CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusLAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.

                   [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 414

A            CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
                                   v.
               LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER & ANR.
                 (Civil Appeal No(s).1743 of 2006)
                        NOVEMBER 22, 2011
B
       [R.M. LODHA AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]

        Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s.23 - Market value -
   Assessment of - Acquired land, an un-irrigated, undeveloped
C agricultural land admeasuring 144 acres - Assessment of
   market value, on basis of the exemplar sale transaction of a
   developed site measuring 2400 square feet and executed
   subsequent to the date of publication of preliminary
   notification - Quantum of deductions to be applied -
D Determination of - High Court reduced the compensation
   awarded by the Reference Court from Rs. 1, 45, 0001- per acre
  to Rs. 65,0001- per acre, deducting 55 percent of the market
  value assessed on the basis of the exemplar sale deed,
   towards developmental charges, 5 percent towards waiting
E period, and 10 percent towards de-escalation - On appeal
  held: It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions, out of
  the market value of an exemplar land, for each of the two
  components-viz. ·first component-for keeping aside area/space
  for providing developmental infrastructure and second
F component-for developmental expenditure/expense - This
  would be the first step towards balancing the differential factors
  - The second step is to classify the nature of the exemplar
  land as also the acquired land referring to the development
  activities in connection with the first component as also
G second component - Comparison of the classifications
  arrived, would depict the difference in terms of development,
  between the exemplar land and the acquired land, which
  would lead to the final step - In the final step, the absence
  and presence of developmental components, based on such

H                                414
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 415
                  OFFICER

comparison, would constitute the basis for arriving at an        A
 appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to balance
 the differential factors between the exemplar land and the
acquired land - Upper limit of permissible deduction is 75 per
cent-Deduction upto 67 per cent i.e. deduction of 33113 per
cent each can be made for the two components under the           B
head of development - Range of deductions other than the
head development would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case - It may exceed 8 per cent but
that would only be where deductions for development activities
under head development is less than 67 per cent i.e. as long     c
as cumulative deductions do not cross the upper bench mark
of 75 percent - High Courl limited deductions under the head
of "development" to 55 percent, thus, does not call for
interference - Deduction of 10 per cent under the head of 'de-
escalation' is appropriate specially when the period in
                                                                 0
question exceeded 1year7 months and 17 days - Deduction
of 5 per cent towards waiting period is upheld - Cumulatively
these deductions would amount to 70 percent (55+10+5=70)
which is within the parameters laid down by this Courl- Thus,
there is no infirmity in the quantum to accumulated deductions   E
applied by the High Court - High Court awarded final
compensation at the rate of Rs. 65,0001- per acre to the land
losers relying on its own judgment in an earlier case which
perlained to acquisition of land out of the same notification
under which appellants' land was acquired - Consistency in
the judicial determination is of utmost imporlance - Final       F
compensation determined by the High Courl at Rs.65,0001-
per acre, was fully justified, even for the land acquired from
the revenue estate of the other village - City Improvement
Trust Board Act, 1976 - s. 15(1).
                                                                 G
     Development Authority issued a preliminary
Notification under Section 15(1) of the City Improvement
Trust Board Act, 1976 for acquisition of land for raising a
residential layout. After seven years final notification was
issued and the land of the appellants falling in the             H
    416    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A revenue estate of village 8 and R were acquired. The
  Land Acquisition Officer passed an award. The market
  value for the village 8 was fixed at the rate of Rs. 4, 100/-
  per acre and the market value for the village R was fixed
  at the rate of Rs. 13,500/- per acre respectively, as
s compensation. Thereafte•, on a reference filed for
  enhancement of compensation, the compensation
  enhanced from Rs. 4,100/- per acre to Rs. 1,46,000/- per
  acre. The Reference Court on basis of the sale deed
  dated 30.12.1983, from the market value of land
c assessed, applied a deduction of 33 per cent. The
  Development Authority as also Land Acquisition Officer
  filed separate appeals before the High Court. The High
  Court finding the deductions inappropriate remitted the
  matter to the Reference Court for reconsideration on the
  issue of deductions to be made from the market value,
0
  so as to determine compensation payable to the land
  losers. The Reference Court re-determined the market
  value of the acquired land at Rs. 1,45,000/- per acre. The
  Development Authority and the Land Acquisition Officer
  filed appeals before the High Court for reducing the
E quantum of compensation awarded and the landowners
  filed cross-objections for enhancement thereof. The High
  Court reduced the compensation awarded by the
  Reference Court from Rs. 1,45,000/- per acre to Rs.
  65,000/- per acre. It deducted 55 percent of the market
F value assessed on the basis of the exemplar sale deed,
  towards developmental charges, 5 percent towards
  waiting period, and 10 percent towards de-escalation.
  Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeals.

G         Dismissing the appeals, the Court

        HELD: 1.1. The quantum of deductions (tn be made
    from the market value determined on the basis of the
    developed exemplar transaction) on account of
    development is divided into two components. Firstly,
H
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 417
                  OFFICER
space/area which would have to be left out, for providing A
indispensable amenities like formation of roads and
adjoining pavements, laying of sewers and rain/flood
water drains, overhead water tanks and water lines, water
and effluent treatment plants, electricity sub-stations,
electricity lines and street lights, telecommunication B
towers etc. Besides the said, land has also to be kept
apart for parks, gardens and playgrounds. Additionally,
development includes provision of civic amenities like
educational institutions, dispensaries and hospitals,
police stations, petrol pumps etc. This "f.irst component", c
may conveniently be referred to as deductions for
keeping aside area/space for providing developmental·
infrastructure. Secondly, deduction has to be made for
the expenditure/expense which is likely to be incurred in
providing and raising the infrastructure and civic 0
amenities, including costs for levelling hillocks and filling
up low lying lands and ditches, plotting out smaller plots
and the like. This "second component" may conveniently
be referred to as deductions for developmental
expenditure/expense. [Para 16] [436-F-H; 437-A-C]
                                                              E
     1.2. It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions,
out of the market value of an exemplar land, for each of
the two components. This would be the first step towards
balancing the differential •factors. This would pave the
way for determining the market value of the undeveloped F
acquired land on the basis of market value of the
developed exemplar land. For the "first component"
under the head of development, deduction of 33-1/3
percent can be made. Likewise, for the "second
component" under the head of "development" a further G
deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made.
The facts and circumstances of each case would
determine the actual component of deduction, for each
of the two components. Yet under the head of
"development", the applied deduction should not exceed H
    418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL) S.C.R.

A 67 percent. That should be treated as the upper
  benchmark. This would mean, that even if deducticn
  under one or the other of the two components exceeds
  331/3 percent, the two components under the head of
  development put together, should not exceed the upper
B benchmark. [Para 17, 18] (437-D-E; 438-C-F]

         1.3. In Lal Chand's case and in Andhra Pradesh
    Housing Board's case this Court expressed the upper limit
    of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions
C upto 67 percent can be made under the head of
    "development". Further deductions would obviously
    pertain to considerations other than the head of
    "development". A deduction could be made keeping in
    mind the waiting period required to raise infrastructure,
    as also, the waiting period for sate of developed plots and
D or built-up areas. This nature of deduction may be placed
    under the head "waiting period". Deductions could also
    be made in cases where the exemplar sale transaction,
    is of a date subsequent to the publication of the
    preliminary notification. This nature of deduction may be
E placed under the head "de-escalation". Likewise,
    deductions may be made for a variety of other causes
    which may arise in different cases. All deductions should
    not cumulatively exceed the upper benchmark of 75
    percent. A deduction beyond 75 percent would give the
F impression of being lopsided, or contextually unreal,
    since the land loser would seemingly get paid for only 25
    percent of his land. This impression is unjustified,
    because deductions are made out of the market value of
    developed land, whereas, the .acquired land is
G undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences
    between the nature of the exemplar land and the acquired
    land, it should be remembered, is the reason/cause for
  . applying deductions. Market value based on an exemplar
    sale, from which a deduction in excess of 75 percent has
H to be made, would not be a relevant sale transac~~n to
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 419
                  OFFICER

be taken into consideration, for determining the              A
compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation,
the exemplar land and the acquired land would be
uncomparable, and therefore, there would be no question
of applying the market value of one (exemplar sale) to
determine the compensation payable for the other              B
(acquired land). Even though on account of
developmental activities (under the head "development"),
the upper benchmark of 67 percent is specified, it would
seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible
range would be upto 8 percent. That however, is not the       c
correct position. The range of deductions, other than
under the head "development", would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. Such deductions,
may even exceed 8 percent, but that would be so only,
where deductions for developmental activities (under the
                                                              0
head "development") is less than 67 percent, i.e., as long
as the cumulative deductions do not cross the upper
benchmark of 75 percent. Therefore, the range for
deductions, for issues other than developmental costs,
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case, they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof,      E
or even further more, as long as, cumulatively all
deductions put together do not exceed the upper
benchmark of 75 percent. (Para 19] [438-G-H; 439-A-H;
440-A-B]
                                                              F
    1.4. Before applying deductions for ascertaining the
market value of the undeveloped acquired land, it would
be necessary to classify the nature of the exemplar land,
as also, the acquired land. This would constitute the
second step in the process of determination of the correct    G
quantum of deductions. The lands under reference may
be totally undeveloped, partially developed, substantially
developed or fully developed. In arriving at an
appropriate classification of the nature of the lands which
are to be compared, reference may be made to the              H
   420    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A developmental activities referred in connection with the
  "first component'', as also, the "second component". The
  presence (or absence) of one or more of the components
  of development, would lead to an appropriate
  classification of the exemplar land, and the acquired land.
B Comparison of the classifications thus arrived, would
  depict the difference in terms of development, between
  the exemplar land and the acquired land. This exercise
  would lead to the final step. In the final step, the absence
  and presence of developmental components, based on
c such comparison, would constitute the basis for arriving
  at an appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to
  balance the differential factors between the exemplar land
  and the acquired land. [Para 20] [440-C-G]

         1.5. The material sought by the appellant from the
J Commissioner, Gulbarga Development Authority was
  irrelevant for the determination of the percentage of
  deduction to be applied. It is the overall developmental
  cost, incurred (or incurable) on the entire acquired land
  which has to be apportioned amongst the landholders In
  a given case, the developmental cost on a small piece of
  land, may be far in excess of the cost of the land. That
  would however not mean, that the landowner in question,
  would not be entitled to compensation. Again, if no
  specific developmental activity is carried out on a
F particular piece of land, it would be improper to conclude,
  that no deduction should be made while determining the
  compensation payable to such landowner, even though
  the acquired land was undeveloped. What the appellant
  ought to have ascertained, is the developmental cost on
G the entire acquired land. In such a situation, if the entire
  developmental activity had been completed, it would be
  permissible to proportionately apportion the same
  amongst land holders. Such a situation may not arise in
  actuality. In most cases development is a continuous and
H ongoing process, which would be completed over a long
  CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 421
                   OFFICER

 stretch of time extending in some cases to a decade or        A
 even more. Therefore, it cannot be said that no deduction
 should be made in the instant case under the head of
 "development" because no expense is shown to have
 been incurred for development of the land acquired from
 the appellants. [Para 22] (441-G-H; 442-A-F]                  B

       1.6. In the absence of inputs as were sought by the
 appellants from the Commissioner, Gulbarga
  Development Authority, the deductions can only be
 based on reasonable and logical norms. Comparison of          C
 the state of development of the exemplar land, as also,
 that of the acquired land can be the only legitimate basis,
 for a reasonable and logical determination on the issue.
 Based on the said foundation, an assessment has to be
 made by applying the parameters delineated. It is
 proceeded on the assumption that the exemplar sale            D
 deed was a fully developed site. In such a situation,
 keeping in mind the parameters laid down by this Court,
 and the conclusions drawn as also the facts of the instant
 case, a deduction of upto 67 percent may have been
 justified, and the same would fall within the parameters      E
 laid down by this Court because the exemplar land could
 be classified as fully developed, whereas, the acquired
 land was totally undeveloped land. As against the said,
 the High Court limited deductions under the head of
 development to 55 percent. There is no justifiable reason     F
 to interfere with the same, specially in an appeal
 preferred by the land loser, more so, because no
 justifiable basis for the same was brought to the notice.
 [Para 23] (442-F-H; 443-A-D]
                                                               G
      1.7. The High Court while determining the
 compensation payable to the appellants on the basis of
 the sale deed dated 30.12.1983 applied a further deduction
·of 10 percent under the head of "de-escalation". Even
 though escalation of market price of land is a question
                                                               H
    422   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A of fact, which should ordinarily to be proved through
  cogent evidence. Yet, keeping in mind ground realities,
  and taking judicial notice thereof, the land prices are on
  the rise throughout the country. The outskirts of Gulbarga
  town are certainly not an exception to the rule. The
B exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983 was executed
  exactly 1 year 7 months and 17 days after the publication
  of the preliminary notification on 13.5.1982 no fault can
  be found with the determination rendered by the High
  Court in making a deduction of 10 percent under the
c head of "de-escalation", specially when the period in
  question exceeded one year (as for annual deductions),
  by 7 months and 17 days. Thus, no fault can be found
  with the determination rendered by the High Court in
  making a deduction of 10 percent under the head of de-
D escalation. [Paras 24 and 25) [443-E-H; 444-A-F]

      Delhi Development Authority Vs. Bali Ram Sharma
  (2004) 6 SCC 533; ONGC Limited Vs. Rameshbhai
  Jeewanbhai Patel, (2008) 14 SCC 748; Val/iyammal & Anr.
  Vs. Special Tehsildar (Land Acquisition) & Anr. (2011) 8 SCC
E 91 - relied on.

       1.8. Under the head "waiting period", the High Court
  allowed a deduction of 5 percent. During the course of
  hearing, the appellants did not assail the said deduction.
F Therefore, it is not necessary to record any findjng in
  respect of the deduction applied by the High Court under
  the head of "waiting period". The "waiting period" is one
  of the relevant components for making deductions. The
  instant deduction of 5 percent applied by the High Court
G is upheld. [Para 26) [444-G-H; 445-A-B]

         Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs. Special Land Acquisition
    Officer Poona &Anr. (1988) 3 SCC 751: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR
    531: Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional Officer,

H
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 423
                  OFFICER
Chittor vs. L. Kamalamma (Smt.) Dead by LRs. & Ors. (1998)    A
2 SCC 385: 1998 (1) SCR 1153; Atma Singh (Dead) through
LRs & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568: 2007
(12) SCR 1120 - referred to.

     1.9'. 55 percent deduction accorded by the High          B
Court towards "development" is upheld. The deduction
of 10 percent on account of "de-escalation", as also, the
deduction of 5 percent on account of "waiting period" is
upheld. Cumulatively these deductions would amount to
70 percent (55+10+5=70). The outer benchmark for
deductions laid down by this Court in Lal Chand's case        C
and in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case is 75
percent. Cumulatively also the deduction allowed by the
High Court, fall well within the parameters laid down by
this Court. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the quantum
of accumulated deductions applied by the High Court           D
during the course of making an assessment of the market
value of the acquired land. [Para 27] [445-C-E]

      1.10. Based on the said deductions, the High Court
calculated the market value of the acquired land at E
Rs.67,954/- per acre. The market value of the acquired
land for disbursement of compensation to the land losers
was fixed by the High Court at Rs.65,000/- per acre. In
allowing final compensation at the rate of Rs.65,000/- per
acre to the land losers, the High Court had placed reliance F
on market value fixed by the High Court itself in an earlier
case. The High Court had awarded Rs.65,000/- per acre
as compensation payable to the land losers, in an earlier
process of litigation pertaining to acquisition of land, out
of the same notification (under which the appellants land G
was acquired). The said determination was rendered in
respect of the land acquired from the revenue estate of ·
village 8. While recording its final determination the High
Court expressed, that it was desirable to arrive at a
uniform value, specially when the land in question came H
    424   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A to be acquired out of the same process of acquisition,
  and had not been shown to be any different from the
  appellants land. The said view expressed by the High
  Court is upheld. This sentiment expressed by the High
  Court should never be breached. Consistency in judicial
B determination is of utmost importance. s'ince the
  judgment relied upon by the High Court has attained
  finality, the final compensation determined by the High
  Court at Rs.65,000/- per acre, was fully justified. [Para 28]
  (445-F-H; 446-A-C]
c      1.11. The conclusions drawn pertaining to
  acquisition of land falling in the revenue estate of village
  B apply equally to land acquired from the revenue estate
  of village R. The High Court, while making a reference to
  the land acquired from village R, noticed that·village R
D had a lower market value as it was farther from the nerve
  centre of Gulbarga town as compared to village B. As·
  such, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case,
  it would be just and appropriate to uphold the
  compensation determined by the High Court at Rs.65,000/
E - per acre, even for the land acquired from the revenue
  estate of village R. [Para 29] (446-D-F]

      Brigadier Sahib Singh Katha & Ors. v. Amritsar
  Improvement Trust & Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 419; Administrator
F General of West Bengal vs. Collector, Varanasi (1988) 2 SCC
  150: 1988 ( 2 ) SCR 1025; Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs.
  Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona & Anr. (1988) 3 SCC
  751: 1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531; Land Acquisition Officer
  Revenue Divisional Officer, Chottor vs. L. Kamalamma (Smt.)
  Dead by LRs. & Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 385: 1998 (1) SCR 1153;
G Kasturi and others vs. State of Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 354:
  2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 117; Land Acquisition Officer,
  Kammarapal/y Village, Nizamabad District, A.P. vs. Nookala
  Rajamallu & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 334: 2003 (6) Suppl. SCR
  67; V. Hanumantha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. vs. Land
H
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 425
                  OFFICER

Acquisition Officer & Manda/ R. Officer (2003) 12 SCC 642;   A
Viluben Jha/ejar Contractor (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of
Gujarat (2005) 4 SCC 789: 2005 (3) SCR 542; Atma Singh
(Dead) through LRs & Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Anr.
(2008) 2 sec 568: 2001 (12) SCR 1120; Lal Chand vs.
Union of India & Anr. (2009) 15 SCC 769: 2009 (13) SCR       B
622; Subh Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (2010) 1
SCC 444: 2009 (15 ) SCR 287; Andhra Pradesh Housing
Board vs. K. Manohar Reddy & Ors. (2010) 12 SCC 707: 2010
(11).SCR 1107; Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. vs.
MK. Rafiq Sahib (2011) 7 SCC 714 - referred to               c
                   Case Law Reference:
    (1982) 1 sec 419          Referred to.      Para 15
    1988 (2) SCR 1025         Referred to.      Para 15
                                                             D
    1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531 Referred to.       Para 15
    1998 (1) SCR 1153         Referred to.     Para 15
    2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 117 Referred to.       Para 15
                                                             E
    2003 (6) Suppl. SCR 67    Referred to.     Para 15
   (2003) 12 sec 642          Referred to.     Para 15
   2005 (3) SCR 542           Referred to.     Para 15
   2007 (12 ) SCR 1120        Referred to.     Para 15       F

   2009 (13 ) SCR 622         Referred to.     Para 15
   2009 (15) SCR 287          Referred to.     Para 15
   2010 (11) SCR 1107         Referred to.     Para 15       G
   (2011) 1 sec 114           Referred to.     Para 15
   (2004) 6 sec 533           Referred to.     Para 25
   (2008) 14 sec 148          Referred to.     Para 25
                                                             H
    426    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         (2011) 8 sec 91            Referred to.       Para 25
          1988 (1) Suppl. SCR 531 Referred to.          Para 26
          1998 (1) SCR 1153          Referred to.       Para 26
          2007 (12) SCR 1120         Referred to.       Para 26
B
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1743 of 2006.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 2.4.2004 of the High
c   Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A. No. 2615 of 2003
    along with Cross Objection 132 & M.F.A. No. 2170 of 2003.

                                WITH
    C.A. No. 8899-8901 of 2011.
D
         Basava Prabhu S. Patil, G.V. Chandrashekar, N.K. Verma,
    P.P. Singh, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, Nandeesh Patil, Anirudh
    Sanganeria, A.S. Bhasme, Kiran Suri, S.J. Amith, V.N,
    Raghupathy, Lagnesh Mishra for the appearing parties.
E         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. Through this common
    order, we propose to dispose of Civil Appeal no.1743 of 2006,
    as also, Civil Appeal nos.8899-8901 of 2011. For convenience,
F   the factual position, as has been depicted in Civil Appeal
    no.1743 of 2006, has been referred to.

       2. Gulbarga Development Authority, consequent upon its
  desire to acquire land for raising a residential layout, issued a
G preliminary notification under section 15(1) of the City
  Improvement Trust Board Act, 1976 on 13.5.1982. Through the
  aforesaid notification, it was proposed to acquire 144 acres
  of land falling in the revenue estate of villages Rajapur (71
  acres) and Badepur (73 acres). The matter in respect of the
  acquisition of land crystallized, when the final notification was
H
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 427
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

issued on 14.12.1989. Thereby the land of the appellants.            A
measuring 8 acres 4 guntas, situated in survey no.63 of the
revenue estate of village Badepur, came to be acquired.
Insofar as Civil Appeal nos.8899-8901 of 2011 is concerned,
the appellants' land measuring 7 acres 7 guntas, falling in survey
no.14/2, in the revenue estate of village Rajapur, was acquired.     B

      3. The Land Acquisition Officer announced his award on
7.7.1990. By the aforesaid award, the market value of the land,
falling in the revenue estate of village Badepur, was fixed at the
rate of Rs.4, 100/- per acre. For the land falling in the revenue    C
estate of village Rajapur, the Land Acquisition Officer,
assessed the market value at Rs.13,500/- per acre. The
landowner, Chandrashekar (whose LRs. are the appellants in
Civil Appeal no.17 43 of 2006) filed Writ Petition nos.15489-
496 of 1990 to assail the acquisition proceedings initiated by
the Gulbarga Development Authority, by finding fault with the        D
procedure adopted. The High Court of Karnataka (hereinafter
referred to as the High Court), while issuing notice, passed an
interim order staying dispossession for a period of 3 weeks.
By a motion bench order dated 10.8.1990, the interim order
passed on 23.7.1990 was continued, "till further orders". Writ       E
Petition nos. 15489-496 of 1990 came to be dismissed on
12.8.1991. The notification for acquisition of land as also the
procedure adopted was held to be in consonance with law.

     4. During the pendency of the writ petition referred to in      F
the foregoing paragraph, the original landowner
Chandrashekar, filed a protest petition assailing the quantum
of compensation assessed by the Land Acquisition Officer. In
the aforesaid protest petition dated 24.9.1990, reference was
also sought, for enhancement of compensation awarded to the          G
appellant. Since the protest petition filed by the landowner was
not referred for adjudication, the landowner filed an application
under section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The
aforesaid application was allowed, and the claim raised by the
landowner was registered for adjudication.
                                                                     H
    428    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A          5. After adjudicating upon the matter, the Reference Court
    announced its award on 19.6.1999. The compensation
    determined by the Land Acquisition Collector at Rs.4, 100/- per
    acre, was enhanced to Rs.1,46,000/- per acre. The Gulbarga
    Development Authority, as also, the Land Acquisition Officer
B   preferred independent appeals before the High Court. By an
    order dated 3.11.1999, the High Court allowed the appeals,
    and remitted the matter to the Reference Court for
    reconsideration, on the issue of deductions to be made from
    the market value, so as to determine compensation payable
C   to the land losers. In this behalf, it would be relevant to mention,
    that while determining the compensation payable to the
    appellant, the Reference Court had based its assessment on
    a sale deed dated 30.12.1983. From the market value of land
    assessed, on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed, the
D   Reference Court had applied a deduction of 33 percent. The
    High Court having concluded, that the aforesaid deduction was
    inappropriate, had remanded the matter for re-determination.
    It is the case of the appellants before this Court, that the only
    issue, which the Reference Court was called upon to settle, after
    the High Court by its order dated 3.11.1999 had remitted the
E   matter to the Reference Court was, the perc.entage of
    deductions to be made from the market value determined on
    the basis of the exemplar sale transaction, so as to determine
    the fair compensation payable to the landowners for acquisition
    of their land.
F
       6. By its order dated 21.12.2002, the Reference Court re-
  determined the market value of the acquired land at
  Rs.1,45,000/- per acre. This determination by the Reference
  Court was again assailed before the High Court. Whilst the
G Gulbarga Development Authority and the Land Acquisition
  Officer filed appeals before the High Court for reducing the
  quantum of compensation awarded, the landowners preferred
  cross-objections for enhancement thereof. The appeals filed by
  the Gulbarga Development Authority and the Land Acquisition
H Officer were partly allowed, inasmuch as, the High Court
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 429
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

reduced the compensation awarded by the Reference Court              A
from Rs.1,45,000/- per acre to Rs.65,000/- per acre. The
instant order passed by the High Court dated 2.4.2004 has
been assailed before this Court through Civil Appeal no. 1743
of 2006, as also, through ihe connect'o!d Civil Appeal nos.
8899-8901 of 2011.                                                   B

     7. It would be relevant to mention, chat while determining
the controversy, the High Court was satisfied in deducting 55
percent of the market value assessed on the basis of the
exemplar sale deed, towards developmental charges, 5 percent         C
towards waiting period, and 10 percer,t towards de-escalation.
By virtue of the aforesaid deductions, the High Court
determined the market v·alue of the land at Rs.67,954/- per
acre. Having done so, by applying the rule of averages, the
High Court held, that compensation for the acquired land was
payable at Rs.65,000/- per acre.                                     D

      8. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
appellants in both set of appeals contended, that the deduction
of 55 percent towards developmental charges, was arbitrary,
and without application of mind. It was sought to be asserted,       E
that the High Court did not record any reason(s) for applying
the aforesaid deduction. Likewise, it was contended, that
deduction of 10 percent by way of de-escalation was also
arbitrary. In this behalf, it was sought to be contended, that the
Reference Court had determined 3 percent as deduction on             F
account of de-escalation, whereas, the High Court had
enhanced the aforesaid deduction to 10 percent, without
recording any reason(s).

     9. For the determination of market value of the acquired
land, it is apparent that primary reliance has been placed by        G
the appellants, on the exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983
(Exhibit P-18, before the Reference Court). It would also be
relevant to mention, that through the aforesaid sale deed, land
measuring 2400 square feet (40' x 60') falling in survey no.63/
                                                                     H
    430    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   1, of the revenue estate of Badepur village, was sold for a total
    consideration of Rs.12,500/-. It would also be relevant to
    mention, that the Reference Court on the basis of the aforesaid
    exemplar sale deed, assessed the value of the land at Rs.5.20
    per square foot. Having applied a deduction of 33 percent
B towards developmental charges, the Reference Court had
    arrived at the figure of Rs.3.47 per square foot. At the aforesaid
    rate, the value of the acquired land was assessed at
    Rs.1,51,153.20 per acre. The Reference Court also allowed de-
    escalation at the rate of 3 percent per annum, as the exemplar
c   sale deed was executed after the issuance of the preliminary
  . notification. Consequent upon the aforesaid deduction, the
    Reference Court arrived at the figure of Rs.1,44,552.20 per
    acre, as compensation payable for the acquired land. The said
    determination was rounded of to Rs.1,45,000/- per acre.
D       10. According to the appellants before this Court, the
    determination rendered by the Reference Court, was in
    consonance with the law laid down by this Court, and
    accordingly, the compensation determined by the Reference
    Court, should be restored to the land losers.
E
       11. The issue which falls for our consideration in the
  present appeal falls in a narrow compass. As already noticed
  hereinabove, through the impugned notifications, the Gulbarga
  Development Authority had sought acquisition of 144 acres of
F land, falling in the revenue estates of villages Rajapur (71 acres)
  and Badepur (73 acres). As compared to the acquired land,
  the exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983 reflects sale of a
  small piece of land measuring 2400 square feet (40' x 60'         =
  2400 square feet). The aforesaid sale transaction (dated
  29.12.1983) was executed 1 year 7 months and 17 days after
G the date of the preliminary notification (dated 13.5.1982).

      12. Insofar as the nature of the acquired land of the
  appellant measuring 8 acres 4 guntas, in survey no.63 of the
  revenue estate of village Badepur is concerned, reference may
H be made to the statement recorded by the landowner before
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 431
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J ]

the Reference Court. Chandrashekar recorded his statement             A
before the Reference Court on 16.2.1998. In his statement he
asserted, that the acquired land was wet land and was being
cultivated by him by taking water from a well situated in survey
no.62. It was acknowledged, that the well situated in survey
no.62 belonged to his uncle. In his cross-examination, he             B
accepted that he used to grow "jawar" and "logri" in the land.
He also affirmed that vegetables were also grown by him on
the land in question. He produced 8 bills pertaining to sale of
crops grown on the land. In the pleadings filed before this Court,
it was sought to be asserted, that the Sedam Gulbarga Highway         c
is located on the northern side of the acquired land. It is also
mentioned, that a ring road exists on the southern side of the
acquired land. It is also pointed out, that there are some
approved residential layouts, in the close vicinity of the acquired
land. Based on the statement of the land loser, it is natural to
                                                                      0
infer, that the appellants' land was undeveloped agricultural land
at time of its acquisition. Furthermore, the appellants land did
not have any independent irrigation facilities. Since it is not the
case of the appellants, that any layout or road abuts or passes
through the appellants' land, it is natural to conclude, that the
appellants' land was surrounded on all sides, by similar lands.       E

     13. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the
appellants did not invite our attention to any evidence on the
basis of which we could ascertain the nature of the land, which
was the subject matter of the Selle dated 30.12.1983. From the        F
dimensions of land (40' x 60'), it emerges that the same was
a developed site meant for use for some urban purpose. The
High Court has recorded, that the exemplar sale is of a
developed site. The said factual position is not a subject matter
of challenge at the hands of the appellants. We shall therefore       G
assume, that the exemplar sale d~ed was in respect of a
developed site measuring 2400 square feet.

     14. From the afore-stated deliberations, the following
inferences emerge:
                                                                      H
    432    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL) S.C.R.


A      Firstly, that the acquired land is a large chunk of land
    measuring 144 acres.

       Secondly, the acquired land owned by the appellants was
  un-irrigated agricultural land, surrounded on all sides by similar
B lands, and as such, unquestionably undeveloped land.

         Thirdly, the exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983, was in
    respect of a small piece of land measuring 2400 square feet
    (40' x 60' = 2400 square feet).

c       Fourthly, the exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983,
    constituted sale of a developed site.

         And fifthly, the exemplar sale deed dated 30.12.1983, was
    executed 1 year 7 months and 17 days, after the publication of
    the preliminary notification on 13.5.1982.
D
          15. The present controversy calls for our determination on
    the quantum of the deductions to be applied, to the market value
    assessed on the basis of the exemplar sale transaction, so as
    to ascertain the fair compensation payable to the land loser.
E   The only factual parameters to be kept in mind are, the factual
    inferences drawn in the foregoing paragraph. On the issue in
    hand, we shall endeavor to draw our conclusions from past
    precedent. In the process of consideration hereinafter, we have
    referred to all the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel
F   for the appellants, as well as, some recent judgments on the
    issue concerned:

       (i) In Brigadier Sahib Singh Ka/ha & Ors. v. Amritsar
  Improvement Trust & Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 419, this Court
  opined, that where a large area of undeveloped land is
G acquired, provision has to be made for providing minimum
  amenities of town-life. Accordingly it was held, that a deduction
  of 20 percent of the total acquired land should be made for land
  over which infrastructure has to be raised (space for roads etc.).
  Apart from the aforesaid, it was also held, that the cost of
H raising infrastructure itself (like roads, electricity, water,
CHANDRASHEKAR (0) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 433
     OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

underground drainage, etc.) need also to be taken into             A
consideration. To cover the cost component, for raising
infrastructure, the Court held, that the deduction to be applied
would range between 20 percent to 33 percent. Commutatively
viewed, it was held, that deductions would range between 40
and 53 percent.                                                    B

    (ii) Noticing the determination rendered by t~is Court in
Brigadier Sahib Singh Katha's case (supra), thls Court in
Administrator General of West Bengal vs. Co/le(tor, Varanasi,
(1988) 2 sec 150, upheld deduction of 40 percent (from the         c
acquired land) as had been applied by the High Court.

     (iii) In Chimanlal Hargovinddas vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Poona & Anr., (1988) 3 SCC 751, while
referring to the factors which ought to be taken into
consideration while determining the market value of acquired D
land, it was observed, that a smaller plot was within the reach
of many, whereas for a larger block of land there was implicit
disadvantages. As a matter of illustration it was mentioned, that
a large block of land would first have to be developed by
preparing its lay out plan. Thereafter, it would require carving E
out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out smaller plots,
waiting for purchasers (during which the invested money would
remain blocked). Likewise, it was pointed out, that there would
be other known hazards of an entrepreneur. Based on the
aforesaid likely disadvantages it was held, that these factors F
could be discounted by making deductions by way of allowance
at an appropriate rate, ranging from 20 percent to 50 percent.
These deductions, according to the Court, would account for
land required to be set apart for developmental activities. It was
also sought to be clarified, that the applied deduction would G
depend on, whether the acquired land was rural or urban,
whether building activity was picking up or was stagnant,
whether the waiting period during which the capital would
remain locked would be short or long; and other like
entrepreneurial hazards.
                                                                   H
    434    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      (iv) In Land Acquisition Officer Revenue Divisional
  Officer, Chottor vs. L. Kamalamma (Smt.) Dead by LRs. &
  Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 385, this Court arrived at the conclusion,
  that a deduction of 40 percent as developmental cost from the
  market value determined by the Reference Court would be just
B and proper for ascertaining the compensation payable to the
  landowner.

          (v) In Kasturi and others vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 1
    sec 354, this court opined, that in respect of agricultural land
C or undeveloped land which has potential value for housing or
  commercial purposes, normally 1/3rd amount of compensation
  should be deducted, depending upon the location, extent of
  expenditure involved for development, the area required for
  roads and other civic amenities etc. It was also opined, that
  appropriate deductions could be made for making plots for
D residential and commercial purposes. It was sought to be
  explained, that the acquired land may be plain or uneven, the
  soil of the acquired land may be soft and hard, the acquired
  land may have a hillock or may be low lying or may have deep
  ditches. Accordingly, it was pointed out, that expenses involved
E for development would vary keeping in mind the facts and
  circumstances of each case. In Kasturi's case (supra) it was
  held, that normal deductions on account of development would
  be 1/3rd of the amount of compensation. It was however
  clarified that in some cases the deduction could be more than
F 1/3rd and in other cases even less than 1/3rd.

        (vi) Following the decision rendered by this Court in
  Brigadier Sahib Singh Katha's case, this Court in Land
  Acquisition Officer, Kammarapal/y Village, Nizamabad
G District, A.P. VS. Nookala Rajamallu & Ors., (2003) 12 sec
  334, applied a deduction of 53 percent, to determine the
  compensation payable to the landowners.

       (vii) In V. Hanumantha Reddy (Dead) by LRs. vs. Land
  Acquisition Officer & Manda/ R. Officer, (2003) 12 SCC 642,
H this Court examined the propriety of compensation determined
CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 435
     OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGr1 KHEHAR, J.]

as payable to the land loser by the High Court. The Reference       A
Court had determined the market value of developed land at
Rs.78 per sq. yard. The Reference Court then applied a
deduction of 1/4th to arrive at Rs.58 per sq. yard as the
compensation payable. The High Court however concluded,
that compensation at Rs.30 per sq. yard would be appropriate        B
(this would mean a deduction of approximately 37 percent, as
against market value of developed land at Rs.78 per sq. yard).
This Court having made a reference to Kasturi's case (supra)
did not find any infirmity in the order passed by the High Court.
In other words, deduction of 37 percent was approved by this        c
Court.

     (viii) "In para 21 of the judgment in Viluben Jhalejar
Contractor (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of Gujarat, (2005) 4 SCC
789, it was held that for development, i.e., preparation of lay
out plans, carving out roads, leaving open spaces, plotting out     D
smaller plots, waiting for purchasers, and on account of other
hazards of an entrepreneur, the deduction could range between
20 percent and 50 percent of the total market price of the
exemplar land.
                                                                    E
     (ix) In Atma Singh (Dead) through LRs & Ors. vs. State
of Haryana and Anr., (2008) 2 SCC 568, this Court after
making a reference to a number of decisions on the point, arid
after taking into consideration the fact that the exemplar sale
transaction was of a smaller piece of land concluded, that          F
deductions of 20 percent onwards, depending on the facts and
circumstances of each case could be made.

     (x) In Lal Chand vs. Union of India &Anr., (2009) 15 SCC
769, it was held that to determine the market value of a large
tract of undeveloped agricultural land (with potential for          G
development), with reference to sale price of small developed
plot(s), deductions varying between 20 percent to 75 percent
of the price of such developed plot(s) could be made.

    (xi) In Subh Ram & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Anr.,            H
    436     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A (2010) 1 SCC 444, this Court opined, that in cases where the
  valuation of a large area of agricultural or undeveloped land was
  to be determined on the basis of the sale price of a small
  developed plot, standard deductions ought to be 1/3rd towards
  infrastructure space (areas to be left out for roads etc.) and 1/
B 3rd towards infrastructural developmental costs (costs for
  raising infrastructure), i.e., in all 2/3rd (or 67 percent).

        (xii) In Andhra Pradesh Housing Board vs. K. Manohar
  Reddy & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 707, having examined the
C existing case law on the point it was concluded, that deductions
  on account of development could vary between 20 percent to
  75 percent. In the peculiar facts of the case a deduction of 1/
  3rd towards development charges was made from the awarded
  amount to determine the compensation payable.

D      (xiii) In Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. vs. M.K.
  Rafiq Sahib, (2011) 7 SCC 714, this Court after having
  concluded, that the land which was subject matter of acquisition
  was not agricultural land for all practical purposes and no
  agricultural activities could be carried out on it, concluded that
E in order to determine fair compensation, based on a sale
  transaction of a small piece of developed land (though the
  acquired land was a large chunk), the deduction made by the
  High Court at 50 percent, ought to be increased to 60 percent.

        16. Based on the precedents on the issue referred to
F above it is seen, that as the legal proposition on the point
  crystallized, this Court divided the quantum of deductions (to
  be made from the market value determined on the basis of the
  developed exemplar transaction) on account of development
  into two components. Firstly, space/area which would have to
G be left out, for providing indispensable amenities like formation
  of roads and adjoining pavements, laying of sewers and rain/
  flood water drains, overhead water tanks and water lines, water
  and effluent treatment plants, electricity sub-stations, electricity
  lines and street lights, telecommunication towers etc. Besides
H the aforesaid, land has also to be kept apart for parks, gardens
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 437
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.)

and playgrounds. Additionally, development includes provision           A
of civic amenities like educational institutions, dispensaries and
hospitals, police stations, petrol pumps etc. This "first
componenf', may conveniently be referred to as deductions for
keeping aside area/space for providing developmental
infrastructure.                                                         B

     Secondly. deduction has to be made for the expenditure/
expense which is likely to be incurred in providing and raising
the infrastructure and civic amenities referred to above,
including costs for levelling hillocks and filling up low lying lands   C
and ditches, plotting out smaller plots and the like. This "second
component" may conveniently be referred to as deductions for
developmental expenditure/expense.

      17. It is essential to earmark appropriate deductions, out
of the market value of an exemplar land, for each of the two            D
co171ponents referred to above. This would be the first step
towards balancing the differential factors. This would pave the
way for determining the market value of the undeveloped
acquired land on the basis of market value of the developed
exemplar land. As far back as in 1982, this Court in Brigadier          E
Sahib Singh Kalha's case (supra) held, that the permissible
deduction could be upto 53 percent. This deduction was divided
by the Court into two components. For the "first component"
referred to in the foregoing paragraph, it was held that a
deduction of 20 percent should be made. For the "second                 F
component", it was held that the deduction could range between
20 to 33 percent. It is therefore apparent, that a deduction of
upto 53 percent was the norm laid down by the Court as far
back as in 1982. The aforesaid norm remained unchanged for
a long duration of time, even though, keeping in mind the               G
peculiar facts and ·circumstances emerging from case to case,
different deductions were applied by this Court to balance the
differential factors between the exemplar land and the acquired
land. Recently however, this Court has approved a higher
component of deduction. In 2009 in Lal Chand's case (supra)
                                                                        H
and in 2010 in Andhra Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra),
    438    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A it has been held, that while applying the sale consideration of
  a small piece of developed land, to determine the market value
  of a large tract of undeveloped acquired land, deductions
  between 20 to 75 percent could be made. But in 2009 in Subh
  Ram's case (supra), this Court restricted deductions on account
B of the "first componenf' of development, as also, on account of
  the "second component" of development to 33-1/3 percent
  each. The aforesaid deductions would roughly amount to 67
  percent of the component of the sale consideration of the
  exemplar sale transaction(s).
c       18. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the
  analysis of the legal position referred to in the foregoing two
  paragraphs, we are of the view that there is no discrepancy on
  the issue, in the recent judgments of this Court. In our view, for
  the "first component" under the head of "development'',
D deduction of 33-1/3 percent can be made. Likewise, for the
  "second component" under the head of "development" a further
  deduction of 33-1/3 percent can additionally be made. The
  facts and circumstances of each case would determine the
  actual component of deduction, for each of the two
E components. Yet under the head of "development", the applied
  deduction should not exceed 67 percent. That should be treated
  as the upper benchmark. This would mean, that even if
  deduction under one or the other of the two components
  exceeds 33-1/3 percent, the two components under the head
F of "development" put together, should not exceed the upper
  benchmark.

        19. In Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andhra Pradesh
  Housing Board's case (supra), this Court expressed the upper
G limit of permissible deductions as 75 percent. Deductions upto
  67 percent can be made under the head of "development".
  Under what head then, would the remaining component of
  deductions fall? Further deductions would obviously pertain to
  considerations other than the head of "development".
  Illustratively a deduction could be made keeping in mind the
H waiting period required to raise infrastructure, as also, the
CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 439
     OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

waiting period for sale of developed plots and or built-up areas.     A
This nature of deduction may be placed under the head "waiting
period". Illustratively again, deductions could also be made in
cases where the exemplar sale transaction, is of a date
subsequent to the publication of the preliminary notification. This
nature of deduction may be placed under the head "de-                 B
escalation". Likewise, deductions may be made for a variety
of other causes which may arise in different cases. It is however
necessary for us to conclude, in the backdrop of the precedents
on the issue, that all deductions should not cumulatively exceed
the upper benchmark of 75 percent. A deduction beyond 75              c
percent would give the impression of being lopsided, or
contextually unreal, since the land loser would seemingly get
paid for only 25 percent of his land. This impression is
unjustified, because deductions are made out of the market
value of developed land, whereas, the acquired land is
                                                                      0
undeveloped (or not fully developed). Differences between the
nature of the exemplar land and the acquired land, it should be
remembered, is the reason/cause for applying deductions.
Another aspect of this matter must also be kept in mind. Market
value based on an exemplar sale, from which a deduction in
excess of 75 percent has to be made, would not be a relevant          E
sale transaction to be taken into consideration, for determining
the compensation of the acquired land. In such a situation the
exemplar land and the acquired land would be uncomparable,
and therefore, there would be no question of applying the
market value of one (exemplar sale) to determine the                  F
compensation payable for the other (acquired land). It however
needs to be clarified, that even though on account of
developmental activities (under the head "development"), we
have specified the upper benchmark of 67 percent, it would
seem, that for the remaining deduction(s), the permissible range      G
would be upto 8 percent. That however is not the correct
position. The range of deductions, other than under the head
"development", would depend on the facts and circumstances
of each case. Such deductions, may even exceed 8 percent,
but that would be so only, where deductions for developmental         H
    440    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A activities (under the head "development") is less than 67
  percent, i.e., as long as the cumulative deductions do not cross
  the upper benchmark of 75 percent. We therefore hold, that the
  range for deductions, for issues other than developmental costs,
  would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case,
B they may be 8 percent, or even the double thereof, or even
  further more, as long as, cumulatively all deductions put together
  do not exceed the upper benchmark of 75 percent.

         20. Before applying deductions for ascertaining the market
   value of the undeveloped acquired land, it would be necessary
C to classify the nature of the exemplar land, as also, the acquired
   land. This would constitute the second step in the process of
   determination of the correct quantum of deductions. The lands
   under reference may be totally undeveloped, partially
   developed, substantially developed or fully developed. In
D arriving at an appropriate classification of the nature of the lands
  ·which are to be compared, reference may be made to the
   developmental activities referred to by us in connection with the
   "first component'', as also, the "second component" (in
   paragraph 17 above). The presence (or absence) of one or
E more of the components of development, would lead to an
   appropriate classification of the exemplar land, and the
   acquired land. Comparison of the classifications thus arrived,
   would depict the difference in terms of development, between
   the exemplar land and the acquired land. This exercise would
F lead to the final step. In the final step, the absence and
   presence of developmental components, based on such
   comparison, would constitute the basis for arriving at an
   appropriate percentage of deduction, necessary to balance the
   differential factors between the exemplar land and the acquired
G land.
         21. We shall now apply the aforesaid parameters to
    determine the veracity of the deductions allowed by the High
    Court. First and foremost, it has been the contention of the
    learned counsel for the appellants, that despite strenuous efforts
H
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 441
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

having been made at the hands of the appellants, the                 A
respondents failed to divulge the expenses incurred towards
developmental costs on the acquired land in question. Insofar
as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is relevant
to notice, that the appellant submitted an application dated
4.11.1999 to the Commissioner, Gulbarga Development                  B
Authority, requiring him to furnish to the appellant, interalia,
certified copies of expenditure incurred in developing survey
no.63 of the revenue estate of Badepur. The appellant had
specially sought, the expenditure incurred in developing 8 acres
4 guntas of the land, acquired from the appellant. The aforesaid     c
communication was responded to vide a letter dated
16.12.1999, whereby, the Commissioner, Gulbarga
Development Authority declined to furnish the certificate sought
by the appellant. Based on the said denial at the hands of the
respondents, it is sought to be inferred, that no developmental      D
expenses came to be incurred on the acquired land. As such,
it was the vehement contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants, that it was impermissible for the High Court to have
made the deduction of 55 percent from the market value
determined on the basis of the exemplar sale deed dated
30.12.1983 under the head of"development". In fact, based on         E
the aforesaid inference, it was contended, that no deduction
whatsoever was permissible under the head. Alternatively it
was contended, that the deduction of 33 percent applied by the
Reference Court, would have been appropriate in the facts and
circumstances of the case.                                           F

      22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the
contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the
appellants, as has been noticed in the foregoing paragraph. The
material sought by the appellant from the Commissioner,              G
Gulbarga Development Authority was irrelevant for the
determination of the percentage of deduction to be applied. It
is the overall developmental cost, incurred (or incurrable) on the
entire acquired land which has to be apportioned amongst the
landholders. Illustratively, in a given case, the developmental      H
    442   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A cost on a small piece of land, may be far in excess of the cost
  of the land. That would however not mean, that the landowner
  in question, would not be entitled to compensation. Illustratively
  again, if no specific developmental activity is carried out on a
  particular piece of land, it would be improper to conclude, that
B no deduction should be made while determining the
  compensation payable to such landowner, even though the
  acquired land was undeveloped. What the appellant ought to
  have ascertained, is the developmental cost (based on the
  components referred to hereinabove), on the entire acquired
c land. In such a situation, if the entire developmental activity had
  been completed, it would be permissible to proportionately
  apportion the same amongst land holders. Such a situation may
  not arise in actuality. In most cases development is a
  continuous and ongoing process, which would be completed
  over a long stretch of time extending in some cases to a
D decade or even more. We therefore find no merit in the instant
  contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants,
  that no deduction should be made in this case under the head
  of "development" because no expense is shown to have been
  incurred for development of the land acquired from the
E appellants.
       23. In the absence of the actual expenditure incurred
  towards development, we shall now endeavor to determine
  whether the deduction of 55 percent allowed by the High Court
F towards development of the land, out of the ·market value
  determined on the basis of the exemplar sale deed, was just
  and proper. The determination in question, more often than not,
  has to be in the absence of inputs as were sought by the
  appellants from the Commissioner, Gulbarga Development
G Authority. Obviously, deductions can only be based on
  reasonable and logical norms. Comparison of the state of
  development of the exemplar land, as also, that of the acquired
  land can be the only legitimate basis, for a reasonable and
  logical determination on the issue. Based on the aforesaid
H foundation, an assessment has to be made by applying the
CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 443
     OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

parameters delineated above. From the inferences drawn by          A
us, on the basis of the statement made by the landowner before
the Reference Court in paragraph 12 hereinabove, it is natural
to conclude, that the acquired land in question was totally
undeveloped. Likewise, even though the High Court had
described the exemplar sale transaction as a developed site,       B
the appellants have not disputed the same. We shall therefore
proceed on the assumption, that the exemplar sale deed was
a fully developed site. In such a situation, keeping in mind the
parameters laid down by this Court, and the conclusions drawn
by us, as also the facts of this case, a deduction of upto 67      c
percent may have been justified, and the same would fall within
the parameters laid down by this Court because the exemplar
land could be classified as fully developed, whereas, the
acquired land was totally undeveloped land. As against the
aforesaid, the High Court limited deductions under the head of
                                                                   0
"development" to 55 percent. We therefore find no justifiable
reason to interfere with the same, specially in an appeal
preferred by the land loser, more so, because no justifiable
basis for the same was brought to our notice.
      24. The High Court while determining the compensation E
payable to the appellants on the basis of the sale deed dated
30.12.1983 applied a further deduction of 10 percent under the
head of "de-escalation". The contention advanced at the hands
of the learned counsel for the appellants was, that the
Reference Court had awarded a deduction at the rate of 3 F
percent per annum, but the same was arbitrarily increased to
10 percent by the High Court, without recording any reasons
for the same. It was submitted, that deduction at the rate of 10
percent on account of de-escalation was arbitrary, and was
liable to be set aside.                                          G
      25. Insofar as the contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants on the issue of deduction
under the head of "de-escalation" is concerned, reference may
be made to the decision rendered by this Court in Delhi
Development Authority Vs. Bali Ram Sharma, (2004) 6 SCC H
    444    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A    533, wherein this Court found it appropriate to allow annual
    escalation, at the rate of 10 per cent, in order to determine the
    market value of the acquired land. In ONGC Limited Vs.
    Rameshbhai Jeewanbhai Patel, (2008) 14 SCC 748, this Court
    held, that provision of 7.5 percent per annum towards escalation
B   of land costs, was appropriate to arrive at the market value of
    the acquired land. In Val/iyammal & Anr. Vs. Special Tehsildar
    (Land Acquisition) & Anr., (2011) 8 SCC 91, this Court was
    of the view that 10 percent per annum escalation in price,
    should be added to the specified price to determine the market
C   value. It is therefore apparent, that escalation in the market
    value has been dete.rmined by this Court at percentages
    ranging between 7.5 percent per annum to 10 percent per
    annum. Even though escalation of market price of land is a
    question of fact, which should ordinarily to be proved through
    cogent evidence. Yet, keeping in mind ground realities, and
0
    taking judicial notice thereof, we are of the view that land prices
    are on the rise throughout the country. The outskirts of Gulbarga
    town are certainly not an exception to the rule. The exemplar
    sale deed dated 30.12.1983 was executed exactly 1 year 7
    months and 17 days after the publication of the preliminary
E   notification on 13.5.1982. Keeping in mind the judgments
    referred to hereinabove, we are of the view, that no fault can
    be found with the determination rendered by the High Court in
    making a deduction of 10 percent under the head of "de-
    escalation", specially when the period in question exceeded
F   one year (as for annual deductions), by 7 months and 17 days.
        26. The only other deduction allowed by the High Court was
  made towards "waiting period". Under this head the High Court
  allowed a deduction of 5 percent. During the course of hearing,
G learned counsel for the appellants did not assail the aforesaid
  deduction. It is therefore not necessary for us to record any
  finding in respect of the deduction applied by the High Couot
  under the head of "waiting period". Needless to mention, that
  "waiting period" has been held to be one of the relevant
H components for making deductions by this Court in Chimanlal1
    Hargovinddas vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona &j
 CHANDRASHEKAR (D) BY LRS. v. LAND ACQUISITION 445
      OFFICER [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Anr., (1988) 3 SCC 751, Land Acquisition Officer Revenue                 A
Divisional Officer, Chittor vs. L. Kamalamma (Smt.) Dead by
LRs. & Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 385, and Atma Singh (Dead)
through LRs & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Anr., (2008) 2
SCC 568. We therefore, also uphold the instant deduction of
5 percent applied by the High Court.                                     B
      27. Our conclusions in respect of the quantum of
permissible deductions have been recorded in paragraphs 18
and 19 hereinabove. While determining the validity of individual
deductions, it is also imperative to examine whether or not the
total deductions put together fall within legal parameters. We           C
have upheld 55 percent deduction accorded by the High Court
towards "development". We have also individually upheld
deduction of 10 percent on account of "de-escalation", as also,
the deduction of 5 percent on account of "waiting period".
Cumulatively these deductions would amount to 70 percent                 D
(55+10+5=70). The outer benchmark for deductions laid down
by this Court in Lal Chand's case (supra) and in Andfira
Pradesh Housing Board's case (supra) is 75 percent.
Cumulatively also the deduction allowed by the High Court, fall
well within the parameters laid down by this Court. We therefore         E
find no infirmity in the quantum of accumulated deductions
applied by the High Court during the course of making an
assessment of the market value of the acquired land.
      28. Based on the aforesaid deductions, the High Court
calculated the market value of the acquired land at Rs.67,9541           F
- per acre. lnspite of the above, the market value of the acquired
land for disbu~sement of compensation to the land losers was
fixed by the High Court at Rs.65,0001- per acre. A perusal of
the judgment rendered by the High Court reveals, that in allowing
final compensation at the rate of Rs.65,0001- per acre to the            G
land losers, the High Court had placed reliance on market value
fixed by· the High Court itself in an earlier case. In this behalf, it
would be pertinent to mention, that the High Court had awarded
Rs.65,0001- per acre as compensation payable to the land
losers, in an earlier process of litigation pertaining to acquisition    H
    446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A of land, out of the same notification (under which the appellants
  land was acquired). The aforesaid determination was rendered
  in respect of the land acquired from the revenue estate of
  Badepur village. \Nhile recording its final determination the
  High Court expressed, that it was desirable to arrive at a uniform
B value, specially when the land in question came to be acquired
  out of the same process of acquisition, and had not been shown
  to be any different from the appellants land. We affirm the
  aforesaid view expressed by the High Court. This sentiment
  expressed by the High Court should never be breached.
c Consistency in judicial determination is of utmost importance.
  Since we are informed that the judgment relied upon by the High
  Court has attained finality, we are of the view, that the final
  compensation determined by the High Court at Rs.65,000/- per
  acre, was fully justified.
D       29. The conclusions drawn by us hereinabove, apply
  equally to Civil Appeal nos.8899-8901 of 2011. In this behalf it
  would also be pertinent to mention, that the conclusions drawn
  by us pertain to acquisition of land falling in the revenue estate
  of village Badepur. In so far as the instant set of appeals are
E concerned, they pertain to land acquired form the revenue
  estate of village Rajapur. The High Court, while making a
  reference to the land acquired from village Rajapur, noticed that
  village Rajapur had a lower market value as it was farther from
  the nerve centre of Gulbarga town as compared to village
F Badepur. As such, we are of the view that in the facts and
  circumstances of the present case, it would be just and
  appropriate to affirm the compensation determined by the High
  Court at Rs.65,000/- per acre, even for the land acquired from
  the revenue estate of villa9e Rajapur.
G        30. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no
    cause or justification to interfere in the impugned order passed
    by the High Court.
         31. Dismissed.
H N.J.                                        Appeals dismissed..