COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY-IIversusKIRAN SPINNING MILLS, KOLSHET ROAD, THANE
- Citation
- 1988 INSC 43
- Decided
- 15 February 1988
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- SABYASACHI MUKHERJI
Holding
Cutting polyester fibre tow into staple fibre does not amount to manufacture as it does not create a new substance, so no excise duty is payable.
Summary
The respondents purchased polyester fibre tow, described as "crimpled uncut waste," and cut it into short lengths to produce polyester staple fibre. The Collector held that this conversion constituted manufacture and attracted excise duty, but the Customs, Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal found that merely cutting the fibre did not create a new substance and therefore was not manufacture. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the cutting of tow into staple fibre amounted to "manufacture" under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that manufacture requires the creation of a new substance or a distinct article, which was absent here. Consequently, the cutting did not attract duty and the Tribunal's decision was affirmed. The revenue's appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether cutting polyester fibre tow into staple fibre constitutes "manufacture" within the meaning of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, thereby making the product liable to excise duty.
Legislation cited
- Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944s. 35-L(b), s. 35-P
Subjects
Judgment
COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, BOMBAY-II
A
v.
KIRAN SPINNING MILLS, KOLSHET ROAD, THANE
FEBRUARY 15, 198~
B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND S. RANGANATHAN, JJ.]
Central Excise and Salt Act 1944: Section· 35L & Ministry of 1
Finance Notification dated December 22, 1972-'Tow' and 'Staple \ ·~
fibre'-Distinction between-Running length fibre (tow) cut into short -
length fibre (staple fibre)-Substance obtained-Polyester staple
C fibre-Excise duty-Liability for-Taxable event under excise law is
'manufacture'. . -~
Word & Phrases: 'Tow'-'Staple fibre'-'Manufacture'-Mean-
ing of.
D
The Central Excise Officers during the course of investigations t .,,
made against M/s Swastik Investment Company, Bombay found that
some of the consignments of the material described in documents as
'crimpled uncut waste' were cleared from M/s Swadeshi Polytex
Limited, Ghaziabad during the period from January, 1974 to
E December, 1977, were purchased by the respondents and utilised by --f,
them in the manufacture of 'polyester staple fibre'.
The Collector held that the 'crimpled uncut waste' purchased by
the respondents was in fact 'polyester fibre tow' and that the respon-
dents had carried on manufacture of 'polyester staple fibre' from tow
F and, as such, exigible to duty.
Aggrieved by the Collector's Order the respondents filed an -~- ,,
appeal before the Central Board of Excise and Customs. This appeal '..:'llf
was transferred to the Customs Excise and Gold Control Appellate
Tribunal in pursuance of s. 35-P of the Central Excises and Salt Act,
G 1944.
The Tribunal on an examination of the material and the conten-
tions came to the conclusion that what the respondents had purchased
was already man-made-fibre but in running length, and that what they
did in relation to it, was to cut it into. staple length after some manual
H sorting and straightening and held that such cutting involved no
1006
COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE v. KIRAN SPNG. MILLS 1007
y manufacture and hence no duty liability could be imposed. A
1 In the Appeal by the revenue to this Court on the question:
whether there was exigibility to taxation on the item manufactnred by
the respondent.
B
Dismissing the Appeal.
HELD: l. There is a distinction between 'tow' and 'staple fibre'.
'Tow' 'is fibre in running length and 'staple fibre' is obtained by cutting
it into required short length. I1009BI
2. The taxable event under the Excise Law is 'manufacture'. C
rl--:Mannfacture' means to bring into existence a new substance and does
/ not mean merely to produce some change in a substance. I10090 I
'
3. Etymologically the word 'manufacture' properly construed
would doubtless cover transformation, bot the qnestion is whether the
0
transformation in the instant case brings about fundamental change, a
-+ new substance is brought into existence, or a new different article
having distinctive name, character or use results from a particular
process or a particular activity. I1009D-EI
In the instant case, it is not disputed that wbat the respondents
r did, was to cut the running length fibre (tow) into short length fibre E
(staple fibre). indubitably brought a change in the substance but did
It
not bring into existence a new substance. The character and use of the
substance (man-made fibre) remained the same. By the change in the
length of the fibre, the substance acquired a new name. But since the
tariff entry recognised the single description 'man-made fibre' with no F
further sob-division based on length of fibre and even without any
distinct enumeration of the various forms of fibre by cutting long fibres
,_,,..into short ones, the respondents did not bring into existence any new
product so as to attract any levy under the same tariff entry. Even by
cutting, the respondents obtained man-made fibre. Such cutting, there-
fore, involved no manufacture and, hence, no duty liability can be G
)' imposed upon them. h009E-HJ
y Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills, 11963] 1 Snppl.
SCR 586; Empire Industries Ltd. & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors.
etc., [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR page 292 and Mis Ujagar Prints v. Union of
India, [1986] Suppl. SCC 652, referred to. H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] 2 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2891 'y
of 1984.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.2.84 of the Customs
Excise and Gold Control Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Order
No. 118/84-D.
B
A.K. Ganguli, P. Parrneswaran and K. Swamy for the
Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is a statutory appeal under
C Section 35-L(b) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944, hereinafter A
called the 'Act', against the Order dated February 22, 1944 passed by \
the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, herein-
after called the 'CEGAT'
D In this appeal we are concerned with the question whether there
was exigibility to taxation on the item concerned under the Act. It 1 ·-
appears that during the course of investigations made against Swastik
Investment Company, Boin bay, the Central Excise Officers found that
some of the consignments of the material described in the documents
as 'crimpled uncut waste' were cleared from M/s. Swadeshi Polytex
E Ltd., Ghaziabad, during the period from Jan'74 to Dec'77 and were i
purchased by the respondents herein and utilised in the manufacture
of polyester staple fibre .. The Collector held that the so-called 'crimp-
led uncut waste' purchased by the respondents was, in fact, polyester
fibre tow and the staple fibre which were commercially two distinct
products and the respondents had carried on manufacture of polyester
F staple fibre from tow and, as such, exigible to duty. The respondents
filed an app.eal before the Central Board of Excise & Customs against - J . ,r
the Collector's Order. The appeal was thereafter transferred to- 'J
CEGAT in pursuance of Section 35--P of the Act. -
It appears that there is distinction between a tow and staple
G fibre. The Ministry of Finance (Deptt. of Revenue)'s circular indicates
as follows:
y
"'row is a collection of many parallel continuous filaments
without twist which are grouped together in rope like form."
H "Tow is used for the same purpose for which staple fibre is
COLLECTOROFCEN1RALEXCISEv.KIRANSPNG.MILLS[MUKHARJI,J.] 1009
y used. Tow is mainly converted into staple fibre and only a A
negligible quantity is converted directly into yam. It has
been therefore decided that duty should be levied on
Tow at the rate applicable to staple fibre (MF (DR & I)
F. No. 50/7/71-CX2dt. 22.12.72)".
B
In other words, Tow is fibre in running length and staple fibre is
obtained by cutting it into required short length. On an examination of
the material and the contention, the Tribunal came to the conclusion
that the material which the respondents had purchased was already
man-made fibre but in running length. All that the respondents did in
relation to it, was to cut it into staple length after some manual sorting
-.
and straightening. The question, therefore, is whether cutting the long C
fibre into short fibre resulted into a new and different articles of com-
t "merce. Now it is well settled how to determine whether there was
manufacture or not. This Court held in the case of Union of India v.
Delhi Cloth & General Mills, I1963] 1 Suppl SCR 586 that 'manu-
facture' means to bring into existence a new substance and does not D
mean merely to produce some change in a substance (emphasis
.. t supplied). It is true that etymological word 'manufacture' properly
construed would doubtless cover the transformation but the question
is whether that transformation brings about fundamental change, a
new substance is brought into existence or a new different article
having distinctive name, character or use results from a particular
process or a particular activity. The taxable event under the Excise E
Law is 'manufacture'. See in this connection Empire Industries Ltd. &
r Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc., [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR page 292
and Mis Ujagar Prints v. llnion of India, [1986] Suppl. SCC 652. In the
instant case it is not disputed that what the appellant did, was to cut
the running length fibre (tow) into short length fibre (staple fibre). It
F
indubitably brougbt a change in the substance but did not bring into
, l existence a new substance. The character and use of the substance
-,.. (man-made fibre) remained the same. It is true that by the change in
the length of the fibre, it acquired a new name. But since in this case
the tariff entry recognised the single description 'man-made fibre' with
no further sub-division based on length of the fibre and even without G
any distinct enumeration of the various forms of fibre by cutting long
fibres into short ones, the respondents did not bring into existence any
y new product so as to attract any levy under the same tariff entry. Even
by cutting, the respondents obtained man-'made fibre. Such cutting,
therefore, involved no manufacture and, hence, no duty liability can
be imposed upon them.
H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 2 S.C.R.
A In that view of the matter and on the facts found by the Tribunal,
we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in the view it took and
{
that decision needs no interference. This appeal, therefore, cannot be
entertained and is accordingly dismissed.
N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
l
y
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