Holding

All accused members of the unlawful assembly were liable under Section 149 IPC as the prosecution established a common object of murder and arson, and the eyewitness testimony was deemed reliable.

Summary

On 23 July 1994 a mob of 300‑400 persons armed with guns and petrol bombs attacked the house of informant Ganesh Singh in Amarpur, Bihar, killing six members of his family. The informant identified 19 persons, including the appellants Chandra Bihari Gautam and others, and the prosecution charged them under IPC Section 302 read with Section 149, among other provisions. The trial court and the Patna High Court convicted the appellants, sentencing some to death and others to life imprisonment. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the prosecution failed to prove a common object under Section 149 and that the eyewitnesses were unreliable. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had established the existence of a common object—murder and arson—and that every member of an unlawful assembly is liable under Section 149 even without proof of an individual overt act. The Court also found the eyewitness testimony reliable and affirmed the lower courts' findings, dismissing the appeals.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved the existence of a common object among the accused under Section 149 of the IPC.
Whether mere presence in the unlawful assembly, without an overt act, suffices for conviction under Section 149.
The reliability of eyewitness testimony despite the witnesses being relatives of the victims.
The scope of Supreme Court interference with findings of fact of lower courts under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 27
Constitution of Indias. Article 136
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 141, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 436

Subjects

Section 149 IPCunlawful assemblycommon objectmurderconspiracyeyewitness testimonyappellate reviewArticle 136criminal liabilityvicarious liability

Judgment

,'t': __

A CHANDRA BIHARI GAUTAM AND ORS. ....._
v.
~
STATE OF BIHAR

APRIL 15, 2002
,.
I
B [R.P. SETHI AND DORAISWAMY RAJU, JJ.] L

L
Penal Code, 1860-s.302 rlws.149-Murder-Common object-Accused
persons attacked house of the informant night armed with deadly weapons .....
including gims and petrol bombs-Leading to killing of six persons in the
c family-Conviction-Courts below holding that accused persons committed
offence in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly-On appeal,
held prosecution establishing the existence of common object of unlawful
assembly amongst accused persons thus Section 149 applicable-However,
mere fact that no overt act attributed to the accused persons does not render
D Section 149 inapplicable.

Evidence Act, 1872~Testimony ofrelated witnesses-Reliance on-Held,
such testimony is reliable.· >
.
.__
Constitution of India, Article 136-Concurrent finding of fact- I

E Interference with-Held, is permissible only in exceptional cases when there
is some manifest illegality or irregularity. .T
Appellants-accused persons apprehending one 'N' attacked the house
of the informant at the dead of the night armed with deadly weapons including ~

guns and petrol bombs. One of the members of the family died and five were
F burnt alive inside the room where they were hiding. Motive was enmity of
one of the accused with the family of the informant Informant identified 19
persons including appellant out of the mob of 300-400 persons. FIR was
lodged. Prosecution filed charge sheet against the accused persons. Trial Court
convicted two of them under Section 302 and others under Section 302 read ... ~

with 149 IPC. Aggrieved, accused filed appeals which were disposed of. Courts
G
below held that the accused persons committed murder of six family members
in prosecution of common object of unlawful assembly. Hence the present ......--
,be
appeals.
·"]
I
In appeals before this Court appellants contended that the prosecution
H 1164

l
r
CHANDRA BIHARI GAUTAM v. STATE OF BIHAR 1165

. had failed to prove the presence of all the appellants and the existence of A
common object within the meaning of Section 149 of the Penal Code. It
submitted that even ifthe appellants were proved to be present on spot when
the occurrence took place they cannot be held guilty for the commission of
any offences as they were not proved to be sharing any common object but
were only by-standers. Further the prosecution witnesses being interested were
not reliable and the courts below wrongly relied upon their testimony to B
convict and sentence the appellants.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: I.I. The submission that the prosecution had failed to allege and C
prove a specified object on the part of the appellants, thus they cannot be
held to be guilty for the commission of the offence with the aid of Section 149
of the Penal Code cannot be accepted in view of the settled position of law
that every member of the unlawful assembly is guilty of the offence committed
in prosecution of the common object. [1170-F)
D
1.2. Even if the common object of the unlawful assembly is stated to be
apprehending 'N' only, the fact that the accused persons bad attacked the
house of the complainant at the dead of the night and were armed with deadly
weapons including the guns, and used petrol bombs proves beyond doubt that
they knew that in prosecution of the alleged initial common object murders
were likely to be committed. The knowledge of the consequential action in E
furtherance of the initial common object is sufficient to attract the applicability
of Section 149 for holding the members of the unlawful assembly guilty for
the commission of the offence by any member of such assembly. In the instant
case the appellants, along with others, have been proved to have formed
unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to commit murder and F
arson and in prosecution of the said common object they raided tbe house of
the informant armed with guns and committed offence. The courts below have,
therefore, rightly held that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly,
the common object of which was to commit murder of the informant and his
family members and in prosecution of the said common object six persons
were killed. The appellants were also proved to have hired the services of some G
extremists for the purposes of eliminating the family of the complainants.
[1171-F-G-H; 1172-A)

1.3. There is consistant and reliable evidence of the prosecution
establishing that all the accused had attacked the house of the informant at
the dead of night when !hey were armed with deadly weapons like guns and H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R.

A rifles. The prosecution has established the existence of the common object of.· ,
the unlawful assembly for attracting the applicability of Section 149 of the
Penal Code and the mere fact that no overt act has been attributed to each
of the accused persons is not sufficient to hold that charge under Section 149
of the Penal Code has not proved against them. [1J72-C, E, Fl

B 1.4. There is no reason to disbelieve any of the eye-witnesses. The trial
court as well as High Court have, after critical examination '>f their statements,
rightly concluded that they were the truthful witnesses and that all the
appellants were present at the time of occurrence. Merely because the
witnesses happened to be the relations of the deceased is not a ground to reject
C their testimony. [1169-C-DJ

Mukteshwar Rai and Ors. v. State ofBihar, AIR (1992) SC 483 and Umrao
Singh and Ors. v. State of UP. JT, (2000) 9 SC 588, distinguished.
I
j
Fatte and Ors. v. State of UP., Am (1979) SC 1504, referred to.
,t
D
2. The mere possibility of the occurrence having taken place in the
manner suggested by the defence counsel is no ground for interference in the
appeals filed by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. Time
and again it has been held by this Court that no interference would be made
with the concurrent finding of fact based on pure appreciation o.f evidence
E even if this court was to take a different view on the evidence. The court will
normally not enter into reappraisal or the review of evidence unless the trial
court or the High Court is shown to have committed an error of law or
procedure and the conclusions arrived at are perverse. This court cannot enter
into the credibility of the evidence with a view to substitute its opinion for
F that of the High Court. This court may interfere where on proved facts wrong
inferences of law are shown to have been drawn. It needs to be emphasised
that this court is not a regular court of appeal to which every judgment of
the High Court in criminal case may be brought up for scrutinising its
correctness. It is. only in rari: or exceptional case where there is some manifest
illegality or grave or serious irregularity that the court would interfere with
G such findings of fact. [1169-D-E-F-G)

Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration, [1975] 4 SCC 469; Ramaniklal
Gokaldas and Ors. v. The State of Gujarat, [1976] 1 SCC 6; Mst. Dalbir Kaur I.
and Ors. v. State ofPunjab, [1976] 4 SCC 158 and Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel
H and o;s. v. State of Gujarat, [2000] 1 sec 358, referred to.
CHANDRA BIHARI GAUTAM v. STATE OF BIHAR [SETHI, J.] 1167

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1161 A
of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.5.99 of the Patna High Court in
Crl. A. No. 517 of 1997.

WITH B

Crl. A. Nos. 380 and 525 of 2000.

K.B. Sinha, K.N. Rai, Jayant Bhushan (AC), Shiv Kumar Suri (AC)

- B.B. Singh and Kumar Rajesh Singh for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by •

SETHI, J. Contending that the prosecution had failed to prove the
c

presence of all the appellants and the existence of common object within the
meaning of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, the learned counsel for the D
appellants has argued that except appellant Manoj Kumar no other accused
could be convicted or sentenced for the death of the deceased persons. It is
submitted that even if the appellants are proved to be present on spot when
the occurrence took place, they cannot be held guilty for the commission of
any offence as they were not proved to be sharing any common object but
were only by-standers. It has been further argued on behalf of some appellants E
that the prosecution witnesses being interested were not reliable and the
courts below wrongly relied upon their testimony to convict and sentence the
appellants.

The facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeals are that on 23rd
· July, 1994 at about 2.00 a.m. the appellants accompanied by 300-400 persons, F
armed with deadly weapons like guns, attacked the house of Ganesh Singh
in Village Amarpur. Bholi Singh was shot dead and Nawlesh Singh, Shiv
Narain Singh, Kedar Singh, Sanjay Singh and Ajay Kumar were burnt alive
inside the room where they were hiding. According to the First Information
Report, the informant, namely, Ganesh Singh (PW5) along with other members G
of the family had slept on the upper floor of his house in open. At about 1.30
a.m. in the night there was some drizzling whereupon female members of the
family came down to the ground floor of the house and male members
moved inside three separate rooms on the southern side of the upper floor of
the house. In the western room facing north Nawlesh Singh, Sanjay Singh,
Ajay Kumar, Kedar Singh, Shiv Narain Singh and Bholi Singh went to sleep. H
•
'\-
1168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 2 S.C.R. t

A The informant (PW5) himself occupied the middle room and in the room on t
the eastern side his nephew Dhanju Kumar (PWl) slept. After about half an !'
hour, the informant heard sounds of firing from northern side of the roof of
his house and he got up. He heard one person saying that Nawlesh should
come out and surrender as the person speaking claimed to be the officer-
incharge of the police station.He heard Nawlesh saying that if the person
B seeking surrender was the officer-incharge of the police station, he should
come to the front door of the house. Ganesh Singh (PW5) further stated that
he saw some fire like substance and then raised an alarm that the extremists
had arrived in Khakhi dress. The culprits set the room on fire in which
Nawlesh was sleeping along with others. The fire was set with the help of

-
.....
c petrol bombs. The occurrence was seen by the informant through a hole in
the room where he was sleeping. Out of the mob of 300-400 persons, he
identified 19 persons in the light of torch flashed by fire in the room including
the appellants. All the aforesaid persons were named in his statement. In the
entire process about 300-400 rounds of firing were made terrifying the whole
of the locality. The motive behind the commission of the crime was stated to
D be the enmity of Manoj Kumar with the family of the informant.

After completion of the investigation the prosecution filed the charge-
sheet in the trial court against 16 persons including the appellants. To prove .....
its case the prosecution examined 8 witnesses. During the pendency of the
trial one of the accused, namely, Mani Singh (A-16) died. Out of the remaining
E 15 accused persons Ram Binay Singh (A-4), Bageshwari Sharma (A-7) and (:

Divya Kumar Madhu (A-15) were acquitted by the trial court. A-2, namely,
Hirdaya Singh @ Dhirendra Singh and Manoj Kumar Gautam (A-11) were
convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death
by the trial court. The other accused were convicted for the commission of ~

F offences under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The accused were also convicted for the commission of offences
under Sections 148, 436 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27
of the Arms Act but no separate sentences were awarded to them. Not satisfied
with their conviction and sentences, the accused persons filed Criminal Appeal
Nos. 464of1997, 517of1997, 528of1997 and 24of1998. All the appeals,
G along with Death Reference No. 6 of 1997 were disposed of by the common
judgment impugned in these appeals. The conviction of the appellants was
upheld but the sentence awarded to Hirdaya Singh @ Dhirendra Singh (A-
2) and Manoj Kumar Gautam (A-11) was commuted from death sentence to

H
imprisonment for life. Not satisfied even with the judgment of the High
Court, the present appeals have been filed by the convicted accused persons.
'
CHANDRA BIHARI GAUTAM v. STATE OF BIHAR [SETHI, J.) 1169

During the pendency of the Criminal Appeal No. 1161of1999, one of A
the appellants, namely, Nawal Kishore Gautam (A-3) has died. So far as the
appeal regarding Nawal Kishore Gautam is concerned, the same has thus
abated.

We are not inclined to re-examine the whole of the prosecution case for B
finding out as to whether occurrence had taken place in which six people
were killed by the appellants in the manner alleged by the prosecution. We
find no reason to disbelieve any of the eye-witnesses, namely, Dhananjay
Kumar (PW!), Neelam Devi (PW2) , Narendra Singh (PW3), Balwanti Div
(PW4) and Ganesh Singh (PW5). The trial court as well as the High Court
have, after critical examination of their statements, rightly concluded that C
they were the truthful witnesses and that all the appellants in these appeals
were present at the time of occurrence. Merely because the witnesses happened
to be the relations cif the deceased is not a ground to reject their testimony.
Under the circumstances of the case, the aforesaid witnesses appear to be
natural witnesses who were supposed to be at the house of Ganesh Singh
(PW5) when the occurrence took place. The mere possibility of the occurrence D
having taken place in the manner suggested by the defence counsel is no
ground for interference in the appeals filed by special leave under Article 136
of the Constitution. Time and again it has been held by this Court that no
interference would be made with the concurrent finding of fact based on pure
appreciation of evidence even if this court was to take a different view on the E
evidence. The court will normally not enter into reappraisal or the review of
evidence unless the trial court or the High Court is shown to have committed
an error of law or procedure and the conclusions arrived at are perverse. This
Court cannot enter into the credibility of the evidence with a view to substitute
its opinion for that of the High Court. This Court may interfere where on
proved facts wrong inferences of law are shown to have been drawn. It needs F
to be emphasised that this Court is not a regular court of appeal to which
every judgment of the High Court in criminal case may be brought up for
scrutinising its correctness. It is only in rare or exceptional case where there
is some manifest illegality or grave or serious irregularity that the court
would interfere with such findings of fact. In this regard reference may be G
made to the judgments of this Court reported in Duli Chand v. Delhi
Administration, (1975] 4 SCC 469, Ramaniklal Goka/das and Ors. v. The
State of Gujarat, (1976] I SCC 6, Mst. Dalbir Kaur and Ors. v. State of
Punjab, (1976] 4 SCC 158 and Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel and Ors. v.
State of Gujarat, [2000] I SCC 358, etc.
H
1170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R. '
A It has been argued alternatively that even if the occurrence is held to
have taken place in the manner alleged by the prosecution and the accused
persons were seen on spot, they cannot be convicted and sentenced as the
prosecution allegedly failed to establish the existence of a common object
amongst the accused persons. Section 149 is an exception to the criminal law
B whereunder a person can be convicted and sentenced for his vicarious liability
only on proof of his being a member of the unlawful assembly, sharing the
common object, notwithstanding as to whether he had actually participated in
the commission of the crime or not. Common object does not require prior
concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. An unlawful
object can develop after the accused assembled. The existence of the common
C object of the unlawful assembly has to be ascertained in the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is true that the mere presence of the accused
is not sufficient to hold them guilty for the sharing of common object as the
prosecution has t9 further establish that they were not mere by-standers but
in fact were sharing the common object. When a concerted attack is made by
a large number of persons, it is often difficult to determine the actual part
D played by each of the accused but on that account for an offence committed
by a member of the unlawful assembly in the prosecution of the common
object or for an offence which was known to be likely to be committed in
prosecution of the common object, persons proved to be members cannot
escape the consequences arising from the doing of that act which amounts to
E an offence. There may not be a common object in a sudden fight but in a
planned attack on the victim, the presence of the common object amongst the
persons forming the unlawful assembly can be inferred.

It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that as the
prosecution had failed to allege and prove a specified object, their clients
F cannot be held to be guilty for the commission of the offence with the aid
of Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. Such a submission cannot be accepted
in view of the settled position of law. Every member of the unlawful assembly
is guilty of the offence committed in prosecution of the common object.
Unlawful assembly has been defined under Section 141 of the Indian Penal
Code to mean:
G
"141. Unlawful assembly - An assembly of five or more persons is
designated an "unlawful assembly", if the common object of the
persons composing that assembly is -
First - To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the
H Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of
CHANDRA BIHARI GAUTAM v. STATE OF BIHAR [SETHI, J.] 1171

any State, or any public servant in the exercise of the lawful power A
of such public servant; or

Second. - To resist the execution of any law, or any legal process; or

Third - To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence;
or;
B
Fourth- By means of criminal force or show of criminal force, to any
person, to take or obtain possession of any property, or to deprive
any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of the use of water
or other incorporeal right of which he is in possession or enjoyment,
or to enforce any right or supposed right; or C
Fifth- By means of criminal fore~, .·or show of criminal force, to
compel any person to do what he 'ii not legally bound to do, or to
omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.

Explanation - An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, D
may subsequently become an unlawful assembly."

Section 149 has two parts. First part deals with the commission of an
offence by a member of unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common
object of that assembly and the second part deals with the liability of the
members of the unlawful assembly who knew that an offence was likely to E
= be committed in prosecution of the object for which they had assembled.
Even if the common object of the unlawful assembly is stated to be
apprehending Nawlesh Singh only, the fact that the accused persons had
attacked the house of the complainant at the dead of the night and were
armed with deadly weapons including the guns, and used petrol bombs proves
beyond doubt that they knew that in prosecution of the alleged initial common F
object murders were likely to be committed. The knowledge of the
consequential action in furtherance of the initial common object is sufficient
to attract the applicability of Section 149 for holding the members of the
unlawful assembly guilty for the commission of the offence by any member
of such assembly. In this case the appellants, along with others, have been G
proved to have formed unlawful assembly, the common object of which was
to commit murder and arson and in prosecution of the said common object
they raided the house of the informant armed with guns and committed
offence. The courts below have, therefore, rightly held that the accused persons
formed an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to commit
murder of the informant and his family members and in prosecution of the H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A said common object six persons were killed. The appellants were also proved
to have hired the services of some extremists for the purposes of eliminating
the family of the complainant.

The reliance of the learned defence counsel on the judgment of this
Court in Mukteshwar Rai qnd Ors. v. State of Bihar, AI}\ (1992) SC 483] is
B misplaced inasmuch as in that case the existence of the common object was
negated in view of the fact that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
accused were armed at the time of commission of the offence of murder and
were proved to be t~e members of the unlawful assembly, the object of which
was to commit the offence of mischief only punishable under Section 436 of
C the Indian Penal Code. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, there is consistent
and reliable evidence of the prosecution establishing that all the accused had
attacked the house of the informant at the dead of night when they were
armed with deadly weapons like guns and rifles. Similarly, the facts of the
case in Umrao Singh and Ors. v. State of UP., JT 2000 9 SC 588 are
distinguishable. In that case this Court on facts found that the members of the
D unlawful assembly shared the common object but the offence committed in
pursuance of the said object was found to be punishable under Section 304
<'
(Part I) of the Indian Penal Code. In the case of Fatte and Ors. v, State of
UP., AIR (1979) SC 1504, relied upon by the leam-.d counsel for the appellant,
it was held that the mere fact that no overt act was attributable to the members
E of the unlawful assembly, was not sufficient to disprove the charge under
Section 149 of t~e Indian; Penal Code. However, the question regarding the
applicability of the aforesaid section depends upon facts of each case. In the
instant case the prosecution has established the existence of the common
object of the unlawful assembly for attracting the applicability of Section 149
of the Indian Penal Code and the mere fact that no overt act has been attributed
F to each of the accused persons is not sufficient to hold that charge under
Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code has not proved against them.

We have, therefore, no doubt in our mind that the appellants have
rightly been convicted for the commission of various offences by the trial
court, as confirmed by the appellate court and sentenced accordingly. There
G is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.

N.J. Appeal dismissed.

•