Holding

Regulation 6 restriction applies only to acquisitions made through the specified government or semi‑government agencies; acquisition via a cooperative society does not fall within its scope, rendering the cancellation invalid.

Summary

The respondents, a retired army officer and his wife, were allotted a dwelling unit by the Chandigarh Housing Board (CHB) under a housing scheme. They were also members of the Army Welfare Housing Organisation (AWHO), a cooperative society registered under the Societies Registration Act, which had obtained land and allotted a flat to them. CHB issued a show‑cause notice invoking Regulation 6 of its 1979 Regulations, which bars allotment to persons who have acquired a house or residential site anywhere in India "through" Government, semi‑government, municipal or improvement‑trust agencies at a concessional rate. The respondents contended that acquisition through a cooperative society does not fall within the meaning of "through" and therefore the restriction is inapplicable. The Supreme Court held that the word "through" must be given its ordinary meaning of "agency" and applies only to acquisitions made via the specified agencies; a cooperative society is not such an agency, so the restriction does not apply and the cancellation is impermissible. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court's order allowing the respondents to retain their allotment was affirmed.

Issues considered

The term 'through' in Regulation 6 of the Chandigarh Housing Board Regulations, 1979, whether it includes acquisition of property via a cooperative society.
Whether the restriction on eligibility for allotment can be invoked to cancel the respondents' allotment on the ground of their acquisition of a flat through AWHO.

Legislation cited

Subjects

housing allotmenteligibility criteriacooperative societystatutory interpretationright to acquire propertycancellation of allotmentRegulation 6human right

Judgment

j CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD A
v.
DEVINDER SINGH AND ANR.

MARCH 14, 2007

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KATJU, JJ.] B

Haryana Housing Board Act, 1971-Allotment of housing plot-
Eligibility conditions for-Regulations imposing restriction on allotment to
person having residential site through Government/Semi Government/ C
Municipal Committee/Improvement Trust-Allotment by Housing Board-
Allottee getting another residentiaf unit through a Cooperative Society-
Show cause to allottee by Housing Board for cancellation of the allotment-
Propriety of cancellation-Held: Cancelltion not permissible-Right ot
acquire property though not fundamental but a constitutional and human
right-A clause impinging on the right of a citizen must be construed strictly D
and principle of contextual interpretation will have no application in such
cases-The restrietions provided under the provision are applicable onfy
when the property is acquired throgh the agency, specifically mentioned
therein-Co-operative society not being the specified agency, restriction
clause not applicable-Chandigarh Housing Board (Alltoment, Management E
and Sale of Tenements) Regulations, 1979-Regulations 6-lnterpretation of
Statutes-Rules of interpretation-Principle-Principle of contextual
interpretation.

Interpretation of Statutes/Deeds-Principle of interpretation-When a
plain meaning can be given effect to, court should not take recourse to any F
other principle or interpretation, when it is not necessary.

Rights-Rights to acquire Property-Nature of-Held: It is a
constitutional and human, right, through not fundamental right.

Respondents-a retired Army Officer and his wife, had applied for and G
were allotted a housing plot under a Housing Scheme of the appellant-Board.
Resj>odents had also jointly become members of a Housing Cooperative Society
constituted for the welfare of the Army Officer. The Co-operative Society was
later allowed some land at Delhi and the respondents were allotted a flat

1049 H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007 J 3 S.C.R.

A therein.
Regulation 6 of Chandigarh Housing Board (Allotment, Management
and Sale of Tenements) Regulations, 1979, constituted under Haryana
Housing Board Act, 1971, imposed restriction on alltoment to such persons
who has acquired a house/residential site in india through Government/Semi
B Government/Municipal Committee/Improvement Trust at concessional rate in
their name or in the name of any of their dependents.

In view of the allotment to the respondents of the Cooperative society,
appellant-Board issued show cause notice to the respondents for cancellation
C of their allotment under the Scheme. Respondents filed Wirt Petition and the
same was allowed by High Court. Hence the present appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. It is, one thing to say that a member of a society has no
independent status so as to acquire a higher right than the society itself or
D for the purpose of questioning the validity or constitutionally of the provisions
of the Cooperative Society Act or the Rules, it does not have any independent
locus to maintain an action, but it is another thing to say that although a person
acquired a reight of propertyy by reason of allotment made by another juristic
person, namely, a Corporation, he can be deprived therefrom by reason of a
E clause. Status of a member qua Society and his relationship as an allottee
under a statutory organisation stands on different footings. One deals with
his right qua another organisation. In the first case, he exercises a limited
right, in the second would be no such restriction. In a given case if allotment
is made by different authorities in the same area, matter may have to be
considered differently. IPara 17111056-G-H; 1057-A-BI
F
State of UP. and Anr. v. COD. Chheoki Employees' Cooperative Society
and Ors .. 1199713 SCC 681, referred to.

2.1. Keeping in view the settled principles of interpretation of deed/
Statute the condition of eligibility in question must be C611strued literaily. If
G a plain meaning can be given effect to, there is no reason why it should not be
applied. The Court would not take recourse to any other principle of
interpretation when it is not necessary. IPara 27111059-F-HI

2.2. A plain reading of Regulation 6 of Chandigarh Housing Board
H (Allotment, Management and Sale of Tenements) Regulations, 1979 indicates
. 1051
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARDr. OEVINDERSINGH

that the same consists of the ingredients i.e. (I) The Applicant should not A
)
have acquired a house/residential site anywhere in India; (2) such acquisition
must be through Government/Semi GovernmenUMunicipal Committee/
Corporation/Improvement Trust; (3) such acquisition must he at a concessional
rate i.e. at reserved/fixed price; (4) such acquisition may be in his own name
or in the name of any dependent member of his/her family. B
IPara 28111060-A-B-C]

2.3. Right to acquire a property although is not a fundamental right,
but is a consitutional and human right Before a person can be deprived of
his right to acquire property, the law and or a contract must expressly and
explicity state so. [Para 11) (1059-HI C
2.4. The word 'through' occuring in Regulation 6 in this context would
imply 'agency'. Thus only when a person acquired some property through the
'agency' specifically mentioned therein, the condition of eligibility which
imposes a restriction on a valuable right of a citizen must be held to be
applicable and not otherwise. Acquisition of any property through any other D
source or through any other agency is not prohibited. Right to acquire property
is a human right. A deed must be construed reasonably and in its entirety. If
acquisition of any property through any agency other than specified therein
is not prohibited, evidently, the restriction clause in the condition of eligibility
will have no application. The same must be construed strictly. A clause
impinging the right of a citizen must receive strict instruction and the E
principle of contextual interpretation will have no applillation in such a case.
[Paras30am;l31) (1060-E,F-G)

2.5. Respondents were allotted a flat by a society registered under the
Societies Registration Act. It is indisputably not a Government or Semi- F
Government organisation. It, indisputably, does not come within the purview
of the other terms specified therein. IPara 141 (1055-DI

2.6. The Housing Board being a statutory organisation and having a
regulation making power, could have made an explicit provision. If it intended
to put such a restriction on the right of a citizen to acquire immovable G
property, would be free to do so. jPara 33) (1060-H; 1061-AI

Chandigarh Housing Board and Anr. v. Narinder Kaur Mako/, (20001
6 sec 415, distinguished.

Harsh Vardhan Bansal v. Chandigarh Housing Board and Anr., (2006) H
1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

A 9 sec 708, referred to.
CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7171 of2000.
~
•
From the Final Judgment and Order dated 25.02.2000 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 7070 of 1998.

B Rachna Joshi lssar and Kapil Saxena for the Appellant.

A.K. Ganguli, Suresh C. Gupta, A. Guneshwar Sharma, Shiddhant
Srivastava and Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c S.B. SINHA J. 1. Interpretation of a condition of eligibility for allotment
of a housing plot in the Modren Housing Complex, Manimajra under the
Manimajra Housing Scheme Phase III 1993 by the appellant herein is in
question in this appeal which arises out of the judgment and order dated
25.2.2000 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Courtin C. W.P. No. 7070/1998.
D
2. The fact of the matter is not in dispute. Respondent No. 1 is a retired
Army Officer. He and his wife jointly became member of a Cooperative Society
known as 'Army Welfare Housing Organisation' ('AWHO' for short). The
said Cooperative Society was registered with the Registrar of Societies. Delhi
under the Socities. Delhi under the Socities Registration Act being Act,, XX!
E
of 1860.

3. 'A WHO' was allotted some land in Delhi by the Ministry of Housing
and Urban Development.

4. Respondents applied for and were allotted a dwelling unit by the
F appellant-Board in the said Housing Scheme. Having come to know of the
purported allotment of a housing site by the 'A WHO' in favour of the said -\
respondents, a show-cause notice was issued by the appellant-Board on
22.9.1997. directing the respondents to show cause as to why the allotment
in the aforementioned Scheme not be cancelled and the entire amount recieved
by the Board against the dwelling unit and/or flat is forrfeited. The said show-
G
cause notice was issued purported to be in terms of Clause 20 of the allotment
,.
letter dated 21.7.95. '-.
I.
5. A writ petition was filed by the respondents before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court and by reason of the impugned judgment, the same had
been allowed.
H
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARD v. DEVIN DER SINGH [S.B. SINHA J.] ) 053

6. Ms. lssar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant- A
) Board, would submit that the High Court committed a serious error in
interpreting one of the conditions of eligibility as stiputed in the Brochure
insofar as it failed to take into consideration the purport and object for which
allotment is made by the Housing Board at a concessional rate and/or at
reserved/fixed price.
B
7. It was urged that respondents being members of the 'A WHO' had
no independent existence and that being a part of the Society itself, would
come within the purview of the word 'through Government/Semi-Government/
Municipal Committee/Corporation/Improvement Trust/Notified Area
Committee' and for the said purpose the contextulal rule of interpretation C
should be applied.

8. Mr. Ganguli, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, on the other hand, submits that the condition of eligibility must
recieve strict construction. It was furthermore submitted that, in any event the
show-cause notice having not contained any stipulation that the land was D
allotted to the respondents and/or the 'AWHO' at the concessional rate, no
order of cancellation could have been passed relying on or on the basis
thereof.

9. Indisputably, the Chandigarh Housing Board has been constitued
under the Haryana Hoiusing Board Act, 1971, as extended to the Union E
Territory of Chandigarh. The Union Territory of Chandigarh in exercise of its
power conferred upon it by Section 74 of the said Act, made regulations
known as 'The Chandigarh Housing Board (Allotment, Management and Sale
of Tenements) Regulations. 1979. Regulation (6) of the said Regulation, with
which we are concerned, reads as under:
F
"6. Eligibility of Allotment-( I) A dwelling unit or flat in the Housing
Estate of the Board shall be allotted only to such person who or his
wife/her husband or any of his/her dependent relations including
unmarried children, does not own on free-hold or lease hold or on hire
purchase basis, a residential plot or house in the Union Territory of G
Chandigarh or in any of the Urban Estates of Mohali or Panchkula
Similarly persons who have acquired a house/residential site anywhere
,i
in India through Government/Semi government/Municipal committee/
Improvement Trust at concessional rate in their name or in the name
of any/dependent member of their family will not be eligible to apply
H
1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 3 S.C.R.

A to the Board for allotment of a dwelling unit or flat. Subject to the
above provis~on, the applicant should be domicile ofU.T. of Chandigarh
or should have been a bona fide resident of U.T. of Chandigarh for
a period of at least three years on the date of submitting the application

[Provided that the condition of eligibility regarding the applicant
B being a bonafide resident of U.T. Chandigarh for at least three years
on the date of submitting the application or of his being a domicile
of U.T. Chandigarh shall not apply to the following categories of
persons:
)
(i) Defence/Ex-defece personal including pensioners belonging to
c the defence forces; and
(ii) employees of the Government of India, Punjab Government,
Haryana Government and the U.T. Administration and then Boards/
Corporation and undettaking]
(iiI) Retired employees including pensioners of Government of India.
D Punjab Government, Haryana Government and Union Territory
Administration and their Boards/Corporation/Undertakings.]
(2) The applicant shall furnish an affidavit in the prescrinbed· form
with regard to his eligibility along with the application. In the
event of the affidavit being found false at any stage, the Board
E shall be entitled to cancel the registration or the allotment of
dwelling unit of flat as the case may be, and to forfeit the deposit
r.ecieved with the application and all the payment made t the
Board thereafter... "

F I0. The relevant provision/stipulating conditions of eligibility as stated
• in the Brochure reads as under:

"The applicant should not have acquired a housee/residential site
anywhere in India through Governmert/Semi-Government/Municuipal
Committee/Corporation/Improvement Trust at concessional rate i.e. at
reserved/fixed price. in his/her own name or in the name of any
G
dependent member of his/h.er family."

11. Right to acquire a property 11lthough is not a fundamentalright, but
is a constitutional and human right. Before a person can be deprived of his
right to acquire property, the law and/or a contract must expressly and
''"ity states so.
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARDv DEVJNDERSINGH [S.8 SINHA,l] J05 5
12. Regulations( 6) of the Regulations is in two parts. The First Part A
• )
deals with a bar on allotment of a dwelling unit or a flat in favour of such
a person who or his wife/her husband or any of his/her dependent relations
including unmarried children does not own any free-hold or lease hold or on
hire purchase basis, a residential plot or house in the Union Territory of
Chandigarh. The Second Part of Regulation (6) takes within its purview a B
restiction on allotment to such persons who have acquired a house/residential
site anywhere in India through Government/Semi-Government/Municipal
Committee, Improvement Trust at consessional rate in their name or in the
name of any of their dependents. Besides, the applicant not also fulfill other
condition.

13. The purport and object for imposition of such drastic restriction on
c
acquisition of property by a person of more than one house or a dwelling unit,
appears to serve the purpose of allotment of a house by the Housing Board
in question. It is obligatory on the part of the applicant to be an ordinary
resisdent of Chandigarh.
D
14. Res~ondent were allotted a flat by the 'AWHO' a society registered
under the Socities Registration Act. It is indisputably not a Government or
1
Semi-Government organisation. It indisputably, does not come within the
purview of the other terms specified therein.

15. The status of a member vis-a-vis a Cooperative Society came for E
consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Daman Singh and
Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1985) 2 SCC 670, wherupon Ms. Issar,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant, places strong reliance. The
question which arose for consideration therein was the validity of certain
provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act providing for compulsory
amalgamation of Cooperative Societies. The issue with which this Court was F
concerned, keeping in view the difference of opinion rendered by different
High Courts, was as to whether for the purpose of amalgamation of such
Cooperative Societies, Individual members of Cooperative Societies are required
to be h~ard. Dealing with the defination of term 'Corporation'; this Court
while holding that it would be so and in that view of the matter a member of G
the Cooperative Society has no independent existence apart from the Socities
,_;
stated as under:

"11.. ... He argued that in the absence of any provision, the rules
of natural Justice may be read into the provisions and notice to the
members of the affected societies was imperative. Otherwise, he argued, H
1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 3 S.C.R.

A members of one society would be formed against their will and without
being heard to associate themselves with members of another society.
We have no hesitation in rejecting this submission also. Once a
person becomes a member of a Coopearive Society, he losus his
individuality qua the society and he has no independent rights expect
those given to him by the statute and the by-laws. he must act and
B speak through the society or rather, the society alone can act and
speak for him qua rights or duties of the society as a body. So if the
statute which authorities compulsory amagamation of Cooperative
societies provides for notice to the socities concerned, the
requirements of natural justice is fully satisfied, The notice to the
c society will be deemed as notice to all its members.... "

16. Yet again in State of UP. and Anr. v. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees'
Cooperative Society and Ors., [1997) 3 SCC 681, Daman Singh (Supra) was
followed wherein validity of certain provisons and the rules framed under the
U.P. Cooperative Socities Act, 1965 were in question. In that context, it was
D held as under:
y
"16. Thus, it is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right
under I9(l)(c) to become a member of a Cooperative Society. His right
is governed by the provisions of the statute. So, the right to become
or to continue being a member of the society is a statutory right. On
E fulfilment of the qualfications prescribed to become a member and for
being a member of the society and on admission, he become member
and for being a member of the society is subject to the operation of
the Ac,t rules and bye-laws applicable from time to time. A member
of the society has no independent right qua the society and it is the
' society that is entitled to represent as the corporate aggregate. No
F
individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionlity of the
_ ~,ovisio~ of th~J\:cat;.._~!es and the bye-laws as he has his right
_ ,. 'Ii-· und-er' the..tfit,ruli,~nd- the ~ye-laws and is subject to its operation.
--.'"': T1 stream:canno11i5~h€r than the source."
. - ,,
• - 1 ...,,,- . .

"·'\:r- 17. It ir,' thus, one thing to say that a mt:mber of a society has no
independent status so as to acquire a higher right than the society itself or
for the purpose of questtioning the validity or constitutionality of the
provisions of the Cooperative Society Act or the rules, it does not have· any -
independent locus to maintain a action, but it is antoher thing to say that
altough a person acquires a right of property by reason of allotment made by
H another juristic person, namely, a Corporation, he can be deprived therefrom
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARDr. DEVIN DER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 1057
,;.
" by reason of a clause of the nature with which we are concerned. Status of A
a member qua Society and his relationship as an allottee under a statutory
orgainisation stands on different footings. One deals with his rights qua the
Society and other with his right qua another organisation. In the first case,
he exercise a limited right, in the second there wou Id be no such restriction.
In a given case if a allotment is made by different authorities in the same area,
matter may have to be considered differently.
B

18. We have noticed, hereinbefore, that Regulation (6) is in two parts.
We are only concerned with the second part in fact before the High Court
as also before us the learned counsel for the parties referred only to the
second part of the said Regulation which has been reproduced in the Brochure
and has been noticed by us hereinbefore.
c
19. We would deal with the principal contention raised by the learned
counsel a little later but at this Stage, we may notice the decisions of this
Court upon which strong reliance has been placed by Ms. Issar.
D
20. In Chandigarh Housing Board and Anr. v. Narinder Kaur Mako!,
[2000] 6 SCC 415, this Court was concerned with the case where a husband,
an allottee, although was allotted a plot for commercial purposes, he, in fact,
used the same for residential purpose. In that situation, a question arose as
to whether a residential plot by the same Housing Board could be allotted in
favour of his wife. In the fact situation therein, this Court opined as under: E
"12. In our opinion, in view of the admitted fact that there is a
residential flat on the second and third floors of the ground floor
commercial plot, it must necessarily be held that the husband o.f the
).. respondent owned a residential house within the territory in question
and that therefore the respondent wife of the first allottee is not F
eligible for allotment of another residential plot from . the said authority.
It must be realised that these plots are allotted on concessional basis
to the allottees by the public authority and the relevant regulations
must therefore be interpreted in fi.UCh a manner as to save (sic serve)
their real purpose so that the plots are available. as· far as possible,. G
...J
to the largest number of person. and for preventing the same family
members, husband or wife or dependants, as the case may be, from
getting more than one plot or house, for the same purpose. We are
of the view that the words 'residential house' in Regulation 6( 1) must
be treated as including a flat constructed above the commercial flat
H
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

A on the ground floor. This will be so even if originally the plot was
allotted for commercial purposes, if incidentally construction of
residential flat above the ground floor commercial plot is permitted as
per the plans. In other words, even though the plot is allotted as a
commercial plot, if it is permissable to build a residential flat above the
commercial plot, and is so constructed, then such a residential flat will
B come within the prohibition in Regulation6( 1)."

21. As we have noticed hereinbefore that Regulation (6) is in two parts
and this Court was concerned therin with the first part of the said Regulation
,.
and thus, in our opinio, the said decision will have no application in the
instant case. Both parts of the said regulation seek to achieve different
c purposes.

22. Reliance has also been placed on Harsh Vardhan Bansal v.
Chandigarh Housing Board and Anr., [2006] 9 SCC 708, where a judgment
of the High Court upholding an order of cancellation of a dwelling unit and/
D or flat in favour of the respondent therein was not interfered with by this
Com1 on the premises that the same had substantially been worked out
stating as under:

"5. Learned counsel for the respondent Board submitted that though
clauses XI of the Chandigarh Housing Board (Allotment, Management
E and Sale of Tenements) Regulations, 1979 enable the Board to cancel
the registration of the dwelling unit or the flat and to forrfeit the
deposit recieved with the application and all the payments made to the
Board !hereinafter, the respondent pursuant to the order passed by
this Court on 12.7.2004 refunded Rs. 8,06,441. As already noticed, a
sum of Rs. I 0 lakhs and odd was deposited and the Housing Board
F has now refunded a sum of Rs. 8 lakhs and odd even though they
~

are entitled to forfeit the entire deposit made. Now that a major
portion of the amount has already been refunded to the appellant, we
do not propose to go into the merits of the rival claims or the
correctness of the order passed by the High Court or the cancellation
G order passed by the Housing Board. We also make it clear that any
._
observation made in the show-cause notice or in the order passed by
the High Court will not affect the career of the appellant herein since,
as argued and accepted by us, the appellant has furnished all the
details in the application form for registration on a bona fide belief
and impression."
H
- )
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARDr. DEVINDERSINGH [S.B. SINHA. J.]

23. No law has, thus, been laid down therein. The rival contentions of
the parties had not been considered. No determination on the lis was made.
\ 059

A

No reason in support of any of the ovservations was assigned. The said
decision, therefore, does not constitute any precedent far less binding
precedent.

24. Before us, the Housing Scheme of the' AWHO' has been placed by B
Ms. Issar, learned counsel for showing that the same had been constituted
for promoting housing schemes under its own care, and arragements or
acquire for its members houses under the schemes already in operation in
public sector. i.e. Government or Quasi Government agencies under the control
of either the Central or State Govemment(s). The economy in land cost was C
to be made by advance planning and acquisition of land at concessional rates
through goverment and other agencies. It is to function at no loss and no
profits venture.

. 25. Our attention in particular has been drawn to the Form of Declaration
which is required to be made by an allottee which is in the following terms: D
" ... It is certified that I do not have residential house in full or in
part or lease hold or free hold basis in any urba1n area either in my
name or in the name of my wife/husband or any of my dependent
relation including unmarried children".
E
26. We will assume that the Scheme framed by the 'A WHO' was to
obtain lands either through its own efforts or from the Government or Semi-
Government organisations so as to enable it to con:struct houses for the
retired army personnel. The declaration, however, which is required to be
given by a Member of the Society must be held to h:ave application which
the Scheme seekss to achieve. It applies only when the conditions to allotment F
are required to be complied with. It does not prohibit any future acquisition.
If any declaration is made, which may subsequently be found to be false, the
Society may or may not proceed against the al\ottee. 'If it does, it again must
be confined only to a situation arising within the four comers of the said
Scheme.
G
27. Keeping in view the settled principles of interpretation of deed/
Statute, we are of the opinion that the condition of eligibility in question must
be construed literally. if a plain meaning can be given effect to there is no
reason why should not be applied. The Court would not take recourse to any
other principle of interpretation when it is not necessary. H
A
1060
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007) 3 S.C.R.

28. A plain reading thereof indicates that the same consists of the
following ingredients:
-
(I) The Applicant should not have acquired a house/residential site
anywhere in India:
(2) Su'ch acquisition must be through Government/Semi Government/
B Municipal Committee/Corporation/Improvement Trust.
(3) Such acquisition must be at a concessional rate i.e. at reserved/
fixed price.
(4) Such acquisition may be in own name or in the name of any
C dependent members of his/her family.

29. Ms. lssar, learned counsel submits that the word 'through' must be
given its ddue meaning in construction of the eligibilty conditions and in view
of the fact thai some allotment at concessional rate had been made by the
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development to the Societies. Respondents
D being part of the' Society would come within the purview of the said restriction.
30. We are unable to accept the said submission. The word 'through'
in this context would imply 'agency' Thus only when a person acquires some
property through the 'agency' specifically mentioned therein, the condition
of eligibility which, it will be a repetition to state, impose a restriction on a
E valuable right of'a citizens must be held to be applicable and not otherwise.

3 I. Acquisit1on of any property through any other source or through
any other agency 'is not prohibited. Right to acquire property is a human
right. A deed must be construed reasonably and in its entirty. If acquisition
F of any property through any agency other than specified therin is not
prohibited, evidentty, the restriction clause in the condition of eligibility will
have no application. The same, in our. opinion, must be construed strictly. A
clause impinging the right of a citizen must, in our opinion, recieve strict
construction and the principle of contextual interpretation will have no
application in such Ia case.
G
32. The High 'Court, in our opinion, has rightly answered the question
in its judgment.

33. The Housing Board being a statutory organisation and having a
regulation making power, could have made an explicit provisions if it intended
H
- )
CHANDIGARH HOUSING BOARDv. DEVINDERSINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 106]
to put such a restriction on the right of a citizens to acquire immovable
property as has been sought to be canvassed before us by Ms. lssar, learned
A

counsel and it would be free to do so. For the views we have taken, it is not
necessary to deal with the second contention of Mr. Ganguli, learned counsel.

34. For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The
appeal is dismissed. B
KKT. Appeal dismissed.

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