Supreme Court of India
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE BOARD AND OTHERSversusT.T. MURALI BABU
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 88
- Decided
- 10 February 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- H L GOKHALE
Holding
The dismissal of the respondent was proper; the High Court’s reinstatement order was erroneous as the doctrine of proportionality does not apply and the delay cannot be condoned.
Summary
The respondent, a Junior Engineer of the Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board, was absent without authorization from 28‑08‑1995 to 31‑03‑1997 and submitted a medical certificate belatedly. A charge‑sheet under Regulations 6(1) and 6(2) was issued, the enquiry officer found the charges proved and the disciplinary authority dismissed him. The High Court, invoking the doctrine of proportionality and the notion of first‑time desertion, set aside the dismissal and ordered reinstatement without back wages. The Supreme Court held that the charges were proved, the dismissal was not disproportionate, the doctrine of proportionality did not apply, and the four‑year delay in filing the writ petition could not be condoned. Consequently, the High Court’s orders were set aside and the dismissal upheld.
Issues considered
- Whether unauthorized long‑term absence constitutes misconduct justifying dismissal.
- Whether the doctrine of proportionality applies to a dismissal for such unauthorized absence.
- Whether the four‑year delay in filing the writ petition bars relief under the doctrine of delay and laches.
- Whether the High Court erred by not examining the proof of the charges before ordering reinstatement.
Legislation cited
Subjects
unauthorised absencemisconductdismissalproportionalitydelaylachesservice lawdisciplinary proceedingsreinstatementArticle 226
Judgment
[2014] 1 S.C.R. 987
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND A
SEWERAGE BOARD AND OTHERS
v.
T.T. MURALI BABU
(Civil Appeal No. 1941 of 2014)
B
FEBRUARY 10, 2014
[H.L. GOKHALE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.)
SERVICE LAW:
c
Misconduct - Unauthorised long absence from duty -
Dismissal from service -- Reinstatement directed by High
Court without back wages - Held: Employee remained
unauthorisedly absent for a long time - Medical certificate was
filed belatedly - Charges were found proved - Single Judge D
and Division Bench of High Court did not advert to these
issues - High Court has erred in giving emphasis on first time
desertion and directing reinstatement - Plea of absence of
"habitual absenteeism" is unacceptable - Besides,
respondent was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his E
official position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline,
act with responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve
the institution with honesty - This kind of conduct cannot be
countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and
ushers indiscipline in an organization --Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply And Sewerage Board Employees (Discipline F
And Appeal) Regulations, 1978 -- Regulations 6(1) and 6(2).
Proportionality of punishment - Long absence from duty
- Dismissal - Held: Doctrine of proportionality in the context
of imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted when G
the court on the analysis of material brought on record comes
to the conclusion that punishment imposed by disciplinary
authority or appellate authority shocks the conscience of court
987 H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A -- Unauthorized absence by an employee, as misconduct,
·cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for imposition of
punishment - Respondent by remaining unauthorisedly
absent for such a long period with inadequate reason and in
not responding to the communications from the employer
B while he was unauthorisedly absent, had not only shown
indiscipline but also made an attempt to get away with it -
Such a conduct is not permissible -- Doctrine of proportionality
does not get remotely attracted to such a case - The
punishment is definitely not shockingly disproportionate.
c DELA YILACHES:
Misconduct - Dismissal from service - Four years delay
in filing writ petition -Held: Doctrine of delay and /aches should
not be lightly brushed aside - A writ court is required to weigh
D the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same - It
should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction - It is the duty of the court to scrutinize
whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any
justification - That apart, in the instant case, such belated
E approach gains more significance as the respondent-
employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing
a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained
unauthorisedly absent -- Such delay does not deserve any
indulgence - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226.
F The respondent, who was working as a Junior
Engineer in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board, remained continuously absent from
duty w.e.f.28.8.1995 without any intimation and did not
respond to the repeated memoranda/reminders requiring
G him to explain his unauthorized absence from duty and
to rejoin duty. A charge-sheet was issued to him on
11.9.1996 stating that he had failed to submit an
explanation to the first charge memo dated 11.10.1995
inspite of reminders and that he deserted his post by
H
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 989
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT MURALI BABU
remaining unauthorisedly absent from duty from A
28.8.1995, and thereby committed misconduct under
Regulations 6(1) and 6(2) of the Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and, Sewerage Board Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1978. On 1.4.1997 he
reported to duty with the medical certificate for the period B
28.8.1995 to 31.3.1997. The enquiry officer found that the
charges were proved. The disciplinary authority by order
dated 16.4.1998 imposed the punishment of dismissal
from service. The departmental appeal filed by the
respondent was dismissed. However, the single Judge c
of the High Court allowed his writ petition, set aside the
punishment of dismissal and directed his reinstatement
with continuity of service but without back wages holding
that the punishment of dismissal from service for ~he first
time desertion/absenteeism was too harsh and 0
disproportionate. The Division Bench of the High Court
declined to interfere.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, the medical certificate E
was belatedly submitted and the respondent had
remained unauthorisedly absent from 28.08.1995. The
Inquiry Officer found that both the charges had been
proved. The disciplinary authority had ascribed reasons
and passed an order of dismissal from service. Further, F
there has been delay of 4 years by the respondent in
invoking the extraordinary jurisdictio·n of the· High Court.
From the decision rendered by the single Judge as well
as that of the Division Bench of the High Court, it is clear
that there has been no advertence with regard to the G
issue whether the charges levelled against the
respondent had been proved or not. The only aspect
which was really proponed before the High Court
pertains to the nature of charges and proportionality of
punishment. [para 10 and 12) [998-C-E; 999-C-D]
H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A 1.2 The doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a
B constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of
the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to
the primary principle that when an aggrieved person,
without adequate reason, approaches the court at his
own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal
c obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage
should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes
in the way of equity. Delay does bring in hazard and
causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there
has been four years' delay in approaching the court, yet
the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty
0
of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay
is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in
the instant case, such belated approach gains more
significance as the respondent-employee being
absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a
E lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained
unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill
health. In the considered opinion of this Court, such delay
does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground
alone the writ court should have thrown the petition
F overboard at the very threshold. [para 16) [1001-C-H;
1002-B-C]
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v.
Ba/want Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others, 1969
G SCR 808 =AIR 1969 SC 329; and Lindsay Petroleum Co. v.
Prosper Armstrong Hurd. Abram Farewal/, and John Kemp,
(1874) 5 PC 221, State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, 1995 (1)
~uppl. SCR 492 = (1995) 4 sec 683; and State of M.P. and
others etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others etc. etc. 1987
f-< (1) SCR 1 = AIR 1987 SC 251 - referred to.
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 991
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU
2.1 Doctrine of proportionality in t.he context of A
imposition of punishment in service law gets attracted
when the court on the analysis of material brought on
record comes to the conclusion that the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the court. [para 27] B
[1006-F-H]
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another v. Ashok Kumar
Arora, 1997 (1) SCR 980 = (1997) 3 SCC 72; and Union of
India and another v. G. Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 - C
referred to
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680;
and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil
Service, 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935 - referred to. o
2.2 It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in
'law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence,
it Is. obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to
record a findi.Jlg that the said absence is willful even if the
employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to E
remain absent. Unauthorized absence by an employee,
as misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket
formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon
many a\factor. [para 22 and 26] [1005-8-C; 1006-E-F]
F
State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Sing/a 2008 (11) SCR 600 =
(2008) 8 SCC 469; and Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat
and anotber 2009 (3) SCR 229 = (2009) 11 sec 678 -
referred to.
2.3 In the instant case, the High Court, has given G
emphasis, on first time desertion and thereafter
proceeded to apply the doctrine of proportionality. The
said approach is obviously incorrect. The plea of
absence of "habitual absenteeism" is absolutely
unacceptable. The respondent by remaining H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A unauthorisedly ~bsent for such a long period with
inadequate reason and in not responding to the
communications from the employer while he was
unauthorisedly absent, had not only shown indiscipline
but also made an attempt to get away with it. Such a
B conduct is not permissible and the High Court has
erroneously placed reliance on the authorities where this
Court had interfered with the punishment. The doctrine
of proportionality does not get remotely attracted to such
a case. The punishment is definitely not shockingly
c disproportionate. [para 30] [1009-C-H]
Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India and another
2012 (3) SCR 484 = (2012) 3 SCC 178; and Chairman-cum-
Managing Director, Coal India Limited and another v. Mukul
Kumar Chaudhuri and others, 2009 (13) SCR 487 = (2009)
D 15 SCC 620; Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v. Commissioner of
Police, Delhi 2004 (3) SCR 1 = (2004) 4 SCC 560; and
Jagdish Singh v. Punjab Engineering College 2009 (9) SCR
=
379 (2009) 7 SCC 301; B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India
1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 644 = (1995) 6 SCC 749; V. Ramana
=
E v. A.P. SRTC, 2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1149 2005 (7) sec
338; and V. Senthurvelan v. High Court of Judicature at
Madras, (2009) 7 MLJ 1231 - distinguished.
2.4 Besides, the respondent was a Junior Engineer.
Regard bei~ had to his official position, it was expected
F of him to maintain discipline, act with responsibility,
perform his duty with sincerity and serve the institution
with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be
countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work
culture and ushers indiscipline in an organization. (Para
G 31) [1010-A-B]
Government of India and another v. George Philip 2006
(9) Suppl. SCR 108 = (2006) 13 SCC 1-relied on.
2.5 The interference by the High Court with the
H punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable.
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 993
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU
The High Court was also wholly unjustified in entertaining A.
the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The judgments
and orders passed by the single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court are set aside. [para 33-34] [1011-
A-C]
".
B
Case Law Reference:
2004 (3) SCR 1 distinguished para 7
1995 (4) Suppl. SCR 644 distinguished para 7
2005 (2) Suppl. SCR 1149 distinguished para 7 c
(2009) 7 MLJ 1231 distinguished para 7
2009 (9) SCR 379 distinguished para 7
1969 SCR 808 referred to para 13 D
(1874) 5 PC 221 referred to para 13
1995 (1) Suppl. SCR 492 referred to para 14
1987 (1) SCR 1 referred to para 15
E
2012 (3) SCR 484 distinguished para 21
2008 (11) SCR 600 referred to para 23
2009 (3) SCR 229 referred to para 25
1997 (1) SCR 980 referred to para 27 F
(1948) 1 KB 223 .: (1947) 2 referrerd to para 28
All ER 680
1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 referrerd to para 28
All ER 935 G
(1997) 1 sec 463 referred to para 28
2009 (13) SCR 487 distinguished para 29
2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 108 relied on para 31 H
--
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
1941 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.11.2012 of the
High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 2531
B of 2012.
S.S. Ray, Vaibhav Gulia, Rajan Tyagi, Dheeraj Gupta,
Rakhi Ray for the Appellants.
Gautam Narayan, Mubashir Mushtaq, Swami Dharmendra
C Balyogi for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
D 2. The present appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the judgment and order dated 22.11.2012 passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 2531
of 2012 whereby the Division Bench has affirmed the judgment
and order dated 21.7.2011 in W.P. No. 25673 of 2007
E whereunder the learned single Judge had allowed the writ
petition, and after setting aside the punishment of dismissal,
directed reinstatement of the respondent with continuity of
service but without back wages.
3. Bereft of unnecessary details, the expose' of facts that
F have been undraped are that the respondent was appointed
as a Surveyor in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and
Sewerage Board (for short, "CMWSSB") and subsequently
promoted as Junior Engineer in 1989. From 28.8.1995 he
remained continuously absent from duty without any intimation
G to the employer and did not respond to the repeated
memoranda/reminders requiring him to explain-his unauthorized
absence from duty and to rejoin duty. On 1.4.1997 he reported
to duty with the medical certificate for his absence from duty
for the period commencing 28.8.1995 to 31.3.1997. As he had
H already remained unauthorisedly absent and did not respond
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 995
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
to the memos by offering an explanation, a charge-sheet had A
already been issued on 11.9.1996 under the Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board Employees
(Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1978 (for brevity "the
Regulations"). The charge memo contained two charges,
namely, that the respondent-herein had failed to submit an B
explanation to the first charge memo dated 11.10.1995 inspite
of reminders and second, he deserted his post by remaining
unauthorisedly absent from duty from 28.8.1995, and thereby
committed misconduct under Regulations 6(1) and 6(2)
respectively of the Regulations. Be it noted, though the charge c
memo was duly acknowledged· by the respondent on
19.11.1996, yet he chose not to submit his explanation till
6.1.1997, much after the charge-sheet was issued.
4. As the factual matrix would further uncurtain, an enquiry
was conducted against the respondent and his explanation in D
the enquiry was that he could not attend to the duties and could
not give explanation to the first charge memo because of ill
health. The enquiry officer found charges were proved and,
accordingly, submitted the enquiry report which was accepted
by the disciplinary authority and after following the due E
procedure punishment of dismissal was passed on 16.4.1998.
In the order of dismissal disciplinary authority observed that
belated submission of medical certificate on 1.4.1997
irresistibly led to the conclusion that the respondent employee
was unauthorisedly absent from 28.8.1995. A conclusion was F
also arrived at that the first charge, namely, that he had not
responded to the letters and reminders, also stood proved.
Being of this view, the disciplinary authority thought it apt to
impose the punishment of dismissal from service and he did
so. G
5. On an appeal being preferred by the respondent the
Board rejected the appeal dated 30.6.1998. Being dissatisfied
by the order of dismissal and the affirmation thereof in appeal,
the respondent preferred W.P. No. 15272of1998. The learned
Single Judge, by order dated 12.3.2003, directed re- G
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A consideration of the appeal solely on the ground that the
Managing Director who was the disciplinary authority had taken
part in the proceedings of the Board which decided the appeal.
After the said order came to be passed, the matter was again
placed before the Board and the appellate authority,
B considering the enquiry report, the evidence brought on record
and after due discussion, affirmed the order of disciplinary
authority and consequently dismissed the appeal on 1.7.2003.
6. The grievance of re-affirmation of the order of dismissal
was agitated by the respondent in W.P. No. 25673 of 2007
C which was preferred on 7.7.2007. The appellant-Board in the
counter affidavit, defending the order of dismissal, stated that
the only reason given by the employee was that he could not
attend the duties as he was availing continuous treatment for
tuberculosis and, further, he also met with an accident in
D September 1995 which was unacceptable. In addition, it was
stated in the counter affidavit that bunch of medical certificates
was produced by him on 1.4.1997 which mentioned that he
was suffering from depressive psychosis and bronchitis and
there was no mention about any accident and injury sustained
E by him in September 1995 and treatment availed by him.
7. The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment,
after narrating the facts, noted the statement of the learned
counsel for the respondent that even if the employee had
F absented from duty, there was no past misconduct of desertion/
absence and, therefore, the punishment of dismissal from
service for the first time desertion/absenteeism is too harsh and
disproportionate and deserved to be interfered with. The
learned Single Judge did not advert to any other facet and
referred to the decisions in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya v.
G Commissioner of Police, Delhi1, B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
lndia 2, V. Ramana v. A.P. SRTC3, Jagdish Singh v. Punjab
1. c2004) 4 sec 560.
2. (1995) a sec 749.
H 3. c2005) 7 sec 338.
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 997
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT. MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J:]
Engineering Col/ege 4 and Division Bench judgment in V. A
Senthurvelan v. High Court of Judicature at,.Madras 5 and
opined thus:-
"10. Applying the said judgment to the fact of this case and
considering the counter filed by the respondents wherein B
it is not stated as to whether the petitioner has deserted I
absented on any previous occasion, this Court is of the
view that this writ petition deserves to be allowed.
11. This writ petition is allowed with a direction to· the
respondent to reinstate petitioner with continuity of service C
but without backwage, within a period of four weeks from
the date of receipt of a copy of this order."
8. Grieved by the aforesaid order the CMWSSB preferred
Writ Appeal No. 2531 of 2012 and the Division Bench accepted o
the conclusion of the learned single Judge by stating thus: -
"It is not in dispute that the respondent/ writ petitioner was
unwell during the said period, though there might have
been some discrepancies in the date of the certificate
issued, it has not been controverted by the appellant that E
the respondent/writ petitioner was suffering from
depressive psychosis and bronchitis. That apart it has also
not been disputed that the respondent/ writ petitioner had
not suffered any earlier punishment while in the services
of the appellant Board from the date of his appointment. F
Therefore. in such circumstances. it would be very harsh
and unreasonable to impose the punishment of removal
from service for the charge of unauthorized absence. as
such punishment is awarded for acts of grave nature or as
cumulative effect of continued misconduct or for such other G
reasons. where the charges are very serious and in case
where charge of corruption had been proved. Admittedly,
4. (2009) 7 sec 301.
5. (2009) 7 MLJ 1231. H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 1 S.C.R.
A there has been no such allegation against the respondent/
writ petitioner. Further, the learned single Judge while
setting aside the order of dismissal from service, rightly
denied back wages to the respondenUwrit petitioner as the
respondenUwrit petitioner failed to discharge duty during
B the relevant period."
[Underlining is ours]
9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material brought on record.
c
10. On a keen scrutiny of the decision rendered by the
learned single Judge as well as that of the Division Bench it is
clearly demonstrable that there has been no advertence with
regard to the issue whether the charges levelled against the
D respondent had been proved or not. It is manifest that there had
been no argument on the said score before the writ court or in
intra-court appeal and hence, we are obliged to state that the
only aspect which was really proponed before the High Court
pertains to the nature of charges and proportionality of
E punishment. Therefore, we shall confine our analysis with regard
to said limited sphere and an added facet which the learned
counsel for the appellant has emphatically urged before us, that
is, the belated approach by the respondent in invoking the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.
F 11. The charges that were levelled against the respondent-
employee read as follows: -
"CHARGE NO. 1:
That he has failed to offer his explanation to this
G office Memo dated 11.10.95 in spite of reminders thereon
dated 20.01.96 and 23.04.96 which clearly shows his
disobedience to the order of superior and it amounts to
misconduct under Regulation 6(1) of the MMWSS Board
Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations 1978.
H
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 999
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
CHARGE NO. 2: A
That he has deserted the post from 28.08.95
onwards and remains unauthorisedly absent from duty
which amounts to misconduct under Regulation 6(2) of the
MMWSS Board Employees (Discipline and Appeal)
B
Regulations 1978.'!
12. It is not in dispute that the Inquiry Officer found that both
the charges had been proved. The disciplinary authority had
ascribed reasons and passed an order of dismissal from
service. On a perusal of the order of dismissal it is vivid that C
the medical certificate was belatedly submitted and he had
remained unauthorisedly absent from 28.08.1995. The question
that arises is when the charges of unauthorized absence for a
long period had been proven, was it justified on the part of the
High Court to take resort to the doctrine of proportionality and D
direct reinstatement in service. That apart, one aspect which
has not at all been addressed to by the High Court is that the
respondent invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High
Court after four years.
E
13. First, we shall deal with the facet of delay. In
Maharasl]tra State Road Transport Corporation v. Ba/want
Regular Motor Service, Amravati and others 6 the Court
referred to the principle that has been stated by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd, Abram Farewall, and John Kemp 7, which is as follows:- F
"Now the doctrine of !aches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party
has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be G
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
6. AIR 1969 SC 329.
7. (18740 5 PC 223.
H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R .
A . that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if
an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just,
B is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such
cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
c acts done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one
course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy."
14. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambaf3, while dealing
with exercise of power of the High Court under Article 226 of
D the Constitution, the Court observed that power of the High
Court to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution, if
is discretionary, its exercise must be judicious and reasonable,
admits of no controversy. It is for that reason, a person's
entitlement for relief from a High Court under Article 226 of the
E Constitution, be it against the State or anybody else, even if is
founded on the allegation of infringement of his legal right, has
to necessarily depend upon unblameworthy conduct of the
person seeking relief, and the court refuses to grant the
discretionary relief to such person in exercise of such power,
F when he approaches it with unclean hands or blameworthy
conduct.
15. In State of M.P. and others etc. etc. v. Nand/a/ Jaiswal
and others etc. etc. 9 the Court observed that it is well settled
that power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under
G Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High
Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the
tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. It
8. (1955) 4 sec 683.
H 9. AIR 1987 SC 251.
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1001
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J]
has been further stated therein that if there is inordinate delay A
on the part of the petitioner in filing a petition and such delay
is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to
intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
Emphasis was laid on the principle of delay and laches stating
that resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction B
at a belated stage is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in injustice.
16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the C
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court
should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to
protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep
itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved
person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his D
own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should
be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of
equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be
fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only E
invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law
does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay F
does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at
hand, though there has been four years' delay in approaching
the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is
the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay
is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the G
present case, such belated approach gains more significance
as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his
duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility
had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some
kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 1 S.C.R.
A remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster
the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it
is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others'
ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation
which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated
B to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give
indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with
'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van Winkle'. In our
considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any
indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should
c have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.
17. Having dealt with the doctrine of delay and !aches, we
shall presently proceed to deal with the doctrine of
proportionality which has been taken recourse to by the High
Court regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix. We think
D it appropriate to refer to some of the authorities which have
been placed reliance upon by the High Court.
18. In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) this Court opined
that the unauthorized absence was not a grave misconduct
E inasmuch as the employee had proceeded on leave under
compulsion because of his grave condition of health. Be it
noted, in the said case, it has also been observed that no
reasonable disciplinary authority would term absence on
medical grounds with proper medical certificate from
F Government doctors as a grave misconduct.
19. In Jagdish Singh (supra) the Court took note of the fact
that the appellant therein was a sweeper and had remained
absent on four spells totalling to fifteen days in all in two months.
In that context, the Court observed thus: -
G
"The instant case is not a case of habitual absenteeism.
The appellant seems to have a good track record from the
date he joined service as a sweeper. In his long career of
service, he remained absent for fifteen days on four
H occasions in the months of February and March 2004. This
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1003
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
was primarily to sort out the problem of his daughter with A
her in-laws. The filial bondage and the emotional
attachment might have come in his way to apply and obtain
leave from the employer. The misconduct that is alleged,
in our view, would definitely amount to violation of
discipline that is expected of an employee to maintain in B
the establishment, but may not fit into the category of gross
violation of discipline. We hasten to add, if it were to be
habitual absenteeism, we would not have ventured to
entertain this appeal."
20. If both the decisions are appositely understood, two C
aspects clearly emerge. In Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra), the
Court took note of the fact, that is, production of proper medical
certificate from a Government medical doctor and opined about
the nature of misconduct and in Jagdish Singh (supra) the
period of absence, status of the employee and his track record D
and the explanation offered by him. In the case at hand, the
factual score being different, to which we shall later on advert,
the aforesaid authorities do not really assist the respondent.
21. Learned counsel for the respondent has commended E
us to the decision in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India
and another10 to highlight that in the absence of a finding
returned by the Inquiry Officer or determination by the
disciplinary authority that the unauthorized absence was willful,
the charge could not be treated to have been proved. To F
appreciate the said submission we have carefully perused the
said authority. In the said case, the question arose whether
"unauthorized absence from duty" did tantamount to "failure of
devotion to duty" or "behavior unbecoming of a Government
servant" inasmuch as the appellant therein was charge-sheeted G
for failure to maintain devotion to duty and his behavior was
unbecoming of a Government servant. After adverting to the rule
position the two-Judge Bench expressed thus: -
10. (2012) 3 sec 11a. H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 1 S.C.R.
A' "16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorized
absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to
maintain devotion to duty and his behavior was
unbecoming of a government servant. The question
whether "unauthorized absence from duty" amounts to
B failure of devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a
government servant cannot be decided without deciding
the question whether absence is willful or because of
compelling circumstances.
17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances
c under which it was not possible to report or perform duty,
such absence cannot be held to be willful. Absence from
duty without any application or prior permission may
amount to unauthorized absence, but it does not always
mean willful. There may be different eventualities due to
D which an employee may abstain from duty, including
compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness,
accident, hospitalization, etc., but in such case the
employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty
or behavior unbecoming of a government servant.
E
18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of
unauthorized absence from duty is made, the disciplinary
authority is required to prove that the absence is willful, in
the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount
to misconduct."
F
22. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think
that the Court has, while dealing with the charge of failure of
devotion to duty or behavior unbecoming of a Government
servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned
G Judges have also opined that there may be compelling
circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee.
That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the
appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the
attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite
H apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1005
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.°]
oh the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion A
that the absence is willful. On an apposite understanding of the
judgment we are of-the opinion that the view expressed in the
said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case
regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge
levelled against the employee and the material that had come 8
on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute
proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized
absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority
to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the
employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain c
absent.
23. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other
authorities relating to unauthorized absence and the view
expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. Dr. P.L. Sing/a11
the Court, dealing with unauthorized absence, has stated thus:- D
"Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of
indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorized absence
by an employee, two courses are open to the employer.
The first is to condone the unauthorized absence by E
accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the
period of the unauthorized absence in which event the
misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the
unauthorized absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry
and impose a punishment for the misconduct." , F
24. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment
the Court ruled as follows: -
"Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does
not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory G
explanation, or where the explanation offered by the
employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take
recourse to disciplinary action in n:;igard to the unauthorized
11. c2ooa) a sec 469. H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to
imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like
dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like
withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The
extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service,
B the position held by the employee, the period of absence
and the cause/explanation for the absence."
25. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat and another12,
the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for
C a period of six months and further had also written threatening
letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct.
Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal
and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the
same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court
stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly
D absent from official duty for more than six months because in
the interest of discipline of any institution or organization such
an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be
countenanced.
E 26. Thus, the unauthorized absence by an employee, as
a misconduct, cannot be put into a straight-jacket formula for
imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as
has been laid down in Dr. P.L. Sing/a (supra).
F 27. Presently, we shall proceed to scrutinize whether the
High Court is justified in applying the doctrine of proportionality.
Doctrine of proportionality in the context of imposition of
punishment in service law gets attracted when the court on the
analysis of material brought on record comes to the conclusion
G that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority or the
appellate authority shocks the conscience of the court. In this
regard a passage from Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and another
v. Ashok Kumar Arora 13 is worth reproducing: -
12. (2009) 11 sec e1a.
H 13. (1997) 3 sec 12
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1007
SEWERAGE BOARD v. T.T. MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
"At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court A
in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings
recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate
court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such
cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the
domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance B
of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable
opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the
punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved
misconduct of an employee."
28. In Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham 14, the
c
Court analysed the conception of proportionality in
administrative law in England and India and thereafter
addressed itself with regard to the punishment in disciplinary
matters and opined that unless the court/tribunal opines in its
secondary role that the administrator was, on the material D
before him, irrational according to Associated Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. 15 and Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service 16 norms, the
punishment cannot be quashed.
E
29. In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India
Limited and another v. Mukul Kumar Chaudhuri and others 17,
the Court, after analyzing tht. doctrine of proportionality at length,
ruled thus: -
"19. The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised . F
concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is
otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power
of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the
charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary
power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a G
14. (1997) 1 sec 463.
15. (1948) 1 KB 233: (1947) 2 All ER 680.
16. 1985 AC 374 : {1984) 3 ALL ER 935.
11. {2009) 15 sec 620.
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of
punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations
cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference
under limited scope of judicial review.
20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the
B
question of quantum of punishment would be: would any
reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in
like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is
expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude
and degree of misconduct and all other relevant
c circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before
imposing punishment.
21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct
of the delinquent was unauthorized absence from duty for
D six months but upon being charged of such misconduct,
he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reason for his
absence by stating that he did not have intention nor
desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate
any of the Company's rules and regulations but the reason
E was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a
matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not
accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be
justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer
would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like
F circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but
grossly in excess to the allegations."
30. After so stating the two-Judge Bench proceeded to say
that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the
question of quantum of punishment is whether any reasonable
G employer would have imposed such punishment in like
circumstances taking into consideration the major, magnitude
and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances
after excluding irrelevant matters before imposing punishment.
It is apt to note here that in the said case the respondent had
H
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1009
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for six months and A
admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence
by stating that he neither had any intention nor desire to disobey
the order of superior authority or violated any of the rules or
regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his
control. Regard being had to the obtaining factual matrix, the B
Court interfered with the punishment on the ground of
proportionality. The facts in the present case are quite different.
As has been seen from the analysis made by the High Court,
it has given emphasis on past misconduct of absence and first
time desertion and thereafter proceeded to apply the doctrine c
of proportionality. The aforesaid approach is obviously
incorrect. It is telltale that the respondent had remained absent
for a considerable length of time. He had exhibited adamantine
attitude in not responding to the communications from the
employer while he was unauthorisedly absent. As it appears, D
he has chosen his way, possibly nurturing the idea that he can
remain absent for any length of time, apply for grant of leave at
any time and also knock at the doors of the court at his own
will. Learned counsel for the respondent has endeavoured hard
to impress upon us that he had not been a habitual absentee.
E
We really fail to fathom the said submission when the
respondent had remained absent for almost one year and
seven months. The plea of absence of "habitual absenteeism"
is absolutely unacceptable and, under the obtaining
circumstances, does not commend acceptation. We are
disposed to think that the respondent by remaining F
unauthorisedly absent for such a long period with inadequate
reason had not only shown indiscipline but also made an
attempt to get away with it. Such a conduct is not permissible
and we are inclined to think that the High Court has erroneously
placed reliance on the authorities where this Court had G
interfered with the punishment. We have no shadow of doubt
that the doctrine of proportionality does not get remotely
attracted to such a case. The punishment is definitely not
shockingly disproportionate.
H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 1 S.C.R.
A 31. Another aspect needs to be noted. The respondent
was a Junior Engineer. Regard being had to his official
position, it was expected of him to maintain discipline, act with
responsibility, perform his duty with sincerity and serve the
institution with honesty. This kind of conduct cannot be
B countenanced as it creates a concavity in the work culture and
ushers in indiscipline in an organization. In this context, we may
fruitfully quote a passage from Government of India and
another v. George Philip 18: -
"In a case involving overstay of leave and absence from
c duty, granting six months' time to join duty amounts to not
only giving premium to indiscipline but is wholly subversive
of the work culture in the organization. Article 51-AO) of the
Constitution lays down that it shall be the duty of every
citizen to strive towards excellence in all spheres of
D individual and collective activity so that the nation
constantly rises to higher levels of endeavour and
achievement. This cannot be achieved unless the
employees maintain discipline and devotion to duty. Courts
should not pass such orders which instead of achieving the
E underlying spirit and objects of Part IV-A of the
Constitution have the tendency to negate or destroy the
same."
32. We respectfully reiterate the said feeling and re-state
F with the hope that employees in any organization should adhere
to discipline for not only achieving personal excellence but for
collectiv'e good of an organization. When we say this, we may
not be understood to have stated that the employers should be
harsh to impose grave punishment on any misconduct. An
G amiable atmosphere in an organization develops the work
culture and the employer and the employees are expected to
remember the same as a precious value for systemic
development.
H 1a. c2oos) 13 sec 1.
CHENNAI METROPOLITAN WATER SUPPLY AND 1011
SEWERAGE BOARD v. TT MURALI BABU [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
33. Judged on the anvil of the aforesaid premises, the A
irresistible conclusion is that the interference by the High Court
with the punishment is totally unwarranted and unsustainable,
and further the High Court was wholly unjustified in entertaining
the writ petition after a lapse of four years. The result of
aforesaid analysis would entail overturning the judgments and B
orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court and, accordingly, we so do.
34. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgments
~md-orders passed by the High Court are set aside leaving the C
parties to bear their respective costs.
RP. Appeal allowed.
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