CHERUKURI MANI W/O NARENDRA CHOWDARIversusTHE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 380
- Decided
- 8 May 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
Holding
The Government cannot extend preventive detention to twelve months in a single order; any extension must not exceed three months at a time, and the High Court’s dismissal of the habeas corpus petition was erroneous.
Summary
The petitioner, Cherukuri Mani, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the preventive detention of her husband under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986. The Collector initially ordered detention and the State Government subsequently issued a single order extending the detention to twelve months, contrary to the statutory requirement of an initial three‑month period and subsequent extensions not exceeding three months each. The High Court dismissed the petition without addressing the merits, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court examined Section 3 of the Act and Article 22 of the Constitution, holding that the Government cannot extend detention for twelve months in one stroke and must adhere to the prescribed procedural safeguards, including periodic review by an Advisory Board. Finding the Government order illegal and the High Court's dismissal erroneous, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the detention order and set aside the High Court judgment.
Issues considered
- Whether the State Government may issue a preventive detention order for a period of twelve months in a single order under the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986.
- Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the habeas corpus petition without considering its merits.
- Whether the extension of detention beyond three months without periodic review violates Section 3 of the Act and Article 22 of the Constitution.
Legislation cited
- Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986s. 10, s. 13, s. 2(g), s. 3, s. 8(1)
- Constitution of Indias. Article 22
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 6 S.C.R. 750
A CHERUKURI MANI W/O NARENDRA CHOWDARI
v.
THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF ANDH~A
PRADESH & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 1133 of 2014)
B
MAY 08, 2014
[RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND N.V. RAMANA, JJ.]
Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
c Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas Immoral
Traffic Offenders and Land Grabpers Act, 1986:
s.3 - Detention order passed by Government for a period
of 12 mof1ths - Propriety of - Held: An order of detention
D should in the first instance be in force for a period of three
months - Government is, however, conferred with the power
., to extend the period beyond three months - Such extension
however, cannot be for period exceeding three months - In
the instant case, the Government erred in directing detention
E of husband of the appellant for a period of 12 months in one
stroke ignoring the legislative intention that even the order of
extension of detention must not exceed three months at an}'-
,one time.
s. 3 - Detention order - Normally, a person who is
F detained under the provisions of the Act is facing trial which
in other words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and
denial of civil rights - In such cases, whether continuous
detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be
assessed and reviewed from time to time - Detention, in the
G instant case, for about seven months at a stretch without
periodical review was, therefore, not sustainable - Constitution
of India, 1950 - Article 22.
Writ jurisdiction: Writ of habeas corpus - Duty of court to
H 750
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 751
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS
entertain - Technical lapse in framing writ petition - Held: A·
Even though the petition is not properly framed and
appropriate relief is not sought, the Writ Court is expected to
go into the issue and decide on merits - Normally, in such
matters where liberty of a person is at stake, Courts would take
a liberal approach in the procedural aspects. B
Interpretation of statutes: Deviation from prescribed
procedure - Held: Where the law prescribes a thing to be
done in a particular manner following a particular procedure,
it shall be done in the same manner following the provisions C
of law, without deviating from the prescribed procedure.
The husband of the appel,lant was alleged to have
been involved in several cases of theft of Government
and private properties as well as cases of destruction of
public properties and his anti social a~tivities were D \
'
harmful to the society and general public and 11 cases
were registered against him. The Collector issued a
preventive detention under the Andhra Pradesh
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers,
Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic E
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 stating that the.
husband of the appellant has got all the attributes to be
called as a 'goonda' as envisaged under Section 2(g) of
the Act. While passing the detention order, the Collector
made it clear that the detenu has a right to make a F
representation to the Government under Section 8(1) of
the Act and the case will be referred to the Advisory
Board for review and opinion under Section 10 of the Act
and the detenu can be heard personally by the Advisory
Board. The Collector also indicated that the Government, G
on the basis of opinion of the Advisory Board, may
confirm and continue the detention for a period not
exceeding 12 months from the date of detention. After
having served with a copy of the .detention order along
with the grounds of detention, the husband of the
H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A appellant was taken into custody by Respondent No. 3
and from 5th October, 2013 he was detained in the Central
Prison. On the basis of the recommendation of the
Collector and after obtaining a report from the Advisory
Board, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.0.Rt.
B No. 4803, dated 6th November, 2013 and directed
detention of the detenu for a period of twelve monttis
from the date on which he was detained i.e. 5th October,
2013. When the appellant challenged the detention of her .
husband before the High Court in a habeas corpus Writ
c Petition, the High Court dismissed the same with a cryptic
order. The instant appeal was filed challenging the order
of the High Court.
. Allowing the appeal, the Court
D HELD: 1. When habeas corpus writ petition is filed,
even though the petitioner has not properly framed the
petition and not sought appropriate relief, it is expected
from the Court to at least go into the issue and decide on ·
merits. Normally, in such matters where liberty of a person
E is at stake, the Courts would take a liberal approach in the
procedural aspects. But unfortunately in the instant case,
the High Court has dismissed the writ petition at the
threshold itself. [Para 7] [756-G-H; 757-A-B]
2. Section 3 of the Act empowers the detention of
F certain category of persons, as defined under the Act.
Apart from conferring of power, the section regulates the
manner of passing the orders of detention as well as their
duration. A reading of the provision makes it clear that
the State Government, District Magistrate or
G Commissioner of Police are the authorities, conferred
with the power to pass orders of detention. The only
difference is that the order of detention passed b,Y the
Government would remain in force for a period of three
months in the first instance, whereas similar orders
H passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 753 .
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS
Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days. A
The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would
depend upon the appro.val to be accorded by the
Government in this regard. Sub-section (3) makes this
aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that the
maximum period of detention under the Act is 12 months. B
Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its
purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from
time to time. An order of detention wofild in lhe first
instance be in, force for a period of three months. The
Government alone is conferred with the power to extend c
the period, beyond three months. Such extension,
however, cannot be for a period, exceeding three months,
at a time. It means that, if the Government intends to
detain an individual under the Act for the m·aximum
peri'd of 12 months, there must be an initial order of 0
detenlion for a period of three months, and at least, three
orders of extension for a period not exceeding three
months each. The expression "extend such period from
time to time by any period not exceeding three months at
any one time" assumes significance in this regard. [Paras
E
11, 12 and 13] [757-H; 758-A-F]
3. Restriction of initial period of detention to three
months, is nothing but implementation of the mandate
contained in Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution
of India. Where the law prescribes a thing l:o be done in F
a particular manner following a· particular procedure, it
shall be done in the same manner following the
provisions of law, without deviating from the prescribed
procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act
clearly mandated the authorities to pass an order of G
detention at one time for a period not exceeding three
months only, the Government Order in the instant case,
directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a
period of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of
the prescribed manner and contrary to the provisions of H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A law. The Government cannot direct or extend the period
of detention up to the maximuin period of twelve months,
in one stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention
that even the order of extension of detention must not
exceed three months at any one time. One should not
B ignore the underlying principles while passing orders of
detention or extending the detention period from time to
time. [Paras 14 and 15] [759-G, H; 760-D-G]
4. Normally, a person who is detained under the
provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other
C words amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial
of civil rights. In such cases, whether continuous
detention of such person is necessary or not, is to be
assessed and reviewed from time to time. Taking into
consideration these factors, the Legislature Jlas
D specifically provided the mechanism "Advisory Board" to
review the detention of a person. Passing a detention
order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without
proper review, is deterrent to the rights of the detenu.
Hence, the impugned Government Order directing
E detention for the maximum period of twelve months
straightaway cannot be sustained in law. Undisputedly,
the detenu was detained on 5th October, 2013 which
means that he remained under detention for about seven
months at a stretch without any periodical review as
F envisaged by law. The detention order passed by the
Government of Andhra Pradesh in this case is in
contravention to the provisions of law. On this ground
alone, without going into other issues, we thought this
appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention has
G to be quashed. [Paras 16 and 17] [760-H; 761-A-E]
Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2011) 5 SCC 244: 2011
(4) SCR 740 Munagala Yadamma v. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 386: 2012 (1) SCR 26 -
referred to.
H
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 755
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS
Case Law Reference : A
2011 (4) SCR740 Referred to Para 8
2012 (1) SCR 26 Referred to Para 8
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal B
No.1133 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28.10.2013 of the
High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad in
Writ Petition No. 30794 of 2013.
ATM Rangaramanujam, R.K. Adsure, AVS Raju, V.K.
Sidharthan, D. Mahesh Babu, Amit K. Naidu, Suchitra
Harangkhawp, Amjit Maqbool, Aditya Jain, B. Ramkrishna Rao,
T.V, Bhaskar Rao for the appearing Parties.
\
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
N.V. RAMANA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant, who is the wife of one Cherukuri Narendra
Chowdari-detenu, filed a wr[t petition under Article 226 of th~ E
Constitution before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh alleging
that her husband has been unauthorisedly detained and the
detention order passed was illegal and sought his release. The
writ petition was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned
order dated 28th October, 2013 stating that until and unless the
F
competent Court of law decides the order of detention as illegal
and invalid, it cannot be said that it is unauthorized detention.
Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal
by special leave.
3. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this G
appeal are that the Collector & District Magistrate, East
Godavari District, Andhra Pradesh (Respondent No. 2) issued
a preventive detention order on 30th September, 2013, under
the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of
Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 {for short "the
Act") stating that the husband of the appellant {detenu) has got
all the attributes to be called as a 'goonda' as envisaged under
Section 2{g) of the Act. It is also mentioned that he was involved
in several cases of theft of Government and private properties
B as well as cases of destruction of public properties and his
antisocial activities are harmful to the society and general public
and referred 11 cases registered against him.
4. It is significant to note that while passing the detention
C order, the Collector made it clear that the detenu has a right to
make a representation to the Government under Section 8(1)
of the Act and the case will be referred to the Advisory Board
for review and opinion under Section 10 of the Act and the
detenu can be heard personally by the Advisory Board. The
Collector also indicated that the Government, on the basis of
D opinion of the Advisory Board, may confirm and continue the
detention for a period not exceeding 12 months from the date
of detention.
5. After having served with a copy of the detention order
E along with the grounds of detention, the· husband of the
appellant was taken into custody by Respondent No. 3 and from
5th October, 2013 he was detained in the Central Prison,
Rajahmundry till date.
6. It appears that on the basis of the recommendation of
F the Collector and after obtaining a report from the Advisory
Board, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued G.0.Rt. No.
4803, dated 6th November, 2013 and directed detention of the
detenu for a period of twelve months from the date on which
he was detained i.e. 5th October, 2013.
G
7. When the appellant challenged the detention of her
husband before the High Court in a habeas corpus Writ Petition,
the High Court dismissed the same with a cryptic order. In our
considered view, when habeas corpus writ petition is filed, even
H though the petitioner has not properly framed the petition and
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY GOVT. Or 757
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
not sought appropriate relief, it is expected from the Court to A
at least go into the issue and decide on merits. Normally, in
such matters where liberty of a person is at stake, the Courts
would take a liberal approach in the procedural aspects. But
unfortunately in the instant case, the High Court has dismissed
the writ petition at the threshold itself. B
8. Before us, learned counsel for the appellant mainly
contended that as per the provisions of the Act, the period of
detention in the first instance shall not exceed more than three
months and a person cannot be put under detention without C
facing trial for a long period. When the husband of the
appellant-detenu is already facing charges· under various
provisions of the Indian Penal Code in around 11 cases, the
invocation of detention laws against him and not permitting him
to face the trial is bad in law and it is also contrarY to Clause
(4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. He further D
contended that the Government Order directing detention of the
detenu for a period of 12 months is contrary to the proviso to
sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, and· on this ground
alone, the order of detention is liable to be set aside. To support
his arguments, he strongly relied on decisions of this Court in E
Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Na du (2011) 5 SCC 244 and
Munaga/a Yadamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.
(2012) 2 sec 386.
9. On behalf of the State, Mr. A.T.M. Rangaramanujam, F
learned senior counsel supported the detention order and
sought time till after summer vacation.
10. Now the issue for consideration before us is whether
the State Government has the power to pass a detention order
to detain a person at a stretch for a period of 12 months under G
the provisions of the Act.
11. To answer the above issue, it is necessary to examine
the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 3 of the Act
empowers the detention of certain category of persons, as H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2914] 6 S.C.R
A defined under the Act. Apart from conferring of power, the
section regulates the manner of passing the orders of detention
as well as their duration. It reads thus:
Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certail)
persons : (1) The Government may, if satisfied with
B
respect to any bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda,
immoral traffic offender or land-grabber that with a view to
preventing him from acting in·any manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make
an order directing that such person be detained.
c
(2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely
to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction
of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the
Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they
D may, by order in writing direct that during sucti period as
may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or
Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as providl;!d
in Sub-section (1 ), exercise the powers conferred by the
said sub-section:
E
Provided that the period specified in the order made by
the Government under this sub-section shall not in the first
instance, ex6eed three months, but the Government may,
if satisfied as aforesaid that it isnecessary so to do, amend
such order to extend suchperiod from time to time by any
F period not exceedingthree months at any one time.
(3) When any order is made under the section by an officer
mentioned in Sub-section (2); he shall forthwith report the
fact to the Government together with the grounds on which
G the order has been made and such other particulars as in'
his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such
order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after
the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been
approved by the Government.
H
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 759
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS [N.V. RAMANA, J.)
12. A reading of the above provisions makes it clear that A
the State Government, District Magistrate or Commissioner of
Police are the authorities, conferred with the power to pass
orders of detention. The only difference is that the order of
detention passed by the Government would remain in force for
a period of three months in the first Instance, whereas similar B
orders passed by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner
of Police shall remain in force for an initial period of 12 days.
The continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend
upon the approval to be accorded by the Government in this
regard. Sub-section (3) makes this aspect very clear. Section c
13 of the Act mandates that the maximum period of detention
under the Act is 12 months.
13. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear
in its purport, as to the operation of the order of detention from
time to time. An order of detention would in the first instance D
be in force for a period of three months. The Government alone
is conferred with the power to extend the period, beyond three
months. Such extension, however, cannot be for a period,
exceeding three months, at a time. It means that, if the
Government intends to detain an individual under the Act E
for the maximum period of 12 months, there must be an
initial order of detention for a period of three months, and
at least, three orders of extension for a period not
exceeding three months each. The expression "extend such
period from time to time by any period not exceeding three F
months at any one time" assumes significance in this regard.
14. The requirement to pass order of detention from time
to time in the manner referred to above, has got its own
significance. It must be remembered that restriction of initial G
period of detention to three months, is nothing but
implementation of the mandate contained in
Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It
reads as under:
H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A Clause 4 : No law providing for preventive detention shall
authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than
three months unless
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or
have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of
B
a High Court has reported before the expiration of the S(lid
period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient
cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the
c detention of any person beyond the maximum period
prescribed by any law made by Parliament Under Sub-
. clause (b) of Clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the
D provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-
clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7).
15. Where the law prescribes a thing to be done in a
particular manner following a particular procedure, it shall be·
done in the same manner following the provisions of 1§1.~,_witl:lout-\
E deviating from the prescribed procedure. When the provisions
of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated the authorities to pass
an order of detention at one time for a period not exceeding
three months only, the Government Order in the present case,
directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period
F of twelve months at a stretch is clear violation of the prescribed
manner and contrary to the provisions of law. The Government
cannot direct or extend· the period of detention up to the
maximum period of twelve months, in one stroke, ignoring the
cautious legislative intention that even the order of extension
G of detention must not exceed three months at any one time. One
should not ignore the underlying principles while passing orders
of detention or extending the detention period from time to time.
16. Normally, a person who is detained under the
H provisions of the Act is without facing trial which in other words
CHERUKURI MANI v. CHIEF SECY. GOVT. OF 761
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS [N.V. RAMANA, J.]
amounts to curtailment of his liberties and denial of civil rights. A
In such cases, whether continuous detention of such person is
necessary or not, is to be assessed and reviewed from time
to time. Taking into consideration these factors, the Legislature·,.
has specifically provided the mechanism "Advisory Board" to
review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for B
a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper/ review,
is deterrent to the rights of the detenu. Hence, the impugned
Government Order directing detention for the maximum period
of twelve months straightaway cannot be sustained in law.
17. Even though, learned senior counsel app~aring for the C
State sought for an adjournment beyond summer vacation, we
are unable to accept his prayer for the simple reason that
maximum part of the period of detention of the detenu is going
to complete by the end of summer vacation. Undisputedly, the
detenu was detained on 5th October, 2013 which means that D
he remained under detention for about seven months at a
stretch without any periodical review as envisaged by law. We
are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention orq,r
passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this cas~ 'is
in contravention to the provisions of law. On this ground alone, E
without going into other issues, we thought this appeal has to
be allowed and the order of detention has to be quashed.
18. We accordingly allow the appeal quashing the detention
order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and setting F
aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu
shall be set at liberty forthwith.
Devika Gujral Appeal allowed.
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