CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDYversusBADDAM PRATAPA REDDY (DEAD) THR LRS. & ANR.

                          [2019] 11 S.C.R. 739                            739


                CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY                                  A
                                  v.
   BADDAM PRATAPA REDDY (DEAD) THR LRS. & ANR.
                (Civil Appeal Nos.7818-7819 of 2009)
                         AUGUST 27, 2019                                  B
 [N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
                AJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]
       Suit – Expert Evidence – Evaluation of – Appellant filed suit
for specific performance in respect of the agreement of sale
                                                                          C
pertaining to the suit schedule house – As per the appellant, after
execution of the agreement of sale in his favour, the first defendant-
first respondent (now deceased) did not execute the sale deed and
rather along with his brother sold their respective shares to the
second defendant-second respondent – Trial Court decreed the suit
– Judgment reversed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Evidence         D
of PWs-2, 3 (attesting witnesses) fully support the case of the
appellant – High Court not justified in rejecting their evidence on
mere assumptions and wrong reasons – It mainly relied upon the
opinion of the handwriting expert, who opined that the signature of
the first respondent on the agreement of sale, Ext.A-1 did not tally
                                                                          E
with his admitted signatures – Court must be cautious while
evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and
not substantive in nature – Mere expert evidence as to a fact is not
regarded as conclusive proof of it and the Court may seek
independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case
– Evidence of DW-3 (brother of the first respondent) belies the           F
allegation of the first respondent that the signature found on Ext.A-
1 is forged – DW-3 admitted that he could identify the signature of
his elder brother, the first respondent– Merely because appellant’s
signature was not present on Ext.A-1, this would not ipso facto nullify
the agreement altogether – Ext.A-2, the receipt evidencing the
                                                                          G
payment of earnest money in pursuance of Ext.A-1, bears the
signature of the first respondent on the revenue stamps affixed
thereon– No material brought on record to show that he did not
receive the amount under Ext.A-2– Plaintiff was ready and willing
to perform his part of the contract – Judgment of the High Court
                                                                          H
                                 739
740            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     set aside, while that of Trial Court stands restored– Evidence Act,
      1872 – ss.45, 47– Specific Relief Act, 1963– s.16(c) – Limitation
      Act, 1963 – Art.54 of the Schedule– Code of Civil Procedure, 1908–
      Appendix A, Forms 47 & 48.
           Evidence Act, 1872 – Explanation to s.47 – Opinion of person
B     acquainted with the handwriting of another – Relevance of –
      Discussed.
             Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.16(c) – Held: Filing of suit for
      specific performance of an agreement of sale is governed by s.16(c)
      r/w Art. 54 of the Schedule of the 1963 Act – Forms 47 & 48 of
C     Appendix A of CPC prescribe the format of the plaint for such a
      suit – Thus, a plaint which seeks the relief of specific performance
      of an agreement/contract must comply with all these requirements –
      Limitation Act, 1963 – Art.54 of the Schedule – Code of Civil
      Procedure, 1908 – Appendix A, Forms 47 & 48.
D           Allowing the appeals, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 The High Court mainly relied upon the opinion
      evidence of DW-2, the handwriting expert, who opined that the
      signature of the first defendant on the agreement of sale Ext.A-1
      did not tally with his admitted signatures. The Court must be
E     cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type
      of evidence and not substantive in nature. It may not be safe to
      solely rely upon such evidence, and the Court may seek
      independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given
      case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded
      as conclusive proof of it. Ext. A-1 is the agreement of sale entered
F     into by the plaintiff and the first defendant. Ext. A-2 is the receipt
      evidencing the payment of earnest money of Rs. 61,200/- in
      pursuance of this agreement of sale. The receipt bears the
      signature of the first defendant on the revenue stamps affixed
      thereon. Ext. A-2 was not sent for obtaining expert opinion. No
G     reliable material was brought on record that the first defendant
      has not received the amount under Ext. A-2. In the absence of
      any challenge to the first defendant’s signature on Ext. A-2, and
      in the absence of any reliable material produced by the first
      defendant to deny the receipt of such earnest money, the High
      Court should have relied upon this receipt. In fact, the High Court
H
   CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                          741
               REDDY (D) THR LRS.

has not considered Ext. A-2 in its entire judgment. As a matter of     A
fact, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 go hand in hand, and Ext. A-2 should
not have been ignored by the High Court. Merely because the
plaintiff’s signature was not present on the agreement of sale,
this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement altogether. The
agreement was signed by the first defendant and clearly reveals
                                                                       B
that he had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a due
consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/-. This agreement was followed by
Ext. A-2, which shows the payment and receipt of the earnest
money. This receipt bears the signature of the plaintiff on revenue
stamps. Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 are part of the same transaction.
The evidence of DW-3 (the brother of the first defendant) belies       C
the allegation of the first defendant that the signature found on
Ext. A-1 is forged. DW-3 specifically admitted during his cross-
examination that he could identify the signature of the first
defendant, who is his elder brother. He has further admitted that
Ext. A-1 and Ext. B-1 bears the signature of the first defendant.
                                                                       D
A partition had taken place between the first defendant and DW-
3 in 1980, and such partition was effected through Ext. B-1, an
unregistered partition deed. Crucially, the first defendant has also
admitted his signature on Ext. B-1 in his cross-examination. Thus,
it is clear that such admitted signature and the disputed signature
of the first defendant have been identified by his brother as those    E
of the first defendant himself. The opinion of a handwriting expert
is a relevant fact under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. Under
Section 47 of the Evidence Act, the opinion of any person
acquainted with the handwriting of the person by whom it is
supposed to be written or signed is also a relevant fact. Section
                                                                       F
47 of the Evidence Act is concerned with the relevance of the
opinion of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of
another person. DW-3 lived and resided with the first defendant
in the same house for over three decades. DW-3 identified the
first defendant’s signature on Ext. B-1 (the partition deed), which
has been admitted by the first defendant himself. In light of this,    G
and given that DW-3 came in to support the case of his brother,
the first defendant before the Court, it can be inferred that their
relations were cordial even after partition and that DW-3 would
have seen the latter write on multiple occasions in normal course
of family affair. Thus, it is clear that, he was acquainted with the
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742            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     handwriting of the first defendant in terms of the Explanation to
      Section 47 of the Evidence Act. This makes his opinion as to the
      disputed handwriting a relevant fact under Section 47. The weight
      to be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent of
      familiarity shown by the witness with the disputed handwriting.
      This, in turn, depends on the frequency with which the witness
B
      has had occasion to notice and observe the handwriting, his own
      power of observation, and how recent such observations were.
      The testimony of DW-3 may safely be relied upon, and must be
      accorded similar, if not greater, weight than the expert evidence
      adduced by the defendants to advance their case. The first
C     defendant neither challenged DW-3’s admission nor his
      acquaintance with the disputed handwriting, although it was open
      for him to do so by way of re-examination. [Paras 7, 8, 12-14][746-
      A-C; 747-D-H; 748-A-D, G-H; 749-A-F]
             1.2 The disputed signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-
D     1 is genuine. Moreover, keeping in mind the principle that expert
      evidence should not be given precedence over substantive
      evidence, the High Court was not justified in giving precedence
      to the opinion of the expert (DW-2) and solely relying upon his
      testimony to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
      There is another reason why we are not inclined to place reliance
E     on the opinion of the expert DW-2. From a perusal of his report
      Ext. B-2, it is evident that barring the signature on a written
      statement in a prior suit, all other admitted signatures of the first
      defendant are of a period subsequent to the filing of the plaint
      (i.e. on the vakalatnama and the written statement filed in this
      suit itself). These admitted signatures taken subsequent to the
F     filing of the suit could not have been used as a valid basis of
      comparison, and their use for this purpose casts serious doubt
      on the reliability of the entire report Ext. B-2. Thus, the report
      was liable to be discarded on this ground alone, and was wrongly
      relied upon by the High Court. The filing of a suit for specific
G     performance of an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16(c)
      of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with Article 54 of the
      Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this, Forms
      47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
      prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint
      which seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/
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   CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                         743
               REDDY (D) THR LRS.

contract must comply with all these requirements. All the             A
formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for
getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. The
plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance consideration to
the first defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part
of the contract. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial
Court stands restored. [Paras 15-18][749-G-H; 750-C-H; 751-           B
A-B]
      Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee AIR
      1964 SC 529 – followed.
      Ram Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar
      Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 381; Magan Bihari Lal v. State             C
      of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC 210 : [1977] 2 SCR 1007; S.
      Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC
      596 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 439; Murari Lal v. State of
      Madhya Pradesh (1980) 1 SCC 704 : [1980] 2 SCR
      249; Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi) (2003) 1 SCC 21 :            D
      [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 88 – referred to.
                      Case Law Reference
AIR 1957 SC 381                    referred to        Para 8
AIR 1964 SC 529                    followed           Para 8
                                                                      E
[1977] 2 SCR 1007                  referred to        Para 8
[1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 439            referred to        Para 8
[1980] 2 SCR 249                   referred to        Para 9
[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 88             referred to        Para 9
                                                                      F
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7818-
7819 of 2009
      From the Judgment and Order dated 12.06.2008 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Appeal Suit No. 1404 of
2004 and Cross Objections (SR) No. 50168 of 2004
                                                                      G
      D. Rama Krishna Reddy, Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, Advs. for the
Appellant.
      Mahabir Singh, Sr. Adv., C. S. N. Mohan Rao, D. Mahesh Babu,
Ms. Suchitra Hrangkhawl, M. Sudhakar Reddy, Ganesan Subbian,
T.V. Bhaskar Reddy, Advs. for the Respondents.                        H
744             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
             These appeals are directed against the impugned judgment dated
      12.06.2008 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
      in Appeal Suit No. 1404 of 2004 and Cross-Objection (SR) No. 50168 of
B     2004.
             2. By the impugned judgment, the High Court has reversed the
      judgment of the Trial Court dated 05.12.2003 passed by the IIIrd Additional
      District Judge at Karimnagar in O.S. No. 91 of 1996, in which the Trial
      Court had decreed the suit.
C
              3. A suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff,
      Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy (the appellant herein) in respect of the
      agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993 pertaining to House No. 1-5-266
      (new) situated at Kaman Road, Karimnagar. It is his case that the first
      defendant in the suit, Baddam Pratapa Reddy (the first respondent herein,
D     now deceased) agreed to sell the suit schedule house in his favour; that
      he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract; and
      though he had sufficient money to get the sale deed registered and had
      brought the availability of money to the notice of the first defendant, the
      latter did not execute the sale deed in his favour. The first defendant and
E     his brother, Baddam Ram Reddy, sold their respective shares in the suit
      house in favour of the second defendant, Neethi Satyanarayana (the
      second respondent herein) after execution of the agreement of sale in
      favour of the plaintiff. The suit was initially filed against the first defendant.
      The second defendant was impleaded subsequently. It is relevant to
      note here that the plaintiff purchased half of the suit property from the
F     second defendant after the impugned judgment was passed by the High
      Court.
             The defendants in their written statement denied the case of the
      plaintiff, specifically alleging that the agreement of sale is forged.
             On evaluation of the material on record, the Trial Court decreed
G
      the suit. Vide the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the suit
      and disposed of the appeal and cross-objections arising out of the
      judgment of the Trial Court. Hence, the instant appeals have been
      preferred before this Court.

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  CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                                     745
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

        4. During the trial, the agreement of sale Ext. A-1 was sent for         A
obtaining expert opinion on the genuineness of the signature of the first
defendant thereon. DW-2 is the expert who examined it and his report is
at Ext. B-2. He opined that the admitted signatures of the first defendant
and the disputed signature do not tally, thereby meaning that it is forged.
The Trial Court considered this expert opinion, but preferred not to rely
                                                                                 B
on it, inasmuch as it ruled that the expert opinion was not corroborated
by any reliable evidence. It also held that the evidence of the attesting
witnesses (PWs 2 and 3) is cogent and reliable, and there is no reason
why their evidence should be disbelieved to give way to the expert opinion.
      Per contra, the High Court solely relied upon the expert opinion
and dismissed the suit by concluding that the signature of the first             C
defendant on the agreement of sale Ext. A-1 is forged.
        5. From the discussion of the High Court in arriving at this
conclusion, we find that it has not assigned any valid reason for disbelieving
the attesting witnesses PWs 2 and 3. In fact, with respect to their evidence,
the High Court made certain observations which are against the evidence          D
on record. Similarly, with respect to PW-1, the High Court observed that
he had not deposed as to the presence of the third attestor, Krishna
Murthy, at the time of execution of the agreement of sale. However, it is
clear from the evidence of PW-1 that he has specifically deposed about
the presence of Krishna Murthy at that time. It was also wrongly observed        E
by the High Court that PWs 1 and 2 are silent as to the time and place of
the execution of the agreement. However, in his examination-in-chief,
PW-2 has clarified that the first defendant executed this agreement at
the suit schedule house, at a time when he was residing there and the
plaintiff was residing in the western side of the house, etc. From the
aforementioned facts, it is clear that the High Court disbelieved the            F
evidence of the plaintiff (PW1) and the attestors (PWs 2 and 3) on mere
assumptions and wrong reasons.
       6. In any case, to satisfy our conscience, we have gone through
the evidence of PWs 1, 2, and 3. As rightly observed by the Trial Court,
there is no reason to disbelieve these witnesses, whose evidence is              G
consistent, cogent, and reliable. Though they were subjected to lengthy
cross-examination, nothing noteworthy has been brought out from their
deposition to discard their evidence. Thus, the evidence of PWs 1, 2,
and 3 fully supports the case of the plaintiff and in our considered opinion,
the High Court was not justified in rejecting their evidence.                    H
746            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A            7. As mentioned supra, the High Court mainly relied upon the
      opinion evidence of DW-2, the handwriting expert, who opined that the
      signature of the first defendant on the agreement of sale Ext. A-1 did
      not tally with his admitted signatures.
             8. By now, it is well-settled that the Court must be cautious while
B     evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not
      substantive in nature. It is also settled that it may not be safe to solely
      rely upon such evidence, and the Court may seek independent and reliable
      corroboration in the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence
      as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it. In this respect,
      reference may be made to a long line of precedents that includes Ram
C     Chandra and Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957
      SC 381, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, AIR
      1964 SC 529, Magan Bihari Lal v. State of Punjab, (1977) 2 SCC
      210, and S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC
      596.
D            We may particularly refer to the decision of the Constitution Bench
      of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra), where it was observed
      that the evidence of a handwriting expert can rarely be given precedence
      over substantive evidence. In the said case, the Court chose to disregard
      the testimony of the handwriting expert as to the disputed signature of
E     the testator of a Will, finding such evidence to be inconclusive. The
      Court instead relied on the clear testimony of the two attesting witnesses
      as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will.
            9. On the other hand, in Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
      (1980) 1 SCC 704, this Court emphasised that reliance on expert testimony
F     cannot be precluded merely because it is not corroborated by independent
      evidence, though the Court must still approach such evidence with caution
      and determine its creditworthiness after considering all other relevant
      evidence. After examining the decisions referred to supra, the Court
      was of the opinion that these decisions merely laid down a rule of caution,
      and there is no legal rule that mandates corroboration of the opinion
G     evidence of a handwriting expert. At the same time, the Court noted that
      Section 46 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter “the Evidence
      Act”) expressly makes opinion evidence open to challenge on facts.
             In Alamgir v. State (NCT, Delhi), (2003) 1 SCC 21, without
      referring to Section 46 of the Evidence Act, this Court reiterated the
H
  CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                                 747
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

observations in Murari Lal (supra) and stressed that the Court must          A
exercise due care and caution while determining the creditworthiness of
expert evidence.
       10. In our considered opinion, the decisions in Murari Lal (supra)
and Alamgir (supra) strengthen the proposition that it is the duty of the
Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously while determining its          B
reliability and that the Court may seek independent corroboration of such
evidence as a general rule of prudence. Clearly, these observations in
Murari Lal (supra) and Alamgir (supra) do not go against the proposition
stated in Shashi Kumar Banerjee (supra) that the evidence of a
handwriting expert should rarely be given precedence over substantive
evidence.                                                                    C

       11. In light of these principles, it is necessary to evaluate the
correctness of the findings of the High Court as to the genuineness of
the signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-1.
       12. As mentioned earlier, Ext. A-1 is the agreement of sale entered   D
into by the plaintiff and the first defendant. Ext. A-2 is the receipt
evidencing the payment of earnest money of Rs. 61,200/- in pursuance
of this agreement of sale. The receipt bears the signature of the first
defendant on the revenue stamps affixed thereon. Curiously, Ext. A-2
was not sent for obtaining expert opinion. At the same time, no reliable
material was brought on record that the first defendant has not received     E
the amount under Ext. A-2. In the absence of any challenge to the first
defendant’s signature on Ext. A-2, and in the absence of any reliable
material produced by the first defendant to deny the receipt of such
earnest money, the High Court, in our considered opinion, should have
relied upon this receipt. In fact, we find that the High Court has not       F
considered Ext. A-2 in its entire judgment. As a matter of fact, Ext. A-1
and Ext. A-2 go hand in hand, and Ext. A-2 should not have been ignored
by the High Court.
       Moreover, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not present
on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement    G
altogether. This is because the agreement was signed by the first
defendant and clearly reveals that he had agreed to sell the property to
the plaintiff for a due consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/-. This agreement
was followed by Ext. A-2, which shows the payment and receipt of the
earnest money. In addition to the signature of the first defendant, this
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748             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     receipt bears the signature of the plaintiff on revenue stamps. As
      mentioned earlier, Ext. A-1 and Ext. A-2 are part of the same transaction.
      Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on Ext. A-
      1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted.
             In addition to this, the evidence of DW-3 (the brother of the first
B     defendant) belies the allegation of the first defendant that the signature
      found on Ext. A-1 is forged. DW-3 specifically admitted during his cross-
      examination that he could identify the signature of the first defendant,
      who is his elder brother. He has further admitted that Ext. A-1 and Ext.
      B-1 bears the signature of the first defendant. It may be noted here that
      a partition had taken place between the first defendant and DW-3 in the
C     year 1980, and such partition was effected through Ext. B-1, an
      unregistered partition deed. Crucially, the first defendant has also admitted
      his signature on Ext. B-1 in his cross-examination. Thus, it is clear that
      such admitted signature and the disputed signature of the first defendant
      have been identified by his brother as those of the first defendant himself.
D            13. Undoubtedly, the opinion of a handwriting expert is a relevant
      fact under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 47 of the
      Evidence Act, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting
      of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed is also a
      relevant fact.
E            Per the explanation to Section 47 of the Evidence Act, a person is
      said to be acquainted with the handwriting of another person when he
      has seen that person write, or when he has received documents purported
      to be written by that person in answer to documents written by himself
      or under his authority and addressed to that person, or when, in the
F     ordinary course of business, documents purporting to be written by that
      person have been habitually submitted to him.
             14. A reading of Section 47 of the Evidence Act makes it clear
      that this provision is concerned with the relevance of the opinion of a
      person who is acquainted with the handwriting of another person. The
G     Explanation to this Section goes on to enumerate the circumstances in
      which a person may be said to have such acquaintance.
             In the matter at hand, DW-3, in his cross-examination, has identified
      the disputed signature of the first defendant (his elder brother) on Ext.
      A-1. He also stated that the suit schedule house was constructed when
      he was 25 years old; a partition was effected in 1980, after which he
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  CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                                    749
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

and the first defendant occupied their respective shares in the house;          A
and that he finally sold his share in 1996 (when he was aged about 58
years). This goes on to show that DW-3 lived and resided with the first
defendant in the same house for over three decades. Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, DW-3 identified the first defendant’s signature on Ext.
B-1 (the partition deed), which has been admitted by the first defendant
                                                                                B
himself. In light of this, and given that DW-3 came in to support the case
of his brother, the first defendant before the Court, it can be inferred that
their relations were cordial even after partition and that DW-3 would
have seen the latter write on multiple occasions in normal course of
family affair. Thus, it is clear that, he was acquainted with the handwriting
of the first defendant in terms of the Explanation to Section 47 of the         C
Evidence Act. This makes his opinion as to the disputed handwriting a
relevant fact under Section 47.
       At this juncture, it would be apposite to observe that the weight to
be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent of familiarity
shown by the witness with the disputed handwriting. This, in turn, depends      D
on the frequency with which the witness has had occasion to notice and
observe the handwriting, his own power of observation, and how recent
such observations were. In light of the facts discussed above, which go
on to show the familiarity of DW-3 with the handwriting of the first
defendant, we conclude that the testimony of DW-3 may safely be relied
upon, and must be accorded similar, if not greater, weight than the expert      E
evidence adduced by the defendants to advance their case. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the first defendant
neither challenged DW-3’s admission nor his acquaintance with the
disputed handwriting, although it was open for him to do so by way of
re-examination.                                                                 F
       15. The admission by DW-3 is further supported by the cogent
and consistent testimony of the plaintiff (PW-1) and attesting witnesses
(PWs 2 and 3), and the fact that the first defendant has not denied his
signature on Ext. A-2 (the receipt of payment of earnest money). Having
regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, we conclude that         G
the disputed signature of the first defendant on Ext. A-1 is genuine.
Moreover, keeping in mind the principle that expert evidence should not
be given precedence over substantive evidence, in our considered opinion,
the High Court was not justified in giving precedence to the opinion of

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750             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 11 S.C.R.


A     the expert (DW-2) and solely relying upon his testimony to set aside the
      judgment and decree of the Trial Court.
             In any case, to satisfy our conscience, we have examined the
      admitted and disputed signatures ourselves, and find that the signatures
      are virtually the same. However, in this case, it is unnecessary for us to
B     rely on our own comparison in light of the material on record, as discussed
      above. We hasten to emphasize that we have not been prejudiced by our
      own comparison in appreciating the evidence and reaching our conclusion.
              16. There is another reason why we are not inclined to place
      reliance on the opinion of the expert DW-2. From a perusal of his report
C     Ext. B-2, it is evident that barring the signature on a written statement in
      a prior suit, all other admitted signatures of the first defendant are of a
      period subsequent to the filing of the plaint (i.e. on the vakalatnama and
      the written statement filed in this suit itself). These admitted signatures
      taken subsequent to the filing of the suit could not have been used as a
      valid basis of comparison, and their use for this purpose casts serious
D     doubt on the reliability of the entire report Ext. B-2. Thus, the report was
      liable to be discarded on this ground alone, and was wrongly relied upon
      by the High Court.
             17. Moreover, the High Court has wrongly observed that the
      plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the
E     performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. The
      filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is
      governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with
      Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this,
      Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
F     prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which
      seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must
      comply with all these requirements. In the matter at hand, the plaintiff
      has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to
      perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated
      20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been
G     demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of
      Rs. 58,800/- and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but
      the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the
      agreement of sale. In light of this, in our considered opinion, all the
      formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting
H     a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled. Moreover, there
  CHENNADI JALAPATHI REDDY v. BADDAM PRATAPA                                   751
REDDY (D) THR LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

cannot be any proof of oral demand. Be that as it may, we are satisfied        A
from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the
balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract.
       18. In view of the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment
of the High Court is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the judgment and     B
decree passed by the Trial Court stands restored. The appeals are allowed
accordingly.


Divya Pandey                                                Appeals allowed.
                                                                               C




                                                                               D




                                                                               E




                                                                               F




                                                                               G




                                                                               H