Supreme Court of India
CHANDRA PRAKASHversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 385
- Decided
- 9 May 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, finding the consent valid, the identification parade delay non‑fatal, the approver’s testimony admissible with corroboration, the discoveries admissible under Section 27, and the possession of the seized materials sufficient to constitute offences under the Explosive Substances Act and the Explosive Act, thereby confirming the existence of a criminal conspiracy.
Summary
On 26 January 1996 a bomb exploded at the SMS Stadium in Jaipur, leading to the arrest of six accused, including Chandra Prakash, Abdul Mateen and others. The prosecution relied on the testimony of an approver (PW‑1) who implicated the accused, on material recovered from the accused’s premises (ammonium nitrate, dynamite, fuse‑wire) and on the recovery of a live bomb based on information given by the accused in custody. The appellants challenged the trial on several grounds: lack of consent under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, delay in conducting a test identification parade, the admissibility of the approver’s evidence without independent corroboration, the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the discoveries, and whether possession of the seized materials constituted an offence under the 1908 and 1884 Acts. The Supreme Court held that the District Magistrate’s consent was valid, the three‑week delay in the identification parade was not fatal, the approver’s testimony was reliable and sufficiently corroborated by independent material, and the discoveries were admissible under Section 27. It further held that the seized substances fell within the definitions of “explosive substance” and “explosive” and that the charges were properly framed, establishing a criminal conspiracy. Consequently, all convictions were upheld and the appeals dismissed.
Issues considered
- The validity of the consent required under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
- Whether the delay in holding the test identification parade vitiated the evidence.
- The admissibility and reliability of the approver’s testimony under Sections 133 and 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872.
- The applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act to the recovery of explosives based on information from an accused in custody.
- Whether possession of ammonium nitrate, fuse‑wire and related items constitutes an offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and the Explosive Act, 1884.
- Whether the specific charges were properly framed under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The proof of criminal conspiracy among the accused.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 306
- Explosive Act, 1884s. 4(d), s. 98
- Explosive Substances Act, 1908s. 2, s. 3, s. 7
- Foreigners Act, 1946s. 14
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 133, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1208, s. 307, s. 427
- Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984s. 3
Subjects
terrorismbomb blastcriminal conspiracyapprover testimonyevidence admissibilityexplosive substancesidentification paradesanction under Section 7foreigners act
Judgment
[2014] 6 S.C.R. 819
CHANDRA PRAKASH A
V.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
(Criminal Appeal No. 1155 of 2014)
MAY 9, 2014
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860: s. 307, 427 rlw s. 1208; Prevention
of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984: s.3; Explosive
Substances Act, 1908: s. 3; Explosive Act, 1884: s. 98 - c
Conviction under - Evidence of approver that all accused
used to meet at one place and bring explosive substance and
the approver himself used to carry the boxes of substance
along with other accused - Approver implicated himself in the
crime and did not make any effort to give any exculpatory D
statement - On the basis of evidence of approver, accused
was arrested and search conducted - Recovery of explosive
substance was made at the instance of accused - Deposition
of expert witness to the effect that ammonium nitrate seized
from appellant's godown was in such a condition that it could E
be used to prepare bomb - Recovery of fuse wire, live bomb,
ammonium nitrate and other items made at the instance of
appellants - Chain of events and participation of the accused
persons which had the genesis in the discussion and
meetings, the purchase of ammonium nitrate and other items, F
carrying of the boxes and all other·factors showed that there
was conspiracy - Charges were proved beyond reasonable
doubt - No interference called for with the order of conviction.
: Test Identification Parade: Object of - Delay in
conducting TIP - Held: The purpose of TIP is to provide G
corroborative evidence and is more confirmatory in nature --
Delay per se cannot be fatal to validity of holding an
identification parade in all cases without exception.
819 H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A Evidence: Testimony of accomplice/approver -
Evidentiary value of - Held: Testimony of accomplice/
approver can be relied upon if it is corroborated by
independent evidence either direct or circumstantial
connecting the accused with the crime - While looking for
B corroboration, one must first look at the broad spectrum of
approver's version and then find out whether there is other
evidence to lend assurance to that version.
'
Evidence Act, 1872: s. 27 - Discovery under - _Held: It
should be credibly proved that the discovery made was a
C relevant and material discovery which proceeded in
pursuance of information supplied by accused in custody -
In the instant case, bombs, wires, ammonium nitrate and other
i\ems were recovered at the instance of accused - The
accused has stated about the fact of planting of bomb at a
D particular site in the stadium and led. to the said place from
which the bomb was recovered - The said fact is a relevant
fact and admissible in evidence.
Explosive Substances Act, 1908:
E
s.2 - Explosive Substance - Ammonium nitrate, fuse
wire, empty boxes, Dynamite, Detonator, Gulla etc. - Seized
from the possession of accused persons - Held: Possession
of these articles in such large quantity by the accused gave
credence to the prosecution version that possession was
F conscious and intended to be used in blast - Explosive Act,
1884 - s.4(d}.
s. 7 - Consent by District Magistrate for prosecution -
Held: s. 7 does not require a sanction but only consent for
G prosecuting a pf}rson for an offence under the Explosive
Substance Act - Approval/consent granted by District
Magistrate cannot be treated as vitiated - Document of
consent of District Magistrate showed that the same was
proved by the competent authority - Examination of District
H magistrate to prove consent is not necessary.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 821
Code _of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Non-framing of A
specific charges - Held: The purpose of-framing of charges
is that accused should be informed with certainty and
accuracy of charge brought against him - There should not
be vagueness - Accused must know the scope and
particulars in detail - In the case at hand, the charges were B
framed - That apart, neither any prejudice was caused nor
there was any failure of justice ..
Criminal Law: Criminal conspiracy - While dealing with
the fact of criminal conspiracy, it has to be kept in mind that C
in case of conspiracy, there is no direct evidence -
Circumstances proved before, during and after the occu"ence
have to be considered to decide about complicity of accused
- Such conspiracy is never hatched in open and, therefore,
evaluation of proved circumstances play a vital role in
establishing the criminal conspiracy. D
Foreigner Act, 1946: s. 14 - Accused of Pakistan
nationality - Neither having passport nor visa - No y_alid
document to be in India - Offence under the Act proved.
E
The prosecution case was that on the Republic day
i.e. on 26th January, 1996, an explosion took place in
Jaipur Stadium. The trial court convicted all the accused
and sentenced them individually in respect of all the
specific charges framed against them under the
F
Foreigner Act, 1946, Prevention of Damage to Public
Property Act, Penal Code, Explosive Act, 1908 and
Explosive Substance Act, 1884. The trial court held that
during the course of investigation, appellant-AM was
arrested from Srinagar and no passport or visa was found
in his possession and, therefore, the offence punishable G
under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act was established
beyond reason"ble doubt. From the evidence of the
approver, PW-1 and the information under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act, it concluded that prior to 26.1.1996, two
time bombs were implanted by appellant-AM and the H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A charge of crime punishable under Section 9B of the1
Explosive Act levelled against ~ppellant-AM was proved
beyond reasonable doubt. In respect of appellant-RB and
appellant-AH, the trial court held that appellant-AH had
been visiting appellant-CP quite frequently and both the
B accused persons had helped appellant-AM and
conspired in the commission of the offence. The trial
court further held that the explosive substances including
gelatin and dynamite in huge quantity were recovered
from the possession of appellant-CP on 1.8.1997 which
c were used in both the bombs; that approver PW-1, was
an associate and colleague of appellant-AM and prior to
the incident, the explosive substan~e was brought by
appellant-CP in village Farah, where PW-1 used to live
with him; that 28 kattas of ammonium nitrate wasl
0 recovered from possession of appellant-CP. The High
Court confirmed the order of conviction.
In the instant appeals, it was contended for the
appellants that sanction under section 7 of the 1908 Act
was not given and, therefore, the trial was vitiated; that
E there was delay in holding of Test Identification Parade;
that the testimony of the PW-1 was not admissible in
evidence; that recovery made from the appellant-CP at the
instance of information given by PW-1 was not
admissible in evidence; that Section 27 of the Evidence
F Act, 1872 was not applicable to the facts of the case as
appellant-CP was not arrested by the time the alleged
discovery took place; that the recovery of ammonium
nitrate is not punishable either under Section 1908 Act or
under the 1884 Act; and that the prosecution has failed
G to prove the nexus of appellants-AH and RB with
appellant-AM in the crime.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The consent as required under the
H Explosive Act, 1908 was given by the concerned District
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 823
Magistrate as ~xt. P-277/278. His authori~y was not A
questioned. It was urged before. the Court that there had
been no application of mind inasmuch as the relevant
materials were not placed before him while according
sanction. When such a point was not raised, the
consequences have to be dilferent. The District B
Magistrate had the authority to. give consent for the
prosecution. Section 7 does not require a sanction but
·only consent for prosecuting a person for an offence
under the Explosive Substances Act. The object of using
the word "consent" instead of "sanction" in Section 7 is c
to have a purely subjective appreciation of the matter
before givi.ng the necessary consent. The approval/
consent granted by the District Magistrate in the
obtaining factual matrix cannot be treated as vitiated. A
perusal of the document of consent of District Magistrate
0
showed that the same has been proven by the competent
person and the document has been marked as Ext. P-
277/278. The examination of the District Magistrate to
prove his consent is really not necessary. [Paras 24, 25,
26, 28 and 29] [847-8, C, F; 848-C-D-F-H; 849-A]
E
Erram Santosh Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC 206; State of Tamil Nadu v. Sivarasan
alias Raghu alias Sivarasa and Ors. (1997) 1 SCC 682:
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 243 - relied on.
F
State of M.P. v. Bhupendra Singh (2000) 1 SCC 555:
2000 (1) SCR 104 - referred to.
2. No dispute, appellant-AH arid appellant-RB were
arrested on 8.6.1997 and the test identification parade was \...
held on 25.6.1997. Thus, it is evident that they were G
arrested long after the occurrence but the test
identification parade was held within a period of three
weeks from the date of arrest. The analysis of the trial '
court showed they could not have been arrested as the
materials could not be collected against them and things H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 ~.C.R.
A got changed at a later stage. That apart, the witnesses,
PW-78, and PW-30 identified them in the Court. The delay
per se cannot be fatal to the validity of holding an
identification parade, in all cases, without exception. The
purpose of the identification parade is to provide
8 corroborative evidence and is more confirmatory in its
nature. The witnesses had identified the accused
persons in court and nothing was elicited in the cross-
examination even to create a doubt. [Paras 31, 32, 33 and
34) [849-C-F; 850-0-G]
c . Ramanand Ramnath v. State of MP. (1996) 8 SCC 514;
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471: 1999 (5)
Suppl. SCR 215; Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. (2003) 3 SCC
569: 2003 (1) SCR 1067; Munna Kumar Upadhyay alias
Munna Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh through'
D Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh (2012) 6 SCC
174: 2012 (6 ) SCR 611 - relied on.
3. It is established as a rule of prudence that the
conviction could only be based on the testimony of the
E accomplice if it is thought reli.able as a whole and if it is
corroborated by independent evidence either direct or
circumstantial, connecting the accused with the crime.
While looking for corroboration, one must first look at the
broad spectrum of the approver's version and then find
F out whether there is other evidence to lend assurance to
· that version. The nature and extent of the corroboration
may depend upon the facts of each case and the
corroboration need not be of any direct evidence that the
accused committed the crime. The corroboration even by
G circumstantial evidence may be sufficient. PW-1 has
clearly deposed that appellant-AM used to visit the
Madarsa at village Farah. AH and AM were seen at village
Farah many times without any reason before the incident.
As far as appellant-AH and appellant-RB were concerned,
he deposed that both the accused used to go to the
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 825
house of appellant-CP in Roopwas to collect the A
"masala" in a cover box. Both of them used to meet
appellant-AM in the Madarsa at village Farah on a number
of occasions. He used to contact appellant-AM from
Firozabad ma!ly times and the watches fixed with bombs
as timers were given at Farah by appellant-AH to make B
the bomb. It also came out in his evidence that he along
with appellant-RB and other accused persons used to
visit the Madarsa at village Farah. His ~vidence also
showed that RB and PW-1 used to br:ing expfosive from
Roopwas to village Farah and he mentioned that c
appellant-RB had brought five boxes of "masala" for
Rs.10,000/- from the house of appellant-CP and those
boxes were unloaded at the Madarsa in Farah. PW-1 was
asked to carry the boxes along with appellant-RB and
appellant.AH. He clearly deposed about the conspiracy 0
that was told to him by appellant-AM. As far as appellant-
CP ,Was concerned, it came in the evidence that though
PW-1 used to visit his house at Roopwas along with other
accused persons, yet he used to stay outside- the house
of CP and the others used to go to bring "masala'~ from
the house of appellant-CP. The alleged "masala" u·sed to
E
be brought in boxes from time to time to the associates
of appellant-RB anCI appellant~AH who used to come to
Madarsa at Farah. From -the analysis of the said evidence,
it is clear that PW-1 implicated himself in the crime. He .
has not made any effort to give any statement which is F
exculpatory. He has spoken quite graphically about the
involvement of all the accused persons. [Paras 42, 46, 47
and 48) [855-A-B; 856-B-G; 857-A-D]
Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC G
599: 1963 SCR 830 ; Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v.
K.S. Dalipsinghji and Anr. etc. (1969) 3 SCC 429: 1969 (3)
SCR 130; Saryvan Singh S!o Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab
AIR 1957 SC 637: 1957 SCR 953; Ravinder Singh v. State
of Haryana (1975) 3 SCC 742: 1975 (3) SCR 453; Mrinal H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS . [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A Das and Ors. v. State of Tripura AIR 2011 SC 3753: 2011
(14) SCR411; Devendran v. State of T.N. (1997) 11 SCC
720: 1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 591; Raman/al Mohan/al
J~andya
,,.,..)II··.•
~:~h-
v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 961; Tribhuvan
.
.. !bJath. v. State of Maharashtra. (1972) 3 SCC 511; Ram Narain
B v. State ofRajasthan (1973) 3 SCC 805: 1973 (3) SCR 463;
Ba/want Kaur v. Union Territory of Chandigarh (1988) 1 SCC
1: 1988 (1) SCR 745; Chandan and another v. State of
Rajasthan (1988) 1 SCC 696: 1988 (2) SCR 599; Haroon
Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra A_IR 19t)8 SC 832: 1968
c SCR 641 ; Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay AIR 1961
SC 1762: 1962 SCR 195; Renuka Bai alias Rinku alias
Ratan and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 7. SCC 442:
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR 643; Ranjeet Singh and Anr. v. State
of Rajasthan (1988) 1 SCC 633 - relied on.
D
3.2. On the basis of the evidence of PW-1, appellant-
C P was arrested on 1.8.1997. On the basis of the
information of the appellant-CP, the Investigating -Officer
searched hit; house and godown and recovered 28 boxes
E of ammoniurn o!trate. It came out in the evidence 'that
appellant-CP opened tile lock-of the godown the key of
which was in his possession; PW-32, an eye witness t~
the seizure of articles from the godown of appellant-CP
categorically stated that the accused CP led to th
recovery of red and blue coloured bundles from th ,
F godown of the building. The office of PW-32 was also in
the said building. From the godown, fuse wires and five
kilograms of grey coloured material was also recovered.
The Investigating Officer PW-71, has also proven the
factum of recovery. PW-22, who had accompanied the
G investigating team deposed that the explosive which was
used in the live bomb had ammonium nitrate/gelaltine. I
PW-34, who is an expert witness in respect of explosives ;
deposed that the ammonium nitrate that was seized from 1
the godown of appellant-CP was in such a condition that :
H
' . .
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 827
it could be used to prepare a bomb. [Para 49) [857-F-H; A
858-A-C]
4.1. The essence of the proof of a discovery under
S~ction 27 of the Evidence Act is only th\t it should be
credibly proved. that the discovery made was a relevant 8
and material discovery which proceeded in pursuance of
the information supplied by the accused in the custody.
How the prosecution proved it, is to be judged by the
court but if the court finds the fact of such information
having l;>een given by the accused in custody is credible C
and acceptable even in the absence of the recorded
statement and in pursuance of that information some
material discovery has been effected then the aspect of
discovery will not suffer from any vice and can be acted
upon. [Para 50] (858-E-G] ·
D
Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011)
·13 SCC 621: 2011 (10) SCR 56 ; Vikram Singh and Ors. v.
State of Punjab (201O)"3 SCC 56: 2010 (2) SCR 22; State
of Uttar Prad~sh v. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125;
Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2004) 10 SCC 657: 2004 E
(2) SCR j23; Madan Singh v. State of Rajasthao (1978) 4
SCC 435; Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra (2001) 9 SCC
362; Pulukuri Kottaya v.. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67; Prabhoo
v. State of U.P. AtR 1963 SC 1113: 1963 Suppl. SCR 881;
Mohd. lnayatullah v. State of Maharashtra (1976) 1 SCC 828: F
1976 (1) SCR 715; State of Maharashtra v. Damu (2000) 6.
SCC 269: 2000 (3) SCR 880; Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State
of Uttaranchal (2010) 2 SCC 583: 2010 (1) SCR 1027 -
relied on.
·iJ.2. When the accused had given a statement that G
related to th~ discovery of an electric wire by which the
crime was committed, the said disclosure statement was
admissible as evidence. As the material brought on
record would show, the accused "\'as in the custody of
the investigating agency and the fact whether he was H
. 828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
'·
A · formally arr~sted or not will not vitiate the factum of
leading to discovery. However, the accused was also
arrested on that day. As regards recovery from appellant-
. AM was concerned, it is born9' out from the record that
after his arrest on 28.6.1997, he gave information at 6.00
B · a.m., about another bomb and on the basis of the said
Information the Investigating Officer, PW-71, visited the
spot along with the accused and at his instance a live
bomb was recovered which was underneath the earth. In
the said information the accused had stated that the two
c .bombs were inside the SMS Stadium and he could verify
the places by going inside the stadium. In the evidence
of PW-6, PW-7 and PW-22, it has come on record that the
bombs were recovered at the instance of appellant-AM on
28.6.1998. This fact was corroborated by PW-16 and PW-
D 10 who also accompanied the investigating team. PW-22
had clearly stated that the bomb recovered was high
explosive time bomb and the battery was inside the timer\
and the same was switched on and he further confirmed
1
that electric detonator was used in the bomb. PW-16 also
E' stated that the electric detonator was found in the bombJ'
and the same was neutralized. PW-67, in his deposition,
gave description of loss caused due to the explosion of.'
the time bomb. He had further deposed that lid of
stainless steel of casio watch had been recovered from' 1
the scene of crime. The said accused has stated about\
F the fact of planting of bomb at a particular site in the
1
stadium and led to the said place from which the bomb
was recovered. The said fact is a relevant fact which is
admissible in evidence. [Paras 56, 57, 58, 59 & 61) [861-
F, G; 862-A-H; 863-A; 864-A]
G
Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 6 SCC
396: 2011 (6) SCR 330 ; Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of
De.Ihi) (2010) 6 SCC 1: 2010 (4) SCR 103; Prakash Chand
v. State (Delhi Administration) (1979) 3 SCC 90: 1979 (2)
H SCR 330 ; Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 829
(1972) 1 SCC 249: 1972 (2) SCR 765; A.N. Venkatesh and A
Anr. v. State of Kamataka (2005) 7 SCC 714 - relied on.
5. The seizure report showed that apart from
ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty boxes were also
seized. That apart, 17 packs containing blue coloured 8
fuse wire kept in plastic (polythene) bags and four boxes
containing blue coloured fuse wire, one carton of
explosives detonating fuse measuring 1500 meters in
length and 38 kg in weight, containing four wooden logs
of red colour, 375 meter wire in each Gattha and black C
coloured cap fitted on the tip of the wire, three cartons
of explosive Belgelative 90 (Gulla Dynamite) net weight
of each being 25 Kg. with "Division I Class ll safety
distance category Z:Z. Bhar~t Explosive Ltd. 9 KM lalitpur
(U.P.), four packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600
detonators, a substance of light yellow colour kept inside D
a carton of paer in a plastic bag weighi!lg nearly 5 kg and
16 empty cartons, one of gulla and 15 of fuse wire, were
seized. Section 2 of the 1908 Act has a deeming
provision which states that explosive substance would
include any materials for making any explosive E
substance. Similarly, Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act has a
broader spectrum which includes coloured fires or any
other substances, whether single chemical compound or
a mixture of substances. Apart from ammonium nitrate
other articles were seized. The combination of the same, F
as per the evidence of the expert witness, was sufficient
to prepare a bomb for the purpose of explosion. In
addition to the same, huge quantity of ammonium nitrate
was seized and it was seized along with other items. The
cumulative effect is that the possession of these articles G
. in such a large quantity by the accused gave credence
to the prosecution version that the possession was
conscious and it was intended to be used for the purpose
of the blast. [Paras 64 & 65] [865-D-H; 866-A-C]
H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 6 S.C.R.
A 6. The next aspect dealt is non-framing of specific
charge. A perusal of the record showed the Judge has
framed the charges specifically by putting the charges to
the accused. The purpose of framing of charges is that
the accused should be informed with certainty and
B accuracy of the charge brought against him. There
should not be vagueness. The accused must know the
scope and particulars in detail. In the case at hand, the
charges were framed. That apart, neither any prejudice
was caused nor there was any failure of justice. [Paras
c 66 and 68) [866-D-F; 867-G; 868-A]
Santosh Kumari v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and
·ors. (2011) 9 SCC 234: 2011 (13) SCR 1054; K. Prema S.
Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217: 2002 (3)
Suppl. SCR 339; State of U.P. (2004) 5 SCC 334; State
D of U.P. v. Paras Nath Singh (2009) 6 sec 372: 2009 (8)'
SCR 85; Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P (2009}
12 sec 546: 2009 (6) SCR 755 - relied on.
7. The trial Judge inappositely drew certain
E inferences to show that there was a criminal cons'piracy
and the High Court concurred with the same. The
deposition of PW-11, 12, 13, and PW-17 showed that
appellant-AM, appellant-RB and appellant-AH used to
meet at the Madarsa at village Farah. That apart, PW-1
F also deposed implicating himself that when there used
to be discussion at madarsa in the village Farah about
the suitable place for planting the bomb, the timer of the
bomb was supplied. The chain of events and the
participation of the accused persons which had the
G genesis in the discussion and the meetings, the purchase
of ammonium nitrate and other items, carrying of the
boxes to the Madarsa and all other factors cumulatively
showed that there was conspiracy. While dealing with tht
facet of criminal conspiracy, it has to be kept in mind that
in case of a conspiracy, there cannot be any direc·
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 831
evidence. Express agreement betw~en the parties A
cannot be proved. Circumstances proved before, during
and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide
about the complicity of the accused. Such a conspiracy
is never hatched in open and, therefore, evaluation of
proved circumstances play a vital role in establishing the B
criminal conspiracy. Ttie opinion expressed by the trial
Judge as well as by the High Court that there has been
conspiracy between the parties to commit the blast on a
particular day cannot be found fault with. [Paras 69, 70
and 73] [868-B-H; S69-D, E] · · 'c
Yogesh · alias Sachin Jagdish. Joshi v. State of
Maharashtra (2008) .10 SCC 394: 2008 (6) SCR 1116;
Pratapbhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat and Anr.
'(2013) 1 SCC 613: 2012 (9) S<;_!j,561; Yakub.Abdul Razak
Menon v. The State of Maharashtra, through CBI, Bombay D
,2013 (3) SCALE 565 - relied on.
8. The trial Judge, analyzing the material on record,
came to hold that appellant-AM was a resident of
Pakistan and he had no valid document to be in India. In E
!his statement under Section 313 of the Code, he had not
;disputed that he was not having passport or visa and he
was of Pakistan nationality. Thus, the offence under the
said Act was proved beyond reasonable doubt. [Paras 75
.& 76] [871-D-F] F
, 9. These kinds of activities by anyone breeds
;lawlessness, fear and affects the fundamental unity of our
'great country. A nation with a desire to prosper is
'required to maintain high degree of law and order
.situation apart from respecting "imperatives of· G
.internationalism". Certain individuals harbouring
,unacceptable notions and inexcusable philosophy and,
on certain occasions, because of enormous avarice, try
to jeopardize the cohesive and collegial fabric of the
State. This leads to national decay and gives rise to
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A inc_omprehensible anarchy. It reflects non-reverence for
humanity. Be it categorically stated, every citizen of this
country is requirt::d to remember that national patriotism
is founded on the philosophy of public good. Love for
one's country and humanity at large are eternally
· B cherished v~lues. The infamous acts of the appellants are
really condemnable not only because of the dent they
intended to create in the social peace and sovereignty of
the nation, but also from the humane point of view as they
are founded on greed, envy, baseless anger, pride,
c prejudice and perverse feelings towards mankind. When
a devastating activity like the present one occurs on the
Republic Day of our country, it injures the nationality,
disturbs the equilibrium of each individual citizen, creates
a concavity in the equanimity of the peace of the State,
generates a stir in the sanctity and divinity of law and
0
order situation which is paramount in any civilized State,
attempts to endanger the economic growth of a country
and, in the ultimate eventuate, destroys the con~eptual
normalcy of any habitat. Law cannot remain silent to this
because it is the duty of law to resist such attacks on
E peace. It is manifest that the accused-appellants had
conspired to send a savage stir among the citizenry of
this country on the Republic Day. The great country like
ours cannot succumb to this kind of terrorist activity as
it is nationally as well as internationally obnoxious. Such
F tolerance would tantamount to acceptance of defeat. The
iron hands of law has to fall and in the obtaining facts and
circumstances, as the charges have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the law has rightly visited the
appellants. [Paras 77, 78} [871-G, H; 872-A-G]
G
R.K. 6Jalmia v. Delhi Administration AIR 1962 SC 1821:
1963 SCR" 253; Lennart Schussler and Anr. v. Director ol
Enforcement and Anr. (1970) 1 SCC 152: 1970 (2) SCR
7-60; Shivanarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. Sta.te ol
H Maharashtra and Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 833
Maniyar and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra." AIR 1981 SC A
1062: 1981 (3) SCR 68 - relied on.
Case Law Reference :
2000 (1) SCR 104 Referred to Para 23
B
(1991) 3 sec 206: Relied on Para 24
1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 243 Relied on Para 26
(1996) 8 sec 514 Relied on Para 31
1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 215 Relied on Para 32 c
2003 (1) SCR 1067 Relied on Para 33
2012 (6) SCR 611 Relied on Para 33
1963 SCR 830 Relied on Para 36
D
1969 (3) SCR 130 Relied on Para 37
1957 SCR 953 Relied on Para 38
1975 (3) SCR 453 Relied on Para 39
2011 (14) SCR 411 Relied on Para 40 E
1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 591 Relied on Para 41
AIR 1960 SC 961 Relied on Para 41
(1972) 3 sec 511 Relied on Para 41
F
1973 (3) SCR 463 Relied on Para 41
1988 (1) SCR 745 Relied on Para 41
1988 (2) SCR 599 Relied on Para 42
G
1968 SCR 641 Relied on Para 43
1962 SCR 195 Relied on Para 44
2006 (5) Suppl. SCR643 Relied on Para 45
(1988) 1 sec 633 Relied on Para 46 H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A 2011 (10) SCR 56 Relied on Para 50
2010 (2) SCR 22 Relied on Para 51
AIR 1960 SC 1125 Relied on Para 52
2004 (2) SCR 123 Relied on Para 53
B
.(1978) 4 sec 435 Relied on Para 53 ·
c2001) 9 sec 362 Relied on Para,53
AIR 1947 PC 67 Relied on Para 53
c 1963 Suppl. SCR 881 Relied on Para 53
'.
1'976 (1) SCR 715 Relied on Para 53
2000 (3) SCR:c.880 Relied on Para 54
2010 (1) SCR 1027 Relied on Para 55
D
2011 (6) SCR 330 Relied on Pllra 56
2010 (4) SCR 103 Relied on Para 56
<e.
2010 (4) SCR 103 ,, Relied on Para 56
E 1979 (2) SCR 330 Relied on Para 59
1972 (2) SCR 765 Relied on Para 59
c2005) 1 sec 714 Relied on Para 60
F 2011 (13) .SCR 1054 Relied on Para 66
2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339 Relied on Para 67
(2004) 5 sec 334 Relied on Para 67
2009 (8) SCR85 Relied on Para 67
G 2009 (6) SCR 755 Relied on Para 67
_2008 (6) SCR 1116 Relied on Para 70
2012 (9) SCR561 Relied on Para 71
2013 (3) SCALE 565 Relied on Para 72
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 835
1963 SCR 253 Relied on Para-72 A
1970 (2) SCR 760 Relied on ·Para 72
1981 (3) SCR68 Relied on Para 72 ·
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No.1155 of 2014. B
From the Judgment and Order dated 03.02.2009 in.
SBCRA No. 189/2000, pf- the High Court of Rajasthan
. . . at jaipur.
WITH c
Crt ~- Nos. 1156-57 arid 1160 of 2014.
' .
Dr. Manish Singhvi, AAG., Sushil Kumar Jain, Puneet Jain,
·Anurag Gohil, Pratibha Jain, Balaji Srinivasan, Pragati Neekhra
for the appearing parties. · D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA., J. 1. On 26th January, 1996, a d~y of
celebration and conscientious remembrance of the "Red Letter
Day" in the history of India because 26th January is the date in E
1950, when our·organic, inclusive, humane and compassionate
Constitution came into existen~e being given by the people of
this country to themselves and the nation has been obliged to
jubilate remembering the said .important day in our national
history, for it chartered the path of many an emancipation and F
oonferred on the people the highly cherished fundamental rights;
about 8.30 a.m., there was a blast of explosive substances
'between Gate No.12 and Gate No. 13, towards the southern
and eastern side of Sawai Man Singh Stadium Jaipur, where ·
~e Stpte level function on Republic Day was going to be G
celebrated. Soon after the blast, Prahlad Singh, the Station
House Officer, Police Station lodged an FIR about 9.30 a.m.
which was registered as FIR No. 39/1996. As per the FIR, when
the blast took place, the people who had assembled were
asked to leave the stadium so that there could be a check. H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A During the check, it was found that due to the blast, a big size
crater had come into existence at the scene of explosion. That
apart, by the said explosion, the sand hopped upward and fell
on the places meant for sitting in the stadium and also on the
roof. The glasses of the windows of the pavilion near the
B explosion had broken into pieces. At the time when the
explosion had occurred, only police personnel but no civilians
were present in that part of the stadium. The public at large,
which was present inside the Stadium, was informed to leave
the Stadium so that the check and security could be carried
c out. Due to the sound caused by the explosion, one Ramgopal
Choudhary, an employee of the Public Works Department, who
was passing nearby, had met with an injury on his ear for which
he was immediately sent to the hospital. On the basis of the
FIR, offences under Section 120-B read with Sections 307 and
D 427 IPC, under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to
Public Property Act, 1984 and under Section 3 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908 (for short "the 1908 Act") and also under
Section 98 of the Explosive Act, 1884 (for brevity "the 1884
Act") were registered and the investigation commenced. Later
E on, the investigation of the case was transferred to C.1.D(C.B.).
2. During theinvestigation, an anonymous letter in Urdu
language dated 1st June, 1997 was sent to the Superintendent
of Police, wherein some information was given which was
alleged to have been gathered by the senders who described
F themselves as well wishers while they were in custody in the
Central Jail, Jaipur, in respect of the bomb-blast that took place
on 26th January, 1996 at the SMS Stadium, Jaipur. In that
letter, the names of some persons, i.e., Raies Beg of Agra, Dr.
Abdul Hamid of Firozabad and Pappu Puncturewala were
G mentioned. It was also mentioned that the ISi of Pakistan was
behind the bomb-blast. On the basis of the said information,
the investigating officer arrested five persons, namely, Abdul
Hamid, Raies Beg, Abdul Mateen, Pappu @ Saleem and
Chandra Prakash on various dates.
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 837
[DIPAK MISRA; J.]
3. Duringthe investigation, the investigating agency A
recovered a live time bomb from SMS Stadium and explosive
items were recovered from Roopwas, District Bharatpur. In the
course of the investigation, accused Pappu @ Saleem filed an
application under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for brevity "the_ Code") before the Chief Judicial B
Magistrate on 14.8.1997 who, by prder dated 30.8.1997,
authorized the Additional Chief Judicial Ma{!listrate No. 6 to
record the stateme11t of the said accused under Section 164
of the Code and thereafter, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, by a
reasoned order dated 20.9.1997, allowed the application. After c
carrying out the detailed investigation, the police laid the
charge-sheet against the arrested accused persons, namely,
Chandra Prakash, Abdul Mateen, Raies Beg and Abdul
Hamid. ·
4. All the accused persons abjured guilt, pleaded false D
implication and, accordingly, faced trial.
5. The learned trial Judge framed different charges against
ttie four accused persons and we think that it would be apt to
refer to the charges framed against each of them. As far as E
Chandra Prakash is concerned, the charges that were framed
against him were under Section 9B of the 1884 Act and under
Sections 3, 4, 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act. As far as
Abdul Mateen is concerned, he was charged with the offences
under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, under Sections F
3, 4 and 5 of the 1908 Act, under Section 9B of the 1884 Act,
under Section 3 of the Prevention of Damages to Public
Properties Act and under Sections 307, 118, 435 and 456 IPC.
As far as Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid are concerned, they
were faced with similar charges, namely, under Section 9B of G
the 1884 Act, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 read with Section 6
of the 1908 Act and under Sections 307/120B, 118/120B and
435/120B IPC.
6. To bring home the charges against the accused persons,
the prosecution examined as many as 78 witnesses and H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A brought on record exhibits P-1 to P-296. In defence, no witness
was examined. on behalf of any of the accused persons.
However;·documentary evidence was produced by them, i.e.,
exhibits D-1 to E>-5. We shall refer to the relevant parts of the
testimonies of ttle'vital witnesses and advert to the documents
s which have been stressed an.d emphasized upon by the
prosecution at a later stage.
7. The accused persons in their statements under Section
313 of the Code took separate plea and hence, it is obligatory
C on our part to record their pleas individually. Abdul Mateen
admitted that he is a Pakistani and he had remained as a
Pakistani always; that he had never come to India before his
arrest; that he did not know any person in India; that he never
visited the places, namely, Jaipur, Farah, Roopwas, Agra
Firozabad or any other city; and that he had never given any
D information to the police and no recovery was made by the
police at his instance and he had never identified any place.
The plea of Abdul Hamid was that he never gave any
information to the police during the investigation of the case and
he did not furnish any information about the shop of Mohit Jain,
E PW-30, situated at Delhi and he had been falsely implicated.
Raies Beg took the plea that due to communal riots he had
been falsely booked in the crime. Accused Chandra Prakash,
apart from false implication, denied any relationship with Pappu
@Saleem, PW-1, and further stated that no key was recovered
F from him and he did not open any godown and room with his
keys. He also took the stand that he had not taken any room
on rent in Krishi Upaz Mandi or any shop near the power house
on rent and disputed the recovery from any shop. The trial court,
appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record, by
G its judgment and order dated 22.04.2000 in Sessions Case no.
8/98, convicted all the accused and sentenced all of them
individually in respect of all the specific charges framed against
them. The offence for which each of them had faced trial has
been already mentioned hereinabove. All the accused had
H been sentenced separately by the learned trial Judge.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 839
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
8. Accused Abdul Mateenwas sentenced to undergo five A
years rigorous imprisonment and a. fine of Rs.10,000/-, in
default of payment of fine to further undergo one year's simple
imprisonment under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act; ten
years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.20,000, in default
to further undergo two years' simple imprisonment under 8
Section 4 of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act;'
three years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.3,000/-, in
default to further undergo six months' simple imprisonment
under Section 456 IPC; to undergo ten years rigorous
imprjsonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to further c '
undergo two years' simple imprisonment under Section 307
~read with Section 1208 IPC; seven years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 7,000/-, in default to further
0
undergo one and half years' simple imprisonment under
Section 435 read with Section 1208 IPC; five years rigorous D
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to further
undergo one year's simple imprisonment under Section 118
read with Section 1208 IPC; two years rigorous imprisonment
and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default to further undergo three
months' simple imprisonment under Section 98 of the 1884
E
Act; imprisonment for life ana a fine of Rs.20,000/-in default to
furthet" undergo three years' simple imprisonment under Section
3 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous imprisonment and a
fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to further undergo one and half
years' simple imprisonment under Section 4 of the 1908 Act;
• and five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/- F
, in default to further undergo one year's simple imprisonment
under Section 5 of the 1908 Act.
9. Accused Chandra Prakash was sentenced to undergo
. two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in G
default to further undergo three months' simple imprisonment
under Section 98 of the 1884 Act; ten years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to further
undergo two years' simple imprisonment under Section 3 read
with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to further
undergo one and half years' simple imprisonment under
Section 4 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; and five years
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to
further undergo one year's simple imprisonment under Section
B 5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.
10. Accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg were sentenced
to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of
Rs.2,000/-, in default to further undergo three months' simple
C imprisonment; ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of
Rs.10,000/-, in default to further undergo two years simple
imprisonment under Section 307 read with Section 1208 IPC;
seven years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-,
in default to further undergo one and half years' simple
imprisonment under Section 435 read with Section 120B IPC;
D five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in
default to further undergo one year's simple imprisonment
under Section 118 read with Section 120B IPC; ten years
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to
further undergo two years' simple imprisonment under Section
E 3 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; seven years rigorous
imprisonment and a fine of Rs.7,000/-, in default to further
undergo one and half years' simple imprisonment under
Section 4 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act; and five years.
rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default to
F further undergo one year's simple imprisonment under Section
5 read with Section 6 of the 1908 Act.
11. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to state the
findings recorded by the learned trial Judge against each of the
G accused. As far as AbdalMateen is concerned, the trial court
held that it was clear from the evidence of GPS Wirk, PW-69,
Assistant Commander, BSF, that Mhd. Ashlam Baba was the'
financial head of a terrorist organization by the name of
"Harkat-ul-Ansar", and during the course of investigation, the
accused Abdul Mateen was arrested from Srinagar and no
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 841
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
passport or visa was found in his possession. The offence A
punishable under Section 14 of the Foreigners.Act which had
been levelled against him was established beyond reasonable
doubt. The live time bomb was duly recovered and accused
Abdul Mateen had exclusive knowledge. and it was he who
planted the time bomb at that place and it was proven from the B
testimonies of the witnesses. From the evidence of the
approver, Pappu, and the information under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, it could be concluded that prior to 26.1.1996, two
time bombs were implanted by accused Abdul Mateen. It was
clear from the testimonies of Jai Narayan, PW-6, and Gopal · c
Saini, PW-7, that Abdul Mateen· had led to the recovery of the
bomb and the charge of crime punishable under Section 9,B
of the Explosive Act levelled against the accused Abdul Mateen
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
12. In respect of Raies Beg and Abdul Hamid, the trial D
court held that Abdul Hamid had been visiting accused Chandra
Prakash at Roopbas quite frequently and both the accused
'persons had helped accused Abdul Mateen in the commission
of the offence. They used to meet at the Madarsa of village
Farah and the conspiracy was hatched. The learned trial Judge E
came to hold that the involvement of the said accused per&ons
in the commission of the crime was reflectible from the
evidence of number of witnesses and the prosecution had
established their role beyond any shadow of doubt.
F
13. Pertaining to Chandra Prakash, the Court held that
explosive substances including gelatin and dynamite in huge
quantity were recovered from his possession on 1.8.1997.
Scanning the evidence, it recorded that the dynamite was used
in both the bombs. He further opined that.eappu@ Saleem, G
PW-1, was an associate and colleague of accused Abdul
Mateen and prior to the incident, the explosive substance was
brought from Chandra Prakash in village Farah, where Pappu
@Saleem used fb live with him. That apart, Chandra Prakash
was identified by 1P~ppu and the key of the godown ,was with
H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A the accused and he opened the lock of the said godown from
which 28 kattas of ammonium nitrate were recovered. It was
also clear from the evidence of Chetandass Rawatani, PW-34,
that the goods which were recovered from the accused were
utilized for the preparation of the explosive substance. I
B 14. On the basis of the aforesaid findings and conclusions,
the learned trial Judge convicted the accused persons and
sentenced them as has been stated hereinbefore.
15. Being grieved by the aforesaid conviction and
sentence, the accused persons preferred separate appeals
C before the High Court being D.B. Criminal (Jail) Appeal No.
318 of 2000, D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 189 of 2000, 258 of
2000 and 369 of 2000. The State filed application for grant of
leave (D.B. Criminal Leave to Appeal No. 26 of 2008) with an
application for condonation of delay of seven years and nine
D months which was taken up along with the appeals preferred
by the accused persons and the said appeal was dismissed
on the ground of delay. However, it may be stated here that the
High Court also addressed to the merits of the case of the State
which pertained to enhancement of sentence and did not find
E any substance in the same. As regards the appeals preferred
by the accused persons, the appellate court did not perceive
any merit and, resultantly, dismissed the same by way of
judgment and order dated 3.2.2009. Hence, the assail is to the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence by the
F applications of special leave petitions.
16. Leave granted in all the special leavt? petitions.
17. As all the appeals relate to defensibility of common
judgment passed by the Hjgh Court in respect of all the
G accused-appellants, they are disposed of by a singular
judgment. ·
18. Mr. Sushil K. Jain, learned senior counseJ for the
appellants, criticizing the- judgment of the trial court and that of
the High Oourt, has raised the following contentions:
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 843
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
(a) The learned trial Judge as well as the High Court A
committed grave error by coming to hold th.at
sanction given under Section 7 of the 1908 Act
.cannot be found fault with, though the District
Magistrate, Jaipur was not examined as a witness
to prove the order of sanction. B
(b) The recovery made from the appellant, Chandra
Prakash, at the instance of information given by
Pappu_ would not be admissible in evidence-.·
because at the time of giving information, Pappu
was an accused and _had not been treated as an
c
approver which was done later on by virtue of the
order of the Court. The testimony of the approver
is not creditworthy since he has deposed that he
was not aware about the contents of the box that
he was asked· to carry by the other accused D
persons.
(c) The alleged recovery of ammonium nitrate from the
custody of accused, Chandra Prakash, either at the
instance of Pappu @ Saleem, PW-1, or by the E
accused-appellant cannot be accepted because
Pappu @Saleem, PW-1 is an accomplice and in
absence of any corroboration, his evidence has to
be thrown overboard and further the case of
prosecution that at the instance of the accused F
articles were discovered is to be rejected inasmuch
as Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 could not
have been made applicable to the facts of the
present case, for Chandra Prakash had not been
arrested by the time the alleged discovery took
G
place.
(d) Assuming the ammonium nitrate was recovered
from the custody of Chandra Prakash, the same
would not make out any offence punishable under
any of the provisions of the 1908 Act or the 1884 H
. 844 · SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20f4] 6 S.C.R.
A Act, for the simple reason that it does not come
under the statutory definition. Even if the language
of Sections 2 and 3 of the 1908 Act as well as
Section 98 of the 1884 Act are stretched, it would
not bring in its sweep the simple act of sale by
B Chandra Prakash without any intention or
knowledge about its use.
(e) No independent " charges were
'
framed against the
accused-appellant under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the
1908 Act but along with Section 6 of the 1908 Act
c and, therefore, conviction under the said provision
i$ absolutely fallacious.
19. Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, submitted as
D under:
(A) The prosecution has failed to prove the nexus of the
accused-appellants with the co-accused Abdul
Mateen in the crime and nothing has been brought
on record to establish the allegations. The only
E
evidence that has been recorded is that Abdul
Hamid used to meet Abdul Mateen, frequently at
village Farah.
(B) There is no recovery of explosive substance or any
F incriminating materials from the appellant's house
and in the absence of any recovery; the appellant
cannot be roped in the crime.
(C) The allegation of the prosecution with regard to the
G relation of the.appellant with Abdul Mateen does not
hav~ any substance and, in any cas.e, there is no
proof to establish the same.
(D) The bomb blast at SMS Stadium, Jaipur took place
on 26.01.1996 and the accused was arrested on
H 8.06.1997 and identification parade was conducted
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 845
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
on 25.06.1997 about one .and half years after the A
incident. This aspect vitiates the identification
parade and creates a dent in the case of the
prosecution for which·the appellants should be
given the benefit of doubt.
B
20. Mr. Atul Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant Abdul Mateen, in addition to the contentions raised
by Mr. Jain and Mr. Balaji, has contended that no consent has
been taken under Section 7 of the 1908 Act from the Central
Government and hence, the entire trial is vitiated.
c
21. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the State of Rajasthan, supporting the
judgment of the High Court, has submitted as follows: -
(i) The sanction given by the District Magistrate, on a D
perusal, would show application of mind and, by no
stretch of imagination, it can be regarded as invalid
in law.
(iiY The recovery at the instance of an accused under
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is admissible E
in evidence and the information given by Pappu,
PW-1, which led to the recovery of huge quantity of
explosives would per se be admtssible in evidence
and this evidence is not to be treated as
inadmissible merely because the accused at the F
relevant point of time had subsequently become the
approver.
(iii) The recovery of explosives by the accused,
Chandra Prakash, by opening the keys of the G
godown would be a relevant fact and admissible
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective
of the fact that the conduct falls within the purview
of Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
(iv) The recovery of the explosive substance has been H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A made by the police vide memo Ex. P-42 during the
search and seizure operatio_ns. Chetan Das
Rawatani, PW-34, Explosive Expert, has stated that
the articles recovered in Ex. P-42 were explosive
articles and the same has also been proved by the
B FSL Report, Ex. P 234.
· (v) The evidence of the approver P.appu, PW-1 , is
admissible as substantive evidence u/s 133 of the
Evidence Act. In the evidence of the approver, it has
·been mentioned that the accused, Chandra
c Prakash, was engaged in the supply of materials
for solicitation of money for the commission of
offence under the 1908 A~t. Possession of huge
quantity of ammonium nitrate without any plausible
explanation by the ,acc;u.sed, Chandra Prakash,
D corroborates the eviden~e .of the approver.
22. First, we shall deal with.the ·issue of sanction. Section
7 of the 1908 Act reads as fOllows:
"7. Res,triction on trial of offences. - No Court shall
E
proceed to the trial ·of any person for an offence against
this Act except with the consent ofthe District Magistrate."
23. The learned counsel for Abdul Mateen has submitted
that no consent has been granted by the Central Government.
F In this context, we may refer to the decision in State of MP. v.
Bhupendra SiQgh 1 • In the said case, the consent for the
_prosecution was granted by the Additional District Magistrate
by notification dated 24.4.1995 issued by the State
Government. The High Court has quashed the proceeding as
G there was no sanction. This Court concurred with the said view
on the ground that it was within the domain of the Central
G9vernmel"lt to delegate the authority and, in fact, the Central
Government vide notification dated 2.12.1978 has entrusted to
H 1. (2000) 1 sec 555.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 847
[DIPAK- MISRA, J.]
the District Magistrates in the State of Madhya· Pradesh its A
consent under Section 7 of the 1908 Act. Thus, there could be
delegation by the Central Government to the Di~trict
Magistrates.
24. It is relevant to note here that the consent was given
8
by the concerned District Magistrate as Ext. P-277/278. His
authority was not.questioned. What was urged before the Court
was that there had been no application of mind inasmuch as
the relevant materials were not placed before him while
according sanction. When such a point was not raised, the
consequences have to be different. In this regard, reference to C
a two-Judge Bench decision in Erram Santosh Reddy and
others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2 would be appropriate. In
the said case, the Court has observed as follows:
"7. The last submission is that no sanction was obtained D
from the Central Government as laid down under Section
7 of the Explosive SubstancesAct for prosecuting the
appellants for the offencesunder the Explosive Substances
Act. From the judgment we do not find that any such
objectionwas taken. In any event from the record we E
findthat the Collector granted permission and this must be
pursuant to the delegation of powers ascontemplated
under Section 18(2) of the 'TADA'."
25. From the aforesaid, we come to the conclusion that
the District Magistrate had the authority to give consent for the F
prosecution.
26. The next facet of the challenge pertaining to sanction
is that the sanctioning authority had not perused the relevant
materials. The learned trial Judge, upon scrutiny of Ext. P-277/ G
278, has expressed the opinion that the approval had been
granted after perusal of the materials on record. The High Court
has observed that the consent/sanction order is a self-speaking
2. (1991) 3 sec 206. H
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A and detailed one. It has also been held that all the facts have
been taken into consideration by the District Magistrate and the
entire police diary was made available to him at the time of
grantof sanction/approval. With regard to the authority of
consent as postulated in the 1908 Act, reference to certain
B authorities would be fruitful. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Sivarasan
alias Raghu alias Sivarasa and others3 , the Court, while
dealing with the effect of Section 7 of the 1908 Act, has
observed as follows:
"Section 7 does not require a sanction but onlyconsent for
c prosecuting a person for an offenceunder the Explosive
Substances Act. The object ofusing the word "consent"
instead of "sanction" inSection 7 is to have a purely
subjective appreciation of the matter before giving the
necessary consent."
D
27. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state as follows:
"We do not think that for obtaining consent of theG(lllector
for prosecuting the accused for the offence punishable
under the Explosive Substances Act it was necessary for
E
the investigating officer to submit the statements
ofwitnesses also, who had deposed about the movements
of the accused and their activity ofmanufacturing bombs
and grenades. We, therefore, hold that the consent given
by the Collector was quite legal and valid."
F
28. In view of the aforesaid, the approval/consent granted
by the District Magistrate in the obtaining factual matrix cannot
be treated as vitiated.
G 29. The third aspect of challenge to the sanction is that the
District Magistrate has not been examined as a witness to
prove the order of sanction. On a perusal of the document, we
find that the same has been proven by the competent person
and the document has been marked as Ext. P-277/278. We
H 3. (1997) 1 sec 682.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 849
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
are of the considered opinion that the examination of the District A
Magistrate to prove his consent is really not necessary.
30. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the submission relating
to the invalidity of the consent, as stipulated in Section 7 of the
1908 Act, does not commend us and, accordingly, the same
stands rejected. B
31. The next issue, to which we should advert to, pertains
to the delay in holding the test identification parade. The
submission of Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing
for accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg, is that there has been C
enormous delay in conducting the test identification parade in
_respect of accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg. There is no
dispute that both of them were arrested on 8.6.1997 and the
test identification parade was held on 25.6.1997. Thus, it is
evident that they were arrested long after the occurrence but the D
test identification parade was held within a period of three
weeks from the date.of arrest. As the analysis of the trial court
shows, they could not have been arrested as the materials could
not be collected against them and things got changed at a later
stage. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in E
Ramanand Ramnath v. State of M.P. 4 , wherein identification
parade was held within a period of one month from the date of
arrest. This Court observed that there was no unusual delay in
holding the test identification parade.
32. That apart, the witnesses, namely Prem Prakash F
Gupta, PW-78, and Mohit Jain, PW-30, have identified them in
the Court. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh 5, it has been held
as follows:
"We remind ourselves that identification paradesare not G
primarily meant for the court. They aremeant for
investigation purposes. The object of conducting a test
4. (1996) s sec 514.
5. (2000) 1 sec 471. H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A identification parade is twofold.First is to enable the
witnesses to satisfythemselves that the prisoner whom they
suspect isreally the one who was seen by them in
connection with the commission of the crime. Second is
to satisfy the investigating authoritiesthat the suspect is the
B real person whom the witnesses had seen in connection
with the said occurrence."
33. The said legal position has been reiterated in Anil
Kumar v. State of U.P. 6 Recently, in Munna Kumar Upadhyay
C alias Munna Upadhyaya v. State of Andhra Pradesh through
Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh 7 , a two-Judge
Bench has observed thus:
"66. There was some delay in holding the identification
parade. But the delay per se cannotbe fatal to the validity
D of holding an identificationparade, in all cases, without
exception. The purpose of the identification parade is to
providecorroborative evidence and is more confirmatoryin
its nature. No other infirmity has been pointed out by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in the holding
E of the identification parade. The identification parade was
held in accordance with law and the witnesses had
identified the accused from amongst a number ofpersons
who had joined.the identification parade."
F 34. In view of the aforesaid, the submission that there has
been delay in holding the test identification parade does not
really affect the case of the prosecution. It is also noteworthy
that the witnesses had identified the accused persons in court
and nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination even
to create a doubt. Thus, we repel the submission advanced by
G the learned counsel for accused Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg.
· 35. The next facet to be addressed is whether the
6. (2003) 3 sec 569.
H 7. (2012) 6 sec 174.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 851
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
evidentiary value of the testimony of approver Pappu, PW-1, A
is required to be considered. Learned counsel for the State
has drawn our attention to Section 133 and illustration (b) to
Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. They read as
under: -
B
"133. Accomplice .-An accomplice shall be a competent
witness against an accused person;and a c;pnviction is not
illegal merely because itproceeds upon the
uncorroborated testimony of anaccomplice."
Illustration (b) to Section 114
c
"(b) The Court may presume that an accomplice isunworthy
of credit, unless he is corroborated inmaterial.particulars."
36. The aforesaid two provisions came to be considered D
in Bhiva Dou/u Patil v. State of Maharashtra 8 wherein the
Court held as follows:
'The combined effect of Sections 133 and Illustration (b)
to Section 114, may be stated as follows:
E
According to the· former, which is a Rule oflaw, an
accomplice is competent to give evidenceand according
to the latter, which is a Rule of practice it is almost always
unsafe to convict uponhis testimony alone. Therefore,
_though the conviction of an accused on the testimony of F
anaccomplice cannot be said to be illegal yet thecourts
will, as a matter of practice, not accept theevidence of such
a witness without corroboration in material particulars."
37. In Mohd. Husain Umar Kochra etc. v. K.S.
Dalipsinghji and another etc. 9 , the Court observed thus: G
" ... The combined effect of Sections 133 and 114,
8. AIR 1963 SC 599.
9. (1969) 3 sec 429. H
852 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A Illustration (b) is that though a convicMon basedupon
accomplice evidence is legal, the Court willnot accept such
evidence unless it is corroboratedin material particulars.
The corroboration must connect the accused with the
crime. It may be direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary'
B that the corroboration should confirm all the circumstances
of the crime. It is sufficient if the corroboration is in material
particulars. The corroboration must be from an
independent source. One accomplice cannot corroborate
another."
c 38. Having stated the legal position with regard to the
statutory provisions, presently we shall proceed to consider the
requisite tests to be applied to accept the credibility of the
testimony of the approver. ·At this juncture, we may sit in a time
· .machine and quote a passage from Sarwan Singh Sia Rattan
D 'singh v. State of Punjab 10 wherein it has been held as follows:
" ... An accomplice is undoubtedly a competentwitness
under the Indian Evidence Act. There can be, however, no
doubt that the very fact that hehas participated in the
E commission of the offenceintroduces a serious stain in his
evidence and Courts are naturally reluctant to act on such
tainted evidence unless it is corroborated in material
particulars by other independentevidence. It would not be
right to expect that suchindependent corroboration should
F cover the wholeof the prosecution story or even all the
materialparticulars. If such a view is adopted it would
render the evidence of the accomplice wholly superfluous.
On the other hand, it would not be safe to act upon such
evidence merely because itis corroborated in minor
particulars or incidentaldetails because, in such a case,
G
corroboration does not afford the necessary assurance that
the mainstory disclosed by the approver can be
reasonablyand safely accepted as true. But it must never
H 10. AIR 1957 SC 637.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF __RAJASTHAN 853
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
beforgotten that before the court reaches the stageof A
considering the question of corroboration andits adequacy
or otherwise, the first initial and essential question to
consider is whether even asan accomplice the approver
is a reliable witness. lfthe answer to this question is against
the approverthen there is an end of the matter, and no B
question as to whether his evidence is corroborated or not
falls to be considered. In other words, the appreciation of
an approver's evidencehas to satisfy a double test. His
evidence must show that he is a reliable witness and that
is a test which is common to aH witnesses. If this test is c
satisfied the second test which still remains to be applied
is that the approver's evidence must receive sufficient
corroboration. This test is specialto the cases of weak or
tainted evidence like that of the approver. ,
8 ... Every person who is a competent witness is nota D
reliable witness and the test of reliability has tobe satisfied
by an approver all the more before thequestion of
corroboration of his evidence is considered by criminal
courts".
E
39.ln Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana 11 , this Court has
observed that:
"An approver is a most unworthy friend, if at all,and he,
having bargained for his immunity, mustprove his
worthiness for credibility in court. This test is fulfilled, firstly, F
if the story he relates involves him in the crime and appears
intrinsicallyto be a natural and probable catalogue of
eventsthat had taken place .... Secondly, once that hurdle
• is crossed, the story given by an approverso far as the
accused on trial is concerned, must implicate him in such G
a manner as to give rise to aconclusion of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt."
11. (1975) 3 sec 742. ._ H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A 40. Similar principles have been reiterated in Mrinal Das
and Ors. v. State of Tripura 12 •
41. In A. Devendran v. State of T.N. 13 , the Court has
registered the view that there cannot be any dispute with regard
to the proposition that ordinarily an approver's statement has
8 to be corroborated in material particulars. Certain clinching
features of involvement disclosed directly to an accused by an
approver must be tested qua each accusfd from independent
credible evidence and on being satisfied, the evidence of an
approver can be accepted. The Court further observed that the
C extent of corroboration that is required before the acceptance
of the evidence of the approver would depend upon the facts
and circumstances of the case, however, the corroboration
required must be in material particulars connecting each of the
accused with the offence, or in other words, the evidence of the
D approver implicating several accused persons in the
commission of the offence must not only be corroborated
generally but also qua each accused but that does not mean
that there should be independent corroboration of every
particular circumstance from an independent source. The court
E proceeded to state that all that is required is that there must
be some additional evidence rendering it probable that the
story of the accomplice is true and the corroboration could be
both by direct or circumstantial evidence. Be it noted, the said
principle was stated on the basis of pronouncements in
F Raman/al Mohan/al Pandya v. State of Bombay14 , Tribhuvan
Nath v. State of Maharashtra 15 , Sarwan Singh v. State of
Punjab (supra), Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan 16 and
Ba/want Kaur v. Union Territory of Chandigarh 17.
G 12. AIR 2011 SC 3753.
13. (1997) 11 sec 720.
14. AIR 1960 SC 961.
15. (1972) 3 sec 805
16. (1973) 3 sec 805.
H 17. (1988) 1 sec 1.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 855
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
42. In Chandan and another v. State of Rajasthan 18 , the A
Court held that so far as the question about the conviction based
on the testimony of the accomplice is concerned, the law is
settled and it is established as a rule of prudence that the
conviction could only be based on the testimony of the
accomplice if it is thought reliable as a whole and if it is B
corroborated by independent evidence either direct or
circumstantial, connecting the accused.with the crime.
43. In Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra 19 , the
view in this regard was expressed in the following terms:
''An accomplice is a competdnt witness and hisevidence
c
could be accepted and a conviction based on it if there is
nothing significant to rejectit as false. But the rule of
prudence, ingrained inthe consideration of accomplice
evidence, requiresindependent corroborative evidence first
0
of the offence and next connecting the accused,
againstwhom the accomplice evidence is used, with
thecrime."
44. In Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay20 , it has been
observed that this Court had never intended to lay down that E
the evidence of an approver and the corroborating pieces of
evidence should be treated in two different compartments, that
is to say, the court shall first have to consider the evidence of
the approver dehors the corroborated pieces of evidence and
reject it if it comes to the conclusion that his evidence is
F
unreliable; but if it comes to the conclusion that it is reliable,
then it will have to consider whether that evidence is
corroborated by any other evidence.
45. In Renuka Bai alias Rinku alias Ratan and another
v. State of Maharashtra 21 , the Court held that the evidence of G
the approv~r is always to be viewed with suspicion especially
18. (1988) 1 sec 696.
19. AIR 1968 SC 832.
20. AIR 1961 SC 1762.
21. (2006) 7 sec 442. H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A when it is seriously suspected that he is suppressing some
material facts.
46. In Ranjeet Singh and another v. State of Rajasthan22
, the Court observed that while looking for corroboration, one
must first look at the broad spectrum of the approver's version
B and then find out whether there is other evidence to lend
assurance to that version. The nature and extent of the
corroboration may depend upon the facts of each case and the
corroboration need not be of any direct evidence that the
accused committed the crime. The corroboration even by
C circumstantial evidence may be sufficient.
47. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles which relate
to the. acceptance of the evidence of an approver, we have
bestoi,.yed our anxious consideration and carefully perused the·
judgment of the trial court and that of the High Court. Learned
0 counsel for the parties have taken us through the evidence of
Pappu@ Saleem, PW-1. He has clearly deposed that Abdul
Mateen who is also known as Iqbal, used to visit the Madarsa
at village Farah. Abdul Hameed and Abdul Mateen were seen
at village Farah many times without any reason ··before the
E incicent. As far as Abdul Hameed and Raies Beg are
concerned, he has deposed that both the accused used to go
to the house of Chandra Prakash in Roopwas to collect the.
"masala" in a cover box. Both of them used to meet Abdul
Mateen in the Madarsa at village Farah on a number of
F occasions. He used to contact Abdul Mateen from Firozabad
many times and the watches fixed with bombs as timers were
given at Farah by Abdul Hameed to make the bomb. It has also
come out in his evidence that Pappu along with Accused Raies
Beg @ Raies Ahmad and other accused persons used to visit
G the Madarsa at village Farah. His evidence also shows that
Raies Beg and Pappu used to bring explosive from Roopwas
to village Farah and he has mentioned that Raie·s Beg had
brought five boxes of "masala" for Rs.10,000/-from the house
H 23. (1988) 1 sec 633.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 857
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
of Chandra Prakash and those boxes were unloaded at the A
Madarsa in Farah. Pappu was asked to carry the boxes along
with Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed. He has clearly deposed
about the conspiracy that was told to him by accused Abdul
Mateen. As far as Chandra Prakash is concerned, it had come
in the evidence that though Pappu used to visit his house at B
Roopwas along with other accused persons, yet he used to stay
outside the house of Chandra Prakash and the others used to
go to bring "masala" from the house of Chandra Prakash. The
alleged "masala" used to be brought in boxes from time to time
to the associates of Raies Beg and Abdul Hameed who used c
to come to Madarsa at Farah.
48. From the analysis of the aforesaid evidence, it is clear
that Pappu as approver has implicated himself in the crime. He
has not made any effort to give any statement which is
exculpatory. He has spoken quite graphically about the D
involvement of all the accused persons. Mr. Jain, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant, would contend that he has
used the word "masala" but not ammonium nitrate, but Pappu
has clarified that though he was not aware what was contained
in the boxes, yet he was told by the other accused persons later E
on that it contained certain explosive substances. The said
aspect has been corroborated from other ocular evidence as
well as the seizure.
49. Presently, we shall advert to the various facets of
corroboration in evidence against the accused persons. As far F
as Chandra Prakash is concerned, on the basis of the approver
Chandra Prakash was arrested on 1.8.1997 vide Ext.P-37. On
the basis of the information of the accused, Chandra Prakash,
the Investigating Officer searched his house and godown and
recovered 28 boxes of ammonium nitrate. It has come out in G
the evidence that Chandra Prakash opened the lock of the
godown the key of which was in his possession. Bhup Singh,
PW-32, eye witness to the seizure of articles from the godown
of Chandra Prakash, has categorically stated that the accused
Chandra Prakash led to the recovery of red and blue coloured H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A bundles from the godown of the building. The office of PW-32
was also· in the said building. From the godown, fuse wires and
five kilo'grams of grey coloured material was also recovered.
The·fnvestigating Officer, M.M. Atray, PW-71, has also proven
the factum of recovery. Shivnath Kuriya, PW-22, who had
B accompanied the investigating team, has deposed that the
explosive which was used in the live bomb had ammonium
nitrate/gelaltine. Chetan Das Rawatani, PW-34, who is an
expert witness in respect of explosives, approved his report Ext.
P-49 and has deposed that the ammonium nitrate that was
c seized frorn~odown of Chandra Prakash was in such a
condition that it could be used to prepare a bomb .
.so. Mr. Jain, as has been stated earlier, has seriously_
criticized about the recovery from Chandra Prakash on the
ground that when he led to the discovery of the articles seized,
D he was not arrested. In this context, we refer with profit to the
decision in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) 23
wherein the Court opined thus: -
"The essence of the proof of a discovery underSection 27
of the Evidence Act is only that itshould be credibly proved
E · 'that the discovery made was a relevant and material
discovery which proceeded in pursuance of the information
supplied by the accused in the custody. How
theprosecution proved it, is to be judged by the courtbut if
the court finds the fact of such information having been
F given by the accused in custody iscredible and acceptable
even in the absence ofthe recorded statement and in
pursuance of thatinformation some material discovery has
been effected then the aspect of discovery will not suffer
from any vice and can be acted upon."
G 51. In this context, we may refer to the authority in Vikram
Singh and others v. State of Punjab 24 , wherein while
interpreting Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the Court opined
23. (1988) 1 sec 633.
H 24. (2010) 3 sec 56.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. 1 STATE OF RAJASTHAN 859
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
that a bare reading of the provision would reveal that a "person A
must be accused of any offence" and that he must be "in the
custody of a police officer" and it is not essential that such an
accused must be under formal arrest.
52. In this regard, a passage from the Constitution Bench
B
decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya 25
is reproduced below:
''The expression, "accused of any offence" in s. 27, as in
s. 25, is also descriptive of the personconcerned, i.e.,
against a person who is accused of an offence, s. 27 c
renders provable certain statements made by him while he
was in the custody of a police officer. Section 27 is founded
on the principle that even though the evidencerelating to
confessional or other statements madeby a person, whilst
tie is in the custody of a policeofficer, is tainted and
D
therefore inadmissible, if the truth of the information given
by him is assured bythe discovery of a fact, it may be
presumed to beuntainted and is therefore declared
provable in sofar as it di&tinctly relates to the fact thereby
discovered. Even though s. 27 is in the form of a proviso
to s. 26, the two sections do not necessarily deal with the
E
evidence of the samecharacter. The ban imposed bys. 2.6
is against the proof of confessional statements. Section
27 is concerned with the proof of information whether
itamounts to a confession or not, which leads to discovery
of facts. By s. 27, even if a fact is deposed to as F
discovered in consequence of information received, only
that much of the information is admissible as di~tinctly
relates tothe fact discovered."
53. In Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan 25, after referring
G
to the decisions in Madan Singh v. State of Rajasthan 27 ,
25. AIR 1960 SC 1125.
26. (2004) 10 sec 657.
21. (1978) 4 sec 435.
H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A . Mohd. Aslam v. State of Maharashtra 28, Pulukuri Kottaya v.
· Emperor9 , Prabhoo v. State of U.P. 30 and Mohd. lnayatullah
v. State of Maharashtra 31 , this Court summed up the following
principles:
"16. The various requirements of the section can
B
be summed up as follows:
(1) The fact of which evidence is sought to begiven
must be relevant to the issue. It must bebome in
mind that the provision has nothing todo with the
c question of relevancy. The relevancy of the fact
discovered must be established according to the
prescriptions relating to relevancy of other
evidence connecting it with the crime in order to
makethe fact discovered admissible.
D (2) The fact must have been discovered.
(3) The discovery must have been in consequence
of some information received fromthe accused
and not by the accused's own act.
E (4) The person giving the information must
beaccused of any offence.
(5). He must be in the custody of a police officer.
(6) The discovery of a fact in consequence of
F information received from an accused in custody
must be deposed to.
(7) Thereupon only that portion of the information
which relates distinctly or strictlyto the fatt
discovered can be proved. The rest is
G inadmissible."
28. (2001) 9 sec 362.
29. AIR 1947 PC 47.
H 31. (1976) 1 sec 828.
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 861
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
54. In this context, it would be fruitful to refer to the ruling A
in State of Maharashtra v. Damu 32 wl)erein it has been
observed that:
"35. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is the doctrine of confirmation by
subsequent events. The doctrine is foundedon the B
principle that if any fact is dis~pvered in a search .made
on the strength of any information obtained from a.
prisoner, such a discovery is a guarantee that the
informationsupplied by the prisoner is true. The
informationmight be confessional or non-inculpatory in C
nature, but if it results in discovery of a fact itbecomes a
reliable information. Hence the legislature permitted such
information to be used as evidence by restricting the
· admissibleportion to the minimum."
55. In Aftab Ahmad Anasari v. State of Uttarancha/33, after D
referring to earlier decisions, a two-Judge Bench, appreciating
the material brought on· record, came to hold that when the
accused was ready to show the place where he had concealed
. the clothes of the deceased, the same was clearly admissible
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act because the same related E
distinctly to the discovery of the clothes of the deceased from
that very place.
56. In Bhagwan Dass v. State (NCT of Delhi} 34 , relying on
the decisions in Aftab Ahmad Anasari (supra) and Manu
F
Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi)3 5 , the Court opined that when
the accused had given a statement that related to the discovery
of an electric wire by which the crime was committed, the said
disclosure statement was admissible as evidence.
57. As the material brought on record would show, the G
accused was in the custody of the investigating agency and the
32. c2000) 6 sec 269.
33. c2010) 2 sec 583
34. c2011) 6 sec 396.
35. c201 O) 6 sec 1. H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A fact whether he was formally arrested or not will not vitiate the
factum of leading to discovery. However, it may be stated tha~
the accused was also arrested on that day. We have dealt with
the issue that formal arrest is not necessary as Mr. Jain has
seriously contended that the arrest was done after the recovery.
B As we have clarified the position in law, the same would not
make any difference. ·
58. As regards recovery from accused Abdul Mateen is
concerned, it is borne out from the record that after his arrest
C on 28.6.1997, he gave information at 6.00 a.m. as contained
in Ext. P-255, about another bomb and on the basis of the said
information the Investigating Officer, PW-71, visited the spot
along with the accused and at his instance a live bomb was
recovered which was underneath the earth. In the said '"•
information the accused had stated that the two bombs were
D inside the SMS Stadium and he could verify the places by
going inside the stadium. In the evidence of Jai Narain, PW-6,
Gopal Singh, PW-7 c;1r:id Shivnath, PW-22, it has come on
record that the bombs were recovered at the instance of
accused Abdul Mateen on 28.6.1998. This fact has been
E corroborated by Vinod Sharma, PW-16 and Gordhan, PW-10
who also accompanied the investigating team. Shivnath, PW-
22, had clearly stated that the bomb recovered was high
explosive time bomb and the battery was inside the timer and
the same was switched on and he further confirmed that electric
F detonator was used in the bomb. Vinod Kumar, PW-16, also
stated that the electric detonator was found in the bomb and
the same was neutralized. Suresh Kumar Saini, PW-67, in his
deposition, gave description of loss caused due to the
explosion of the time bomb. He had further deposed that lid of
G stainless steel of casio watch had been recovered from the
scene of crime.
59. On appreciating the aforesaid material, it is clear as
crystal that the said accused has stated about the fact of
planting of bomb at a particular site in the stadium and led to
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 863
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the said place from which the bomb was recovered. The A
submission of Mr. Jain is that such material cannot be put
against the accused being inadmissible in evidence. In this
context. we may refer to a two-Judge Bench decision in
Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Administration) 36 wherein the
Court, after referring to the decision in Himachal Pradesh B
Administration v. Om Prakash 37 , opined thus:
"There is a clear distinction between the conduct of a
person against whom an offence is alleged.which is
admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, if such
conduct is influenced by anyfact in issue or relevant f~t C
and the statement made to a Police Officer in the course
of an investigation which is hit by Section 162 of
theCriminal Procedure Code. What is excluded by Section
162; Criminal Procedure Code is the statement made to
a Police Officer in the course of investigation and not the D
evidence, relating to theconduct of an accused perso11 (not
amounting to astatement) when confronted or questioned
by aPolice Officer during the course of an investigation.
For example, the evidence of the circumstance, simpliciter,
that an accused personled a Police Officer and pointed E
out the place where stolen articles or weapons which
mighthave been used in the commission of the offence ·
were found hidden, would be admissible as conduct~ under
Section 8 of the Evidence Act, irrespective of whether any
statement by the accused contemporaneously with or F'
antecedent tosuch conduct falls within the purview of
Section 27of the Evidence Act."
60. The said principle has been reiterated in A.N.
Venkatesh and another v. State of Karnataka 38 •
G
61. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid enunciation
of law, the submission of Mr. Jain leaves us unimpressed and
36. (1979) 3 sec 90.
37. {1972) 1 sec 249.
38. (2005) 7 sec 714. H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A we are inclined to hold that the said fact is a relevant fact which
is admissible in evidence.
62. The next aspect that is to be adverted to is that
ammonium nitrate not being an explosive substance, mere
possession cannot bring the accused Chandra Prakash within
8
the ambit of any offence. In this regard, we may refer to Section
4(d) of the 1884 Act. It reads as follows:
"(d) "explosive" means gunpowder, nitroglycerine,
nitroglycol, guncotton, di-nitre-toluene, tri-nitro-toluene,
c picric acid, di-nitre-phenol, tri-nitro-resorcinol (styphnic
acid), cyclo-trimethylene-tri-nitramine, penta-erythritol-
tetranitrate, tetryl, nitro-guanidine, lead azide, lead
styphynate, fulminate of mercury or anyother metal, diazo-
di-nitro-phenol, coloured fires or any other substance
D whether a single chemical compound or a mixture of
substances, whether solid or liquid or gaseous used or
manufacturedwith a view to produce a practical effect
byexplosion or pyrotechnic effect; and includes fog-signals,
fireworks, fuses, rockets, percussion-caps,detonators,
cartridges, ammunition of all descriptions and every
E
adaptation or preparationof an explosive as defined in this
clause;"
63. Section 2 of the 1908 Act, which deals with definitions,
reads as follows:
F "2. Definitions. -In this Act--
(a) the expression "explosive substance" shall
bedeemed to include any materials for makingany
explo~ive substance; also any apparatus.machine,
implement or material used, or intended to be
G
used, or adapted for causing.or aiding in causing,
any explosion in or withany explosive substance;
also any part of anysuch apparatus, machine or
implement;
H (b) the expression "special category explosive ·
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 865
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
substance" shall be deemed to include research A
development explosive (ROX), pentaerythritol tetra
nitrate (PETN), high meltingexplosive (HMX), tri
nitro toluene (TNT), low temperature plastic
explosive (LTPE),composition exploding (CE) (2, ~.
6 phenylmethyl nitramine or tetryl), OCTOL B
(mixlureof high melting explosive and tri nitro
toluene), plastic explosive kirkee-1 (PEK-1) an~
ROX/TNT compounds and other similartype of
explosives and a combination thereofand remote
control devices causing explosionand any other c
substance and a combinationthereof which the
Central Government may,by notification in the
Official Gazette, specifytor the purposes of this Act."
64. Keeping in view the broad definitions of both the Acts,
we l\"e required to see what has been seized from the accused D
Chandra Prakash. What is evincible from the seizure report,
Ext. P-42, apart from ammonium nitrate, fuse wire and empty
boxes were also seized. That apart, 17 packs containing blue
coloured fuse wire kept in plastic (polythene) bags and \four
boxes containing blue coloured fuse wire, "Sun brand safety E
fuse" numbered as 40208, 40158, 39937, 40203 respectively,
one carton of explosives detonating fuse measuring 1500
meters in length and 38 kg in weight, containing four wooden
logs of red colour, 375 meter wire in each Gattha and black
coloured cap fitted on the tip of the wire, three cartons of F
explosive Belgelative 90 (Gulla Dynamite) net weight of each
being 25 Kg. with "Division I Class II safety distance category
ZZ Bharat Explosive Ltd. 9 KM Lalitpur (U.P.) Date of
manufacturing 4.6.97 batch No. 2" written on each box, four
packets of O.D. Detonator containing 1600 detonators, a G
substance of light yellow colour kept inside a carton of paer in
a plastic bag weighing nearly 5 kg and 16 empty cartons, one
of gulla and 15 of fus'e wire, were seized.
65. Section 2 of the 1908 Act has a deeming provision
H
866 SUPREME CbURT REPORTS [2014) 6 S.C.R.
A which states that explosive substance would include any
materials for making any explosive substance. Similarly,
Section 4(d) of the 1884 Act has a broader spectrum which
includes coloured fires or any other substances, whether single
chemical compound or a mixture of substances. That apart, as
B we find, apart from ammonium nitrate other articles had been
seized. The combination of the same, as per the evidence of
the expert witness, was sufficient to prepare a bomb for the
purpose of explosion. In addition to the same, huge quantity of
ammonium nitrate was seized and it was seized along with
C other items. The cumulative effect is that the possession of
these articles in such a large quantity by the accused gives
credence to the prosecution version that the possession was
conscious and it was intended to be used for the purpose of
the blast.
o 66. The next aspect which needs to be adverted to is non-
framing of specific charge. On a perusal of the record, we find
that the learned trial Judge has framed the charges specifically
by putting the charges to the accused. The purpose of framing
of charges is that the accused should be informed with certainty
. E and accuracy of the charge brought against him. There should
not be vagueness. The accused must know the scope and
particulars in detail. In this context, we may refer to decision in
SantbsJJ Kumari v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others 39 ,
wherein ltha~?een held as follows: .
F "17. Like all procedural laws, the Code of
CriminalProcedure is devised to subserve the ends
ofjustice and not to frustrate them by meretechnicalities. It
regards some of its provisions asvital but others not, and
a breach of the latter is acurable irregularity unless the
G accused isprejudiced thereby. It places errors in the
charge.or even a total absence of a charge in the
curableclass. That is why we have provisions like
Sections215 and 464 in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 867
[DIPAK MISRA, J.]
18. The object of the charge is to give the accusednotice 'A
of the matter he is charged with and doesnot touch
jurisdiction. If, therefore, the necessaryinformation is
conveyed to him in other ways andthere is no prejudice,
the framing of the charge isnot invalidated. _The essential
part of this part oflaw is not any technical formula of words B
but thereality, whether the matter was explained to
theaccused and whether he understood what he wasbeing
tried for. Sections 34, 114 and 149 IPCprovide for criminal
-liability viewed from differentangles as regards actual
participants, accessoriesand men actuated by a common c
object or acommon intention; and as explained by a five-
Judge Constitution Bench of this Court in Willie(William)
Slar;iey v. State of M.P.40 SCR at p. 1189,the charge is a
rolled-up one involving the directliability and the
constructive liability withoutspecifying who are directly 0
liable and who aresought to be made constructively liable."
67. In K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao41, the
Court opined that though the charge specifically under Section
306 IPC was not framed, yet all the ingredients constituting the
offence were mentioned in the statement of charges. In that E
context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court ruled that mere
omission or defect in framing of charge does not disable the
criminal court from convicting the accused for the offence which
is found to have been proved on the evidence on record. The
said principle has been reiterated in Dalbir Singh v. State of F
U. P. 42 , State of U. P. v. Paras Nath Singh 43 and Annareddy
Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. 44 .
68. In the case at hand, as has been stated earlier, the
39. c2011 l 9 sec 234. G
40. AIR 1956 SC 116.
41. c2003) 1 sec 211.
42. c2004) 5 sec 334.
43. c2009) 6 sec 372.
44. c2009) 12 sec 546. H -
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A charges have been framed and we do not find any
vagueness. That apart, neither any prejudice has been
caused nor has there been any failure of justice. Thus, the
submission of Mr. Jain in this regard leaves us unimpressed.
69. The next facet which deserves to be addressed
B
pertains to the criminal conspiracy. The submission of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that the learned trial
Judge has inappositely drawn certain tnferences to show that
there was a criminal conspiracy and the High Court has,
without delving deep into the matter, concurred with the same.
c As per the evidence brought on record, it is clear as crystal
that accused Abdul Mateen, Abdul Hamid and Raies Beg
used to meet quite frequently at the Madarsa at village Farah.
It is also evident from the deposition of Kanchan Singh, PW-
. ~1. Shri Chand, PW-12, Murari Lal Sharma, PW-13, and
D Ashok Kumar, PW-17, that the accused Abdul Mateen, Raies
Beg and Abdul Hamid used to meet at the Madarsa at village
Farah. That apart, Pappu had also deposed implicating himself
that when there used to be discussion at madarsa in the_ village
Farah about the suitable place for planting the bomb, the timer
of the bomb was supplied by Dr. Abdul Hamid. The chain of
events and the participation of the accused persons which had
the genesis in the discussion and the meetings, the purchase
of ammonium nitrate and other items, carrying of the boxes tq
the Madarsa and all other factors cumulatively show that there
F· was conspiracy.
70. While dealing with the facet of criminal conspiracy, it
has to be kept in mind that in case of a conspiracy, there
cannot be any direct evidence. Express agreement between
the parties cannot be proved. Circumstances proved before,
G during and after the occurrence have to be considered to
decide about the complicity of the accused. Such a conspiracy
is never hatched in open and, therefore, evaluation of proved
circumstances play a vital role in establishing the criminal
conspiracy. In this context, we may refer with profit to a passage
H
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN 869
[DIPAK MISRA, J.)
from Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi -v. State of A
Maharashtra 45 :
"20. The basic ingredients of the offence of criminal
conspiracy are: (i) an agreement between two or more
persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing
to be done.either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not B
illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is, therefore,
plainthat meeting of minds of two or more persons fQrdoing
or causing to be done an illegal act or an actby illegal means
is sine qua non of criminal conspiracy. Yet, as observed by
this Court in Shivnarayan Laxminarayan Joshi v. State of C
Maharashtra 46 a conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy
and it is impossible to adduce direct evidence of the
common intention of the conspirators. Therefore, the
meeting of minds of the conspirators can be inferred from
the circumstances proved by the prosecution, if o
suchinference is possible."
71. The same principles have been stated in Pratapbhai
Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat and another4 7 .
72. In Yakub Abdul Razak Menon v. The State of E
Maharashtra, through CBI, Bombay48 , analyzing various
pronouncements, this Court opined thus: -
"68. For an offence Under Section 120B Indian Penal Code,
the prosecution need not necessarilyprove that the
conspirators expressly agreed to door cause to be done the F
illegal act, the agreementmay be proved by necessary
implication. It is notnecessary that each member of the
conspiracymust know all the details of the conspiracy. The
offence can be proved largely from the inferencesdrawn
from the acts or illegal omission committedby the G
conspirators in pursuance of a common design. Being a
45. c2008) 10 sec 394.
46. (1980) 2 sec 465.
47. c2013) 1 sec 613.
48. (1980) 2 sec 465. H
- 870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A continuing offence, if any acts or omissions which constitute
an offence are done in India or outside its territory, the
conspiratorscontinuing to be the parties to the conspiracy
andsince part of the acts were done in India, theywould
obviate the need to obtain the sanction of the Central
B Government. All of them need not be present in India nor
continue to remain in India.The entire agreement must be
viewed as a wholeand it has to be ascertained as to what
in fact the conspirators intended to do or the object they
wanted to achieve. (Vide: R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi
c Administration49, Lennart Schussler and Anr. v. Director
of Enforcement and Anr. 50 , Shivanarayan Laxminarayan
Joshi v. State of Maharashtra and Mohammad Usman
Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra 51 )." ·
D 73. Testing the present factual matrix on the anvil of the
aforesaid enunciation of law, we are of the considered view that
the opinion expressed by the learned trial Judge as well as by
the High Court that there has been conspiracy between the
parties tq commit the blast on a particular day cannot be found
,E faultwith.
74. Presently, we shall engage ourselves to deal with the
conviction of accused Abdul Mateen for the offence under 14 of
the Foreigners Act, 1946. The said provision reads as under:
"14. Penalty for contravention of provisionsof the Act,
F
etc. -whoever -
(a) Remains in any area in India for a periodexceeding
the period for which the visa wasissued to him;
(b) does any act in violation of the conditions ofthe valid
G visa issued to him from his entry andstay in India or
any part thereunder;
------
49. AIR 1962 SC 1821.
50. (1970) 1 sec 152.
H 51. AIR 1981 SC 1062
CHANDRA PRAKASH v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN
871
. - . [DIPAK MISRA, J~] ·
(c) contravenes the provisions of this Act or ofany order A
made thereunder or any directiongiven in pursuance
· of this Act or such order forwhich no specific
punishment is provided underthis Act, shall be
punished with· imprisonmentfor a term which may
extend to five years andshall also be liable to fine; s
and if he has enteredinto a bond in pursuance of
clause (f) of sub-section (2) of section 3, his bond
shall beforfeited, and any person bound thereby
shallpay the penalty thereof or show cause to
thesatisfaction of the convicting court why c
suchpenalty should not be paid by him.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, the
expression "visa" shall have the same meaning as
assigned to it under the Passport(Entry into India)
~ules, 1950 made under thePassport (Entry into D
India) Act, 1920 (34of1920)."
75. The learned trial Judge, analyzing the material on record,
1
has come to hold that the said Abdul Mateen is a resident of
Pakistan and he had no valid document to be in India. In his
statement under Section 313 of the Code, he had not disputed E
that he was not having passport or visa and he is of Pakistan
nationality. Thus, the offence under the said Act has been held
to be proved. The High Court has concurred with the said view.
In our considered opinion, the offence under the said Act has·
been proved beyond reasonable doubt. F
76. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we conclude and hold
that the grounds assailing the judgment of conviction and thf
order of sentence have no legal substantiality and, accordingly,
they are rejected.
77. The factual scenario of the instant case compels usl to G
state that these kinds of activities by anyone breeds lawlessness,
fear and affects the fundamental unity of our great country. A
; nation with a desire to prosper is required to maintain high
. degree of law and order situation apart from respecting... ·
·"imperatives of internationalism". Certain individuals harbouring H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 6 S.C.R.
A unacceptabl.e notions and inexcusable philosophy and, on
certain occasions, because of enormous avarice, try to
jeopardize the cohesive and collegial fabric of the State. This
leads to national decay and gives rise to incomprehensible
anarchy. It reflects non-reverence for humanity. Be it categorically
B stated, every citiz.en of this country is required to remember that
national patriotism is founded on the philosophy of public good.
Love for one's country and humanity at large are eternally
cherished values. The infamous acts of the appellants are really
condemnable not only because of the dent they intended to
c create in the social peace and sovereignty of.the nation, but also
from the humane point of view as they are founded on greed,
eri'qy, baseless anger, pride, prejudice and perverse feelings
towards mankind.
78. We have, in agony and anguish, have expressed thus
o because when a devastating activity like the present one occurs
on the Republic Day of our country Bharat, it injures the
nationality, disturbs the equilibrium of each individual citizen,
creates a concavity in the equanimity of the peace of the State,
generates a·stir in the sanctity and divinity of law and order
E situation which is ·paramount in any civilized State, attempts to
. · · endangerthe economic sgrowth of a country and, in the ultimate
eventuate, destroys the conceptual normalcy of, any habitat. Law
cannot remain silent to this because it is the duty of law to resist
such attacks on peace. It is manifest that the accused-appellants
F had conspired to send a savage stir among the citizenry of this
country on the Republic Day. The great country like ours cannot
succumb to tbis kind of terrorist activity as it is nationally as well
as internationally obnoxious. Such tolerance would tantamount
to acceptance of defeat. The iron hands of law has to fall and in
the obtaining facts and circumstances, as the charges have been
G proved beyond reasonable doubt, the law has rightly visited the
appellants and, accordingly, we concur with the same.
79. Consequently, all the appeals, being bereft of merit,
stand dismissed.
,H Devika Gujral Appeals dismisse~.·
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