in fact a branded good of
another manufacturer. Thus, branded potato chips, soft
drinks, chocolates etc. though sold from such outlets, will
not be considered to be goods of such outlets. However,        G
all other goods, sold without any appearance of a brand
or trade name on them, would not be deemed unbranded
goods; to the contrary, they may be deemed to be
branded goods of that outlet unless a different brand or
trade name appears. [Para 18] [949-A-C]
                                                               H
    936     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A      1.4 Hence, it is not necessary for goods to be
  stamped with a trade or brand name to be considered as
  branded goods under the SSI notification, discussed
  above. A scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances is
  not only permissible, but necessary to decipher the same;
B the most important of these factors being the specific
  outlet from which the good is sold. However, such
  factors would carry different hues in different scenarios.
  There can be no single formula to determine if a good is
  branded or not; such determination would vary from
c case to case. [Para 19] [949-D-F]
         1.5 In the instant case, one fails to see how the same
    branded cookies, sold in containers, can transform to
    become unbranded ones, when sold from the same
    counter, or even from an adjoining counter, without
D   packaging carrying the brand name. Admittedly, on the
    same cookies, physically bearing brand "Cookie Man"
    sold in containers carrying brand name duty is paid. It is
    interesting to note that counsel appearing on behalf of
    the assessee first argued that to determine if the cookies
E   sold from the counter are branded or not, scrutiny must
    be limited to the case of the cookies themselves without
    looking at the surrounding circumstances; yet went on
    to argue that the tissues and plates they were served on
    did not bear the brand of the specified good. Either the
F   environment of the goods can be looked into, or cannot
    be taken into consideration at all. Once it is established,
    as in the instant case, that the environment of the goods
    can be gone into to construe if it is branded or not, one
    fails to see why the environment of the goods should be
G   limited to the plates and tissues, on which they are
    served. As aforesaid, in the instant case, the cookies
    were sold from a dedicated outlet of "Cookie Man" where
    no other products but those of the assessee were sold.
    The invoices carry the name of the company and the
H   cookies were sold from a counter of the store. The
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 937
      AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD.
store's decision to sell some cookies without containers      A
that are stamped with its brand or trade name does not
change the brand of the cookies. The cookies sold even
without inscription of the brand name, indicate a clear
connection with the brand name, in the course of
assessee's business of manufacture and sale of cookies        B
under the brand name "Cookie Man". They continue to
be branded cookies of "Cookie Man" and hence cannot
claim exemption under the SSI Notification. [Para 20) [949-
G-H; 950-A-E]

    Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy v. Rukmani
                                                              c
Pakkwel/ Traders (2004) 11 SCC 801 and Commissioner of
Central Excise, Chandigarh-I, Vs. Mahaan Dairies (2004) 11
sec 798 - relied on.
     Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur v.            D
Superex Industries, Bihar (2005) 4 SCC 207: Kohinoor
Elastics (P} Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Indore
(2005) 7 sec 528 -referred to.
                    Case Law Reference:
                                                              E
    (2005) 4 sec 201           referred to     Para 11, 12
    (2005) 1 sec 528           referred to     Para 13
    (2004) 11 sec 801          relied on       Para 15
                                                              F
    (2004) 11 sec 798          relied on       Para 16
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2826 of 2006.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 27.09.2005 of the         G
Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South
Zonal Bench at Chennai, in Appeal Nos. E/916/2013 and E/
1372/04.

    R.P. Bhatt, Arijit Prasad, Shalini Kumar, Yatinder
Chaudhary, A.K. Sharma for the Appellant.                     H
    938      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A       N. Venkataraman, V. Lakshmi Kumaran, Alok Yadav,
    Rajesh Kumar, R. Satish Kumar, Parivesh Singh, Anjali
    Chauhan, V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
8      D.K. JAIN, J. 1. The short question of law which arises
  for consideration in this appeal is, whether the manufacture and
  sale of specified goods that do not physically bear a brand
  name, from branded sale outlets, would disentitle an assessee
  from the benefit of S.S.I. Notification No. 1/93-C.E., dated 28th
C February, 1993, as amended from time to time.

         2. Briefly stated, the material facts giving rise to the appeal,
    are as follows:

        Pursuant to an inspection by the officials of the
D enforcement Commissionerate, Chennai-11 at the sales outlet
  of the respondent (hereinafter referred as "the assessee"),
  revealed that the assessee was engaged in the manufacture
  and sale of cookies from branded retail outlets of "Cookie Man".
  The assessee had acquired this brand name from M/s Cookie
E Man Pvt. Ltd, Australia (which in turn acquired it from M/s Auto-
  bake Pvt. Ltd., Australia). The brand name used the words
  "Cookie Man" accompanied.with a logo depicting the smiling
  face of a mustachioed chef. The· assessee was selling some
  of these cookies in plastic pouches/containers on which the
F brand name described above was printed. No brand name was
  affixed or inscribed on the cookies. Excise duty was duly paid,
  on the cookies sold in the said pouches/containers. However,
  on the cookies sold loosely from the counter of the same retail
  outlet, with plain plates and tissue paper, duty was not paid.
G
       3. The retail outlets did not receive any loose cookies nor
  did they manufacture them. They received all cookies in sealed
  pouches/containers. Those sold loosely were taken out of the
  containers and displayed for sale separately. Even though no
H separate register was maintained to account for the sale of the
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 939
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
cookies sold loosely, their numbers were calculated from the       A
number of empty pouches/containers left behind at the end of
day.

       4. On scrutiny of the documents recovered from the said
outlet and on the basis of the statement of the Executive          B
Director, a notice dated 20th December, 2012 was issued to
the assessee by the Commissioner to show cause as to why
(i) the cookies sold by the assessee at its outlets be not
classified under Chapter sub-heading 1905.11 as biscuits and
(ii) in view of their use of brand name "Cookie Man" on sale of
cookies in plastic pouches/containers, S.S.I. exemption should     C
not be disallowed.

     5. Upon consideration of the explanation furnished by the
assessee, the Commissioner inter-alia came to the conclusion
(relevant for the controversy at hand) that unless the specified   D
goods or the packaging in which these are sold, bear the brand
name or the logo, prescribed S.S.I. exemption cannot be
denied. Thus, the Commissioner held that since there was
neither any material evidence nor averment to prove that the
brand name was embossed on the cookies, the assessee was           E
eligible to avail of the benefit of small scale exemption in
respect of cookies sold loosely from the counter of the retail
outlet. Being aggrieved by the order, both the Department and
the assessee filed cross appeals before the Customs, Excise
and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench at           F
Chennai (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal).

     6. The decision of the Commissioner having been affirmed
by the Tribunal, the revenue is before us in this appeal under
Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short "the     G
Act").

    7. There is no dispute that the specified good is to be
classified under sub-heading 1905.11 as Biscuits,
manufactured with the aid of power. The controversy revolves
around para 4 of S.S.I. notification No. 1/93-C.E. dated 28th      H
    940       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A   February, 1993, which, in its erstwhile form, read as follows: -

          "4. The exemption contained in this notification shall not
          apply to the specified goods where a manufacturer affixes
          the specified goods with a brand name or trade name
B         (registered or not) of another person who is not eligible for
          the grant of exemption under this notification ... "

        8. The meaning of a "brand name" or "trade name" is
    enunciated in Explanation IX of the said notification which says:-

C         "Explanation IX- 'Brand name' or 'trade name' shall mean
          a brand name or trade name, whether registered or not,
          that is to say a name or a mark, such as symbol,
          monogram, label, signature or invented word or writing
          which is used in relation to such specified goods for the
D         purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate a connection in
          the course of trade between such specified goods and
          some person using such name or mark with or without any
          indication of the identity of that person."

E        9. Para 4 of the said notification that deals with exemption
    for certain goods "affixed" with a brand name was amended
    vide notification No. 59/94-C.E. dated 1st March, 1994, to
    read:-

          "4. The exemption contained in this notification shall not
F         apply to the specified goods, bearing a brand name or
          trade name (registered or not) of another person ... "

       10. Part (iii) of para J of the Budget Changes-1994-95
  dealt with "Changes in the SSI schemes" explains the purpose
G of the amendment in the following words:

          "(iii) Brand name provision has been amended so as to
          provide that SSI concession shall not apply to the goods
          bearing the brand name or trade name of another person.
          The effect of this amendment is that if an SSI unit
H
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 941
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
      manufactures the branded goods for another person              A
      irrespective of whether the brand name owner himself is
      SSI unit or not, such goods shall not be eligible for the
      concession. Another implication of this amendment is that
      the requirement of affixation or brand name by the SSI unit
      has been changed and now the only condition is that the        B
      goods cleared by SSI unit bearing a brand name of another
      person shall not be eligible for the concession irrespective
      of the fact whether the brand name was affixed by the SSI
      unit or that, the input material used by the SSI unit was
      already affixed with brand name."                              c
       11. Mr. N.Venkataraman, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the assessee argued that a combined
reading of Para 4 and Explanation IX of the notification, along
with Para J of the Budget Changes, would lead to the
conclusion that only specified goods bearing an affixed brand D
name, or in other words, those goods that physically display the
brand name, are not covered by the exemption. Learned
counsel relied on the decision of this Court in the case of
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur Vs. Superex
Industries, Bihar1 for the proposition that a physical E
manifestation of a brand name on a good is a necessary
requirement for disqualification from the exemption granted by
the concerned notification. Learned counsel also relied on the
same decision to urge that this Court cannot look into the
surrounding circumstances of a good, especially the specific F
outlet from which it is sold, to construe if it is branded or not;
scrutiny, in his opinion, must be limited to the specified good
itself. The relevant paragraph of the order on which emphasis
was laid, reads as follows:

      "3. CEGAT has held that the benefit of the notification        G
      would be lost only if the manufacturer affixes the specified
      goods with a brand name or trade name of the another
      who is not eligible to the exemption under the notification.
1.   (2005) 4 sec 207.                                               H
    942       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A         It could not be denied that the name Kirloskar is not affixed
          to the generating sets. CEGAT has held that merely
          because, in the invoices, the set is passed off as a
          Kirloskar generating set, the benefit of the notification
          would not be lost. We see no infirmity in this reasoning.
B         We, therefore, see no reason to interfere."

          12. We are unable to appreciate as to how a compulsory
  requirement of physical manifestation of a brand name on the
  specified good, for it to be construed as a branded good, can
  be derived from the above passage. The decision in the above
C case simply recognizes that the benefit would be lost only if a
  manufacturer affixes the specified goods with a brand or trade
  name of another who is not eligible for the exemption under the
  notification. It does not state that the specified good must itself
  bear or be physically affixed with the brand or trade name. Such
D an interpretation would lead to absurd results in case of goods,
  which are incapable of physically bearing brand names. For
  instance, the goods, which, due to their very nature and
  structure, are incapable of bearing brand names, would always
  be deemed unbranded. Liquids, soft drinks, milk, dairy
E products, powders, edible products, salt, pepper, sweets,
  gaseous products, perfumes, deodorants etc., to name a few,
  are either liquids, gases or amorphous/brittle solids, making it
  impossible for the good to be affixed with a brand name. In
  some situations, such an affixation may be impossible, in which
F case, it would be permissible for the specified good to continue
  being a branded good, as long as its environment conveys that
  it is branded. By environment we mean packaging and
  wrapping of the good, accessories it is served with, uniform of
  vendors, invoices, menu cards, hoardings and display boards
G of outlet, furniture and props used, the specific outlet itself in
  its entirety and other such factors, all of which together or
  individually or in parts, may convey that a good is a branded
  one, notwithstanding that there is no physical inscription of the
  brand or trade name on the good itself. Further, a specific,
H dedicated and exclusive outlet from which a good is sold is often
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 943
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]

the most crucial and conclusive factor to hold a good as A
branded. The decision referred to above only made a limited
point that invoices alone cannot be the sole basis of construing
whether a good is a branded good or not; it does not hold that
a specified good itself must be stamped with a brand name. It
is therefore, permissible to look into the environment of the B
good. However, like in the case of Kirloskar generators
[Superex Industries (supra)], invoices bearing brand name
could not be the sole basis of construing whether goods are
branded or not. That decision would depend on the facts and
circumstances of the case. There can be no precise formula       c
for such a determination; in some cases certain factors may
carry more weight than in other situations. However, in most
circumstances, an exclusive branded outlet from which the
good is sold, would be a crucial factor in determining the
question.                                                        D
     13. Learned counsel strongly relied on another decision
of this Court in Kohinoor Elastics (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner
of Central Excise, Indore, 2 for the proposition that only the
"specified good" in question must be scrutinized and the
expression cannot be expanded to mean "specified outlets" or E
other surrounding circumstances. To bring home his point,
reliance was placed on the following paragraphs from the said
decision:

      "5. Clause 4 of the notification is unambiguous and clear. F
      It specifically states that the exemption contained in the
      notification shall not apply to specific goods which bear a
      brand name or trade name (registered or not) of another
      person. It is settled law that to claim exemption under a
      notification one must strictly comply with the terms of the G
      notification. It is not permissible to imply words into the
      notification which the legislature has purposely not used.
      The framers were aware that use of a brand/trade name
      is generally to show to a consumer a connection between
2.   c2005) 7 sec 52a.                                           H
    944       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A         the goods and a person. The framers were aware that
          goods may be manufactured on order for captive
          consumption by that customer and bear the brand/trade
          name of that customer. The framers were aware that such
          goods may not reach the market in the form in which they
B         were supplied to the customer. The framers were aware
          that the customer may merely use such goods as an input
          for the goods manufactured by him. Yet clause 4 provides
          in categoric terms that the exemption is lost if the goods
          bear the brand/trade name of another. Clause 4 does not
c         state that the exemption is lost only in respect of such
          goods as reach the market. It does not carve out an
          exception for goods manufactured for captive
          consumption. The framers meant what they provided. The
          exemption was to be available only to goods which did not
          bear a brand/trade name of another. The reason for this
D
           is obvious. If use of brand/trade names were to be
           permitted on goods manufactured as per the orders of
           customers or which are to be captively consumed then
           manufacturers, who are otherwise not entitled to
           exemption, would get their goods or some inputs
E          manufactured on job-work basis or through some small
           party, freely use their brand/trade name on the goods and
           avail of the exemption. It is to foreclose such a thing that
           clause 4 provides, in unambiguous terms, that the
           exemption is lost if the "goods" bear a brand/trade name
F          of another."

          xxxxx                  xxxxx                   xxxxx
          "7 ..... Now in this case there is no dispute on facts. The
          "course of trade" of the appellants is making elastics for
G
          specified customers. It is an admitted position that the
          appellants are affixing the brand/trade name of their
          customers on the elastics. They are being so affixed
          because the appellants and/or the customer wants to
          indicate that the "goods (elastic)" have a connection with
H
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 945
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
     that customer. This is clear from the fact that the elastics    A
     on which brand/trade name of 'A' is affixed will not and
     cannot be used by any person other than the person using
     that brand/trade name. As set out hereinabove once a
     brand/trade name is used in the course of trade of the
     manufacturer, who is indicating a connection between the        B
     "goods" manufactured by him and the person using the
     brand/trade name, the exemption is lost. In any case it
     cannot be forgotten that the customer wants his brand/
     trade name affixed on the product not for his own
     knowledge or interest. The elastic supplied by the              c
     appellants is becoming part and parcel of the
     undergarment. The customer is getting the brand/trade
     name affixed because he wants the ultimate customer to
     know that there is a connection between the product and
     him ... "                                                       D
       14. We feel that to hold from the above passages that
 every good must be physically stamped with a brand or trade
 name to be considered a branded good in terms of the
 notification, and that, one is forbidden to look beyond the
 specified good into the surrounding environment of the good         E
 in construing if it is a branded good or not, would be a complete
 misunderstanding of the above judgment and a distortion of the
concept of a brand or trade name. The above judgment makes
no such observation and was delivered on a completely
different set of facts and circumstances. It involved a case of      F
undergarments manufactured by a producer P2, which used
branded elastics produced by P1, and retained the brand name
of P1 in the final product. P2 was denied exemption under the
same notification involved in the present case because of the
appearance of brand name of another i.e. P1, not covered by          G
the same notice. P2 argued that the presence of P1 's brand
name should not be taken as a basis for disqualification from
the benefits of the exemption since the customer buying the
good would continue to associate the good with P2 and not P1,
thus making it a branded good of only P2. This Court rejected        H
    946     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A the contention and held that P1 is providing a stamped input
  for captive consumption to P2 "because he wants the ultimate
  customer to know that there is a connection between the
  product and him". The Court further observed that the term
  "specified goods" is used without any caveats and hence
B rejected the contention that some consideration should be given
  to the fact that P1 was used only as an input in the making of
  the final product of P2. It is in this background that this Court
  observed that the requirement of the notifications must be
  adhered to strictly and cannot be diluted by substituting the term
c "specified goods" with the nature of goods or the manner of
  disposal. In case the specified good clearly exhibits a brand
  name of another not covered by the notification, it would
  squarely fall within the confines of Para 4 of the notification;
  looking beyond the specified good to consider whether it is an
  input or not is not necessary in case of a conspicuous brand
0
  name. However, to apply this principle to the scenario of a
  specified good that does not contain a brand name at all would
  be equivalent to fitting a square peg in a round hole. If a final
  product is marked or stamped with a brand name, it is clearly
E a branded good; to stretch this principle to imply that one not
  marked by any brand is an unbranded good, is untenable. In
   case a scrutiny of the good itself fails to reveal a brand name
  then the search must not end there; one ought to look into the
   surrounding circumstances of the good to decipher, if it is in
  fact branded or not.
F
       15. We are of the opinion that such an approach is
  necessary to maintain the essence of the concept of a brand
  name. A brand/ trade name must not be reduced to a label or
  sticker that is affixed on a good. The test of whether the good
G is branded or unbranded, must not be the physical presence
  of the brand name on the good, but whether it, as Explanation
  IX reads, "is used in relation to such specified goods for the
  purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate a connection in the
  course of trade between such specified goods and some
H person using such name or mark with or without any indication
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 947
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
of the identity of the person." Therefore, whether the brand          A
name appears in entirety or in parts or does not appear at all
cannot be the chief criterion; primary focus has to be on whether
an indication of a connection is conveyed in the course of trade
between such specified goods and some person using the
mark. Highlighting this principle, this Court in Commissioner         B
of Central Excise, Trichy Vs. Rukmani Pakkwel/ Traders 3
observed thus: -

      "6. The Tribunal had also held that under the notification
      the use must be of "such brand name". The Tribunal has
      held that the words "such brand name" show that the very        C
      same brand name or trade name must be used. The
      Tribunal has held that if there are any differences then the
      exemption would not be lost. We are afraid that in coming
      to this conclusion the Tribunal has ignored Explanation IX.
      Explanation IX makes it clear that the brand name or trade      D
      name shall mean a brand name or trade name (whether
      registered or not), that is to say, a name or a mark, code
      number, design number, drawing number, symbol,
      monogram, label, signature or invented word or writing.
      This makes it very clear that even a use of part of a brand     E
      name or trade name, so long as it indicates a connection
      in the course of trade would be sufficient to disentitle the
      person from getting exemption under the notification. In this
      case, admittedly, the brand name or trade name is the
      word "ARR" with the photograph of the founder of the            F
      group. Merely because the registered trade mark is not
      entirely reproduced does not take the respondents out of
      clause 4 and make them eligible to the benefit of the
      notification."
                                                                      G
      16. Similarly, in Commissioner of Central Excise,
Chandigarh-I, Vs. Mahaan Dairies, 4 it was noted as follows:

3.   c2004) 11 sec 801.
4.   (2004) 11 sec 798.                                               H
    948       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A         "6. We have today delivered a judgment in CCE v.
          Rukmani Pakkwel/ Traders, (2004) 11 SCC 801 wherein
          we have held in respect of another notification containing
          identical words that it makes no difference whether the
          goods on which the trade name or mark is used are the
B         same in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
          Even if the goods are different, so long as the trade name
          or brand name of some other company is used the benefit
          of the notification would not be available. Further, in our
          view, once a trade name or brand name is used then mere
c         use of additional words would not enable the party to claim
          the benefit of the notification."

          "8. It is settled law that in order to claim benefit of a
          notification, a party must strictly comply with the terms of
          the notification. If on wording of the notification the benefit
D         is not available then by stretching the words of the
          notification or by adding words to the notification benefit
          cannot be conferred. The Tribunal has based its decision
          on a decision delivered by it in Rukmani Pakkwell
          Traders v. CCE (1999) 109 ELT 204 (CEGAT). We have
E         already overruled the decision in that case. In this case
          also we hold that the decision of the Tribunal is
          unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside."

       17. As aforesaid, once it is established that a specified
F good is a branded good, whether it is sold without any trade
  name on it, or by another manufacturer, it does not cease to
  be a branded good of the first manufacturer. Therefore, soft
  drinks of a certain company do not cease to be manufactured
  branded goods of that company simply because they are
G served in plain glasses, without any indication of the company,
  in a private restaurant. The good will continue to be a branded
  good of the company that manufactured it. The same principle
  would apply in the case of potato chips, chocolates, biscuits,
  wafers, powders and other such goods often sold from various
  locations.
H
COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, CHENNAI v. 949
 AUSTRALIAN FOODS INDIA (P) LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
      18. In case of goods sold from exclusive single brand retail A
outlets or restaurants or stores, the fact that a good is sold from
such a store ought to be a relevant fact in construing if the good
is its branded good or not. In the case of such goods, perhaps
a rebuttable presumption arises in favour of such goods being
branded goods of the specified store. Such a presumption can 8
be rebutted if it is shown that the specified good being sold is
in fact a branded good of another manufacturer. Thus, branded
potato chips, soft drinks, chocolates etc. though sold from such
outlets, will not be considered to be goods of such outlets.
However, all other goods, sold without any appearance of a C
brand or trade name on them, would not be deemed unbranded
goods; to the contrary, they may be deemed to be branded
goods of that outlet unless a different brand or trade name
appears.

      19. Hence, we hold that it is not necessary for goods to       D
be stamped with a trade or brand name to be considered as
branded goods under the SSI notification, discussed above. A
scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances is not only
permissible, but necessary to decipher the same; the most
important of these factors being the specific outlet from which      E
the good is sold. However, such factors would carry different
hues in different scenarios. There can be no single formula to
determine if a good is branded or not; such determination would
vary from case to case. Also, our observations must be limited
to this notification and not supplanted to other laws with similar   F
subject matter pertaining to trade names and brand names.
      20. Applying the said principles on the facts at hand, we
fail to see how the same branded cookies, sold in containers,
can transform to become unbranded ones, when sold from the
same counter, or even from an adjoining counter, without             G
packaging carrying the brand name. Admittedly, on the same
cookies, physically bearing brand "Cookie Man" sold in
containers carrying brand name duty is paid. It is interesting to
note that learned counsel appearing on behalf of the assessee
                                                                     H
    950     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A first argued that to determine if the cookies sold from the
  counter are branded or not, scrutiny must be limited to the case
  of the cookies themselves without looking at the surrounding
  circumstances; yet went on to argue that the tissues and plates
  they were served on did not bear the brand of the specified
8 good. Either the environment of the goods can be looked into,
  or cannot be taken into consideration at all. Once it is
  established, as in the instant case, that the environment of the
  goods can be gone into to construe if it is branded or not, we
  do not see why the environment ~f the goods should be limited
C to the plates and tissues, on which they are served. As
  aforesaid, in the instant case, the cookies were sold from a
  dedicated outlet of "Cookie Man" where no other products but
  those of the assessee were sold. The invoices carry the name
  of the company and the cookies were sold from a counter of
  the store. In our opinion, the store's decision to sell some
D cookies without containers that are stamped with its brand or
  trade name does not change the brand of the cookies. We are
  convinced that the cookies sold even without inscription of the
  brand name, indicate a clear connection with the brand name,
  in the course of assessee's business of manufacture and sale
E of cookies under the brand name "Cookie Man". They continue
  to be branded cookies of "Cookie Man" and hence cannot
  claim exemption under the SSI Notification.

       21. In view of the aforegoing discussion, we are of the
F opinion that the impugned decision of the Tribunal is erroneous
  and unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the
  impugned order is set aside, leaving the parties to bear their
  own costs.

   B.B.B.                                        Appeal allowed.