Holding

The circular and the gradation list are valid; classification based on educational qualification for super‑numerary promotions is reasonable and does not infringe Articles 14 or 16.

Summary

The Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) issued a circular on 3 July 2012 creating super‑numerary Assistant Engineer (AE) posts for Sub‑Assistant Engineers (SAEs) and prescribed different eligibility criteria for diploma‑holders (25 years of service) and degree‑holders (13 years of service). The appellants, diploma‑holder SAEs, challenged the circular and the subsequent gradation list as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined whether such classification, made after a common recruitment process, was arbitrary or discriminatory and whether the precedent in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilokinath Khosa applied. Relying on the principle that educational qualification is a permissible ground for classification when it bears a reasonable nexus to administrative efficiency, the Court held that KMC’s policy was neither irrational nor arbitrary. Consequently, the impugned circular and gradation list were upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the differential eligibility criteria for promotion to super‑numerary AE posts based on educational qualification violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Whether the circular creating super‑numerary posts is arbitrary, discriminatory, or beyond the scope of KMC’s policy-making powers.
Whether the decision in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilokinath Khosa is applicable when recruitment is through a single common source.
Whether educational qualification can be a valid basis for classification in promotion within a common cadre.

Legislation cited

Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980s. 20

Subjects

service lawpromotionsupernumerary postsclassificationeducational qualificationArticles 14 and 16public employmentKolkata Municipal Corporationequalityadministrative efficiency

Judgment

720 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 11 S.C.R. 720 [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A CHANDAN BANERJEE & ORS.
v.
KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5582 of 2021)
B
SEPTEMBER 21, 2021
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, VIKRAM NATH
AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]
Service Law: Promotion – Post of Assistant Engineer (AE) –
C Promotion against supernumerary posts – Circular prescribing
separate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-Assistant
Engineers (SAEs) for supernumerary appointments as AEs – In
pursuance thereof, publication of gradation list of SAEs promoted
to the post of AE against the supernumerary posts – Writ petition by
D the appellants-diploma-holder SAEs, challenging the circular and
gradation list – Allowed by the Single Judge holding that when
persons having different educational qualifications are subject to
a common recruitment process and are selected thereafter, a
subsequent classification in that cadre would be in violation of Arts
14 and 16 – However, the Division Bench of the High Court upheld
E the validity of the circular and gradation list – On appeal, held:
The promotional policy of the Municipal Corporation for
supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detriment
of diploma holder SAEs – While creating supernumerary posts, the
Municipal Corporation has not completely restricted the promotional
F avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who stagnated in their service – It
has provided adequate opportunity, although on different terms and
conditions – In matters of public policy and public employment, the
legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide
the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different
positions – Circular indicates that the supernumerary posts were
G created for removal of stagnation amongst SAEs, thus, the circular
and the gradation list do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness
and discrimination – Order passed by the Division Bench upheld –
Calcutta Municipal Corporation Services (Common Cadres)
Regulations.
H
720
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 721

Dismissing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1. While creating supernumerary posts, Kolkata
Municipal Corporation-KMC has not completely restricted the
promotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated
in their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them to
advance in their career, although on different terms and B
conditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC for
supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the
detriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy
and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be
given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks
C
to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions
are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the
policy domain. Thus, the impugned circular and the subsequent
gradation list do not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and
discrimination. The decision of the Division Bench of the High
Court is upheld. [Paras 42, 43][748-E-H; 749-A] D
2. The principles as regards classification made for purpose
of promotion/selection of employees are as follows:
(i) Classification between persons must not produce
artificial inequalities. The classification must be
E
founded on a reasonable basis and must bear nexus
to the object and purpose sought to be achieved to
pass the muster of Articles 14 and 16;
(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limited
to a determination of whether the classification is F
reasonable and bears a nexus to the object sought to
be achieved. Courts cannot indulge in a mathematical
evaluation of the basis of classification or replace the
wisdom of the legislature or its delegate with their
own;
G
(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid
ground for classification between persons of the same
class in matters of promotion and is not violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution;

H
722 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A (iv) Persons drawn from different sources and integrated
into a common class can be differentiated on grounds
of educational qualification for the purpose of
promotion, where this bears a nexus with the
efficiency required in the promotional post;
B (v) Educational qualification may be used for introducing
quotas for promotion for a certain class of persons;
or may even be used to restrict promotion entirely to
one class, to the exclusion of others;
(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterion
C for classification for promotion to increase
administrative efficiency at the higher posts; and
(vii) However, a classification made on grounds of
educational qualification should bear nexus to the
purpose of the classification or the extent of
D differences in qualifications. [Para 26][743-A-G]
State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao AIR 1968 SC 349;
Ganga Ram v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 377 : [1970]
3 SCR 481; Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli (1973)
3 SCC 592; Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India AIR
E 1967 SC 1889; Mohammed Shujat Ali v. Union of India
(1973) 3 SCC 76; Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi
Development Authority 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116; M
Rathinaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu (2009) 2 SCC (LS)
101; State of Uttarakhand v. SK Singh (2019) 10 SCC
49 : [2019] (10) JT 264; AS Iyer v. V Balasubramanyam
F (1980) 1 SCC 634 : [1980] 1 SCR 1036; Union of India
v. Atul Shukla (2014) 10 SCC 432:[2014] 14 SCR
1151; Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Union
v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 1 SCC 149 : [2017] 14
SCR 446; Food Corporation of India v. Om Prakash
G (1998) 7 SCC 676 : [1998] 3 SCR 1193 – referred to.
3.1 The appellants have not contested the fact that
educational qualification is not a valid ground for classification in
matters of public employment, or that promotional avenues are

H
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 723

not available to diploma holder SAEs to the post of AE. The A
appellants seek to challenge the impugned circular on the limited
ground that the eligibility conditions for promotion to the
supernumerary posts of AE are different for diploma-holder SAEs,
who require twenty-five years of experience to be eligible, as
opposed to degree-holder SAEs, who require thirteen years of
B
experience. [Para 28][744-A-C]
3.2 The reading of Trilokinath Khosa’s case as urged by the
appellants is fundamentally flawed. In Trilokinath Khosa’s case,
the Court had adverted to the well-established principle that once
direct recruits and promotees are integrated into a common pool,
they cannot be treated differently based on the ‘source of C
recruitment’. This however does not imply that they cannot be
classified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether there are
two different streams of recruitment, or a single source of
recruitment merged into a common pool, the classification that
was upheld in Trilokinath Khosa’s case was based on educational D
qualification which was linked to the purpose of enhancing
administrative efficiency in the organization. [Para 30][744-E,
F-H]
State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Trilokinath Khosa
(1974) 1 SCC 19:[1974] 1 SCR 771 – relied on. E
3.3 The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequent
amendments by KMC suggest that the administration has
continued to create a distinction between degree and diploma
holder SAEs for the purpose of promotion. In regular promotion,
this distinction is made by way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, F
while in terms of supernumerary promotion, it has been by way
of difference in eligibility conditions. Be it one way or the other,
it is evident that the administration has sought to employ a higher
number of degree holders at the position of AE than diploma
holders. The reason for the increase in degree-holders for the
post of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higher G
level of technical expertise required for the superior post, increase
in managerial and technical workload, and enhancement in
supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a
higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of
H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an
AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this
Court to decide whether a higher educational qualification would
fulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexus
between the educational qualification and the need for higher
efficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. The educational
B
qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency
and thus the classification on this basis is not in violation of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. [Para 38][746-C-E, G-H;
747-A-B]
3.4 The term “supernumerary” is defined as “present in
C excess of the normal or requisite number”, or “not belonging to
a regular staff but engaged for extra work”. A “supernumerary
post” is defined as “a post exceeding the usual stated or
prescribed number”. The impugned circular indicates that these
supernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnation
D amongst SAEs. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted to
the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be
performing the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely
a change in the designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an
increase in workload, supervisory functions, and performance of
the regular functions of an AE. Since that is the case, there is no
E reason why the rationale underlying the need for higher degree-
holders in the AE cadre through regular promotion would not be
applicable in the case of supernumerary posts. In other words, a
challenge to the impugned circular could not be sustained if,
instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMC had
F provided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary posts
out of which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs.
By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary and
depend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of
positions could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this
reason that KMC sought to digress from the regular method of
G granting promotion and opted to introduce separate eligibility
conditions. Therefore, the separate eligibility conditions for
promotion to supernumerary AE posts on the basis of educational
qualification is in line with the past promotion practices of KMC
and is not an unreasonable classification. [Para 40][747-D-G;
H 748-A-C]
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 725

The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Judy Pearsall A
ed., 10th ed, 1999); P. Ramanatha Aiyar, THE LAW
LEXICON, THE ENCYLOPAEDIC LAW
DICTIONARY p. 1838 – referred to.
3.5 Even otherwise, Clause 3 of the impugned circular
provides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted as B
and when a vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned posts
of an AE. Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be no
change in the Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. What
this means is that the regular promotion of degree or diploma
holder SAEs is not impacted by way of the impugned circular. As
and when vacancies arise in the sanctioned AE posts, the AEs C
holding supernumerary posts would be subject to the Recruitment
Regulations and the selection process for promotion of an SAE
to an AE. The supernumerary posts are personal to the eligible
AEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regular basis as
AEs or ceasing to remain in service. [Para 41][748-C-E] D
Manas Kumar Sinha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
Writ Petition 3720(W) of 2008; Union of India v. Atul
Shukla & Ors. (2014) 10 SCC 432 : [2014] 14 SCR
1151; Co.AS Iyer & Ors. v. Bala Subramanyan & Ors.
(1980) 1 SCC 634 : [1980] 1 SCR 1036; Punjab State E
Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ravinder Kumar Sharma &
Ors. (1986) 4 SCC 617 : [1987] 1 SCR 72; Roop Chand
Adlakha v. Delhi Development Authority and others
1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 : [1988] (3) Suppl. SCR 253;
State of Uttarakhand v. SK Singh (2019) 10 SCC 49 :
[2019] (10) JT 264 – referred to. F

Case Law Reference
[1980] 1 SCR 1036 referred to Para 12(iii)
[1987] 1 SCR 72 referred to Para 12(iii)
G
[1988] (3) Suppl. SCR 253 referred to Para 13(iv)
AIR 1968 SC 349 referred to Para 26
[1970] 3 SCR 481 referred to Para 26

H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A (1973) 3 SCC 592 referred to Para 26
AIR 1967 SC 1889 referred to Para 26
(1973) 3 SCC 76 referred to Para 26
1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 referred to Para 26
B (2009) 2 SCC (LS) 101 referred to Para 26
(2019) 10 SCC 49 referred to Para 26
[1980] 1 SCR 1036 referred to Para 26
[2014] 14 SCR 1151 referred to Para 26
C
[2017] 14 SCR 446 referred to Para 26
[1998] 3 SCR 1193 referred to Para 26
[1974] 1 SCR 771 relied on Para 30
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5582 of
D 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.01.2019 of the High Court
of Judicature at Calcutta in F.M.A. No.782 of 2017.
Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, Sr. Adv., Achinta Bannerjee,
Raghunath Chakraborty, Kunal Chatterji, Ms. Maitrayee Banerjee, Advs.
E
for the Appellants.
Amit Sharma, Ms. Pallavi Barua, Dipesh Sinha, Sujoy Mondal,
Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Sukesh Ghosh, Sarvesh Ch. Shrivastava, Advs.
for the Respondents.
F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.
Index
A Facts.........................................................................2
G B Submissions of parties..............................................9
C Legal Position............................................................12
D Analysis..................................................................22
E Conclusion..............................................................29
H
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 727
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

1. The appeal arises from a judgment of the Division Bench of A
the High Court of Calcutta dated 25 January 2019. The Division Bench
upheld a circular dated 3 July 2012 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation1
which prescribed separate conditions for diploma and degree holder Sub-
Assistant Engineers 2 for supernumerary appointments as Assistant
Engineers3. The gradation list dated 5 July 2012 prepared in pursuance
B
of the impugned circular has also been upheld.
2. The appellants, who are SAEs possessing a diploma in
engineering, instituted a writ petition before the High Court challenging
the circular dated 3 July 2012 and gradation list on the ground that
classification within the same cadre of SAE for the purpose of
appointment to supernumerary posts violates Articles 14 and 16 of the C
Constitution of India. By a judgment dated 6 October 2015, the Single
Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition and held the circular to
be arbitrary and unconstitutional. In a Letters Patent Appeal, the Division
Bench, reversed the decision of the Single Judge and held that
classification made on the basis of educational qualifications for D
supernumerary appointments to the higher post of Assistant Engineer, is
valid.
A Facts
3. KMC, the twentieth respondent, has two distinct service cadres
in the Engineering Department : (i) Subordinate Engineering Service E
and (ii) Engineering Service. The entry post in the Subordinate Engineering
Service is a Sub-ordinate Assistant Engineer (SAE), for which the
minimum qualification is a diploma in engineering in civil/mechanical/
electrical branches. Although the minimum requirement is that of a
diploma, a person holding a degree in engineering is also eligible to F
participate in the selection process. The selection process involves a
written examination, followed by an interview conducted by the Municipal
Service Commission. Pursuant to this, a merit list is prepared. The cadre
of Subordinate Engineering Service comprises of persons holding a
diploma or degree in engineering, many of the degree holders having
acquired the qualification after appointment. The first promotion from G
the post of SAE is as an Assistant Engineer (AE), after which an SAE
can aspire for successive promotions, right up to the post of Chief
1
“KMC”
2
“SAE”
3
“AE” H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Engineer. The AE is the entry level post in the Engineering Service cadre,
for which direct recruitment is conducted from persons holding an
engineering degree. Thus, the post of AE may be filled through direct
recruitment or through promotion of SAEs.
4. On 23 December 1994, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation
B Services (Common Cadres) Regulations4 were notified under Section
20 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980. The Recruitment
Regulations apply to the employees under all departments and offices
and provide for the management and control of common cadres; seniority
and recruitment, among other conditions of service. Rule 9 of the
Recruitment Regulations provides the method of recruitment for the post
C of AE and SAE, which is contained in the table below:

D

E

F

G
5. The Recruitment Regulations were modified on 7 August 1997
to provide three modes of appointment to the post of AE: (i) promotion
of SAEs having at least 10 years’ experience in the post below AE; (ii)
direct recruitment; and (iii) promotion by selection of SAEs from all

H 4
Circular No 69 of 1994-95; hereinafter “Recruitment Regulations”
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 729
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

disciplines having a degree. The quota for the above three streams was A
fixed at 45% : 45% : 10%.The modified Regulations are produced below:

B

C

D
6. The Recruitment Regulations for the post of AE were modified
by KMC and notified by a circular5 dated 20 February 2002, which stated
that:
(i) 50% of the total cadre strength of AE shall be filled up by
promotion from the posts borne in the common cadre for E
SAE having at least ten years’ experience as an SAE;
(ii) 15% of the post of total cadre strength of AE shall be filled
up by promotion from amongst SAEs having an engineering
degree or equivalent from a recognized University; and
having at least ten years’ experience as an SAE, out of F
which a minimum of five years should be as a degree (of
equivalent) holder SAE in respective streams; and
(iii) 35% of the total cadre strength would be filled up by direct
recruitment observing necessary formalities.
7. This circular was challenged in a writ petition6 before the High G
Court, which was disposed of with a direction to the petitioners in that
case to make a representation before the KMC.
5
D.M.C.(P)’s Circular No./4/2001-2002
6
Manas Kumar Sinha v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., Writ Petition 3720(W) of
2008 H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 8. The KMC, in an effort to remove stagnation in promotion to
the next higher post of AE from the post of SAE, issued a circular7
dated 17 June 2008. The circular, also known as the first career
advancement scheme, stipulated awarding the basic scale of pay (Rs.
8,000 - 275/-1000) of an AE to SAEs who have completed twenty years
of satisfactory service in the KMC.
B
9. In 2012, a proposal was circulated by the Personnel Department
of KMC for creation of supernumerary posts in the rank of AEs for
opening promotional avenues for SAEs. The rationale for the proposal
was to rectify the stagnation faced by SAEs who, despite having completed
twenty to twenty-five years of service, had not been promoted and were
C thus, demotivated. In addition to this, some SAEs had acquired an
engineering degree while in service, and yet had not been promoted.
The proposal sought to create a distinction between SAEs holding a
diploma and those holding a degree (acquired prior to joining KMC as an
SAE, or during the service). The former would be promoted to the post
D of an AE if they had completed twenty-five years of service, while the
latter would be if they had completed thirteen years of service or more,
out of which five years were served as a degree holder.
10. The proposal, which was considered to be the second career
advancement scheme, was implemented by the impugned circular dated
E 3 July 2012. The circular stipulates the creation of supernumerary AE
posts for SAEs holding a diploma and having completed twenty-five
years of service and SAEs holding a degree and having completed thirteen
years of service (out of which five years were as a degree holder).
Clause 3 of the impugned circular states that the supernumerary posts
will be adjusted against the permanent vacancies as and when a vacancy
F becomes available within the sanctioned posts of AE. Further, Clause 5
of the impugned circular provides that there is no change in the existing
Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. In pursuance of the
impugned circular, an office order dated 5 July 2012 published a list of
SAEs who had been promoted to the post of AE against the
G supernumerary posts. Both the impugned circular and the subsequent
gradation list have been challenged before the High Court and this Court.
11. The Single Judge of the High Court held that when persons
having different educational qualifications are subject to a common
7
D.M.C(P)’s Circular No. 06/IIIB/2008-09; hereinafter “First Career Advancement
H Scheme”
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 731
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

recruitment process and are selected thereafter, a subsequent A
classification in that cadre would be in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution. The Single Judge also observed that the classification
for promotion was not made to reward those SAEs who had improved
their educational qualification during service, but instead was a benefit
granted to all degree holders. On the contrary, in appeal, the Division
B
Bench of the High Court upheld the validity of the impugned circular
and gradation list and while reversing the view of the Single Judge
observed that:
(i) The quota for promotion from SAEs to AEs on the basis of
educational qualification and experience was created on 7
August 1997, and not by the impugned circular. The previous C
circulars making such a distinction have not been challenged
and have remained in operation;
(ii) Irrespective of their qualification, the SAEs are given the
basic pay scale of an AE on completion of twenty years of
service. The impugned circular by creating supernumerary D
posts, merely designates SAE as AEs. No other benefit is
granted apart from this designation;
(iii) The impugned circular does not modify the existing
promotional avenues, but only supplements them by
conferring the title of AE on certain eligible SAEs. These E
supernumerary posts are subject to adjustment against
permanent vacancies on being created. Thus, the normal
strength of the AE cadre is not increased;
(iv) The impugned circular does not alter the promotional
avenues of an SAE holding a diploma, nor does it enhance F
the promotional avenues of a degree holder. Thus, the quota
of posts created by the circular dated 20 February 2002
(modified by circular dated 17 June 2008), has not been
superseded by the impugned circular; and
(v) In State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Shri Trilokinath G
Khosa8, this Court held that a classification made on the
basis of educational qualifications to achieve administrative
efficiency is not arbitrary or impermissible under Articles
14 or 16 of the Constitution. The classification made by
8
(1974) 1 SCC 19 H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A KMC to increase efficiency by removing frustration amongst
stagnated SAEs is also a similar policy decision, which must
not be interfered with.
B Submissions of parties
12. Mr Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharya, learned Senior Counsel
B appearing on behalf of the appellants who are diploma holder SAEs, has
made the following submissions:
(i) The private respondents to the appealare persons possessing
an engineering degree, who had joined the cadre of SAE
despite the minimum qualification for the said post being a
C diploma in engineering. These persons already have a
separate reservation of 15 per cent for the promotion to the
post of an AE according to circular dated 20 February 2002;
(ii) The impugned circular sought to provide an incentive to
stagnating SAEs for promotion. However, KMC had failed
to notify that an existing SAE could obtain a higher
D qualification to avail of the benefit of promotion by creating
supernumerary posts. In the absence of such a notice,
differential treatment cannot be meted out to persons who
have been recruited through a common process;
(iii) The decisions of this Court in Union of India v. Atul Shukla
E & Ors.9; Co. AS Iyer & Ors. v. Bala Subramanyan &
Ors. 10; Punjab State Electricity Board & Anr. v.
Ravinder Kumar Sharma & Ors.11 indicate that once
persons have become members of a service, they are
equals and cannot be differentiated for the purpose of salary,
F seniority, promotion and conditions of service. A career
advancement scheme is an incentive and a class amongst a
class cannot be created to grant this benefit;
(iv) The impugned order of the High Court failed to appreciate
the ratio of Trilokinath Khosa (supra), where this Court
had upheld separate channels of promotion for degree
G holders and diploma holders as they had been recruited
through different channels on the basis of their qualifications.
In this case, the selection was through a common channel;
9
(2014) 10 SCC 432
10
(1980) 1 SCC 634
H 11
(1986) 4 SCC 617
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 733
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(v) During the pendency of the appeal, KMC has issued a draft A
gradation list dated 4 March 2021, which indicates that the
SAEs holding diplomas will have no effective promotional
avenue as those promoted against supernumerary posts
created will first occupy the substantive posts of AEs; and
(vi) The effect of the impugned circular will be that a junior B
SAE, holding a degree, will be promoted faster than a senior
SAE holding a diploma and having more experience.
13. Opposing the submissions of Mr Bhattacharya, Mr Sujoy
Mondal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of KMC, has submitted:
(i) The Recruitment Regulations provide that educational C
qualification is one of the criteria for recruitment as well as
promotion in the Engineering Service of KMC;
(ii) The purpose of the impugned circular was to open
promotional avenues for stagnating SAEs. However, by this
circular, neither are SAEs given substantive promotional D
posts of AE, nor has any financial benefit been granted to
them. They have only been awarded with a designation of
AE for efficient administrative functioning;
(iii) As an employer, KMC is entitled to create a differentiation
for effective discharge of duty and to remove frustration of E
the SAEs; and
(iv) In view of the decisions of this Court in Trilokinath Khosa
(supra), Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development
Authority and others12; State of Uttarakhand v. SK
Singh 13 and other cases, even where persons having F
different qualifications are given an opportunity for
promotion, absolute equality cannot be maintained as the
administration may consider giving the lesser qualified a
promotional opportunity on different terms, rather than
prohibiting them altogether.
G
14. Mr Amit Sharma, learned Counsel appearing on behalf second,
fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth respondents who are degree-holding
SAEs, has supported the submissions of Mr Mondal and urged that:
12
1989 Supp (1) SCC 116
13
(2019) 10 SCC 49 H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A (i) None of the contesting respondents held engineering
degrees at the time of recruitment to the post of SAE, and
had acquired them during service;
(ii) The first circular providing a quota for promotion from SAE
to AE on the basis of educational qualifications was dated
B 7 August 1997, which has remained unchallenged till date.
Similarly, the circular dated 20 February 2002 was
challenged unsuccessfully and the circular dated 17 June
2008 was not challenged; and
(iii) The present case is similar to the decision in Roop Chand
C Adlakha (supra), where the category of Junior Engineers
comprised of both graduates and diploma holders and a rule
providing for different length of qualifying service for
promotion was challenged. This Court upheld therule, holding
that differences in educational qualifications could be
compensated by difference in length of experience required
D in the feeder post.
15. Having adverted to the submissions of the parties, we shall
now address the issue at hand.
C Legal Position
E 16. The issue before the Courtlies in a narrow compass. The
question for consideration is whether persons drawn from a common
source who have been integrated into a cadre can be differentiated on
the basis of educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion to
supernumerary posts.
F 17. The challenge to the classification made for the purpose of
promotion rests on the ground of equality and equal treatment in matters
of public employment guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
The Constitution enshrines the principle of non-discrimination on the basis
of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or descent for appointment to
any office under the State. Under this guarantee, similarly situated persons
G
are to be treated equally. Article 16 however does not a bar reasonable
classifications by the State for selection of employees.
18. The locus classicus on the question whether educational
qualifications can be used as a criteria for classification between persons
integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion is the decision of
H
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 735
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. A
Trilokinath Khosa14. In this case, the post of an Assistant Engineer in
the Engineering Service branch of the appellants was filled by way of
direct recruitment or through promotion from the cadre of Sub-ordinate
Engineering Service. A rule was introduced in 1970 restricting the
promotion to the next higher post of an Executive Engineer only to those
B
Assistant Engineers who possessed a degree in engineering or held the
qualification of A.M.I.E and had put in seven years of service. The
respondents, who were diploma holders and serving as Assistant
Engineers, challenged the rule on grounds of discrimination. The
Constitution Bench dealt with the question of whether persons recruited
from different sources, that are integrated into one class, can then be C
classified to permit preferential treatment to some persons on the basis
of their educational qualifications. Justice YV Chandrachud (as the
learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench elaborated on
the extent of judicial review in matters of classification in public
employment and observed that
D
“32. Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration
whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether
it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking
upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification,
for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the Courts
to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the E
Rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of
achieving a particular object.
33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to
accept the respondents’ submission that the classification of
Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders rests F
on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification,
according to the appellants, was made with a view to
achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering
services. If this be the object, the classification is clearly
co-related to it, for higher educational qualifications are at G
least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment.
This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can be
achieved only through the medium of those possessing
comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is
14
(1974) 1 SCC 19 H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be
achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be
characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest
that judicial scrutiny can extend.
B 34. On the fact of the case, classification on the basis of educational
qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative
efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance
and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances
of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification.”
C (emphasis supplied)
On the issue whether educational qualifications can be recognised
as a criterion for classification, the judgment referred to the decisions of
this Court in State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao15; Ganga Ram v.
Union of India16, Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli17 and Roshan
D Lal Tandon v. Union of India18 and noted that:
“41. We have drawn attention to three decisions of this Court
(Narasing Rao case, Ganga Ram case and Dr (Mrs) Kohli case)
in which classification on the basis of educational qualifications
was upheld. In Narasing Rao case, Tracers doing equal work
E
were classified into two grades having unequal pay, the basis of
the classification being higher educational qualifications. In Dr
(Mrs) Kohli case, as refined a classification as between an
F.R.C.S. in general surgery and an F.R.C.S. in Orthopaedics was
upheld in relation to appointment to the post of a Professor of
F Orthopaedics. But these cases are sought to be distinguished on
the authority of the decision of this Court in Roshan Lal
Tandon v. Union of [I]ndia [AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR
185 : (1968) 1 SCJ 746] . That case is crowded with facts and
requires a careful consideration for its proper understanding.
G […]

15
AIR 1968 SC 349
16
(1970) 1 SCC 377
17
(1973) 3 SCC 592
18
AIR 1967 SC 1889
H
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 737
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

45. Thus, all that Roshan Lal case lays down is that direct recruits A
and promotees lose their birth-marks on fusion into a common
stream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differently
by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from
different sources. Their genetic blemishes disappear once they
are integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as to
B
make equals unequals once again.
46. Roshan Lal case is thus no authority for the proposition that if
direct recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, they
cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis other
than the one that they were drawn from different sources. In the
C
instant case, classification rests fairly and squarely on the
consideration of educational qualifications: Graduates alone shall
go into the higher post, no matter whether they were appointed as
Assistant Engineers directly or by promotion. The discrimination
therefore is not in relation to the source of recruitment as in Roshan
Lal case. D
50. We are therefore of the opinion that though persons
appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a
common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for
purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers,
be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The E
Rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such
promotion to the exclusion of diploma-holders does not
violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be
upheld.”
(emphasis supplied) F
19. The dictum in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) was further
expounded on by a subsequent decision of a Constitution Bench of this
Court in Mohammed Shujat Ali v. Union of India19.In Mohd. Shujat
(supra), the Court was faced with a challenge to a quota reserved in
promotion to the higher post of Assistant Engineers for the graduate G
Supervisors as opposed to the non-graduate Supervisors. Justice PN
Bhagwati (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench,
held that

19
(1973) 3 SCC 76 H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A “28. […]But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as
an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made
on the basis of variant educational qualifications, such
classification must be held to be valid, irrespective of the
nature and purposes of the classification or the quality and
extent of the differences in the educational qualifications.
B
It must be remembered that “life has relations not capable always
of division into inflexible compartments”. The moulds expand and
shrink. The test of reasonable classification has to be applied in
such case on its peculiar facts and circumstances. It may be
perfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regard
C to the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, for
the purpose of achieving efficiency in public service, only degree
holders in engineering shall be eligible for promotion and not
diploma or certificate holders. That is what happened in State of
Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa and a somewhat
similar position also obtained in Union of India v. Dr (Mrs.) S.B.
D
Kohli. But where graduates and non-graduates are both regarded
as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is difficult to see
how, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, any
differentiation can be made between them by laying down a quota
of promotion for each and giving preferential treatment to
E graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of such
quota. The result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of the
two categories of Supervisors would be that when a vacancy
arises in the post of Assistant Engineer, which, according to the
quota is reserved for graduate Supervisors, a non-graduate
Supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is senior
F
to all other graduate Supervisors and more suitable than they. His
opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies
available for non-graduate Supervisors. That would clearly amount
to denial of equal opportunity to him.
[…]
G
But even so, we do not think we can be persuaded to strike
down the Andhra Pradesh Rules insofar as they make
differentiation between graduate and non-graduate
Supervisors. This differentiation is not something brought
about for the first time by the Andhra Pradesh Rules. It has
H always been there in the Engineering Services of the
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 739
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

Hyderabad and the Andhra States. The graduate A
Supervisors have always been treated as a distinct and
separate class from non-graduate Supervisors both under
the Hyderabad Rules as well as the Andhra Rules and they
have never been integrated into one class. Under the
Hyderabad Rules, the pay scale of graduate Supervisors was Rs
B
176-300, while that of non-graduate Supervisors was Rs 140-300
and similarly, under the Andhra Rules, the pay, scale of non-
graduate Supervisors was Rs 100-250, but graduate Supervisors
were started in this pay scale at the stage of Rs 150 so that their
payscale was Rs 150-250. Graduate Supervisors and non-graduate
Supervisors were also treated differently for the purpose of C
promotion under both sets of rules. In fact, under the Andhra
Rules a different nomenclature of Junior Engineers was given to
graduate Supervisors. The same differentiation into two classes
also persisted in the reorganised State of Andhra Pradesh. The
payscale of Junior Engineers was always different from that of
D
non-graduate Supervisors and for the purpose of promotion, the
two categories of Supervisors were kept distinct and apart under
the Andhra Rules even after the appointed day. The common
gradation list of Supervisors finally approved by the Government
of India also consisted of two parts, one part relating to Junior
Engineers and the other part relating to non-graduate Supervisors. E
The two categories of Supervisors were thus never fused into
one class and no question of unconstitutional discrimination could
arise by reason of differential treatment being given to them.
Contention E cannot, therefore, prevail and must be rejected.”
(emphasis supplied) F
20. The Court observed that the service rules for the Engineering
Department had consistently maintained a differentiation between
graduate Supervisors and non-graduate Supervisors and they were never
merged into one class.
21. In Roop Chand Adlakha v. Delhi Development G
Authority20, a two judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question of
whether different conditions of eligibility for promotion could be provided
between diploma holders and degree holders. In the facts of the case,
the initial recruitment to the cadre of Junior Engineer in the Public Works
20
1989 Supp (1) SCC 116 H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Department of the respondent was made from two different sources-
that is degree holders with no experience and diploma holders having
two years of experience or more. For promotion to the cadre of Assistant
Engineers, Junior Engineers holding a degree were required to have
three years of experience, while Junior Engineers holding a diploma were
required to have eight years of experience. Following the decision of
B
this Court in Trilokinath Khosa (supra), Justice MN Venkatachaliah
(as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed that
“29. In Triloki Nath case [(1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S)
49 : (1974) 1 SCR 771] diploma-holders were not considered
eligible for promotion to the higher post. Here, in the present case,
C the possession of a diploma, by itself and without more, does not
confer eligibility. Diploma, for purposes of promotion, is not
considered equivalent to the degree. This is the point of distinction
in the situations in the two cases. If diploma-holders — of course
on the justification of the job requirements and in the interest of
D maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the cadre —
could validly be excluded from the eligibility for promotion to the
higher cadre, it does not necessarily follow as an inevitable
corollary that the choice of the recruitment policy is limited to
only two choices, namely, either to consider them “eligible” or
“not eligible”. State, consistent with the requirements of the
E promotional posts and in the interest of the efficiency of
the service, is not precluded from conferring eligibility on
diploma-holders conditioning it by other requirements which
may, as here, include certain quantum of service experience.
In the present case, eligibility determination was made by
F a cumulative criterion of a certain educational qualification
plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot,
in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court,
that the choice of the State was either to recognise diploma-
holders as “eligible” for promotion or wholly exclude them
as “not eligible”. If the educational qualification by itself
G was recognised as conferring eligibility for promotion, then,
the superimposition of further conditions such as a
particular period of service, selectively, on the diploma-
holders alone to their disadvantage might become
discriminatory. This does not prevent the State from
H formulating a policy which prescribes as an essential part
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 741
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of the conditions for the very eligibility that the candidate A
must have a particular qualification plus a stipulated
quantum of service experience. It is stated that on the basis of
the “Vaish Committee” report, the authorities considered the
infusion of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel
requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services
B
necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless
the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to bring
about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be one
of judicial restraint. The prescriptions may be somewhat
cumbersome or produce some hardship in their application
in some individual cases; but they cannot be struck down C
as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The High Court, in
our opinion, was not justified in striking down the rules as violative
of Articles 14 and 16.
(emphasis supplied)
22. In another decision in M Rathinaswami v. State of Tamil D
21
Nadu , directly recruited Assistants were placed above the promotee
Assistants in the list for promotion to the post of Deputy Tehsildar. The
minimum qualification for direct recruitment to an Assistant was a
graduation degree, while promotee Assistants, who were promoted from
the rank of Junior Assistant, were usually non-graduates. The Court E
observed that the classification made by the executive must have a
rational basis. Thus, although the respondents could create a distinction
between direct recruit graduate Assistants and non-graduate promotee
Assistants on the basis of educational qualifications, those promotee
Assistants who were graduates could not be discriminated against for
the purpose of promotion. F

23. A decision relevant for the purpose for this case is State of
Uttarakhand v. SK Singh22. Similar to the present case, the minimum
eligibility requirement for the feeder post of a Junior Engineer was that
of a diploma, not a degree, however, degree holders were considered
eligible. 60 per cent of appointments to the higher post of an Assistant G
Engineer were made through promotions from the cadre of Junior
Engineer, while the balance 40 per cent were through direct recruitment.

21
(2009) 2 SCC (LS) 101
22
(2019) 10 SCC 49 H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A Out of the said 60 per cent, 7.33 per cent was reserved for accelerated
promotion where Junior Assistants holding a degree were entitled to
promotion after three years of service, as against the normal promotion
which required ten years of service. The High Court had held that if the
higher qualification of a degree was not contemplated as a requirement
for being appointed to the feeder post, then two different periods of
B
experience could not be provided later for promotion to the next higher
post. In reversing the decision of the High Court, a two judge Bench of
this Court speaking through Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, upheld the
different eligibility conditions for accelerated promotions for graduate
Junior Assistants. The Court also went as far as to suggest that even if
C the non-graduates were completely shut out of promotion, or if the time
periods (that is the experience) required for normal promotions were
different between degree and diploma holders, those classifications would
also be valid under law.
24. The appellants in their submissions have strongly urged this
D Court to follow a separate line of precedent, such as in the decisions in
AS Iyer v. V Balasubramanyam23; Union of India v. Atul Shukla24,
Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters Union v. State of
Maharashtra25. The decisions of this Court in AS Iyer (supra) and
Atul Shukla (supra) upheld the proposition of law that differentiation
on the basis of ‘source of recruitment’ cannot be a valid ground of
E classification. Similarly, in Maharashtra Forest Guards and Foresters
Union (supra), this Court struck down a rule prescribing micro-
classification for promotion from a Forest Guard to a Forester, as promotion
of non-graduate Forest Guards was entirely restricted.
25. In Food Corporation of India v. Om Prakash26, this Court
F adjudicated on the validity of a rule providing for different eligibility
conditions between graduates and matriculates for promotion from the
post of Assistant Grade II (AG II) to Assistant Grade I (AG I) as a
typist or telephone operator. While the former were eligible for promotion
after three years of service, the latter would be eligible after five years
G of service. The Court struck down the rule as there was no material to
show that the nature of work in the posts of AG I or AG II required

23
(1980) 1 SCC 634
24
(2014) 10 SCC 432
25
(2018) 1 SCC 149
26
H (1998) 7 SCC 676
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 743
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

higher efficiency which could only be expected from graduates and not A
non-graduates. Thus, the nexus between the rule and the objective of
achieving higher efficiency was absent.
26. The principles which emerge from the above line of precedents
can be summarised as follows:
(i) Classification between persons must not produce artificial B
inequalities. The classification must be founded on a
reasonable basis and must bear nexus to the object and
purpose sought to be achieved to pass the muster of Articles
14 and 16;
(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limited to a C
determination of whether the classification is reasonable
and bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Courts
cannot indulge in a mathematical evaluation of the basis of
classification or replace the wisdom of the legislature or its
delegate with their own;
D
(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid ground
for classification between persons of the same class in
matters of promotion and is not violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution;
(iv) Persons drawn from different sources and integrated into
E
a common class can be differentiated on grounds of
educational qualification for the purpose of promotion, where
this bears a nexus with the efficiency required in the
promotional post;
(v) Educational qualification may be used for introducing quotas
for promotion for a certain class of persons; or may even F
be used to restrict promotion entirely to one class, to the
exclusion of others;
(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterion for
classification for promotion to increase administrative
efficiency at the higher posts; and G
(vii) However, a classification made on grounds of educational
qualification should bear nexus to the purpose of the
classification or the extent of differences in qualifications.
27. We shall now proceed to examine the facts of the present
case within the legal framework laid out above. H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A D Analysis
28. At the outset we must point out that the appellants have not
contested the fact that educational qualification is not a valid ground for
classification in matters of public employment, or that promotional
avenues are not available to diploma holder SAEs to the post of AE. The
B appellants seek to challenge the impugned circular on the limited ground
that the eligibility conditions for promotion to the supernumerary posts of
AE are different for diploma-holder SAEs, who require twenty-five years
of experience to be eligible, as opposed to degree-holder SAEs, who
require thirteen years of experience.

C 29. The crux of the case of the appellants is that unlike
Trilokinath Khosa (supra), where recruitment was through two
different sources of recruitment (direct recruitment and through
promotion) after which graduates and diploma holders were integrated
into a class, in the present case there was a common examination for
recruitment of SAEs. It has been urged that once the graduates and
D diploma holders have qualified at the common examination, that is a
single source of recruitment and any differentiation on the basis of
educational qualification would be invalid. Thus, it has been submitted
that the decision of this Court in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) would be
inapplicable to the present case.
E 30. In our view, the reading of Trilokinath Khosa (supra) as
urged by the appellants is fundamentally flawed. The appellants have
sought to lay emphasis on the fact that the decision in Trilokinath Khosa
(supra) was dependent on the existence of two different sources of
recruitment, while in the present case there is a single source of
recruitment. To read the decision in this light is to miss the wood for the
F trees. In Trilokinath Khosa (supra), the Court had adverted to the
well-established principle that once direct recruits and promotees are
integrated into a common pool, they cannot be treated differently based
on the ‘source of recruitment’. This however does not imply that they
cannot be classified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether there
G are two different streams of recruitment, or a single source of recruitment
merged into a common pool, the classification that was upheld in
Trilokinath Khosa (supra) was based on educational qualification which
was linked to the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency in the
organization. We are unable to agree with the submission of the appellants
that the decision in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) is not applicable in the
H present case.
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 745
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

31. We shall now address the question of whether the classification A
made by KMC based on educational qualification was reasonable given
the objective sought to be achieved.
32. The unamended Recruitment Regulations for KMC formulated
in December 1994 provided that 50 per cent of the total cadre strength
of AEs shall be filled through promotion from SAEs, while the remaining B
50 per cent would be filled by direct recruitment. The SAEs in turn were
to be recruited from candidates who had achieved the qualification of a
diploma in engineering or above. Thus, the Recruitment Rules initially
did not stipulate different conditions for promotion between diploma-
holder SAEs or degree-holder SAEs.
C
33. On 7 August 1997, the Recruitment Regulations were modified
and a quota was introduced for the promotion of degree-holder SAEs.
By this amendment, 45 per cent of AEs were to be directly recruited; 45
per cent were to be promoted from SAEs (either diploma or degree
holder) having ten years of experience and 10 per cent was reserved for
degree-holders SAEs who had served for ten years. A classification D
was made between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs, giving
the former a preference over the latter. However, the promotional avenues
for diploma-holder SAEs were not completely restricted.
34. The Recruitment Regulations were modified again by a circular
dated 20 February 2002. By this amendment, the proportion of AEs to E
be recruited directly was reduced from 45 per cent to 35 per cent. The
advantage of this 10 per cent reduction was given to both sets of
promotees, that is, the reservation for degree-holder SAEs was enhanced
to 15 per cent, while the balance 50 per cent was to be filled by promotion
from SAEs (either diploma or degree holders) having ten years of F
experience. This circular was challenged unsuccessfully before the High
Court.
35. The amendments made to the Recruitment Regulations indicate
that in matters of promotion, KMC has repeatedly sought to create a
distinction between degree-holder SAEs and diploma-holder SAEs since G
1997, by introducing a quota for the promotion of the former. In doing so,
it did not foreclose promotional avenues for diploma holder SAEs. In
fact, in 2002, the promotional avenues were fairly enhanced for both
degree and diploma-holder SAEs, while maintaining a preference for
the former.
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A 36. KMC also sought to provide career incentives to reduce
stagnation amongst SAEs. The First Career Advancement Scheme was
introduced in 2008 which stipulated increasing of the scale of basic pay
of an SAE to that of an AE. In matters of pay, no distinction was made
between degree or diploma-holder SAEs as the duties and work
performed by both sets of SAEs remained the same.
B
37. The Second Career Advancement Scheme introduced by the
impugned circular sought to create supernumerary AE posts. Promotion
to these posts was made available to both SAEs holding degrees and
diplomas. However, the eligibility conditions, in terms of the years of
C service of these SAEs in KMC, are different. A challenge has been
raised against these conditions.
38. The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequent
amendments by KMC suggest that the administration has continued to
create a distinction between degree and diploma holder SAEs for the
D purpose of promotion. In regular promotion, this distinction is made by
way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, while in terms of supernumerary
promotion, it has been by way of difference in eligibility conditions. Be it
one way or the other, it is evident that the administration has sought to
employ a higher number of degree holders at the position of AE than
diploma holders. In 1994, when the Recruitment Regulations were
E introduced, 50 per cent of posts were for direct recruits, who were degree-
holders and in the balance 50 per cent which was to be filled by promotees
it can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holding
degrees. Thus, in total more than 50 per cent of AEs were to be degree-
holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45 per cent of
F AEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10 per cent of AEs were
to be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45 per cent of posts were to
be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated that
more than 55 per cent of AEs would be degree holders. Similarly, in
2002, more than 50 per cent of the AE posts were to be filled by degree
holders (35 per cent of AEs were direct recruits holding degrees, 15 per
G cent of AEs were to be filled by degree-holding SAEs and the balance
50 per cent were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs). The
reason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could be
due to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertise
required for the superior post, increase in managerial and technical
H workload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 747
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated A
years of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an
AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court to
decide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil the
objectives of the management, as long as the nexus between the
educational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd,
B
irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held that
educational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency
and thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution.
39. The challenge before us however is not related to the C
classification made in matters of regular promotion. In fact, as the record
indicates, the SAEs have not challenged the initial circulars dated 7 August
1997, or 20 February 2002 (which was challenged unsuccessfully before
the High Court in another petition). The issue before us solely deals with
the restrictions imposed for promotion to supernumerary AE posts.
D
40. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term
“supernumerary” as “present in excess of the normal or requisite
number”, or “not belonging to a regular staff but engaged for extra
work”27. A “supernumerary post” is defined as “a post exceeding the
usual stated or prescribed number”28. The impugned circular indicates
that these supernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnation E
amongst SAEs. Although that may be the stated goal of the impugned
circular, KMC has urged before this Court that the distinction in education
qualification for promotion has been made for the purpose of enhancing
administrative efficiency. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted
to the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be performing F
the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely a change in the
designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an increase in workload,
supervisory functions, and performance of the regular functions of an
AE. Since that is the case, we do not find any reason why the rationale
underlying the need for higher degree-holders in the AE cadre through
G
regular promotion would not be applicable in the case of supernumerary
posts. In other words, could a challenge to the impugned circular be

27
The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Judy Pearsall ed., 10 th ed, 1999)
28
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, The Law Lexicon, The Encylopaedic Law Dictionary p. 1838
(Justice YV Chandrachud (Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of India) ed., 1997) H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 11 S.C.R.

A sustained if, instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMC
had provided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary posts out
of which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs? We do not
think so. By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary and
depend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of positions
could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMC
B
sought to digress from the regular method of granting promotion and
opted to introduce separate eligibility conditions. Therefore, we find that
the separate eligibility conditions for promotion to supernumerary AE
posts on the basis of educational qualification is in line with the past
promotion practices of KMC and is not an unreasonable classification.
C
41. Even otherwise, we note that Clause 3 of the impugned circular
provides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted as and when
a vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned posts of an AE.
Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be no change in the
Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. What this means is that
D the regular promotion of degree or diploma holder SAEs is not impacted
by way of the impugned circular. As and when vacancies arise in the
sanctioned AE posts, the AEs holding supernumerary posts would be
subject to the Recruitment Regulations and the selection process for
promotion of an SAE to an AE. The supernumerary posts are personal
E to the eligible AEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regular
basis as AEs or ceasing to remain in service.
42. Another aspect to be considered is that while creating
supernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotional
avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. It
F has provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career,
although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policy
of KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the
detriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and public
employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room
to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different
G positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must
refrain from interfering in the policy domain.
E Conclusion
43. Based on the discussion above, it is our view that the impugned
H circular dated 3 July 2012 and the subsequent gradation list do not suffer
CHANDAN BANERJEE v. KRISHNA PROSAD GHOSH 749
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

from the vice of arbitrariness and discrimination. Accordingly, we uphold A
the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss the
appeal.
44. Pending applications, if any, shall stand dismissed.

B
Nidhi Jain Appeal dismissed.

C

D

E

F

G

H