CHANDMALversusFIRM RAM CHANDRA AND VISHWANATH

A
                         CHAND MAL
                             v.
              FIRM RAM CHANDRA AND VISHWANA1H

                                  MAY 7, 1991

B                   [B.C. RAY AND J.S. VERMA, JJ.)

          Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954--
    Section 26--Revisionary jurisdiction of High Court-Scope of.

          Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 115-Revision-Scope
    of.
c
          The appellant-landlord filed a suit for eviction of the respondent
    firm-defendant-commission agent irrm, from his shop under section
    15(3)(a)(iii) of the Hyderabad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control
    Act, 1954 on the ground that the appellant required the Suit si.op for his
D   own personal use as he intended to start commission agency and other
    business; and that the respondent did not vacate the premise inspite of
    his two notices, terminating the tenancy.

          The respondent filed written statement before the Additional Rent
    Controller accepting the ownership of the appellant and tenancy of the
E   respondent and denied the appellant's allegation that he required the
    premises for his personal use, as the appellant was a member of Hindu
    Joint family comprising of his father, and his brothers and appellant;
    the appellant as one of the partners of registered firm runs a kirana of
    commission agency shop under the name and style of M/s Rajmal
    Sumermal Surana and the appellant owned many houses and shops and
F   as such was not entitled to an order of eviction. In the additional written
    statement it was further stated that the appellant purchased the house
    from one registered partnership irrm and one of the partners of the firm
    was occupying the house as a permanent tenant since Samwat 2002. It
    was also contended that the partners of the irrm were not made parties
    to the eviction proceedings and hence the suit was not tenable.
G
          The Trial Court considering the evidence allowed the suit holding
    that the appellant was entitled to evict the respondent in view of the        ·1
    provisions of Section 15(2)(vi) of the Act, though the plea of bona fide      ,
    requirement was negatived.

H         The tenant-respondent filed an appeal under section 25 before the

                                       732
                                 CHANDMAL v. FIRM                           733

       District Judge, which was dismissed though it was held that the land-       A
       lord failed to prove that he required the premises for personal use •

 .,.        The tenant-respondent's revision petition under section 26 to the
       High Court, was allowed by a Single Judge.
                                                                                  B
             Allowing the landlord's appeal, this Court

             HELD: 1. The jurisdiction of the High Court in revision against
       the order passed on appeal by the District Judge is a limited one and It is
:'.    almost pari materia with the provisions of Section 115 of the Code of
       Civil Procedure. The High Court while exercising the revisional juris-
       diction can interfere with the order passed on appeal by the appellate C
       authority only on three grounds, i.e. (i) where the original or apellate
       authority exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) where
       the original or appellate authority failed to exercise a Jurtsdlctlon so
       vested, or (iii) where in following the procedure or passing the order,
       the original or appellate authority acted illegally or with material
                                                                                   0
       irregularity. [738C-E]

             2. The findings in any view of the matter whatsoever cannot
       be held to be either without jurisdiction nor it can amount to a failure
       to exercise jurisdiction vested with them, nor it can be held to be
       made by the original or appellate authority illegally or with material
       irregularity. [738G]                                                     E

             3. The revisional jurisdiction of tiie High Court under Section 26
       of the said Act is coniined strictly to the jurisdictional error or illegal
       exercise of jurisdiction. The ilnding .of the High Court to the effect that
       it was the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere even
       with the concurrent fmding-of facts becau5e on the record, High Court F
       found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclusion
       that the claim was mala fide or was not bona fide as required by
       the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with the pro-
       visions of Section 26 of said Act whiclt confers revisional Jurisdiction
       on the High Court. [738H-739BJ
                                                                                   G
             4. The claim of permanent tenancy by one of the partners has
       been clearly and unequivocally made in the additional written state-
       ment r.ted on behalf of the respondent. 1n such circumstances, the
       provisions of Section 15(2) (vi') of the said Act are applicable and an
       order of eviction can very well be passed on this ground alone. [739F]
                                                                                  H
    734                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2279
    of 1991.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 27.9.1989 of the Bombay
    High Court in C.R.A. No. 500 of 1985.

B         S.C. Birlafor the Appellant.

        V.N. Ganpule, S.V. Deshpande and Ms. Priya Gupta for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c         RAY, J. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we
    grant special leave.

          This appeal on special leave is directed against the judgment and
    order passed in Civil Revision Application No. 500 of 1985 by the High
D   Court of Judicature at Bombay, Aurangabad Bench allowing the Revi-
    sion, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the District
    Judge in Rent Appeal No. 5 of 1984 confirming and allowing the
    judgment and order of the Additional Rent Controller, Aurangabad in
    R.C. No. ARC/71/3.

E         The matrix of the case is as follows:

          The appellant-landlord, Chandmal, S/o Sumermal Surana as
    plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the respondent-defendent Firm Ram
    Chandra & Vishwanath, a commission agent firm from his shop bear-
    ing Municipal No. 4-16-101 situated at Mondha, Taluka, District
F   Aurangabad (Maharashtra) under section 15(3)(a)(iii) of the Hydera-
    bad House (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control .Act, 1954 to be
    hereinafter to be referred to as the said Act on the ground inter a/ia that
    the respondent was the tenant of the said shop attached to the said
    house of the appellant-landlord on the monthly rent of Rs.SO per
    month and the tenancy commences from the 1st day of every month               ~
G   according to the English calender, that the landlord-appellant required
    the suit shop for his own personal use as he intended to start commis-
    sion agency and other business in the said shop, that he terminated the
    tenancy of the respondent by serving the two notices dated 28.3.1969
    and 8. 12. 1970 and that the respondent did not vacate the suit pre-
    mises, hence the suit has been filed for eviction of the tenant-
H   respondent from the said premises. Shankarrao Marutirao Son~wane,
                         CHANDMAL v. FIRM [RAY, J.[                    735

     one of the partners of respondent firm filed his written statement
                                                                             A
     before the Additional Rent Controller accepting the ownership of the
     appellant and tenancy of the respondent at the rate of Rs. 50 per
     month. He, however, denied the appellant's allegation that he
     required the suit premises for his personal use. According to the
     respondent, the appellant is a member of Hindu joint family compris-
     ing of his father, Sumermal, his real brothers and appellant and as one B
     of the partners of registered firm runs a kirana of commission agency
     shop under the name and style of Mis Rajmal Sumermal Surana. It has
     been further submitted that the appellant owns many houses and shops
     at Aurangabad and also runs a very big shop at Bhaji Bazar,
     Aurangabad and is not entitled to evict. In the additional written
     statement it has been further stated that the appellant purchased the C
     house from Balkrishna and brothers, the firm Ramchandra and Vish-
     wanath is a partnership firm registered under the Partnership Act, one
     of the partners of the firm Ramchandra and Vishwanath is occupying
     the house as a permanent tenant since Samwat 2002. It has also been
     contended that the partners of the firm are not made parties to the
     eviction proceeding• and hence the suit was not tenable.                D
Ir
          An additional issue was framed at the request of the appellant
     which was to the following effect:

                "Do defendant prove that he is permanent tenant and his
                claim is bona fide."                                    E

          The trial court considering the evidences adduced on behalf of
     the defendant-respondent held that the defendant failed to prove the
     claim of permanent tenancy of Ramchandra Madhavrao since Samvat
     2002 over the suit premises and that the claim of permanent tenancy is
     not bona fide. This issue was thus answered in the negative.           F

            The Additional Rent Controller, therefore, held that the appel-
     lant is entitled to evict the respondent from the suit premises in view of
     the provisions of Section 15(2) (vi) of the said Act and, therefore,
~    made an order directing the tenant-respondent to hand over vacant
     and peaceful possession of the said shop to the landlord-appellant G
     within a period of 30 days of the order though he negatived the plea of
     bona fide requirement of suit premises for his own occupation.

         This order was made on February 14, 1984. Against this judg-
     ment and order, the tenant-respondent filed ·an appeal being Rent
     Appeal No. 5 of 1984 under section 25 of the said Act in the court of   H
    736                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [ 1991] 2 S.C.R.

A   District Judge at Aurangabad. The learned District Judge confirmed
    the judgment and order of the Additional Rent Controller holding that
    the landlord failed to prove that he bona fide required the premises for
    personal use, for starting new business. It was further held that so far
    as the claim of permanent tenancy, there was no iota of evidence to
    support the tenant-respondent's claim of permanent tenancy. It also
    held that the tenant-respondent has put forth the claim of permanent
    tenancy to defeat the landlord-appellant's right to claim possession of
    the premises and had there been any substance in the claim, the
    tenant-respondent would have produced evidence in support of it.
    Complete absence of evidence indicated that the claim is fake and not
    put forth bona fide. The learned District Judge, therefore, held that
    the tenant's claim of permanent tenancy was not bona fide and so
c   upheld the finding of the Additional. Rent Controller and granted
    three months' time to the tenant-respondent to deliver possession of
    the suit premises to the landlord-appellant.

           The tenant-respondent feeling aggrieved filed an application for
D   Revision under Section 26 of the said Act in the High Court at Bombay
    (Aurangabad Bench) being Civil Revision Application No. 500 of
    1985. The said Revision Application was allowed by the learned Single
    Judge setting aside the concurrent finding of the courts below holding
    inter alia that in the reply of the tenant to the notices sent by the
    landlord, there was no semblance of a claim for permanent tenancy. It
E   was further held that in the written submission there was no whisper
    about the claim of permanent tenancy. It is for the first time that in the
    additional written statement filed on behalf of the tenant the claim of
    permanent tenancy by one of the partners, Ramchandra Madhavrao
    since Samwat 2002 was made. It has also been held that during the
    trial, Shankarrao Marutirao Sonawane, one of the partners of the
F   respondent firm who has signed the written statement has not uttered a
    word in his examination-in-chief with regard to the question of per-
    manent tenancy. It was, therefore, held that in these circumstances "it
    is the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere even with a
    concurrent finding of fact because on the record, I find that there is not
    a single factor to come to the conclusion that the claim was ma/a fide or
G   was not bona fule as is required by the statute."

         The learned Single Judge, therefore, set aside the judgments of
    the courts below and allowed the Revision Application with costs
    throughout.

H         It is against this judgment and order, the instant appeal on
                      CHANDMAL v. FIRM [RAY, J.)                       737

 special leave has been filed by the landlord. It is convenient to set out
                                                                              A
 hereinbelow the relevant provisions of Section 15(2)(vi) of the said
 Act before proceeding to consider whether the High Court was
 justified in setting aside the judgment an~ order of the courts below:

             Section 15(2)(vi):
                                                                              B
             A tenant shall not be evicted, whether in execution of a
             decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provi-
             sions of this section--

             (vi) that the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or
             claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial
             or claim was not bona fide the Controller shall make an          c
             order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession
             of the house, and if the Controller is not so satisfied he
             shall make an order, rejecting the application."

       It is also pertinent to set out in this connection the provisions of   D
· Section 26 of the said Act:

            Section26:

            "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any
            other law for the time being in force, an application for         E
            revision shall lie to the High Court from any final order
            passed on appeal by a,n appellate authority on the following
            grounds:

            (a) that the original or appellate authority exercised a
            jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or                          F

            (b) that the original or appellate authority failed to exer-
            cise a jurisdiction so vested, or

            (c) in following the procedure or passing the order, the
            original or appellate authority acted illegally or with mate-     G
            rial irregularity."

     There is no dispute regarding the submission made in para 9 of
the additional written statement which is a part of the same written
statement, filed on behalf of the respondent .by one of its partners,
Shankarrao Marutirao Sonawane to the effect that one of the partners          H
    738                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1991] 2 S.C.R.

    of the said firm, Ramachandra Madhavrao is occupying the house as a
A permanent tenant since Samvat 2002. Admittedly, on the basis of this
  additional written statement, an additional issue No. I was framed at
  the request of the landlord-appellant whether the claim of permanent
  tenancy of Ramchandra Madhavrao was bona fide. It is evident from
  the provisions of Section 15(2)(vi) as set out hereinbefore that if the
B tenant has claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that such claim
  was not bona fide the Controller shall make an order directing the
  tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house. The Additional
  Rent Controller as well as the District Judge considered carefully and
  minutely the evidences adduced on behalf of the tenant-respondent
  and found that claim of permanent tenancy was not bona fide.
  Accordingly, the courts below held that the tenant-respondent was
c liable to be evicted from the suit premises on this ground alone and
  passed order for eviction from the suit premises. The jurisdiction of
  the High Court in revision against the order passed on appeal by the
  District Judge is a limited one and it is almost pari materia with the
  provisions of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High
D Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction can interfere with the
  order passed on appeal by the appellate authority only on three
  grounds i.e. (i) where the original or appellate authority exercised a
  jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (ii) where the original or appel-
  late authority failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) where
  in following the procedure or passing the order, the original or appel-
E late authority acted illegally or with material irregularity. It is evident
  from the averments made in para 9 of the additional written statement
  that one of the partners of the respondent firm, Ramchandra
  Madhavrao occupied the said premises as a permanent tenant since
  Samvat 2002. This claim of permanent tenancy was held to be not bona
  fide by the original court as well as by the appellate authority on a
F consideration and appraisement of the evidences adduced on behalf of
  the tenant-respondent and as such both the courts below passed order
  of eviction of the tenant-respondent from the suit premises. These are
  admittedly concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the original and the
  appellate authority. Moreover, these findings in any view of the matter
   whatsoever, cannot be held to be either without jurisdiction nor it can
G amount   to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested with them, nor it can
   be held to be made by the original or appellate authority illegally or
   with material irregularity.

       The revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 26 of
  the said Act is confined strictly to the jurisdictional error or illegal
H exercise of jurisdiction. The finding of the High Court to the effect
                          CHANDMAL v. FIRM (RAY, J.]                      739

     that it was the duty of the Court in the interest of justice to interfere
                                                                                 A
     even with the concurrent finding of facts because on the record, High
     Court found that there was not a single factor to come to the conclu·
     sion that the claim was ma/a fide or was not bona fide as required by
     the statute, is entirely baseless and not in accordance with the provi·
     sions of Section 26 of the said Act which confers revisional jurisdiction
     on the High Court. It is pertinent to mention in this connection the        B
     decision in J. Pandu v. R. Narsubai, [1987] 1 SCC 573. It is a case
     under the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1960. Sub·
     section 2(vi) of Section 10 of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Evie·
     tion) which is similar to Section 15(2)(vi) of the Hyderabad Houses
     (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954 sets out two grounds of
     eviction viz. ( 1) denial of title of the landlord without bona fides and
     (2) claim of permanent tenancy rights without bona fides. It was held       c
     that "consequently, either denial of title or claim of permanent
     tenancy without bona fides will· itself be enough to attract Section
     10(2)(vi). The order of eviction on this ground, has therefore, to be
     sustained. By reason of this conclusion alone the appeal can be
     dismissed."                                                                 D

          In the case of Majati Subbarao v. P. V.K. Krishna Rao (deceased)
     by Lrs., [1989] 4 SCC 732 it has been observed that the denial of title
     of the landlord by the tenant must be made in clear and in unequivocal
     terms. It was further observed that it is well settled that the court
     hearing a suit or appeal can take into account events which are subse-      E
     q uent to the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or
     mould the relief appropriately.

           As we have stated hereinbefore that the claim of permanent
     tenancy by one of the partners, Ramchandra Madhavrao has been
     clearly and unequivocally made in the additional written statement          F
     filed on behalf of the respondent. In such circumstances, the provi-
     sions of Section 15(2)(vi) of the said Act are applicable and an order of
     eviction can very well be passed on this ground alone.

           In the premises aforesaid, the judgment and order passed in
-+   revision by the High Court is contrary to law as the High Court in          G
     exercise of its revisional jurisdiction interfered with the concurrent
     finding of fact arrived at by the original court as well as the appellate
     authority. The High Court should not have reversed the same in exer·
     cise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 26 of the said Act. We,
     therefore, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and
     uphold the orders of the court below. The respondent is given three         H
    740                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1991] 2 S.C.R.

A   months' time to vacate the suit premises on filing the usual undertak-
    ing that they will not induct anybody or transfer the same to any other
    person and they will go on paying the rent of the premises at the usual
    rate and will deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the suit
    premises on or before the expiry of the said period to the landlord-
B   appellant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties will
    bear their own costs.

    V.P.R.                                                Appeal allowed.