CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANOTHERversusJASMINE KAUR & OTHERS

                        [2014] 9 S.C.R. 1122


A         CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION & ANOTHER
                                  v.
                     JASMINE KAUR & OTHERS
               (Civil Appeal Nos.8377-8378 of 2014)
                       SEPTEMBER 01, 2014
B
        [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA AND
                 SHIVA KIRTI SINGH, JJ.]

         Education - MBBS course - Admission - Eligibility -
C   NRI Category quota - Prospectus issued by appellants
    challenged by respondent on ground that she being a
    Canadian Citizen was an NRI, that, therefore, she was entitled
    to seek admission to the MBBS course in the NRI category
    quota but yet the definition of NRI as specified in the
D   prospectus would denude her of such status and, therefdre, it
    was liable to be struck down - Entitlement to relief - Held:
    There was total lack of diligence on the part of respondent in
    her decision to work out her remedies in the Court of law - In
    such of those cases where the Court or Board is not in a
E   position to grant relief within the time schedule due to fault
    attributable to the candidate concerned, like the case on
    hand, there should be no hesitation to deny the relief as was
    done by the Single Judge of High Court - Ultimate direction
    of the Division Bench of the High Court in having directed the
F   appellants to provide admission to respondent without her
    participation in the admission process and thereby causing
    prejudice to the rightful claims of the candidates who validly
    made their applications cannot be countenanced as that would
    amount to setting up a bad precedent in all future cases - If
G   the direction of Division Bench is allowed to operate, it would
    amount to paying a premium for respondent's inexplicable
    delay in working out her remedies.

        Equity - Entitlement to equitable relief - Conduct of the

H                                1122
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1123


party - Inexplicable delay in working out remedies - Effect     A
of.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court

     HELD:1.1. The contesting Respondent knew full well
when the prospectus was issued in April 2013 that she           B
did not fulfill the criteria for making an application under
the first category of NRI quota as prescribed in paragraph
2 of the prospectus. But yet there was no immediate
challenge to the said provision before the High Court.
There was total lack of diligence on the part of the            c
contesting Respondent in her decision to work out her
remedies in the Court of law. [Para 33] [1149-D-E]

     1.2. The prospectus which was issued in April, 2013
and the offending clause in the prospectus was not              D
challenged promptly while knowing full well that under
the said clause the candidate was not eligible, but yet for
reason best known to the respondent, an application was
filed and that too three days prior to the last date notified
for submission of such application. There was no reason,
                                                                E
much less justifiable reason, for not challenging the
relevant clause before the filing of the application. There
was no reason for the contesting Respondent to wait for
any reply from the Chandigarh Administration. After the
order of the Single Judge also, the contesting
Respondent took her own time to approach the Division           F
Bench for preferring the Letters Patent Appeal. A
cumulative effect of the conduct of the contesting
Respondent has only resulted in disentitling her to claim
any equitable relief prejudicial to the interest of other
eligible candidates of the year 2014-15 and whose rights        G
came to be crystallized based on the process of selection
made for the academic year 2014-15. If the direction of the
Division Bench in the above stated background is
allowed to operate, it would amount to paying a premium
for the contesting Respondent's inexplicable delay in           H
    1124   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A working out her remedies. Such a recalcitrant attitude
  displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be
  encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other
  candidates for the year 2014-15 against whom the
  contesting Respondent had no axe to grind. [Paras 39,
B 40] [1154-D-H; 1115-A-B]

       1.3. Unless claims of exceptional nature are brought
  before the Court within the time schedule fixed by this
  Court, Court or Board should not pass orders for granting
  admission into any particular course out of time. In such
C of those cases where the Court or Board is not in a
  position to grant the relief within the time schedule due to
  the fault attributable to the candidate concerned, like the
  case on hand, there.should be no hesitation to deny the
  relief as was done by the Single Judge. If for any reason,
D such grant of relief is not possible within the time schedule,
  due to reasons attributable to other parties, and such
  reasons are found to be deliberate or ma/a fide the Court
  should only consider any other relief other than direction
  for admission, such as compensation, etc. In such
E situations, the Court should ensure that those who were
  at fault are appropriately proceeded against and punished
  in order to ensure that such deliberate or malicious acts
  do not recur. [Para 38] [1153-E-H; 1154-A-B]

F     1.4. The ultimate direction of the Division Bench of
  the High Court in having directed the Chandigarh
  Administration and the Government Medical College to
  provide admission to the contesting Respondent without
  her participation in the admissio11 process of the year
G 2014-15 and thereby causing prejudice to the rightful
  claims of the candidates who validly made their
  applic~tions in the said academic year cannot be
  countenanced as that would amount to setting up a bad
  precedent in all future cases. [Para 37] [1153-C-D]

H       Asha v. PT. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1125


and others 2012 (7) sec 389: 2012 (6) SCR 876 and Priya A
Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh and others (2012) 7 SCC 433:
2012 (5) SCR 768; Parmender Kumar and others v. State
of Haryana and others (2012) 1 sec 177: 2011 (14)
 SCR 1065; Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & K and
others (1995) 3 SCC 486: 1995 (1) SCR 908; Ramana B
Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and
others (1979) 3 SCC 489: 1979 (3) SCR 1014; Dr. /ndu Kant
v. State of U. P. and others (1993) Suppl. (2) SCC 71; Rajiv
Kapoor and others v. State of Haryana and others (2000) 9
SCC 115: 2000 (2) SCR 629; Aneesh D. Lawande and C
others v. State of Goa and others (2014) 1 SCC 554; Subhash
Chandra and another v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection
Board and others (2009) 15 SCC 458: 2009 (12) SCR 978;
Faiza Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and
another (2012) 10 sec 149: 2012 (7) SCR 528; Shafali
Nandwani v. State of Haryana and others (2002) 8 SCC 152: D
  2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 548 Bhawna Garg & another v.
University of Delhi & others (2012) 8 SCALE 504;
Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax Officer,
Special Circle, Kanpur and another (1965) 3 SCR 536; State
of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and others (2013) 5 sec 1; Miss E
Neelima Shangla, PH.D. Candidate v. State of Haryana and
others (1986) 4 SCC 268: 1986 (3) SCR 785; Haryana
Urban Development Authority and others v. Sunita Rekhi
(1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 169; Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh
Kumar Shukla and others (1986) Suppl. SCC 285: 1986 F
 SCR 855 ; Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
Commission, Uttarakhand and others (2011) 1 SCC 150:
 2010 (12) SCR 944; K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and
others (2009) 5 SCC 515: 2009 (5) SCR 89; Dhananjay
Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal and others (2008) 4 G
SCC 171: 2008 (3) SCR 1035; Chandra Prakash Tiwari and
others v. Shankunta/a Shukla and others (2002) 6 SCC 127:
2002 (3) SCR 948 and Nee/u Arora (Ms) and another v.
Union of India and others (2003) 3 SCC 366: 2003 (1) SCR
562 - referred to.                                             H
    1126   SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A                       Case Law Reference:
     2012 (6) SCR876            referred to        Para 6
     2012 (5) SCR 768           referred to        Para 6
     2011 (14) SCR 1065         referred to        Para 12
B
     1995 (1) SCR 908           referred to        Para 12
     1979 (3) SCR 1014          referred to        Para 12
     (1993) Suppl. (2) sec 71   referred to        Para 12
c    2000 (2) SCR 629           referred to        Para 12
     (2014) 1 sec 554           referred to        Para 12
     2009 (12) SCR 978          referred to        Para 12
D    2012 (7) SCR 528           referred to        Para 14
     2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 548 referred to           Para 14
     (2012) 8 SCALE 504         referred to        Para 14

E    (1965) 3 SCR 536           referred to        Para 14
     (2013) 5 sec 1             referred to        Para 14
     1986 (3) SCR 785           referred to        Para 14
     (1989) Suppl. 2 sec 169    referred to        Para 14
F
     1986 SCR 855               referred to        Para 17
     2010 (12) SCR 944          referred to        Para 17
     2009 (5) SCR89             referred to        Para 17
G    2008 (3) SCR 1035          referred to        Para 17
     2002 (3) SCR 948           referred to        Para 17
     2003 (1) SCR 562           referred to        Para 21

H
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1127


    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.             A
8377-8378 of 2014.

     From the Jugment & Order dated 13.01.2014 in LPA. No.
2051/2013, 21.02.2014 in RA No. 9/2014 in LPA 2051/2013
of by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh.          B

                           WITH

C.A. No. 8376 of 2014.

    Nidhesh Gupta, Tarun Gupta, Shubham Bhalla, Ritesh           c
Khatri for the Appellants.

     Guru Krishna Kumar, Narender Hooda, Pradeep Dahiya
(for Sheil Sethi), Banc Deswal (for Kamal Mohan Gupta),
Gaurav Sharma, Amandeep Kaur, Ashok Mahajan for the
Respondents.                                                     D

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. Leave
granted.
                                                                 E
    2. These appeals have been preferred against the orders
passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court at Chandigarh in LPA No.2051 of 2013 dated
13.01.2014 and C.M. No.623 of 2014 in RA No.9 of 2014 in
LPA No.2051 of 2013. The Appellants in SLP(C) No.18137-          F
18138 of 2014 are the Chandigarh Administration and the
Government Medical College & Hospital, Chandigarh. The
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 has filed the Special
Leave Petition with the permission of this Court, who was not
a party, either before the Single Judge or before the Division   G
Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

    3. Leave to file Special Leave Petition was granted in
SLP(C) No.18099/2014 considering the grievances expressed
by the said Appellant contending that in the event of the
                                                                 H
    1128    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   impugned orders of the Division Bench being implemented, her
    chance of getting admission to the course of M.B.B.S. for the
    academic year 2014-15 under the Non-Resident Indian (NRI)
    category would be impinged.

B       4. The present impugned orders of the Division Bench
   came to be passed at the instance of the contesting
   Respondent in both the Civil Appeals who was really aggrieved
   of a clause in the prospectus issued by the Appellants in
   SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014 (hereinafter called "the
   Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical
C College Chandigarh"), which according to her was not valid.
   According to the contesting Respondent, she being a Canadian
   Citizen is an NRI, that, therefore, she was entitled to seek
   admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the NRI category quota but
   yet the definition of NRI as specified in the prospectus issued
D, by the Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical
   College, Chandigarh for the academic year 2014-15 would
   denude her of such status and, therefore, it was liable to be
   struck down. The said definition, which was contained in
   paragraph 2 of the prospectus of 2013-14, was as under:
E
        "2. Eligibility and Merit for NRI seats (03 Seats) for
        MBBS Course:

        In addition to the general conditions above, under the
        NRI Category 03 seats shall be filled up as per
F       preference order of Category 1 and 2, given as under:-

        First preference will be given to those NRI candidates who
        have ancestral background of Chandigarh (Category 1):

G       For ancestral background of Chandigarh, the
        grandparents/parents of the candidates should be
        resident of Chandigarh for a minimum period of 5 years
        at anytime since the origin of Chandigarh and should
        have immovable property in his/her name in Chandigarh
        for the last at least 5 years. A certificate to this effect is
H
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1129
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
    required from DC-cum-Estate Officer or Municipal                 A
    Corporation of Chandigarh.

    Second preferenc~ will be given to those NRI candidates
    who have ancestral background of States/UTs other than
    UT Chandigarh (Category 2). A certificate regarding
                                                                     8
    ancestral background of the other State/UT from the
    competent authority is to be submitted in case of students
    with ancestral background of °'ther States!UTs.

    There will be no separate test/entrance test for the
    candidates applying for NRl/Foreign Indian Student. C
    These candidates will have to obtain the eligibility &
    equivalence certificate for their qualifying examination
    from the Punjab University, Chandigar~: (as mentioned
    in general condition point no.f)"
                                                                     D
      5. The contesting Respondent claimed that her grand-
father retired as an Under Secretary in the year 1994, that when
he was in the services of the State of Chandigarh he resided
in a Government house from 1965 to 1984 and shifted to
another Government accommodation provided by the
Chandigarh Administration from 1984 to 1994, that third set of       E
government accommodation was provided by the Government
to the father of the contesting Respondent which was occupied
till December 2003 and that thereafter, her father started living
in the house of her grandfather in Mohali. The contesting
Respondent claimed that she passed as a regular student from         F
Mohali, that the prescription contained. in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus providing for eligibility and merit for NRI seats for
M.B.B.S. course stipulating that the grandparents/parents of the
candidates should be resident of Chandigarh for a minimum
period of 5 years at any time since the origin of Chandigarh         G
and should have immovable property in his/her name in
Chandigarh for the last at least 5 years and a certificate to that
effect issued by DC- cum-Estate Officer or Municipal
Corporation of Chandigarh was not valid. It was on that footing
that a challenge came to be made by the contesting                   H
    1130    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2014] 9 S.C.R.


A Respondent in the High Court in CWP No.14320 of 2013
  (O&M). The learned Single Judge by order dated27.09.2013
  held that the impugned clause was totally impracticable, illegal,
  illogical and declared as such. However, the learned Single
  Judge went further into the question as to whether the contesting
B Respondent can be granted admission at that stage when she
  was already admitted into the B.D.S course in Chandigarh itself
  and that when the contesting Respondent did not challenge the
  eligibility criteria before submitting her application for the
  M.B.B.S. course, ultimately held that the contesting Respondent
C was not entitled to any relief for getting admission into M.B.B.S.
  course.

        6. The order of the learned Single Judge was not
  challenged by the Chandigarh Administration or the Government
  Medical College of Chandigarh. The contesting Respondent
D filed Letters Patent Appeal in LPA No.2051 of 2013 as against
  that part of _the judgment by which she was denied admission
  to the M.B.B.S. course. The Division Bench by its Order dated
  13.01.2014 held that when once the definition clause of NRI
  was found to be invalid by the learned Single Judge, the
E contesting Respondent ought to have been granted admission
  into M.B.B.S. course. By the time the Division Bench passed
  its order on 13.01.2014, since the process of admission to th
   M.B.B.S. course had already come to an end and all seats were
  filled up, th
F
         Division Bench held that in order to do substant
  ve justice to the contesting Respondent and at the same time withe
  t causing any disadvantage to the already admitted candidates
  under the NRI category held that the contesting Respo
  dent should, however, be held to be entitled to admission in t
G e M.B.B.S. course without displacing any other candidate by stati
  g that such admission should be granted even if it required c
  eation of an additional seat and a direction to that effect was
  accordingly made.

H
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1131
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
     7. A review was filed at the instance of the Chandigarh        A
Administration contending that when the administration took
steps to implement the direction of the Division Bench by
approaching the Medical Council of India (MCI) for creating an
additional seat, the said requisition of the administration was
turned down by the MCI and, therefore, it was not in a position     B
to accommodate the contesting Respgooent. The Chandigarh
Administration, therefore, sought for review of the order of the
Division Bench, insofar as it related to the grant of admission
to the contesting Respondent by creating an additional seat.

     8. The Division Bench realizing the predicament in which       C
the Chandigarh Administration was placed, felt that the case
of the contesting Respondent was a rarest of rare one in which
the relief of admission to the M.B.B.S. course should be
provided to her by relying upon the decisions of this Court in
Asha v. PT. B.D. Sharma University of Health Sciences               D
and others reported in 2012 (7) sec 389 and Priya Gupta
v. State of Chhattisgarh and others reported in (2012) 7
SCC 433 and directed that the contesting Respondent be
accommodated in the academic session 2014-15 instead of
2013-14, with a condition that she should pursue her M.B.B.S.       E
course right from the beginning without claiming any advantage
of the course which she undertook in the B.D.S. in the year
2013-14. The Division Bench was conscious of the fact that by
issuing such a direction to be implemented in the academic
session 2014-15, it would result in reduction of one seat for the   F
applicants of that Academic Session under the NRI category.

     9. The Chandigarh Administration and the Government
Medical College, Chandigarh were aggrieved by the said
direction and preferred SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014. The G
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 was aggrieved
inasmuch as she is an applicant of the Academic Session
2014-2015 and but for the direction issued by the Division
Bench under the impugned order dated 21.02.2014, she would
get the admission in the M.B.B.S. course, as she is ranked in . H
    1132    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A the sixth place. Because of the admission of the contesting
  Respondent by way of implementation of the order of the
  Division Bench, the said Appellant has been deprived of the
  seat.

B        10. One other candidate who got himself impleaded in I.A.
    Nos.2-3 of 2014 who supported the stand of the Appellant in
    SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 is in the fifth place of the merit list
    of NRI category. According to the said newly added
    Respondent, after the decision of the Division Bench dated
    21.02.2014, a corrigendum came to be issued by the
C   Chandigarh Administration wherein a provision has been made
    to the effect that one NRI seat is reserved for Scheduled Caste
    NRI and that if it could not be filled up by a Scheduled Caste
    NRI, then only the said seat would revert to the Scheduled Caste
    Union Territory Resident Pool. The grievance of the said
D   impleaded Respondent is that if the said corrigendum is given
    effect to, the total number of seats under NRI quota for the open
    category would get reduced to five and as a sequel to it, the
    implementation of the direction of the Division Bench under the
    orders impugned in these appeals would directly affect the said
E   newly added Respondent. It is, however, submitted that the said
    newly added Respondent has challenged the corrigendum
    issued on 19.06.2014 before the High Court and that the same
    has also been stayed by the High Court by order dated
    09.07.2014. It is further submitted that after granting stay, the
F   High Court also issued directions for the admission of newly
    added Respondent as per the list of successful candidates
    declared in the proceedings of the Chandigarh Administration
    and the Government Medical College, Chandigarh dated
    23.06.2014, in which the name of the said impleaded
G   Respondent found place at serial No.5.

       11. In the above stated background, we heard Mr. Nidhesh
  Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C)
  No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Shubham Bhalla, learned Counsel for
H the Appellant in SLP(C) Nos.18137-18138 of 2014, Mr. Guru
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1133
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
Krishna Kumar, Senior Counsel for the contesting Respondent      A
in SLP(C) No.18137-18138 of 2014 & Respondent No.4 in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014, Mr. Narender Hooda, learned
Senior Counsel for Respondent No.2 in SLP(C) Nos.18137-
18138 of 2014 & Respondent No.5 in SLP(C) No.18099 of
2014, Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate-on-Record (AOR) for MCI        B
and Mr. Ashok Mahajan, AOR for the newly impleaded
Respondents.

       12. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 prefaced his
submissions by referring to the belated point of time at which C
the contesting Respondent approached the High Court seeking
for the relief and, therefore, even though the learned Single
Judge held that the condition prescribed in paragraph 2 of the
prospectus for the first category of NRI quota was invalid, the
relief was not rightly granted. In fact, the entire submission of D
learned Senior Counsel was mainly premised on the belated
approach of the contesting Respondent in seeking for the relief
and that to knowing full well that she was not entitled to seek
for admission under the first category of NRI. Based on the
 above submission, the learned Senior Counsel by relying upon E
various decisions of this Court contended that the principles
 laid down in those decisions certainly did not entitle the
 contesting Respondent to get any admission out of turn either
 in the relevant year in which she applied, namely, 2013-14 or
 in the academic session 2014-15. According to the learned F
 Senior Counsel, when the contesting Respondent knew full well
 that she did not satisfy the criteria prescribed in relation to
 category I of NRI quota as stipulated in paragraph 2 of the
 prospectus, which was published in April 2013, for no
 comprehensible reason she waited almost till the last date for G
 filing the application, whereas in actuality, to challenge the
 stipulation contained in the said paragraph on the ground of
 invalidity, there was no necessity to file the application nor wait
 for any response from the Chandigarh Administration or the
 Government Medical College. The contention of the learned H
    1134    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   Senior Counsel was on the footing that since the contesting
    Respondent did not display the required promptness in
    approaching the Court, the various decisions of this Court by
    which it has laid down that the schedule relating to admission
    to the professional colleges, should be strictly adhered to and
B   should not be deviated under any circumstances had to be
    scrupulously followed, which thereby persuaded the learned
    Single Judge not to grant the relief of admission to the college
    after 30.09.2013. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
    contended that this was not a case where any of the situations
c   wherein admission to a candidate was directed to be given for
    certain stated reasons by this Court after the expiry of the
    prescribed admission scheduled or for any admission whicli
    was directed to be given in the subsequent academi~,year
    could be followed. In other words, the learned Senior Counsel
    contended that there was no exceptional circumstance th;:it was
0
    existing in the case of the contesting respondent in order to
    deviate from the schedule fixed in the matter of admission to
    the professional courses, which was time and again directed
    to be adhered to scrupulously by this Court without any
    deviation. In support of the above submissions learned Senior
E   Counsel relied upon the decisions in Parmender Kumar and
    others v. State of Haryana and others - (2012) 1 SCC 177,
     Madan Lal and Others v. State of J & Kand others - (1995)
    3 SCC 486, Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
    Airport Authority of India and others - (1979) 3 SCC 489,
F    Dr. lndu Kant v. State of U.P. and others - (1993) Suppl.
     (2) SCC 71, Asha (supra), Rajiv Kapoor and others v.
    State of Haryana and others - (2000) 9 SCC 115, Aneesh
     D. Lawande and others v. State of Goa and others - (2014)
     1 SCC 554, Subhash Chandra and another v. Delhi
G    Subordinate Services Selection Board and others - (2009)
     15 sec 458.

      13. As against the above submissions, Mr. Guru Krishna
  Kumar, learned Senior Counsel who ,appeared for the
H contesting Respondent in his submissions contended that the
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1135
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
direction of the Division Bench of the High Court has to be A
considered in light of the prindple of moulding of the relief when
 injustice was found. According to him, a distinction must be
 drawn in the peculiar undisputed facts of this case wherein, the
 challenge made by the contesting Respondent was held to be
 valid in so far as the prescription of the condition to seek B
 admission under the first category of NRI quota and, therefore,
when the learned Single Judge failed to grant the relief, the
 Division Bench took into account the extraordinary
 circumstance which" was prevailing in the interest of justice and
 gave the directions without causing any prejudice to other c
 candidates of the relevant academic year, as well as, in the
 present academic year where the merit of ttie contesting
 Respondent was far superior to the candidates who have been
 enlisted for admission under NRI quota of the first category. It
 was then submitted that while issuing such directions, the D
  Division Bench ensured that there was no carry forward nor any
 telescoping into the seats of the subsequent year. The learned
  Senior Counsel submitted that the question of telescoping
 would arise only if the unfilled seats of the previous year are to
  be accommodated in the subsequent year and that in the case
  on hand, it did not relate to any unfilled seat of the previous year E
  and, therefore, the direction of the Division Bench cannot be
  held to fall under the category of telescoping into the seats of
  the subsequent year. The learned Senior Counsel contended
  that the same principle will apply even to the carry forward
  principle and, therefore, when none of the said allegations are F
  levelled against the contesting Respondent or directed against
  the judgment of the Division Bench, the Civil Appeal does not
. merit any consideration. The learned Senior Counsel pointed
  out that the decision of the learned Single Judge in having
  declared the relevant clause as invalid has become final and -G
  neither the Chandigarh Administration nor the Government
  Medical College or for that matter the Appellant in SLP(C)
  No.18099 of 2014 have raised any challenge. According to him,
  the only other aspect to be examined was the entitlement of the
                                                                       H
    1136    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A contesting Respondent for M.8.8.S. seat under the NRI quota
  under which category the said contesting Respondent secured
  the highest marks based on which her rank can be fixed in the
  third place in the order of merit for the year 2014-15 and,
  therefore, allotment of seat ought to have been granted without
s any hassle. The learned Senior Counsel further pointed out that
  the contesting Respondent had the benefit of her application
  to be entertained by way of an interim direction pending her
  writ petition apart from permitting her to participate in. the
  counselling, though subject to the result of the writ petition. The
c learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that when the
  substantive challenge of the contesting Respondent was
  accepted by the learned Single Judge, the only other order that
  could have been passed was to direct the Chandigarh
  Administration and the Government Medical College to
  consider the claim of the contesting Respondent on merits for
0
  the grant of the seat. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
  contended that when the learned Single Judge committed a
  grave error in not granting the relief, the Division Bench had to
  staple and issue necessary directions.

E      14. In support of the above submissions, the learned
  Senior Counsel relied upon the decisions reported in Faiza
  Choudhary v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and another
  - (2012) 10 SCC 149, Madhu Singh (supra), Shafali
  Nandwani v. State of Haryana and others - (2002) 8 SCC
F 152, Rajiv Kapoor (supra), Shawna Garg & another v.
  University of Delhi & others - (2012) 8 SCALE 504,
  Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family v. Income-Tax
  Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur and another - (1965) 3 SCR
  536, State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and others - (2013)
G 5 SCC 1, Miss Neelima Shangla, PH.D. Candidate v. State
  of Haryana and others - (1986) 4 SCC 268 and Haryana
  Urban Development Authority and others v. Sunita Rekhi
  - (1989j Suppl. 2    sec169.

        15. Having heard learned counsel for the respective
H
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1137
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IB~AHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
contesting parties, namely, the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099       A
of 2014 and the contesting Respondent in both the Civil
Appeals who is the contesting Respondent, since heavy
reliance was placed upon by both the respective counsel on
the earlier decisions of this Court to support their respective
contentions that the case of the contesting Respondent would       B
either fall under one or the other principles laid down in those
decisions or that the facts of those cases are clearly
distinguishable, we feel it appropriate to refer to the relevant
principles contained in those decisions before venturing to
express our decision as regards the correctness or otherwise       C
of the direction issued by the Division Bench in favour of the
contesting Respondent.

      16. In the decision reported in Parmender Kumar
(supra), it was held that once the process of selection of
candidates for admission had commenced on the basis of the         D
prospectus, no change could thereafter be effected by
government orders to alter the provisions contained in the
prospectus. In the decision reported in Madan Lal (supra), it
was held that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and
appears at the interview then 9nly because the result of the       E
interview is not palatable to )'fim he cannot turn around and
subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair
and the selection committee was not properly constituted. By
relying upon the above referred to decisions, the contention
raised on behalf of ~he Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014       F
was that the condftion relating to the NRI quota under the first
category was prevalent at the time when the contesting
Respondent submitted her application and having submitted
the said application and participated in the selection process,
merely because the said clause was subsequently found to be        G
not valid, would not, on that ground, validate the contesting
respondent's right to claim admission.

   17. In fact, the other decisions, namely, Om Prakash
Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla and others - (1986)
                                                                   H
    1138    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A   Suppl. SCC 285, Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service
    Commission, Uttarakhand and others - (2011) 1 SCC 150,
    K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and others - (2009) 5 SCC
    515, Dhananjay Malik and others v. State of Uttaranchal
    and others - (2008) 4 SCC 171 and Chandra Prakash
8   Tiwari and others v. Shankuntala Shukla and others -
    (2002) 6 sec 127 were all referred to by the learned Senior
    Counsel for the Appellant in SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 to show
    that the statement made in Madan Lal was relied upon in those
    decisions.

C       18. Mr. Nidhesh Gupta, learned Senior Counsel, therefore,
  contended that the effect of the directions of the Division Bench
  was that the contesting Respondent was to be admitted into
  the M.B.B.S. course in the academic year 2014-15 without
  competing with the claims of the other candidates who applied
D for the said course in the said academic year. It was also
  contended that even in the academic year 2013-14, she did
  not compete along with the other similarly placed candidates
  but was allowed to participate in the counselling pursuant to the
  interim direction issued by the learned Single Judge during the
E pendency of the writ petition and that to was subject to the
  outcome of the writ petition. The learned senior counsel,
  therefore, contended that the contesting Respondent was not
  entitled for any equitable relief. The learned Senior Counsel,
  therefore, contended that the direction of the Division Bench
F cannot be sustained.

        19. In this context, reliance was placed upon the three-
    Judge Bench decision of this Court reported in Rajiv Kapoor
    (supra), wherein in paragraph 16 this Court has held as under:

G       "16. The dispute relates to the academic session of the
        year 1997 and we are in 2000. To utilise the seats meant
        for the next academic year by accommodating those
        candidates of 1997 vintage would amount to deprivation
        of the legitimate rights of those who would be in the fray
H       of contest for selection, on the basis of their inter se merit
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1139
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

    for the session of 2000, taking into account the A
    performance of the candidates of 1997 in that year ...... "

     20. It was submitted that the selection of candidates should
be based on the inter se merits of the candidates of that year
and, therefore, entertaining the claim of a candidate who             B
applied in any previous year would cause grave injustice, as
those who were not in the fray of competence would thus be
permitted to compete with the lawfully eligible applicants of the
subsequent years, which would certainly cause serious
prejudice to those candidates.
                                                                      c
      21. To the very same effect was the decision reported in
Neelu Arora (Ms) and another v. Union of India and others
- (2003) 3 sec 366, which was also by a three Judge Bench
of this Court. The learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant in
SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014 sought to distinguish the decision            D
relied upon by the Division Bench reported in Asha (supra)
by pointing out that the said decision turns upon the special
facts of that case, where this Court reached a finding of fact
that the candidate concerned was not at fault and the whole fault
was on the authorities concerned in not allowing the said             E
candidate to participate in the counselling for admission to the
M.B.B.S. course in spite of the fact that her merit as compared
to other candidates who were granted admission was far
superior and that she approached the Court for the redressal
of her grievance at the earliest. The learned Senior Counsel          F
by drawing our attention to paragraphs 32, 34 and 37 of the
decision submitted that the said decision cannot be simply
followed as a matter of course as has been done by the Division
Bench in the case on hand. The learned Senior Counsel also
once again brought to our notice the manner in which the              G
contesting Respondent herein approached the Court, made the
application and filed the writ petition after a considerable length
of delay and thereby disentitled her to seek for any relief much
 less there was any scope for moulding the relief as had been
done by the Division Bench by the impugned order.
                                                                      H
    1140     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A        22. The recent decision of this Court reported in Aneesh
    D. Lawande (supra) was relied upon by the learned counsel
    for the Appellant wherein this Court has culled out two main
    principles to be kept in mind in such cases. In paragraph 30,
    the said principles have been laid down and in paragraph 35,
8   this Court has reiterated as to why it will not be proper to issue
    directions to adjust the students of one academic year in any
    subsequent academic year by pointing out that such a course
    would affect the other meritorious candidates who would be
    aspiring to get admissions in the subsequent years. It was
C   stated that for bringing equity to some in praesenti, this Court
    cannot afford to do injustice to others in future. The said
    paragraph 35 can be usefully referred to which reads as under:

         "35. The next submission relates to the issue whether the
         students who cannot be adjusted in the seats of All-India
D        quota that have been transferred to the State quota of this
         year can be adjusted next year. During the course of
         hearing though there was some debate with regard to
         giving of admissions to such students in the academic
         year 2014-2015, Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel for the
E        Medical Council of India, has seriously opposed the
         same and, thereafter, has cited the authorities which we
         have referred to hereinbefore. We are bound by the said
         precedents. In certain individual cases where there is
         defective counselling and merit has become a casualty,
F        this Court has directed for adjustment in the next
         academic session but in the case at hand, it is not
         exactly so. Though we are at pains. vet we must express
         that it will not be appropriate to issue directions to adiust
         them in respect of the subsequent academic year. for
G        taking recourse to the same would affect the other
         meritorious candidates who would be aspirant to get
         admissions next year. For doing equity to some in
         praesenti we cannot afford to do in;ustice to others in
         future. Therefore. the submission stands repelled."

H                                               (underlining is ours)
  CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1141
    [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
       23. The decision relied upon by the contesting Respondent        A
  reported in Faiza Choudhary (supra), rather than supporting
  the case of the said contesting Respondent only clarifies the
  legal position without any ambiguity. The principles have been
  succinctly explained in paragraphs 14 and 15 to the effect that
  there cannot be any telescoping of unfilled seats of one year         B
  with the permitted seats of the subsequent year. It was also
  highlighted that a medical seat has life only in the year it falls
  that to only till the cut-off date fixed by this Court i.e. 30th
  September in the respective year and carry forward principle
  is unknown to the professional courses like medical,                  C
· engineering, dental etc. It was also stated that there is no power
  with the Board to carry forward a vacancy to a succeeding year
  and that if the Board or the Court indulges in such an exercise,
  in the absence of any rule or regulation, that will be at the
  expense of other meritorious candidates waiting for admissions        D
  in the succeeding years. The principles laid down in the said
  decisions have to be, therefore, understood in the abovesaid
  manner and those principles can be applied to the facts of this
  case while examining the correctness of the impugned
  judgment of the Division Bench.
                                                                        E
       24. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the
 Appellant upon the decision reported in Madhu Singh (supra)
 apparently to draw our attention to the effect that even if the
 course adopted by the High Court while directing admission
 to the unfilled seats after the last scheduled date for admission,     F
 this Court directed that such admission granted to a candidate
 will not be affected even if this Court were to set at naught the
 direction given by the High Court. We do not find any ratio or
 principle t<1 be followed based on the said fact noted in
 paragraph 8 of the judgment, but in paragraph 23 this Court            G
 made it clear that a necessity for specifically providing for a time
 schedule for the course and fixing the period during which
 admissions can take place in order to ensure that no admission
 can be granted after the scheduled date, essentially should be
 the date for commencement of the course. By stating the said           H
    1142    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   principle in no uncertain terms, this Court has reiterated the
    position that there should be strict adherence to the schedule
    of dates relating to admission and there cannot be any
    deviation in adhering to the said schedule.

       25. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned Senior Counsel
B appearing for the contesting Respondent submitted that the
  direction issued by the Division Bench to admit the contesting
  respondent in the academic session 2014-15, does not in any
  way violate the principles laid down in the decision reported in
  Aneesh D. Lawande (supra) wherein, in paragraph 30 this
C Court has laid down the principles to the effect that there cannot
  be direction for increase of seats or telescoping of unfilled
  seats of one ye.~r with the permitted seats of the subsequent
  years. According to the learned Senior Counsel, by
  implementing the directions of the Division Bench, there is not
D going to be an increase of the seats for the academic session
  2013-14 and since the admission of the Respondent would be
  based on her merits in the academic session 2014-15, the
  same will not amount to telescoping of unfilled seats of the
  previous year. We will examine the correctness of the said
E submission while dealing with the respective submissions of
  the learned Senior Counsel.

       26. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the
  decision reported in Rajiv Kapoor (supra) is distinguishable
F since in that case this Court was concerned with the candidates
  of the year 1997 whose admissions were directed to be made
  in the academic session 2000. The learned Senior Counsel,
  therefore, contended that having regard to the enormous time
  gap between 1997 and 2000, the principles stated therein,
  cannot be applied to the case of the contesting Respondent.
G The learned Senior Counsel would, therefore, contend that as
  we are concerned with the case of the contesting Respondent
  whose admission related to the immediate preceding year,
  namely, 2013-14 and whose legitimate rights were unlawfully
  denied in that year, the direction for her admission in the
H
 CHANDIGARH AD~INISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1143
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFl,JLLA, J.]
immediate next academic session 2014-·15 and that to based        A
on her merits following the decision of this Court in Asha
(supra) was well justified.

     27. The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, contended that
the said decision though rendered by three Judge Bench of this    B
Court would not in any way dilute the decision in Asha (supra)
on the principles .of per incuriam where the facts of the three
Judge Bench decision are clearly distinguishable.

     28. While strongly relying upon the decision reported in
Asha (supra), the learned Senior Counsel after referring to the   C
question framed in paragraph 4(c) wherein this Court posed
the question as to-what relief the Courts can grant and to what
extent they can mould it while ensuring adherence to the rule
of merit, fairness and transparency in the matter of admission
in terms of rules and regulations, drew our attention to          D
paragraphs 25 and 32. In paragraph 25, this Court has held
as under:

     "25. Strict adherence to the time schedule has again
    been a matter of controversy before the courts. The courts E
    have consistently taken the view that the schedule is
    sacrosanct like the rule of merit and all the stakeholders
    including the authorities concerned should adhere to it
    and should in no circumstances permit its violation. This,
    in our opinion, gives rise to dual problem. Firstly, it
    jeopardizes the interest and future of the students. F
     Secondly, which is more serious, is that such action would
    be ex facie in violation of the orders of the court, and
     therefore, would invite wrath of the courts under the
    provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In this
    regard, we may appropriately refer to the judgments of G
     this Court in Priya Gupta, State of Bihar v. Sanjay Kumar
     Sinho, Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh, GSF
     Medical and Paramedical Assn. v. Assn. of Self
     Financing Technical Institutes and Christian Medical
     College v. State of Punjab."                               H
    1144     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A      29. In paragraph 32, the exceptional circumstances which
  can be examined have been quoted in order to ensure that
  when any deviation is to be made from the normal rule, such
  similar principles should be kept in mind by the Courts. In
  paragraph 32, it was highlighted that in the rarest of rare case
B or exceptional circumstances, the Courts may have to mould
  the reliefs and make an exception to the cut-off date of 30th
  September but in those cases the Court must first return a
  finding that no fault was attributable to the candidate, that the
  candidate pursued her rights and legal remedies expeditiously
C without any delay and that there was no fault on the part of the
  authorities and that there was no apparent breach of the rules,
  regulations and principles in the process of the selection-and
  grant of admission. It was also highlighted that where denial of
  admission would violate the right to equality and equal treatment
  of the candidate, it would be completely unjust and unfair to
D deny such exceptional relief to the candidate. By relying upon
  the said part of the decision, the learned Senior Counsel
  submitted that the case of the contesting Respondent was
  squarely covered by the principle of an exceptional case and,
  therefore, the direction of the Division Bench was well justified.
E The learned Senior Counsel also relied upon the decisions in
  Dwarkanath (supra) and Salil Sabhlok (supra) on the
  principle of moulding of the relief to be made. Reliance was
  placed upon the decisions in Miss Neelima Shangla (supra)
  and Haryana Urban Development Authority (supra) to
F support the stand that a candidate who approached the Court
  diligently deserved different treatment.

      30. Having noted the various decisions relied upon by the
  Appellant in SLP (C) No.18099 of 2014 and the contesting
G Respondent, we are able to discern the following principles:

           (1)   The schedule relating to admissions to the
                 professional colleges should be strictly and
                 scrupulously adhered to and shall not be deviated
                 under any circumstance either by the courts or the
H
CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1145
  [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
          Board and midstream admission should not be A
          permitted.

   (2)    Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds
          that there is no fault attributable to the candidate
          i.e., the candidate has pursued his or her legal right
                                                                  B
          expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault
          only on the part of the authorities or there is an
          apparent breach of rules and regulations as well as
          related principles in the process of grant of
          admission which would violate the right to equality
          and equal treatment to the competing candidates c
          and the relief of admission can be directed within
          the time schedule prescribed, it would be
          completely just and fair to provide exceptional
          reliefs to the candidate under such circumstance
          alone.                                                  D

    (3)   If a candidate is not selected during a particular
          academic year due to the fault of the Institutions/
          Authorities and in this process if the seats are filled
          up and the scope for granting admission is lost due E
          to eclipse of time schedule, then under such
          circumstances, the candidate should not be
          victimised for no fault of his/her and the Court may
          consider grant of appropriate compensation to
          offset the loss caused, if any.
                                                                  F
    (4)    When a candidate does not exercise or pursue
          his/her rights or legal remedies against his/her non-
          selection expeditiously and promptly, then the
          Courts cannot grant any relief to the candidate in
          the form of securing an admission.                    G
    (5)    If the candidate takes a calculated risk/chance by
          subjecting himself/herself to the selection process
          and after knowing his/her non-selection, he/she
                                                                 H
    1146     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A                cannot subsequently turn around and contend that
                 the process of selection was unfair.

           (6)   If it is found that the candidate acquiesces or waives
                 his/her right to claim relief before the Court
                 promptly, then in such cases, the legal maxim
8                vigilantibus non dormientibus aequitas subvenit,
                 which means that equity aids only the vigilant and
                 not the ones who sleep over their rights, will be
                 highly appropriate.

c          (7)   No relief can be granted even though the
                 prospectus is declared illegal or invalid if the same
                 is not challenged promptly. Once the candidate is
                 aware that he/she does not fulfil the criteria of the
                 prospectus he/she cannot be heard to state that,
D                he/she chose to challenge the same only after
                 preferring the application and after the same is
                 refused on the ground of eligibility.

           (8)   Tnere cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one
                 year with permitted seats of the subsequent year
E
                 i.e.,.:Carry forward of seats cannot be permitted how
                 much ever meritorious a candidate is and deserved
                 admission. In such circumstances, the Courts
                 cannot.grant any relief to the candidate but it is up
                 to the candidate to re-apply next academic year.
F
           (9)   There cannot be at any point of time a direction
                 given either by the Court or the Board to increase
                 the number of seats which is exclusively in the realm
                 of the Medical Council of India.
G
           (10) Each of these above mentioned principles should
                be applied based on the unique and distinguishable
                facts and circumstances of each case and no two
                cases can be l)eld to be identical.

H      31. Having culled out the above broad principles from the
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1147
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
various decisions of this Court and before examining the            A
correctness of the judgments impugned in these appeals, it is
necessary to note down certain vital facts relating to the case
of the contesting Respondent in order to find out whether there
was any scope at all for granting the relief as has been done
by the Division Bench by the impugned orders. Admittedly, the       B
contesting Respondent was not eligible under the first category
of the NRI quota prescribed under paragraph 2 of the
prospectus for academic session of 2013-14. She was,
however, eligible under the second category of NRI quota. At
this juncture, it must be stated that under the second category     C
though her name was first in the list, as the eligible candidates
in the first category got selected for all the seats under NRI
quota, she did not get the opportunity. The prospectus was
issued by the Chandigarh Administration and the Government
Medical College as early as in the month of April, 2013. The        D
contesting Respondent filed the application before the last date,
namely, 24.06.2013 claiming admission under the first category
or in the alternate, in the second category. The Chandigarh
Administration, by letter dated 02.07.2013, informed the
contesting Respondent that unless she enclosed a certificate
issued by the DC-cum-Estate Officer or Municipal Corporation        E
of Chandigarh about the fulfillment of the condition relating to
ownership of immovable property, her application cannot be
considered under the first category of NRI quota. The writ
petition was filed by her on 05.07 .2013. A list of eligible
candidates was finalized on 12.07.2013. The first counselling       F
was scheduled on 19.07.2013 insofar as NRI candidates were
concerned. There was an interim order of the High Court
passed on 29.07.2013 directing the administration to receive
the contesting Respondent's application under the first category
of NRI quota, making it clear that at a later point of time, she    G
cannot claim any equity on that basis. Subsequently, by another
order dated 08.08.2013, the High Court directed the
administration to permit her to participate in the second
counselling. The writ petition was ultimately disposed of by the
 learned Single Judge on 27.09.2013. As was noted earlier, the      H
    1148    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C ..R.


A learned Single Judge while upholding the challenge made by
  the contesting Respondent as to the validity of the condition
  imposed in order to be eligible to fall under the first category
  of NRI quota, declined to grant any relief to the contesting
  Respondent holding that she failed to challenge the eligibility
B criteria before submitting her application for M.B.B.S. course
  after taking note of the fact that she secured admission in the
  Dental course.

       32. After the learned Single Judge delivered the judgment
  on 27.09.2013, the contesting Respondent filed the Letters
C Patent Appeal on 15.11.2013 and after rectification of certain
  defects it was re-filed on 06.12.2013. The Letters Patent
  Appeal was heard by the Division Bench and was disposed
  of by order dated 13.01.2014. As the direction issued by the
  Division Bench for creation of an additional seat could not be
D complied with by the Chandigarh Administration and the
  Government Medical College on the ground that the MCI
  declined to grant permission for creation of an additional seat,
  at the instance of Chandigarh Administration, the review came
  to be filed in which the present impugned order came to be
E passed by the Division Bench on 21.02.2014.

        33. When we analyze the above sequence of events, we
  find that the contesting Respondent knew full well when the
  prospectus was issued in April 2013 that she did not fulfill the
F criteria for making an application under the first category of NRI
  quota as prescribed in paragraph 2 of the prospectus. But yet
  there was no immediate challenge to the said provision before
  the High Court. Knowing full well that she was ineligible under
  the said category after waiting almost till the last date for filing
G the application, namely, 24.06.2013, she filed the application
  on 21.06.2013 claiming admission under the first category and
  thereafter, waited till the Chandigarh Administration called upon
  her to fulfill the criteria of submitting a certificate for proof of
  ownership of immovable property by the DC-cum-Estate
  Officer, which she could not have produced even as on April,
H
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1149
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
2013. Therefore, the contesting Respondent cannot be heard A
to say that the filing of the writ petition on 05.07 .2013,
challenging the validity of the prescription contained in
paragraph 2 of the prospectus relating to the first category of
NRI quota was made diligently or atleast within a reasonable
time. When we te~t the said conduct of the contesting B
Respondent in not having approached the Court at the
appropriate time in challenging the said provision, it will have
to be stated that the Chandigarh Administration and the
Government Medical College having received the applications
for admissions for different categories including the category c
under the NRI quota was processing the applications
segregating the different categories and by the time the writ
petition filed on 05.07 .2013, the process of finalizing the eligible
candidates was also nearing completion and by 12.07.2013 the
same was also concluded. If the said factor is noted, it should D
be stated that the conduct of the contesting Respondent in
having fixed her own time limit for approaching the Court, in
particular, with reference to the challenge to the eligibility criteria
with which she had every grievance right from the very first date
when the prospectus was issued in April, 2013, it will have to E
be stated that there was total lack of diligence on the part of
the contesting Respondent in her decision to work out her
 remedies in the Court of law.

      34. Keeping the said factor in mind, when we examine the
subsequent development that had taken place, it is true that the F
relevant criteria prescribed for claiming admission under the
first category of NRI quota was held to be wholly unreasonable
and on that ground the learned Single Judge struck out the said
clause. Thereafter, since the learned Single Judge found that
there was total lack of diligence displayed on the part of the G
contesting Respondent, he expressed his inability to grant the
relief to the contesting Respondent. After the said decision was
rendered by the learned Single Judge on 27.09.2013, when we
analyze the subsequent conduct of the contesting Respondent,
we find that she applied for the copy of the judgment of the H
    1150    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 9 S.C.R.


A   learned Single Judge on 19.10.2013 and the Letters Patent
    Appeal came to be filed only on 15.11.2013. The Letters Patent
    Appeal was defective and it was re-filed only on 06.12.2013.
    Ultimately, the appeal came before the Division Bench on
    13.01.2014, when the Division Bench took the view that the
B   learned Single Judge ought to have moulded the relief and on
    that footing directed that the Chandigarh Administration to
    create a seat for admitting the contesting Respondent to the
    M.B.B.S. course. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated
    21.02.2014, the Division Bench held that when creation of the
c   seat was impossible of compliance as the MCI was not inclined
    to grant permission, issued a direction that the contesting
    Respondent should be admitted in the academic year 2014-
    15 in the NRI quota meant for admission.

        35. When we note the above dates, it will have to be
D stated that the compliance of the direction of the Division Bench
  would certainly cause serious prejudice to the Appellant in
  SLP(C) No.18099 of 2014, as the said Appellant is stated to
  have been ranked in the sixth place, i.e. in the sixth vacancy
  meant for NRI category candidates for admission for the
E academic year 2014-15. It is common ground that the
  contesting Respondent was not an applicanf for the year 2014-
  15 under the NRI category. If we consider the claim of the
  contesting Respondent as to whether her claim can be brought
  under the category of exceptional case, the various factors
F noted above, namely, failure to challenge the relevant provision
  immediately after the issuance of the prospectus in the April,
  2013 would loom large before the Court. There was no
  justifiable reason stated on behalf of the contesting Respondent
  as to why the challenge was not made promptly knowing full well
G that the said provision disentitled her to claim under the said
  category. It is needless to state that if the challenge had been
  made diligently and immediately after the issuance of the
  prospectus in April, 2013 itself, it would have enabled the Court
  to examine the said challenge at the earliest point of time and
H in the event of finding good grounds to accept the challenge,
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1151
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
there would have been no difficulty for the Court to issue             A
appropriate directions not only for accepting the application of
the contesting Respondent under the first category of NRI quota,
but in the event of her scoring the requisite marks on merits,
the grant of admission could have been worked out without
infringing the rights of any other candidate under the said            B
category. It is relevant to note that the invalidity of the relevant
clause as declared by the learned Single Judge, which has
become final and conclusive, would have benefitted all other
candidates who are similarly placed like that of the contesting
Respondent, had it been challenged at the earliest point of time,      C
as that would have provided adequate scope for considering
the relative merits of all those candidates who are similarly
placed like that of the contesting Respondent.

     36. The time gap between April, 2013 and July, 2013
nearly three months is certainly a long period as the process D
of admission to professional courses are regulated by the
Selection Authorities such as the Medical Council of India, All ·
India Council for Technical Education, National Council for
Teacher Education, State Government Authorities as well as the
concerned affiliated universities each one of whom have got E
to play their corresponding roles in regulating the admissions
and also monitoring the subsequent course of study for the
purpose of ultimately granting the degrees of successful
candidates after the completion of the course. As the process
being a continuous one, any delay in working out the remedies F
promptly will have to be viewed very seriously or otherwise the
same would impinge upon the rights of other candidates apart
from causing unnecessary administrative hardship to the
regulatory bodies. When the said factors are kept in mind while
analyzing the case on hand, it will have to be stated that even G
though the contesting Respondent was successful in her
challenge to the concerned provision relating to the NRI quota
in the prospectus of 2013-14, on that sole ground it cannot be.
held that every other factor should be kept aside and her claim
for admission to M.B.B.S. course should be ensured by issuing H
    1152    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A    directions unmindful of the infringement of rights of other
     candidates and the other statutory bodies. We are, therefore,
     of the view that the conduct of the contesting Respondent in
     having fixed her own time limit in making the challenge, namely,
     after three months of the issuance of the prospectus and
8    thereafter, in filing the Letters Patent Appeal which process
     resulted in the Division Bench in deciding the appeal only in
     the month of January, 2014 by which time the substantial part
     of the academic year had been crossed, the question remained
     as to whether the Division Bench was justified in directing the
C admission of the contesting Respondent to the M.B.B.S. course
     in the academic year 2014-15 by merely stating that she was
     already undergoing the B.D.S. course and that the course
     content of the first six months of B.D.S and M.B.B.S. are more
  '1 or less identical. Beyond that we do not find any other good

D grounds which weighed with the Division Bench in issuing the
     direction for creating an additional seat.

       37. The Division Bench did rely upon the decision of this
  Court in Asha (supra) and Priya Gupta (supra).
  Subsequently, when it came to light that the direction for
E admission by creation of an additional seat was impossible of
  compliance, the impugned order came to be issued by the
  Division Bench on 21.02.2014 by which time half of the
  academic year had almost come to an end. In our considered
  view, at least at that stage since the process of issuance of the
F prospectus for 2014-15 was on the anvil, the contesting
  Respondent ought to have been allowed to work out and claim
  under the NRI quota in the said academic year. Since by the
  order of learned Single Judge the restriction in claiming
  admission under the first category of NRI quota having been
G removed, there would have been no impediment for the
  contesting Respondent to apply under the said category and
  staked her claim along with the other competing candidates. It
  was unfortunate that the case of the contesting Respondent was
  considered to be rarest of rare case, which in our considered
H opinion, does not have the required support. As was noted by
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1153
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
us earlier, the contesting Respondent did not display due            A
diligence in making a challenge to the relevant clause relating
to first category of NRI quota of the 2013-14 prospectus.
Further, as she had already secured a seat in the Dental course
and the creation of an additional seat was consistently not
encouraged by this Court, the direction for creation of an           B
additionarseat in the month of January, 2014 for the academic
year 2014-15 by the Division Bench could not be implemented.
Therefore, the ultimate direction of the Division Bench in having
directed the Chandigarh Administration and the Government
Medical College to provide admission to the contesting               C
Respondent without her participation in the admission process
of the year 2014-15 and thereby causing prejudice to the rightful
claims of the candidates who validly made their applications
in the said academic year cannot be countenanced as that
would amount to setting up a bad precedent in all future cases.      D

     38. As time and again such instances of claiming
admission into such professional courses are brought before
the Court, and on every such occasion, reliance is placed upon
the various decisions of this Court for issuing necessary
directions for accommodating the students to various courses         E
claiming parity, we feel it appropriate to state that unless such
claims of exceptional nature are brought before the Court within
the time schedule fixed by this Court, Court or Board should
not pass orders for granting admission into any particular course
out of time. In this context, it will have to be stated that in      F
whatever earlier decisions of this Court such out of time
admissions were granted, the same cannot be quoted as a
precedent in any other case, as such directions were issued
after due consideration of the peculiar facts involved in those
cases. No two cases can be held to be similar in all respects.       G
Therefore, in such of those cases where the Court or Board is
not in a position to grant the relief within the time schedule due
to the fault attributable to the candidate concerned, like the
case on hand, there should be no hesitation to deny the relief
as was done by the learned Single Judge. If for any reason,
                                                                     H
    1154    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A   such grant of relief is not possible within the time schedule, due
    to reasons attributable to other parties, and such reasons are
    found to be deliberate or ma/a fide the Court should only
    consider any other relief other than direction for admission, such
    as compensation, etc. In such situations, the Court should
B   ensure that those who were at fault are appropriately proceeded
    against and punished in order to ensure that such deliberate
    or malicious acts do not recur.

        39. We are, therefore, convinced that the impugned orders
  of the Division Bench in having issued such a direction cannot
C be approved by this Court. When we apply the various
  principles which we have culled out to the case on hand, we
  find that each one of the principle has been violated by the
  contesting Respondent. As stated by us earlier, there was total
  lack of diligence displayed by the contesting Respondent right
D from the stage when the submission of the application was
  made. We have noted that the prospectus which was issued
  in April, 2013 and the offending clause in the prospectus was
  not challenged promptly while knowing full well that under the
  said clause the candidate was not eligible, but yet for reason
E best known to her, an application was filed and that to three
  days prior to the last date notified for submission of such
  application. There was no reason, much less justifiable reason,
  for not challenging the relevant clause before the filing of the
  application. There was no reason for the contesting
F Respondent to wait for any reply from the Chandigarh
  Administration. After the order of the learned Single Judge also,
  the contesting Respondent took her own time to approach the
  Division Bench for preferring the Letters Patent Appeal. A
  cumulative effect of the conduct of the contesting Respondent
G has only resulted in disentitling her to claim any equitable relief
  prejudicial to the interest of other eligible candidates of the year
  2014-15 and whose rights came to be crystallized based on
  the process of selection made for the academic year 2014-15.
   If the direction of the Division Bench in the above stated
H background is allowed to operate, it would amount to paying a
 CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION v. JASMINE KAUR 1155
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
premium for the contesting Respondent's inexplicable delay in      A
working out her remedies.

      40. We are, therefore, convinced that such a recalcitrant
attitude displayed by the contesting Respondent should not be
encouraged at the cost of the rights of the other candidates for
                                                                   8
the year 2014-15 against whom the contesting Respondent had
no axe to grind. Therefore, while setting aside the orders
impugned in these appeals, we issue the following directions:

      (1)   Since the contesting Respondent pursued her
            B.D.S. course till this date though she has secured    C
            her admission pursuant to the direction of the
            Division Bench to M.B.B.S. course in the year
            2014-15 and as we have found no justification for
            the direction issued by the Division Bench which we
            are setting aside, we direct the Chandigarh            D
            Administration and the Government Medical
            College to restore the contesting Respondent's
            admission to the B.D.S. course of the academic
            year 2013-14 and allow her to pursue the said
            course, if she so chooses.                             E

      (2)   The admission granted to the contesting
            Respondent in the M.B.B.S. course of 2014-15
            under the NRI category stands cancelled and the
            selection of candidates who applied for the said
            course in the said category in the academic year       F
            2014-15 shall be finalized by the Chandigarh
            Administration and the Government Medical
            College and on that basis proceed with the
            admission as per the schedule.
                                                                   G
      (3)   As far as the claim relating to the impleaded
            Respondent in I.A. No.2-3 of 2014 is concerned,
            since his claim is subject matter of consideration
            before the High Court, the same would be subject
                                                                   H
    1156     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 9 S.C.R.


A               to the outcome of those proceedings which is left
                open for consideration by the High Court.

        41. The interim direction issued by this Court on
    11.07.2014 is vacated and the seats left vacant in 8.D.S. and
    M.8.8.S. courses shall be filled up on merits.
8
         42. With the above directions, the appeals filed by
    Chandigarh Administration and the Government Medical
    College as well as by Jessica Rehsi stand allowed.

C   Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                           Appeals allowed.