CHANDRO DEVI & ETC.versusUNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

                      [2017] 8 S.C.R. 653


                    CHANDRO DEVI & ETC.                                 A
                                 v.
                  UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
               (Civi!Appea!Nos.11360-11361of2017)
                      SEPTEMBER 08, 2017                                B

       [MADAN B. LOKUR AND DEEPAK GUPTA, JJ.)
      Lease:
        Grant of lease of shops - For rehabilitation of ex-servicemen
- By Army Station Commander - Lease granted for a period of 11 C
months which was renewable from year to year - Jn the year 2007
po1icy introduced whereby lease was not to be extended/renewed
 beyond 5 years - Leases of the lease-holders were cancelled -
Appellants-lease-holders challenged non-renewal of their leases -
Single Judge of High Court dismissed the writ petitions - Letters D
Patent appeals were also dismissed - Some petitioners filed SLP
 which were dismissed - Thereafter review petitions were filed by the
petitioners who had not approached Supreme Court as well as those
 who had approached Supreme Court - Dismissal of review petitions
.- On appeal, plea that the letter on which the courts below had
placed reliance, being a draft letter, a fraud was committed by the E
 Government upon the Court and hence the whole action based on
 this fraud was vitiated - Held: Every wrong action is not a fraudulent
 action - The fact that the letter was a draft letter does not show that
 it was fraudulently introduced by Union of India - Mere allegations
 offraud made for the first time before Supreme Court is not sufficient F
 - From the facts case, it is evident that no guidelines have been
framed with regard to the shops on defence lands created out of
 Government was authorised to issue the SOP dated 1J'h April, 2007
 - There is nothing arbitrary in the policy of SOP 2007- Fraud.
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court
                                                                        G
      HELD: Civil Appeal No. 11360 of 2017: If there is fraud,
which leads to passing of a judgment, then fraud vitiates all actions
taken consequent to such fraud and this would mean that the
judgment would be set aside. Every wrong action is not a
-fraudulent action. In the present .case, assuming that the letter
                                                                        H
                                653
654          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A dated 4th September, 2008 (on the basis of which the High Court
  dismissed the writ petitions) was only a draft letter, it does not
  mean that this letter was fraudulently introduced by the Union of
  India. In the letter placed before the court, the word 'DGL' find
  mention. It may be true that the counsel for the Union of India
B did not inform the court that the words 'DGL' stood for 'Draft
  Government Letter', but, it is equally true that even the counsel
  for the appellant did not make any efforts to find out what the
  words 'DGL' stood for. Even the Court did not look into this
  aspect. Fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Mere allegations
  of fraud made for the first time in this Court are not sufficient. It
C does not mean that the Court is approving the action of the Union
  of India in putting forth this letter before the Court. However, it
  cannot be said that this improper act is a fraudulent action on the
  part of the Union of India. The Single Judge as well as the Division
  Bench of the High Court did place reliance on this letter and
D since this letter is now said to be a draft Government letter only,
   the Court may ignore it for the purposes of deciding this case.
   Even if this letter is ignored, the appellant cannot benefit in view
   of clause 17 of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) dated
   10th August, 2001. (Para 71 (658-C-Fl
         2. It is not correct to say that in view of letter dated 25th
 E
   February, 2005 the Station Commander had no authority to issue
   the second SOP for management and control of shopping
   complexes on 13th April, 2007. No doubt, vide letter dated 25th
   February, 2005 the Ministry of Defence proposed to take over
   the management of all shopping complexes and to frame
 F guidelines in this regard, but as per Para 3 of this letter,
   amendments to clause 2(v) would be applicable from 1•t April 2005
   or from the date when the guidelines/rules, as envisaged in clause
   2(vi) are framed, whichever is later. The Ministry of Defence
   issued Defence Shopping Complexes (Maintenance and
 G Administration) Rules in the year 2006. It is the case of the
   appellant herself that these Rules are not applicable to shops
   constructed on defence lands by public funds. Therefore, as per
    the appellant, these rules are not applicable to the present case.
    The guidelines circulated vide letter dated 4th September, 2008

 H
   CHANDRO DEVI & ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.                 , 655


 was only a draft Government letter and, therefore, these A
 guidelines are also not applicable to them. If that be so, it clearly
 means that no guidelines have been framed with regard to the
 shops on defence lands created out of Government funds. If no
 fresh guidelines have been framed then amended clause 2(v) would
 not come into play. Then SOP of 2001 would be applicable and B
 that can be amended by the Station Commander himself. The
 SOP of 2007 provides that no shops will be leased out for a period
·of more than 5 years. [Para 10) [659-G-H; 660-A-D]
       3. SOP 2007 has been done to ensure that immediately on
suffering a loss, ex-servicemen or their family members are           C
rehabilitated for a certain period of time and after they have been
rehabilitated and earned for 5 years they can earn their own
livelihood without any support from the Army and other persons,
who had suffered during this period, can be given this benefit.
There is nothing arbitrary in this policy. [Para 10) (660-E]
                                                                      D
      4. On going through the SOPs of 2001 and 2007, it is not
found that that the appellant had any vested right to continue in
possession even after 5 years. Even, as per the SOP of 2001, the
Station Commander was to renew lease from year to year and
there was no inherent right to continue as a lessee in perpetuity.
These leases have been determined in a non-discriminatory and         E
non-arbitrary manner. (Para 13[ (662-G-H]
     · Civil Appeal No. 11361 of 2017:


      5. In addition to the reasons given in Civil Appeal No. 11360 F
of 2017, Civil Appeal No. 11361 of 2017 is also liable to be
dismissed because of two additional reasons: (i) That the
appellants in this appeal had earlier filed review petition which
was dismissed and, thereafter, they filed second Review Petition .
which was rightly dismissed by the Delhi High Court as not G
maintainable being a second review petition; (ii) That the
appellants had approached this Court and their special leave
petition was dismissed by this Court on 04.02.2011. However,
the appellants were granted time till 30th November, 2011 to
vacate the premises on their furnishing undertaking. They availed
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656            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A of the benefit granted to them and now they cannot be permitted
  to raise fresh grounds in this appeal. [Para 15) [663-C-D)
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.11360-
      11361 of2017.
 B          From the impugned final Judgment and Orders dated 25 .11.20 J.l
      passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Review Petition
      No.694 of201 I and Review Petition No.717 of201 I respectively.
            Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Sr. Adv., Anupam Lal Das, Anirudh Singh,
      Krishanu Barua, Ms. Ruchita Cheema, Advs. for the Appellant.
 c         R. Balasubramanian, Mukul Singh, Prabhas Bajaj, Akshay
      Amritanshu, Ms.Aarti Sharma, B. V. Balaram Das, Ad vs. for the
      Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
 D          CIVIL APPEAL N0.11360 OF 2017
            (Arising out of SLP (Q NO. 33396 OF 2011)
            I. Leave granted.
         2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25'h
 E November, 2011 passed in Review Petition No.694 of 2011, whereby
   the Division Bench ofthe Delhi High Court dismissed the review petition
   and refused to recall the judgment dated 29'h July, 20 I 0 passed in Letters
   Patent Appeal No.513 of 20 I 0, which was dismissed, upholding the
   judgment of the learned Single Judge, dated J2th July, 2010.
             3. At the outset, it would be pertinent to mention that a number of
 F
      writ petitions were filed by the petitioners who were either ex-servicemen,
      who had suffered injuries during war or active service or had retired
      after rendering full service. Some of the writ petitioners like Chandro
      Devi (appellant herein) were family members of the deceased army
      personnel, who had died in war etc ..
 G          4. The original writ petitioners were rehabilitated by allocating
      them shops in those colonies where defence personnel reside. These
      colonies were being managed by the Station Commander. In Delhi such
      colonies are located at S.P. Marg, Delhi Cantt., Arjun Vihar, Dhaula
      Kuan, Shankar Vihar etc. It is not disputed that as per the lease deed(s)
 H
   CHANDRO DEVI & ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.                       657
                [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

entered between the writ petitioners and the Station Commander, the A
leases were granted to the petitioners only for a period of 11 months, but
there was a clause in the lease deed that it could be renewed. On 131h
April, 2007 a policy was introduced, which provided that the lease should
not be extended beyond 5 years under any circumstances. However,
the persons whose leases were cancelled after 5 years could apply for B
grant of fresh lease after 3 years. The leases of the leaseholders were
cancelled since they had held the shops on lease for more than 5 years.
        5. The petitioners challenged non-renewaLoftheir leases and
·Claimed that they were entitled to renewal thereof. The learned Single
 Judge dismissed the writ petitions. The letter patent appeals filed by the
 lessees including the appellant herein were dismissed by the Division C
 Bench. Some of the original writ petitioners filed special leave petitions
 before this Court, which were dismissed. However, the petitioners, who
 had approached this Court, were granted time to vacate the premises up
 to 30'h November, 2011 on their filing usual undertaking in this regard.
 Some of the writ petitioners like Chandro Devi, the present appellant, D
 did not approach this Court. After the decision by this Court, one set of
 review petition(s)·was filed by the persons, who had approached this
 Court and another review petition was filed by Chandro Devi, who had
 not approached this Court. The review petitions were time barred but
 the delay was condoned. These review petitions were dismissed leading
 to the filing of a number of special leave petitions and one contempt E
 petition.
         6. On 17th July, 2017 we had dismissed the Special Leave Petition
{Civil) Nos.4078 of20ll and 3982 of2012. We had, however, ordered
that we would consider the case of Chandro Devi and Surendra Kumar.
As far as the case ofSurendra Kumar is concerned, i.e. Contempt Petition F
Nos.508-509 of 2014, the same was disposed of separately vide order
 dated 4t11 September, 2017. This leaves or1ly the case of Chandro Devi.
 She had admittedly not approached this Court in the earlier round of
 litigation.
        7. The main argument raised on behalf of the appellant by Shri G
 Rajeev Dhavan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant is
 that the judgments ofboth the learned Single Judge as well as the Division
 Bench are based on a letter dated 4'h September, 2008. On the top of
 this letter the words 'DGL' in capital letters are typed and, according to
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658           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          (2017) 8 S.C.R.


A the appellant, this means 'Draft Government Letter'. It is urged that
  this letter, which was only a draft letter, was held out to be the guidelines
  of the Government and based on this letter the learned Single Judge as
  well as the Division Bench dismissed the writ petitions. According to
  the appellant, this was a fraud committed by the Union of India upon the
B court and since this is a fraud, the whole action based on this fraud is
  vitiated. There can be no dispute with the proposition that if there is
  fraud, which leads to passing ofa judgment, then fraud vitiates all actions
  taken consequent to such fraud and this would mean that the judgment
  would be set aside. However, before setting aside the judgment, we
  must come to the conclusion that the action was fraudulent. Every
C wrong action is not a fraudulent action. Assuming that the letter dated
  4th September, 2008 was only a draft letter, it does not mean that this
   letter was fraudulently introduced by the Union of India. In the letter
  placed before the court the word 'DGL' find mention. It may be true
   that the counsel for the Union oflndia did not inform the court that the
   words 'DGL' stood for 'Draft Government Letter', but, it is equally true
0
   that even the counsel for the appellant did not make any efforts to find
   out what the words 'DGL' stood for. Even the Court did not look into
   this aspect. Fraud has to be pleaded and proved. Mere allegations of
   fraud made for the first time in this Court are not sufficient. We are not,
   in any manner, approving the action of the Union of India in putting forth
E this letter before the Court. However, it cannot be said that this improper
   act is a fraudulent action on the part of the Union oflndia. The learned
   Single Judge as well as the Division Bench did place reliance on this
   letter and since this letter is now said to be a draft government letter
   only, we may ignore it for the purposes of deciding this case. Even if we
F were to ignore this letter, the appellant cannot benefit. We may point out
   that clause 17 of the Standard Operating Procedure (for short 'SOP')
   dated l Oth August, 200 l, which even as per the appellant was applicable,
   reads as follows :
            "17. Renewal of licence deed: Renewal of licence deed will be
            done on the recommendation of residential associations, which
 G          will be obtained three months in advance from the date of expiry
            of licence deed by ODA & QMG, Station. HQ Delhi Cantt. If
            the recommendations are in favour of allottee, then the Station
            Commander may renew the licence deed for the subsequent year.
            However, the licence deed may be terminated at any time by the
 H          Station Commander at his discretion."
   CHANDRO DEVI & ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.                              659
                [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

      8. It was the case of the appellant that till the policy of 13'h April, A
2007 was introduced, as a matter of course renewals were being granted.
This policy became effective from 30'h April, 2007. Clause 18 of the
policy reads as follows:
       "18. Renewal of licence deed: Renewal of licence deed will be
       done on the recommendation of residential associations, which B
       will be obtained three months in advance from the date of expiry
       oflicence deed by AQMG, Station Head Quarter, Delhi Cantt. If
       the recommendations are in favour of allottee, then the Station
     · Commander may renew the licence deed for the subsequent year.
       However, the licence deed may be terminated at any time by the
       Station Commander at his discretion. No extension beyond five C
       years will be given under any circumstance. The same person
       can apply after a gap of minimum three years of clear break (not
       running in any Army Colony of NCR)."
                                                  . (emphasis supplied)
                                                                               D
      9. In the meantime, a letter dated 25'h February, 2005 was sent by
the government of India to the Chief of the Army Staff [Annexure Pl
28]. Relevant portion of this letter reads as follows:
       "(v) The management ofall such complexes will be exercised by
       the Government through the concerned Services who will be fully         E
       accountable for the proper maintenance of their accounts and
       assets as per norms fixed in this regard.
       (vi) Guidelines/Rules regarding operation, maintenance and
       allotment 9f shops, accounts etc. shall be formulated by the Ministry
     . of Defence.                                                             F
       3. All other terms and conditions of Government letter No. 11026/
       5/2001-D(Lands) dated 04-1-2001 will remain unchanged. The
       amendments as at 2(v) above will be applicable from 01-4-2005
       or from the date when the Guidelines/Rules as in 2(vi) above are
       framed, whichever is later."
                                                                               G
       10. The main ground taken by the appellant herein is that in view
of letter dated 2S'h February, 2005 the Station Commander had no
authority to issue the second SOP for management and control of shopping
complexes on l31hApril, 2007. In our view, this contention is totally
misplaced. No doubt, vide letter dated 2S'h February, 2005 the Ministry
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660           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A of Defence proposed to take over the management of all shopping
  complexes and to frame guidelines in this regard, but as per Para 3 of
  this letter, amendments to clause 2(v) would be applicable from 1''April
  2005 or from the date when the guidelines/rules, as envisaged in clause
  2(vi) are framed, whichever is later. The Ministry of Defence issued
  Defence Shopping Complexes (Maintenance and Administration) Rules
8
  in the year 2006. It is the case of the appellant herself that these Rules
  are not applicable to shops constructed on defence lands by public funds.
  Therefore, as per the appellant, these rules are not applicable to the
  present case. Vide letter dated 4•h September, 2008 the guidelines were
  circulated. The appellant contends that this was only a draft government
C letter and, therefore, these guidelines are also not applicable to them. If
  that be so, it clearly means that no guidelines have been framed with
  regard to the shops on defence lands created out of government funds.
   Ifno fresh guidelines have been framed then amended clause 2(v) would
   not come into play. Then SOP of2001 would be applicable and that can
D be amended by the Station Commander himself. The SOP of 2007
   provides that no shops will be leased out for a period of more than 5
   years. 1t was urged by Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel
   appearing for the respondents, that this has been done to ensure that
   immediately on suffering a loss, ex-servicemen or their family members
   are rehabilitated for a certain period of time and after they have been
E rehabilitated and earned for 5 years they can earn their own livelihood
   without any support from the Army and other persons, who had suffered
   during this period, can be given this benefit. There is nothing arbitrary in
   this policy. The learned Single Judge dealt with this issue specifically.
   He has made reference to clause 17 of the SOP of2001 and clause 18
   of the SOP of2007 and held as follows:
 F
            "7. In terms of the above Clause 18, the right to get the licences
            renewed immediately on the expiry of five years has been
            withdrawn. The allottees are expected to apply again after a
            minimum break of three years. In terms of the revised policy, the
            Respondents issued letters to the Petitioners declining renewal of
 G          licences. The copies ofletters requiring the Petitioners to vacate
            the shops under their occupation have been enclosed with the
            petition."
          11. Before the learned Single Judge, the appellant had raised her
   claim on the basis of principle of legitimate expectation and this was
 H rejected by the learned Single Judge in the following terms:
CHANDRO DEVI & ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ,ORS.                         661
             [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

   "47. This Court finds thatthe Petitioners have not been able to, in A
   the first place, show that there is any specific representation either
   to any of them or to all of them generally that their licences would
   stand automatically renewed year after year by the Respondents.
   The mere fact that as a matter of practice the licences were
   renewed does not constitute the specific representation by the B
   Respondents to each of them that indeed their licences would be
   renewed. The renewal, it must be recalled, was only for a year at
   a time and was in accordance with the prevailing policy and Clause ·
    17. In other words, the only "representation" or "assurance" to
   each of them was that at the most the licence would be renewed
   for one more year at the discretion of the Respondent. No C
 · challenge was laid to Clause 17 of the SOP dated 1O'h August,
   2001, which left it to the discretion of the respondents to renew
   the licence at the end of a year. The reasons for the change in
   the policy as explained by the Respondents appear to this Court
   to constitute sufficient justification for such change. The scope D
   ofjudicial review of such policy change is indeed limited. Unless
    it is shown to be not informed by any reasonable criterion or not
    being in public interest, the Court cannot and should not interfere.
    Given the fact that the number of shopping complexes is unlikely
    to increase, and the waiting list of applicants is a growing one, the
    concern of the Respondents that those exservicemen waiting in E
    the expectation of allotment of a shop should also be accounted
    for, cannot be said to be an unreasonable one. Both groups of
    exservicemen, i.e., the present allottees and those awaiting
    allotment are from the same "catchment". The demand for shops
    far exceeds the supply. There has to be a balancing of these two
                                                                          F
 . sets of"expectations". If the Respondent~ take a call and decide
    to change the policy so that the chance of those in the queue
    waiting for allotment. of shops improves, the Court cannot be
    expected to judicially review such policy. As explained in Madras
    City Wine Merchant, no question oflegitimate expectation would
    arise if there is a change in policy or the position is altered by a G
    rule or legislation.

  48. The Petitioners have not questioned the DSC Rules, 2006 or
  the Guidelines issued in September, 2008. It appears that each of

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662           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 8 S.C.R.


A          these Petitioners has been a beneficiary of renewal of licence
           several times over. Each of them has been granted renewal for
           more than three years which is the maximum period of licence
           envisaged under Rule 13 of the DSC Rules. It has been made
           clear in Clause 8 of the September, 2008 Guidelines that the DSC
           Rules would apply to the shopping complexes covered by 3.42. l
B
           of SOA 1983. Consequently, even procedurally, none of the
           Petitioner can harbour a legitimate expectation of being consulted
           before change in the policy."
           12. It is true that in Para 48 of the judgment the learned Single
 C Judge also referred to the Defence Shopping Complexes (Maintenance
   and Administration) Rules, 2006 and the guidelines issued in 2008, but
   the Court also found that the change in the SOP in limiting the maximum
   period of lease to 5 years was not arbitrary or irrational. We may refer
   to the following findings of the learned Single Judge:
           "51. This Court is unable to find the decision of the Respondents
 D
           to restrict the licence period in respect of shops in shopping
           complexes to five years with the opportunity of again applying
           after a break of three years to be either discriminatory or arbitrary.
           Also, any prejudice that may be caused to the Petitioners in whose
           cases the licences were renewed prior to the change in the policy
 E         has been neutralised by the fact that they have continued in
           possession for nearly three years thereafter (amounting to more
            than two renewals) under the interim orders of this Court. As
            regards those Petitioners seeking transfer of the existing licence
            in their capacity as widows of ex-servicemen, they would be
            governed by Rule 7 of the DSC Rules 2006 and in any event, they
 F
            too have continued to be in the premises far beyond the period of
            licence under the interim orders of this Court."
          13. This judgment of the lear ..t. ~Single Judge was upheld by the
   Division Bench and also by this Court though in a petition filed by some
   other petitioner. On going through the SOPs of 200 I and 2007, we do
 G not find that the appellant had any vested right to continue in possession
   even after 5 years. Even, as per the SOP of2001, the Station Commander
   was to renew lease from year to year and there was no inherent right to
   continue as a lessee in perpetuity. These leases have been determined

 H
   CHANDRO DEVI & ETC. v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.                                  663
                [DEEPAK GUPTA, J.]

in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner. We, therefore, find A
no merit in this appeal, which is dismissed accordingly. Pending
application(s), ifany, stand(s) disposed of.
       CIVIL APPEAL N0.11361 OF 2017
       (Arising out of SLP <C) N0.33397 OF 2011)
                                                                                   B
       14. Leave granted.
        15. In addition to the reasons given hereinabove, this appeal is
also liable to be dismissed and is dismissed, because of the following two
additional reasons:
                                                                                   c
     · (i) That the appellants in this appeal had earlier filed review petition
           which was dismissed and, thereafter, they filed second Review
           Petition No. 717 of201 l, which was rightly dismissed by the
           Delhi High Court as not maintainable being a second review
           petition;
                                                                                   D
       (ii) That the appellants had approached this Court and their special
            leave petition was dismissed by this Court on 04.02.2011.
            However, the appellants were granted time till 301h November,
           2011 to vacate the premises on their furnishing undertaking.
            They availed of the benefit granted to them and now they cannot
            be permitted to raise fresh grounds in this appeal.                    E
       16. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.


Kalpa11a K. Tripathy                                          Appeals dismissed.