CHANDRADHOJA SAHOOversusSTATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS

                         [2012] 9 S.C.R. 1158


A                    CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO
                                    v.
                 STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS
                (Civil Appeal No. 9085 of 2012 etc.)

                        DECEMBER 14, 2012.
B
           [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.)

        JUDGMENTS:

c         Writ petition before High Court - Arising out of orders of
    revenue authorities with regard to settlement of land with
    landless persons for agricultural purposes - State authorities
    alleging the proceedings as forged and fabricated and also
    resisting the leases as not permissible under the provisions
D   of Orissa Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition
    of Alienation) Act, 1948 - High Court rejecting the claim of the
    applicant on the basis of provisions of 1948 Act - Held: All
    courts whose orders are appealab/e and not final, should
    decide the tis before it on all issues - Such a course of action
    is necessary to enable the next court in the hierarchy to bring
E   the proceeding before it to a full and complete conclusion
    instead of causing a remand of the matter for a decision on
    the issue(s) that may have been left undetermined - In the
    instant case, High Court ought not to have split up the two
    questions as if they were independent of each other and on
F   that basis ought not to have proceeded to determine the
    second question without recording acceptable findings on all
    aspects connected with the first -Order of the High Court
    discloses mere acceptance of the version of the State as
    disclosed in the counter affidavit without any attempt to enter
G   into the core questions that the conflicting claims of the parties
    had thrown up - Order of High Court is set aside and the matter
    remanded to it for a de nova decision expeditiously - Orrisa
    Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of
    Alienation) Act, 1948 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226.
H                                  1158
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA 1159


     The appellant in C.A. No. 9085 of 2012 stated to have A
filed an application claiming himself to be a landless
person, which was numbered as WL Case No. 71/1979
before the Tehsildar. By an order dated 26.3.1979, two
acres of land comprising plot No. 516 and 301 was settled
in his favour for agricultural purposes. However, when in B
spite of the order of the Board of Revenue passed on
7.1.2005, the Record of Rights was not corrected in terms
of the order dated 26.3.1979, the appellant filed Writ
Petition No. 281 of 2007 before the High Court, which by
order dated 26.2.2007, directed the Tehsildar to comply c
with the dire·ctions issued by the Board of Revenue in its
order dated 7.1.2005. Thereafter, the State Government
filed an application before the Board of Revenue to recall
its order dated 7.1.2005. It also filed Letters Patent Appeal
challenging the order dated 26.2.2007 passed by the
                                                              0
Single Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court
remanded the matter to the Single Judge for
consideration de novo. The appellant then filed Writ
 petition No. 337 of 2008 challenging the proceedings
 before the Board of Revenue seeking recall of its order E
dated 7.1.2005. The stand of the State Government was
that the record of proceedings of WL Case No. 71 of 1979
including the orders dated 26.3.1979 and 28.5.1979 were
forged and fabricated. Alternatively, it was pleaded that
the subject land having been recorded as "kanta jungle"
could not have been leased out as claimed.                    F

     The questions for consideration before the High
Court were: (i) whether the case record of W.L. Case No.
71 of 1979, including the reports and orders passed
therein, were forged and fabricated; and (ii) assuming the   G
lease as claimed by the appellant to have been granted,
whether the same was permissible under the provisions
of the Orrisa Communal Forest and Private Lands
(Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948. The High Court held
that the subject land being covered by the 1948 Act, the     H
    1160   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A lease granted was void and, as such, no legal right could
  be recognized in the claimant, and issued directions for
  resumption of the subject land by the State. Aggrieved,
  the claimant filed C.A. No. 9085 of 2012. The other appeal
  was filed in similar circumstances.
B
      Allowing the appeals, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 The fundamental principle of law that all
  courts whose orders are appealable and not final, should
  take notice of is that they should decide the lis before it
C on all issues as may be raised by the parties though in
  its comprehension the same can be decided on a single
  or any given issue without going into the other questions
  raised or that may have arisen. Such a course of action
  is necessary to enable the next court in the hierarchy to
D bring the proceeding before it to a full and complete
  conclusion instead of causing a remand of the matter for
  a decision on the issue(s) that may have been left
  undetermined, as has happened in the instant case. It
  may provide a small solution to the inevitable delays that
E occur in rendering the final verdict in a given case. [para
  19) [1172-A-C]

       1.2 In the instant case, the two questions that arose
  before the High Court may not be independent of each
  other and in fact the answer to the second question may
F be contingent on an effective resolution of the first. The
  High Court did not record any specific finding with regard
  to the allegations of forgery and fabrication of the case
  record of W.L. Case No. 71 of 1979 and the orders passed
  therein on the basis of the claims and counter claims
G raised before it. The conclusion of the High Court that
  "serious irregularities had been committed while granting
  the lease about which it was stated in the counter
  affidavit" and that "it is also revealed from the counter
  affidavit that before grant of lease no enquiry was ever
H conducted" indicates a mere passive acceptance of the
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA                  1161


stand projected by the State without any attempt to verify       A
the correct position on the issue and to enter into the core
questions that the conflicting claims of the parties had
thrown up. In fact, a reading of the judgment would
indicate that the High Court did not go into the first
question raised before it in any acceptable manner.              B
Instead, the High Court thought it proper to proceed on
the basis that the land in respect of which claims had
been made by the appellant is covered by the provisions
of the Act of 1948 and the leases granted, as claimed,
were void as the conditions precedent for the grant of           c
such leases, as prescribed by the statute, had not been
complied with. [para 15, 16 and 18] [1169-C-F, H; 1170-A;
1171-G]
     1.3 If the version put forth by the appellant is correct,
the outcome/decision on the second issue before the              o
High court would have certainly stood answered in his
favour inasmuch as in such a situation the question of
applicability of the Act of 1948 would not arise. If the
answer to the said question was, however, to be adverse
tp the appellant and in favour of the State, the appellant       E
would not be entitled to any relief from the Court on a
more fundamental principle than what the second
question had raised inasmuch as in that event the
principle that "fraud and justice never dwell together"
would come into play. The High Court ought not to have
                                                                 F
split up the two questions as if they were independent
of each other and on that basis ought not to have
proceeded to determine the second question without
recording acceptable findings on all aspects connected
with the first. Thus, the approach of the High Court in
attempting to resolve the conflict between the parties           G
suffer from a fundamental error which would justify a
correction. The order of the High Court is set aside and
the matter is remanded to it for a de novo decision
expeditiously. [paras 17, 18 and 20] (1170-G-H; 1171-A-B,
E-F; 1172-0-E]                                                   H
    1162    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       Meghmala vs. G.Narasimha Reddy 2010 (10) SCR
    47=2010 (8) sec 383 - referred to

                         Case Law. Reference:
        2010 (10) SCR 47             referred to          para 17
B
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    9085 of 2012.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 13.05.2009 of the
    High Court of Orissa at Cuttak in W.P. (C) No. 337 of 2008.
c                                  WITH
    Civil Appeal No. 9086 of 2012.

      Ranjit Kumar, S.P. Singh, P.K. Mohanty, Pinky Anand, J.K.
D Das, Pramod Swarup, D.S. Parmar, Susheek Tomer, Ashok
  Panigrahi, Surjit Bhaduri, Aruna Gupta, Aayush Chandra, Milind
  Kumar, Swetaketu Mishra, Sandeep Devashish Das,
  Parmanand Gaur, S.K. Biswal, Pareena Swarup, Sachin Das,
  Sachin Das, Azim H. Laskar, Rajiv Narain, Chandra Bhushan
E Prasad, Rajdipa Behura, A. Venayagam B?lan and V.
  Santhanalakshmi for the appearing parties.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Leave granted.
F      2. Both the appeals are directed against two separate but
  identical orders dated 13.05.2009 passed by the High Court
  of Orissa whereby the High Court has held that no legal or valid
  right has accrued to the two appellants under the lease(s)
  granted in respect of two separate areas of land as claimed
G by them. As the facts of the two cases are identical, for brevity,
  reference to the facts in the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C)
  No.14618 of 2009 [Chandradhoja Oahu versus State of Orissa
  and others] would suffice. Similarly, reference to the appellants,
  hereinafter, is being made in the singular for purpose of clarity.
H
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA 1163
            [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

      3. The appellant had instituted a writ petition (W.P.(C) No.   A
337/2008) before the High Court of Orissa contending that
sometime in the year 1979 he, as a landless person, had
applied for grant of a lease of government wasteland. On the
basis of the aforesaid application W.L. Case No. 71/1979 was
registered in the file of the Tehsildar, Bhubaneswar. Notices        B
were duly issued and served and the report of the Amin was
called for and considered by the Tehsildar. Thereafter an order
dated 26.3.1979 was passed settling the land mentioned below
in favour of the appellant for agricultural purposes with the
liability to pay rent as a "bagayatdui":                             c
                        "LAND SCHEDULE
             MOUZA- Patia, Khata No.493, Plot No.516, Area
                                            Ac.1.107 decs
                                   301 Area Ac 0.93 decs.            0
                                                 Ac.2.00"

     4. Specifically, the appellant had claimed that in the report
of the Amin it was mentioned that the settlement operations of
village Patia had been completed and in the Record of the
Rights of the said village published in the year 1973, plot          E
numbers 516 and 301 have been recorded as "Kanta Jungle".
However, the said land did not find any place in the reservation
proceedings. As the land had not been reserved for any
specific purpose it was stated in the aforesaid report that the
same was surplus land. Furthermore, according to Amin, spot          F
enquiries had revealed that there was no forest growth over the
land and therefore the surplus land could be settled for
agricultural purposes. Consequently, by the order dated
26.3.1979, settlement of the land was made in favour of the
appellant. Thereafter, by order dated 28.5.1979, the Tehsildar       G
had directed for correction of the Record of Rights and
issuance of patta in favour of the appellant.

    5. As the Record of Rights was not corrected and patta
was not issued inspite of the order of the Tehsildar the appellant   H
    1164     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A  approached the Tehsildar once again in the year 2004. The
   Tehsildar called for a detailed report in the matter from the
   Revenue Inspector. According to the appellant, the report of the
   Revenue Inspector was submitted on 6.7.2004 specifically
  mentioning that the Record of Rights had not been corrected
B and patta had not been issued to the appellant and the other
  persons mentioned in the report of the Revenue Inspector. On
  the basis of the report of the Revenue Inspector dated 6.7.2004,
  the Tehsildar addressed a communication dated 27.8.2004 to
  the Sub-Collector, Bhubaneshwar, seeking his instructions as
C to whether the Record of Rights is to be corrected and pattas
  are to be issued to the concerned persons including the
  appellant. Despite the above, as no steps were taken in the
  matter the appellant moved the Board of Revenue seeking
  appropriate directions. The le3rned Board by order dated
  7.1.2005 directed the Tehsildar to correct the Record of Rights
0
  in terms of the order dated 26.3.1979 passed in W.l. Case
  No. 71 of 1979 within a period of 15 days and, thereafter, report
  compliance of the action taken.

       6. As the order of the Board of Revenue dated 07 .01.2005
E was also not implemented a Writ Petition i.e. WP(C) No.281
  of 2007 was filed by the appellant before the High Court for
  appropriate directions commanding the respondents therein to
  give effect to the said order of the Board. The Writ Petition was
  disposed of by the High Court, at the admission stage, on
F 26.02.2007 .directing the Tehsildar, Bhubaneswar to forthwith
  comply with the directions issued by the Board of Revenue by
  its order dated 07.10.2005.

       7. Thereafter on 25.08.2007 and while Writ Petition
G No.281 of 2007 was pending, the State of Orissa filed an
  application before the Board of Revenue for recall of its order
  dated 07 .01.2005. By order dated 12.10.2007 the said
  application (registered as Misc. Case No.8 of 2007) was
  entertained and the earlier order of the Board dated
  07.10.2005 was suspended. While the matter was so situated
H
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA 1165
            [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

the State filed a Letters Patent Appeal (Writ Appeal No.129 of      A
2007) before the High Court challenging the order dated
26.02.2007 passed in Writ Petition No. 281 of 2007, inter-alia,
on the ground that the said order was passed ex-parte in so
far as the State is concerned. The aforesaid LPA was disposed
of on 25.07.2008 remanding the matter to the learned Single         B
Judge for a de novo consideration after taking into account the
stand of the State in the matter. It is at this stage that WP(C
)No.337 of 2008 was filed by the appellant challenging the
proceedings before the Board of Revenue (Misc. Case No. 8
of 2007) seeking recall of its order dated 07.01.2005. It is in     c
the said Writ Petition that the impugned order has been passed
giving rise to the present appeals.

     8. We have heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Ms. Pinky Anand, Mr.
J.K. Das, Mr. Pramod Swarup, learned senior counsels and Mr.
Rajdipa Behura, learned counsel on behalf of the contesting         D
parties.

    9. The case urged by the appellant before the High Court
has already been noticed. We may therefore proceed to take
note of the stand taken on behalf of the official respondents       E
before the High Court.

     In the counter affidavit filed by the Tehsildar, Bhubaneswar
it was averred that on receipt of a copy of the order dated
26.02.2007 passed in WP(C )No. 281 of 2007, the Tehsildar,
Bhubaneswar, examined the case records of W.L. Case No.71           F
of 1979. On such examination it was found that the record of
the said case including the report of the Amin and the order
dated 26.3.1979 passed therein are forged and fabricated. The
report dated 06.07.2004 of the Revenue Inspector to the
Tehsildar and the communication dated 27.8.2004 of the              G
Tehsildar to the Sub-Collector are claimed to be non-existent.
The signatures of the Tehsildar at different places in the record
of the proceedings of W.L. Case No.71 of 1979 including those
appended below the orders passed, including the orders dated
26.3.1979 and 28.5.1979, are forged and fabricated. The case        H
    1166     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A registered as W.L. Case No.71 of 1979 was entered in the
  Case Register on 22.1.1979 though W.L. Case Nos. 71-77 of
  1979 were already entered in the Register on a previous date
  i.e. 19.1.1979. No notice was issued to the Gram Pancayat or
  published by beating of drums. No proper enquiry was
B conducted whether the appellant was a landless person so as
  to be eligible for grant of a lease. In the said affidavit it was
  further mentioned that though, according to the appellant, the
  lease was granted by the order of Tehsildar dated 26.03.1979
  the case record was not available in the record room of the
C Tehsil. In fact, according to the official respondents, the
  appellant had obtained certified copies of the orders in the W.L.
  Case No.71 of 1979 in the year 2004 i.e. after nearly 25 years
  of the grant of lease claimed to have been made by the order
  dated 26.03.1979. It is on the basis of the copies of such orders,
  obtained belatedly and in highly suspicious circumstances, that
0 the appellant had approached the different forums claiming
  relief, as already noticed. The above, in substance, was the
  stand of the State in the writ proceeding before the High Court.

        10. In the affidavit filed, alternatively, it was claimed that
E the plots in question were recorded in the Record of Rights as
  'Kanta jungle" which entries would have the effect of bringing
  the land within the purview of the Orrisa Communal Forest and
  Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948 (hereinafter
  referred to as the Act of 1948). According to the respondents,
F the land is covered by the definition of 'Communal land' or
  'Forest land' under the Act of 1948. The same, therefore, could
  not have been leased out to any person without the previous
  sanction of the Collector. Any such transfer after the notified date
  i.e. 01.04.1996 would be invalid unless such invalidation is
G saved by the proviso to Section 4 which is not so in the present
  case. Furthermore, according to the State, the expression
  "landlord" defined by Section 2( d) of the Act of 1948 is
  comprehensive enough to include the State.

         11 . It would thus appear from the stand taken by the State
H
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA 1167
            [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

that the claim made by the appellant in the Writ Petition filed       A
before the High Court was resisted on two principal grounds,
namely:

    (1) No valid order passed on the basis of an appropriate
    proceeding in law exists so as to recognize any right in
                                                                      B
    the appellant to the land under the lease claimed; and

    (2) The land having been shown as "kanta jungle' in the
    Record of Rights lease of the said land, even if assumed,
    is void being contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1948.
                                                                      c
    12. To appreciate the respective stands of the parties
before the High Court it will be useful to notice the definition of
'Communal land' and 'Forest land' as defined in Section 2(a)
and (c) of the Act of 1948:

     "(a) "Communal land" means -                                     D

     (i) in relation to estates governed by the Madras Estates
     Land Act, 1908 (Mad. Act I of 1908), land of the description
     mentioned in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of C1. (16)
     of Sec.3 of that Act; and                                        E

     (ii) in relation to cases governed by the Orissa Tenancy
     Act, 1913 (B.& 0. Act 11 of 1913), lands recorded as
     gochar, rakshit or sarbasadharan in the record-of-rights or
     waste lands )Nhich are either expressly or impliedly set
                                                                      F
     apart for the common use of the villagers, whether
     recorded as such in the record-of rights.

     xxxxx
     (c) "forest land" includes any waste land containing shrubs      G
     and trees and any other class of land declared to be forest
     land by a notification of the [State]* Government."

     13. Certain other significant facts must be ta~ note of
   Subs by the Adaptation of Laws Order. 1950, for "Provincial."      H
    1168     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 9 S.C.R.


A   now. It appears that during the pendency of the present
    appeals, impleadment applications have been filed on behalf
    of the Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation
    -IDCO, (impleaded as respondent No.6) and one Smt. Malaya
   (no formal orders for impleadment has been passed).
B According to the aforesaid respondent No.6 by a Government
   order dated 24.01.1986 sanction for alienation of Government
    land to the extent of Ac 707.93 in Patia village under the
   Bhubneshwar Tehsil had been accorded in favour of the
    Managing Director, IDCO for establishment of the Chandaka
C Industrial Nucleus Complex on payment of premium and ground
   rent. Possession of the said land was already handed over to
   IDCO on 14.10.1985 and a lease deed bearing No. 1381
   dated 05.02.1986 was executed between the Collector, Puri
   and IDCO in respect of the land for a total consideration of
D Rs.17,69,825. The aforesaid documents i.e. sanction order
   dated 24.01.1986; letter of handing over possession dated
   04.10.1985 and lease deed No.1381 dated 05.02.1986 have
   been brought on record by the aforesaid respondent No.6. The
   schedule of the land mentioned in the said documents would
   go to show that a part of the land in respect of the which the
E present claim had been made by the appellant (Khatta No.493
   plot No.516) had been allotted to IDCO on the basis of the
   documents referred to hereinabove. The respondent No.6
   further claims that the entire land covered by Plot No.561 allotted
   to it had been developed and handed over to different units/
F establishments for starting their respective projects and
   possession of such land had also been handed over to such
   units long back. In fact, the other applicant who had sought
   impleadment claims to have been allotted a part of the land
  .covered by plot No.516 (Ac 0.500 decimals) located at
G Industrial Estate, Chandka, Bhubneswar by the IDCO by letter
   dated 27/29.06.2001.

       14. As already noticed two questions had arisen for
  determination before the High Court on the conspectus of the
H facts noted above. The first is whether the case record of W.L.
  CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA                    1169
            [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

Case No. 71 of 1979, including the reports and orders passed        A
therein, are forged and fabricated. The second is assuming the
lease as claimed by the appellant to have been granted whether
the same is permissible under the provisions of the Act of 1948.
The questions posed above not only indicates that the second
may be contingent on an answer to the first and, in any case,       B
as discussed hereinafter, there is a fair amount of co-relation
between the two questions though the same may appear to be
independent of each other.

      15. The High Court did not record any specific finding with
regard to the allegations of forgery and fabrication of the case    C
record of W.L. Case No. 71 of 1979 and the orders passed
therein on the basis of the claims and counter claims raised
before it. The conclusion of the High Court that "serious
irregularities had been committed while granting the lease
about which it was stated in the counter affidavit" and that "it    D
is also revealed from the counter affidavit that before grant of
lease no enquiry was ever conducted" indicates a mere passive
acceptance of the stand projected by the State without any
attempt to verify the correct position on the issue. Intact a
reading of the judgment would indicate that the High Court did      E
not go into the first question raised before it in any acceptable
manner. Instead, the High Court thought it proper to proceed
on the basis that the land in respect of which claims had been
made by the appellant is covered by the provisions of the Act
of 1948 and the leases granted, as claimed, were void as the        F
conditions precedent for the grant of such leases, as prescribed
by the statute; had not been complied with. On the said basis
the High court came to the conclusion that no legal right in
respect of the land in question can be recognized in the
appellant. Accordingly, directions were issued for resumption       G
of the land in question by the State.

    16. It has already been indicated in the earlier part of this .
order that the two questions that arose before the High Court
may not be independent of each other and intact the answer H
    1170    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A to the second question may be contingent on an effective
  resolution of the first. Having given our anxious consideration
  to the matter we are of the view that the manner in which the
  High Court had proceeded to decide the writ petition, namely,
  by an inconclusive and vague determination of the first issue
B and instead, by attempting to answer the second is not only
  unacceptable but certain fundamental errors are inherent and,
  therefore, writ large in the said approach, to which area we must
  now travel.

       17. The publication of the Record of Rights of Mouza Patia
C Village in the year 1973 showing the land covered by plot No.
  516 and 301 as "Kanta jungle" was noticed in the report of the
  Amin submitted to the Tehsildar. However, in the said report, it
  was mentioned that there was no forest growth over the land
  and also that the aforesaid land did not find any place in the
D reservation proceedings. It was also reported that the land, not
  having been reserved for any specific purpose, was surplus land
  available for settlement for agricultural purposes. Pursuant to
  the said report the Tehsildar by order dated 26.3.1979 granted
  settlement of the land in favour of the appellant and on
E 28.5.1979, on expiry of the appeal period, it was directed that
  the Record of Rights be corrected and patta be issued in favour
  of the appellant. In the record of proceedings of W.L. Case
  No. 71 of 1979, it is also recorded that the aforesaid orders
  were passed by the Tehsildar upon due service of notice. The
F State contended that the aforesaid facts are wholly non-existent
  and the reports mentioned and orders issued in connection with
  W.L. Case No.71 of 1979 are forged and fabricated. In fact,
  according to the State, the entire claim of the appellant was
  based on non-existent facts conceived in fraud and deceit and
G there was no case registered as W.L. Case No.71 of 1979 in
  respect of the plot Nos. 516 and 301. If the version put forth by
  the appellant is correct, the outcome/decision on the second
  issue before the High Court would have certainly stood
  answered in his favour inasmuch as in such a situation the
H question of applicability of the Act of 1948 would not arise. If
     CHANDRADHOJA SAHOO v. STATE OF ORISSA                  1171
               [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

the answer to the said question was, however, to be adverse          A
to the appellant and in favour_ of the State, the appellant would
not be entitled to any relief from the Court on a more
fundamental principle than what the second question had raised
inasmuch as in that event the principle that "fraud and justice
never dwell together" would come into play. The elaborate            B
discussions on the said principle of law in Meghmala vs.
G.Narasimha Reddy" made by one of us (Sathasivam,J.) may
be remembered at this stage with abundant profit. Besides, the
additional facts now made available to the court on behalf of
the IDCO namely, that a part of the land covered by plot Nos.        c
516 and 301 had been alienated in favour of IDCO under the
provisions of the Orissa Land Settlement Act would require a
closer examination of the question as to how such an alienation
could have been made in favour of the IDCO if the land was
recorded as "Kanta Jungle in the Record of Rights published
                                                                     0
in the year, 1973.

     18. The discussions that have preceded reasonably lead
to the conclusion that the approach of the High Court in
attempting to resolve the conflict between the parties suffer from
a fundamental error which would justify a correction. The High       E
Court ought not to have split up the two questions as if they were
independent of each other and on that basis ought not to have
proceeded to determine the second question without recording
acceptable findings on all aspects connected with the first. The
extracts from the order of the High Court made above discloses       F
mere acceptance of the version of the State as disclosed in
the counter affidavit filed without any attempt to enter into the
core questions that the conflicting claims of the parties had
thrown up. If required, the High Court could have entrusted the
required exercise to be performed by a Court Appointed               G
Committee. In any event, such a Committee had been
constituted by the High Court by its very same order to look into
other such cases of grant of leases under the Act of 1948.

•.   c2010) a sec 383.                                               H
    1172    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 9 S.C.R.


A       19. We also deem it necessary to reiterate herein a
  fundamental principle of law that all courts whose orders are
  not final and appealable, should take notice of. All such courts
  should decide the lis before it on all issues as may be raised
  by the parties though in its comprehension the same can be
B decided on a single or any given issue without going into the
  other questions raised or that may have arisen. Such a course
  of action is necessary to enable the next court in the hierarchy
  to bring the proceeding before it to a full and complete
  conclusion instead of causing a remand of the matter for a
C decision on the issue(s) that may have been left undetermined
  as has happened in the present case. The above may provide
  a small solution to the inevitable delays that occur in rendering
  the final verdict in a given case.

       20. In the light of what has been discussed and the
D conclusions reached by us we are of the view that in the present
  case the order of the High Court should receive our interference
  and the matter should be remanded to the High Court for a de
  novo decision which may be rendered as expeditiously as
  possible. Accordingly, we set aside the order dated
E 13.05.2009 of the High Court and allow these appeals as
  indicated above.

    R.P.                                        Appeals allowed.