COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHIversusM/S. ACE AUTO COMP. LTD.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 889
- Decided
- 16 December 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- D K JAIN
Holding
Use of another person's brand name with the intention of indicating a connection disqualifies the assessee from the small‑scale exemption under Notifications 1/93‑CE and 16/97‑CE.
Summary
ACE Auto Components Ltd, a small‑scale industrial unit, manufactured clutch parts and affixed the well‑known brand name "TATA" alongside its own brand "ACE" on the goods supplied to Tata vehicles. It claimed exemption from central excise duty under SSI Notification Nos. 1/93‑CE and 16/97‑CE. The Revenue issued a show‑cause notice, the adjudicating authority imposed duty and penalty, but the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside the order; the Tribunal upheld the exemption claim, prompting the Revenue to appeal. The Supreme Court examined the definition of "brand name" and Explanation IX of the notifications, holding that clause 4 expressly bars exemption where goods bear another person’s brand name with the intention of indicating a connection. By using "TATA", the assessee intended to associate its products with Tata’s reputation and quality, thereby attracting the exclusion. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal’s order and restored the adjudicating authority’s decision, denying the exemption.
Issues considered
- Whether the use of another person's brand name on goods by a small‑scale industrial unit disqualifies it from the exemption under Notification No. 1/93‑CE and Notification No. 16/97‑CE.
- Whether the intention to indicate a connection with the brand owner is required to invoke the exclusion clause in the notifications.
Legislation cited
- Central Excise Act, 1944s. 11AC, s. 35(L)(b)
- Central Excise Rules, 1944s. 173Q, s. 226, s. 9(2)
Subjects
Judgment
[2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1101
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI A
v.
MIS. ACE AUTO COMP. LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 3051 of 2003)
DECEMBER 16, 2010
B
(D.K. JAIN AND H.L. DATTU, JJ.)
Central Excise Act, 1944 - Excise duty - Small scale
industrial unit (SS/) exemption - Assessee using brand name
of another person on its goods and supplying the goods to C
the said company - Benefit of SS/ Notification No. 1193 CE
dated 28.02.1993 and 16197 CE dated 01.04.1997 -
Entitlement to - Held: Assessee not entitled to the benefit of
the exemption - By using the said brand name, assessee
intended to indicate a connection between the goods D
manufactured by them and other company as also the quality
of their product as that of a product of the other company -
Notification No. 1193 - CE dated 28.02.1993 and Notification
No. 16197- CE dated 01.04.1997.
E
The respondent-assessee, a small scale industrial
unit, used another person's brand name along with their
own brand name on the goods manufactured and
claimed the benefit of SSI Notification Nos. 1/93-CE dated
28.02.1993 and 16/97-CE dated 01.04.1997. After issuing
a show cause notice to the respondent, the Adjudicating F
• Authority imposed excise duty and penalty, as mentioned
in the notice. However, the Commissioner set aside the
order imposing duty and the penalty. In appeal, the
Tribunal held that the respondent was entitled to the
benefit of Notification Nos. 1/93-CE and 16/97-CE. G.
Therefore, the Revenue filed the instant appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The Notif~~e~ion No. 1 /93 " CE dated H .
1102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 28.02.1993 as amended, grants exemption from payment
of central excise duty to small scale industrial units. It
contains the definition of "brand name" and provides that
the exemption contained therein shall not be available to
goods bearing the brand name of another person.
B Notification No. 16197- CE dated 01.04.1997 contains the
same. It is manifest from a bare reading of Clause 4 of
Notification no. 1193 - CE, read with Explanation IX that it
clearly debars an assessee from the benefit of exemption
under the Notification, if he uses another person's brand
c or trade name with the intention of indicating a
connection between the assessee's goods and such
other person. The object of the exemption Notification is
to grant benefits only to those industries which otherwise
do not have the advantage of brand or trade name. [Paras
.D 10 and 11] [1109-E; 1110-B-E]
Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I/ vs.
BhallaEnterprises (2005) 8 SCC 308; Commissioner of
Central Excise,Raipur vs. Hira Cement. (2006) 2 SCC 439;
Kohinoor Elastics (P) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central
E Excise, Indore (2005) 7 sec 528, relied on.
Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy vs. Grasim
Industries Ltd.(2005) 4 SCC 194.- referred to.
1.2. In order to avail of the benefit of the exemption
F Notification, the assessee must establish that his product
is not associated with some other person. If it is shown
that the assessee has affixed the brand name of another
person on his goods with the intention of indicating a
connection between the assessee's goods and the
G goods of another person, using such name or mark, then
the assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of
exemption notification. If the assessee is able to satisfy
the Adjudicating Authority that there was no such
intention, or that the user of the brand name was entirely
H
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1103
AUTO COMP. LTD.
fortuitous, it would be entitled to the benefit of the A
exemption. [Para 14) [1112-F-H]
1.3. In the instant case, the brand name "TATA" did
not belong to the assessee. By using the said brand
name, the assessee not only intended to indicate a
B
connection between the goods manufactured by them
and a Tata Company, but also the quality of their product
as that of a product of Tata Company, as they were
supplying their goods to the said company. Thus, the bar
created in Clause 4 read with Explanation IX of the C
Notification is clearly attracted in the instant case,
disentitling the assessee from the benefit of the
exemption Notifications under consideration. The
decision of the tribunal is clearly erroneous. The
impugned order is set aside and the order passed by the
Adjudicating Authority is restored. [Paras 15 and 16) D
[1113-A-D]
Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta vs. Emkay
Investments (P) Ltd. & Anr. (2005) 1 SCC 526;
Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I vs. Mahaan E
Dairies (2004) 11 SCC 798; Commissioner of Trade Tax,
UP. and Anr. vs. Kajaria Ceramics Ltd. (2005) 11 SCC 149;
Pappu Sweets and Biscuits· and Anr. vs. Commissioner of
Trade Tax, UP. (1998) 7 SCC 228; Nirlex Spares (P) Ltd. vs.
Commissioner of Central Excise (2008) 2 SCC 628; F
Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur vs. Superex
Industries, Bihar (2005) 4 SCC 207; Commissioner of
Customs, Mumbai. vs. Toyo Engineering India Ltd. (2006) 7
SCC 592; Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur vs.
Ballarpur Industries Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 89, referred to.
G
Case Law Reference:
(2005) 1 sec 526 Referred to. Para 8
(2004) 11 sec 798 Referred to. Para 8
H
1104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R..
A (2005) 11 sec 149 Referred to. Para 9
(1998) 1 sec 228 Referred to. Para 9
(2008) 2 sec 628 Referred to. Para 9
(2005) 4 sec 201 Referred to. Para 9
B
(2006) 1 sec 592 Referred to. Para 9
(2007) 8 sec 89 Referred to. Para 9
(2005) 8 sec 308 Relied on. Para 11
c
(2006) 2 sec 439 Relied on. Para 11
(2005) 1 sec 528 Relied on. Para 12
(2005) 4 sec 194 Referred to. Para 13
D CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
3051 of 2003.
From the Judgment & Order dated 10.10.2002 of the
CEGAT, New Delhi in Appeal No. E/1405/2002-B.
E
B. Bhattacharya, ASG, Shipra Ghose, Arijit Prasad, B.K.
Prasad for the Appellant.
S.K. Bagaria, Nitya Bagaria for the Respondent.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
O.K. JAIN, J. 1. The present civil appeal, filed under
Section 35(L)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short "the
Act") by the Revenue, is directed against order dated 1oth
October, 2002 passed by the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control)
G Appellate Tribunal (for short "the Tribunal") wherein it has been
held that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of
Notifications Nos. 1/93-CE and 16/97-CE.
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts material for the
H
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1105
AUTO COMP. LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
adjudication of the present appeal may be stated as under: A
The respondent (hereinafter referred to as "the assessee"),
a small scale industrial unit (for short "SSI"), is engaged in the
manufacture of clutch plates, clutch cover assemblies and
pressure plates, falling under sub-heading No. 8708.00 of the 8
Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. Admittedly, the
assessee prefixed the symbol and logo "TATA" along with their
own brand name "ACE" on cover assembly manufactured for
TATA 310 vehicle. The assessee filed declaration Nos. 545/
96 w.e.f 4th November 1996; 104/97 w.e.f. 25th March, 1997;
105/97 and 106/97 w.e.f. 1st April 1997, claiming the benefit C
of SSI Notification Nos. 1/93 and 16/97.
3. A raid was conducted at the premises of the assessee,
which resulted in issuance of a show cause notice dated 13th
May, 1998 to the assessee asking them to explain as to why D
duty amounting to '1,46,151/-; and penalty under Rules 9(2),
173Q and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short "the
Rules") together with penalty under Section 11 AC of the Act
may not be levied on them, for clearing branded goods of
another person. E
4. The Additional Commissioner of Central Excise (for
short "the Adjudicating Authority"), vide Order-in-Original No.06
dated 3rd June, 1999, while confirming the duty and penalty as
contained in the show cause notice, observed that:
F
"Any person who buys the product, it is the TATA brand
name which will strike the eyes of the buyer first as it is a
well known and established brand name rather than the
other logo ACE. As such going by the Tribunal decision
cited by the party the case has to be decided against G
them ............................................................ .
14. The other point raised by the party is that since they
do not sell the product to TATA's, the owner of the brand
name TATA, there is no connection between the branded
H
1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A prqduct and the brand name owner. I fail to see the logic
in this contention. The explanation IX to notification no. 1/
93 dated 28.2.1993 merely means that by looking at a
particular brand name or trade name an association
between the brand name owner and the product should
B get established. In fact this is the very purpose of using a
brand name. In the instant case any person buying the
product will naturally assume the product to have the
quality, specification etc. associated with products of TATA
group. It is not necessary to actually sell the product to
c TATA companies to establish any connection between the
product and the brand name owner.
15. Thus once it is held that the cover assembly was
branded with the TATA logo which did not belong to the party,
and no evidence was produced that the TATA group of
D companies was themselves eligible for the excise exemption,
benefit of notification 1/93 and 16/97 cannot be extended to
these products manufactured by the party but carrying the TATA
brand name or logo."·
E 5. Being aggrieved, the assessee preferred an appeal
before the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals). The
Commissioner (Appeals), vide order dated 10th February,
2002, allowed the appeal, observing thus:
"5.4 Thus, we find that the appellate bodies are treating
F any slight variation in the brand names as different entities
as in "Mahaan" and "Mahaan Tastemaker" or "AGI" and
"AGI Switches". Here, the two conflicting brand names are
"TATA" and "TATA ACE" and the sole reason for this
usage of the name "TATA" is that it stands earmarked for
G a particular vehicle. They are also manufacturing auto parts
for use in the other vehicles of different manufacti.:rers for
which they do not use this logo.
5.5. In the light of the above decisions of the Hon'ble
H CEGAT, I have no alternative but to follow the judicial
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1107
AUTO COMP. LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
precedent. I thus hold that 'TATA ACE' brand name is A
different from the popular brand name "TATA"."
6. Aggrieved, the revenue took the matter further in appeal
to the Tribunal. As stated above, vide the impugned order, the
Tribunal has dismissed the appeal. The Tribunal has come to
B
the conclusion that:
"According to the Notification, exemption shall not apply if
the specified goods are bearing the brand name of another
person. It is not the case of the Revenue that 'Tata Ace' is
the brand name of another person. The very fact that there C
is no material to prove that the brand name, which the
excisable goods manufactured by the respondents bear,
belongs to another person, the mischief of Para 4 of the
Notification No. 1/93 will not be attracted.
D
We also find substance in the finding of the Commissioner
(Appeals) that the usage of the name 'Tata' in the brand
name is with a view to indicate that the part is for a
particular vehicle manufactured by Tata."
E
7. Hence, the present civil appeal.
8. Mr. B. Bhattacharya, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing on behalf of the Revenue, while assailing
the impugned order, urged that in light of the decisions of this F
Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Calcutta Vs. Emkay
Investments (P) Ltd. & Anr1• and Commissioner of Central
Excise, Chandigarh-I Vs. Mahaan Dairies2 , it is settled that
whenever the assessee affixes the brand name of another
person on its goods with the intention to indicate some G
connection between the goods and the said brand name, the
assessee is barred from availing the benefit of the Notifications.
It was asserted that in view of the fact that indubitably the brand
1. (2005) 1 sec 526.
2. (2004) 11 sec 798. H
1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A name "TATA", which did not belong to the assessee but to
another identified company, had been affixed by the assessee
on their product, although in conjunction with the word "ACE"
the Tribunal's conclusion that there was no material to prove
that the brand name "TATA ACE" belonged to another person,
B is clearly a misconstruction of para 4 of the notifications in
question and therefore, its decision deserves to be set aside.
9. Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned senior counsel, appearing as
Amicus Curiae, submitted that the Tribunal has rightly
concluded that there was no evidence to prove that the brand
C name 'TATA ACE" belonged to another person, and the said
finding of fact deserves to be affirmed as it has not been
specifically challenged by the Revenue. Learned counsel
argued that in the present case the pre-requisite for invoking
paragraph 4 of Notification No. 1/93 is not satisfied in as much
D as the Revenue has not been able to establish that the brand
name 'TATA ACE" belongs to another person. In support of the
submission that the burden to prove that the brand name
belongs to another person is on the Revenue, learned counsel
placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in
E Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. & Anr. Vs. Kajaria
Ceramics Ltd. 3 . Commending us to the decision of this Court
in Pappu Sweets and Biscuits & Anr. Vs. Commissioner of
Trade Tax, UP., Lucknow\ learned counsel argued that
paragraph 4 of Notification No.1/93 being an extlusionary
F clause, the same has to be strictly construed. Learned counsel
contended that since both the Tribunal as also the
Commissioner (Appeals) have concluded that the use of the
word "TATA" was merely to denote that the product was meant
for use in a particular vehicle, the affixation of 'TATA" was
G merely descriptive of the assessee's product and not as if the
goods had been marketed with another brand name. Relying
on the decisions of this Court in Nirlex Spares (P) Ltd. Vs.
3. (2oos) 11 sec 149.
4. (1998) 1 sec 228.
H
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1109
AUTO COMP. LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
Commissioner of Central Excise 5 ; Commissioner of Central A
Excise, Jamshedpur Vs. Superex Industries, Bihar6 and
Emkay Investments (P) Ltd. (supra), learned counsel submitted
that mere use of the word "TATA" should not disentitle the
assessee from the benefit of the two Notifications. Learned
counsel further urged that the Revenue's argument that the use B
of the word "TATA" would create an impression in the minds
of the consumer that the said product was manufactured by one
of the Tata companies was misplaced in as much as no such
test was envisaged under the Notifications. Moreover, the
Revenue had not made any such allegation in the show cause c
notice, and in light of the decisions of this Court in
Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai Vs. Toyo Engineering
India Ltd. 7 and Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur Vs.
Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 8 , it is trite that the foundation of the
Revenue's case is laid in the show cause notice, and the same
D
must be confined to the allegations contained therein.
10. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be
useful to extract relevant portions of Notification No. 1/93-CE
dated 28th February, 1993 as amended, which grants
exemption from payment of Central Excise duty to small scale F·
industrial units. It read as:
"4. The exemption contained in this notification shall not
apply to the specified goods, bearing brand name or trade
name (registered or not) of aRother person: F .
Explanation IX.- "Brand name" or "trade name" shall mean
a brand name or trade name, whether registered or not,
that is to say a name or a mark, such as symbol, G
5. (2008) 2 sec 628.
6. (2005) 4 sec 207.
7. (2006) 7 sec 592.
8. (2007) a sec 89. H
1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A monogram, label, signature or invented word or writing
which is used in relation to such specified goods for the
purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate a connection in
the course of trade between such specified goods and
some person using such name or mark with or without any
B indication of the identity of that person."
Notification No. 16/97- CE dated 1st April, 1997 contains the
same definition of "brand name" as Notification No. 1/93-CE,
and also provides that the exemption contained therein shall
C not be available to goods bearing the brand name of another
person.
11. It is manifest from a bare reading of Clause 4 of the
Notification, read with Explanation IX that it clearly debars an
assessee from the benefit of exemption under the notification,
D if he uses another person's brand or trade name with the
intention of indicating a connection between the assessee's
goods and such other person. It is evident that the object of the
exemption notification is to grant benefits only to those
industries which otherwise do not have the advantage of brand
E or trade name. (See: Commissioner of Central Excise,
Chandigarh-I/ Vs. Bhalla Enterprises; 9 Nirlex Spares (P) Ltd.
(supra); Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur Vs. Hira
Cement. 10)
12. In Kohinoor Elastics (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of
F Central Excise, Indore, 11 while construing an identical
notification (No.1of1993-CE), dated 28th February 1993, this
Court had observed that:
"Clause 4 of the notification is unambiguous and clear. It
G specifically states that the exemption contained in the
notification shall not apply to specific goods which bear a
9. (2005) 8 sec 308.
10. (2006) 2 sec 439.
H 11. (2005) 7 sec 528.
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1111
AUTO COMP. LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.l
brand name or trade name (registered. or not) of another A
person. It is settled law that to claim exemption under a .
notification one must strictly comply with the terms of the
notification. It is not permissible to imply words into the ·
notification which the legislature has purposely not used.
The framers were aware that use of a brand/trade name B
is generally to show to a consumer a connection between
the goods and a person. The framers were aware that
goods may be manufactured on order for captive
consumption by that customer and bear the brand/trade
name of that customer. The framers were aware that such c
goods may not reach the market in the form in which they
were supplied to the customer. The framers were aware
that the customer may merely use such goods as an input
for the goods manufactured by him. Yet clause 4 provides
in categoric terms that the exemption is lost if the goods . D
bear the brand/trade name of another. Clause 4 does not
state that the exemption is lost only in respect of such
goods as reach the market. It does not· carve out an
exception for goods manufactured for captive
consumption. The framers meant what they provided. The
exemption was to be available only to goods which did not
bear a brand/trade name of another. The reason for this
is obvious. If use of brand/trade names were to be
permitted on goods manufactured as per the orders of
customers or which are to be captively consumed then
manufacturers, who are otherwise not entitled to F
exemption, would get their goods or some inputs
manufactured on job-work basis or through some small
party, freely use their brand/trade name on the goods and
avail of the exemption. It is to foreclose such a thing that
clause 4 provides, in unambiguous terms, that the G ·.
exemption is lost if the "goods" bear a brand/trade name
of another."
We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning in the
afore-extracted paragraph. H
1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 13. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy Vs. Grasim
Industries Ltd. 12 , a Bench of three judges of this Court, while
construing Notification No. 5/98-CE, dated 2nd June 1998,
which was similar to the one under consideration by us, had
observed that:
B
" .... Even the name of some other company, if it is used
for the purposes of indicating a connection between the
product and that company, would be sufficient. It is not
necessary that the name or the writing must always be a
brand name or a trade name in the sense that it is normally
c understood. The exemption is only to such parties who
do not associate their products with some other person.
Of course this being a notification under the Excise Act,
the connection must be of such a nature that it reflects on
the aspect of manufacture and deal with quality of the
D products. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down however
it is possible that words which merely indicate the party
who is marketing the product may not be sufficient. As we
are not dealing with such a case we do not express any
opinion on this aspect."
E
(Emphasis supplied by us)
14. Therefore, in order to avail of the benefit of the
exemption notification, the assessee must establish that his
product is not associated with some other person. To put it
F differently, if it is shown that the assessee has affixed the brand
name of another person on his goods with the intention of
indicating a connection between the assessee's goods and the
goods of another person, using such name or mark, then the
assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of exemption
G notification. We may hasten to clarify that if the assessee is able
to satisfy the Adjudicating Authority that there was no such
intention, or that the user of the brand name was entirely
fortuitous, it would be entitled to the benefit of the exemption.
H 12. c2oos) 4 sec 194.
COMMISSIONER CENTRAL EXCISE, DELHI v. ACE 1113
AUTO COMP. LTD. [D.K. JAIN, J.]
15. In the instant case, admittedly, the brand name "TATA" A
did not belong to the assessee. It is also evident that by using
the said brand name, the assessee had not only intended to
indicate a connection between the goods manufactured by them
and a Tata Company; but also the quality of their product as
that of a product of Tata Company, as they were supplying their B
goods to the said company. Thus, the bar created in Clause 4 ·
read with Explanation IX of the Notification is clearly attracted
in the present·case, disentitling the assessee from the benefit
of the exemption notifications under consideration. We are of
the opinion that the decision of the Tribunal is clearly erroneous c
and deserves to be set aside.
16. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal
is allowed; the impugned order is set aside and the order
passed by the Adjudicating Authority is restored.
D
17. Before parting with the case, we place on. record our
deep appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri
S.K. Bagaria, the learned Amicus Curiae.
18. There will be no ord.er as to costs.
E
N.J. Appeal allowed.
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.