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Supreme Court of India

CHANDA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.versusRATTNI AND ANR.

Citation
2007 INSC 337
Decided
23 March 2007
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 empowers the court, at its discretion, to rescind a contract for sale when the purchaser fails to pay the purchase money within the period fixed by the decree, and the trial court correctly exercised this power.

Summary

The plaintiff entered into an agreement to purchase land, paid earnest money and was required to pay the balance consideration and obtain execution of the sale deed within two months of the decree for specific performance. The trial court decreed specific performance, directing the defendants to execute the deed upon payment of the balance. The plaintiff failed to deposit the balance within the stipulated period and applied for execution of the decree. The defendants invoked Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to rescind the contract on the ground of the plaintiff's non‑payment, and the trial court rescinded the agreement, dismissing the execution application. The High Court upheld this order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Section 28 confers a discretionary power to rescind where the purchaser fails to pay within the time fixed, and that the trial court correctly exercised this power as the plaintiff had not deposited the balance; the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

  • Whether Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows rescission of a contract for sale when the purchaser fails to pay the balance consideration within the period fixed by the decree.
  • Whether the court has discretion to extend the time for payment and whether such discretion was exercised in the present case.
  • Whether the plaintiff was required to deposit the balance consideration as a condition precedent to the defendants' execution of the sale deed.

Legislation cited

Subjects

Specific performanceRescissionSection 28Specific Relief ActDiscretionary powerContract of saleExecution of decreeCivil Procedure

Judgment

A                        CHANDA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.
                                           v.
                                 RA TTNI AND ANR.

                                   MARCH 23, 2007

B         [DR.ARIJITPASAYATANDLOKESHWARSINGHPANTA,JJ.]


          Specific Relief Act, 1963:

          S.28-Power under-Held, is discretionary-On facts, decree ofspecific
C performance of contract passed-In execution proceedings, plaintiff's failure
    to deposit the balance sale consideration-No prayer made by plaintiff
    before trial Court and High Court for deposit or extension of time-Order
    of rescission of contract rightly passed on application filed by defendant-
    Specific Relief Act, 1877-s.35(c).
D        The defendant-respondent enteretJ into an agreement to sell land to
 ' plaintiff-appellant and received earnest money. The sale deed was to be              ...
   executed on payment of balance sale consideration. Appellant filed suit for
   specific performance of agreement to sell on the promise that respondent did
   not execute the sale deed. Trial Court decreed the suit and directed respondent
E to execute sale deep on receipt of balance sale price and also to get it registered
   within 2 months from the date of decree.

         Appellant did not deposit the balance sale price within the time allowed
    by Court. The respondents did not execute the sale deed.

F          Appellant moved an application for execution of decree pleading that
    since the respondents had failed to execute sale deed the same was to be
    executed through Court. Respondents moved an application u/s.28 of the
    Specific Relief Act, 1963 praying for rescission of the agreement to sell as
    appellant had failed to deposit the balance sale consideration. The trial Court
    allowed the application and rescinded the contract Accordingly, the execution
G   application by appellant was dismissed. High Court dismissed the revision
    petition. Hence the present appeal.

          Dismissing the appeal, the Court


H                                         402
         -+
                              CHANDA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RA TTNI                        403
.,.,     4           HELD: I. Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corresponds to s.
                                                                                                   A
               35 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (the 'repealed Act') under which it was
               open to the Vendor or lessor in the circumstances mentioned in that Section
               to bring a separate suit for rescission; but this Section goes further and gives
               to the Vendor or lessor the right to seek rescission in the same suit, when
               after the suit for specific performance is decreed the plaintiff fails to pay the   B
               purchase money within the period fixed. The present section, therefore, seeks
               to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree for specific

         .     performance in the same suit without requiring one of the parties to initiate
               separate proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits. Likewise
               under the present provision where the purchaser or lessee has paid the money,
               he is entitled in the suit for specific performance to the reliefs as indicated
                                                                                                   c
               in sub-section (3) like, partition, possession etc. A suit for specific
                performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and the Court
  ~
               which as passed the decree for specific performance retains·the control over
               the decree even after the decree has been passed. (Para 9) (407-E-G; 408-A)
                                                                                                   D
                      2. The decree for specific performance has been described as a
"""            preliminary decree. The power under s. 28 of the Act is discretionary and
           j
               the Court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it. Although the
               power to annul the decree exists yet s.28 of the Act provides for complete
               relief to both the parties in terms oftbe decree. The Court does not cease to
......         have the power to extent the time even though the trial Court had earlier           E
               directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by certain
               date and on failure suit would stand dismissed. The power exercisable under
               this Section is discretionary. (Para 10) (408-A-B)

                     3. The stand now taken by appellant that there was no direction to pay
               within a particular time was not pleaded before the trial Court and High Court
                                                                                                   F
         ...
               and is clearly unsustainable. [Para 11) [408-D)

                    Kumar Dhirendra Mullick and Ors. v. Tivoli Park Apartments (P) Ltd,
               [2005) 9 sec 262, distinguished.

                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5494 of2000.                  G

                    From the Final Judgment Order dated 21.5.1999 of the High Court of
               Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.R.No. 4509 of 1998.

                    Neeraj Kr. Jain, Sanjay Singh, Sandeep Chaturvedi and Ugra Shankar             H
               Prasad for the Appellants.
                                                                                        +
    404                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A        Naresh Kaushik, B.S. Methaila, Arnita Kalka!, and Lalita Kaushik for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment
B   of a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing
    the revision petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
    1908 (in short the 'Code').

          ·2. Background facts as projected by the plaintiff in a nutshell are as
    follows:
c
           3. Defendants-respondents entered into an agreement dated 25.3.1989 to
    sell land measuring 54 Kanals 3 Marlas to the original plaintiff-Chandu and
    received Rs.56,000/- as earnest money. The sale deed was to be executed on
    or before 15 .6.1989 on payment of the balance sale consideration of Rs.1,39,000/
D   -. Since the defendants did not execute the sale deed within the time specified
    in the agreement, the plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit on 24.1.1990 for
    specific performance of the agreement to sell. The suit was decreed ex parte
    on 1.5.1992 and it is common case of the parties that the decree has become
    final between them. Para 6 of the judgment of the trial court decreeing the
    suit reads as under:-
E
            "For the reasons discussed above, the suit succeeds. A decree for
            possession of the suit land by way of specific performance is hereby
            passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with
            costs. Defendants are directed to execute the proposed sale deed on
            payment of the balance sale price of Rs.1,39,000/- and get it registered
F           within a period of two months from the date of this decree failing
            which the plaintiff shall be at liberty to get the sale deed executed and
            registered under Order 21 Rule 12 Code. Decree be drawn up
            accordingly and file be consigned to the record room."

          4. The plaintiff did not deposit the balance sale price within two months
G from the date of the decree, and the defendants did not execute the sale deed.
    Plaintiff then moved an application on 10.10.1992 for the execution of the
    decree pleading therein that since the judgment debtors-respondents had
    failed to execute the sale deed the same was to be executed through court
    and .that he (plaintiff) be allowed to deposit the balance sale price in court.
H   During the pendency of this application, one Sarup Singh through his general
     +
                  CHANDA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RA TTNI [PASA YAT, J.]              405

--       attorney moved an application for being impleaded as a party in the execution
         proceedings on the plea that he was the owner in possession of the suit land
                                                                                            A

         on the basis of a decree dated 26. 7.1991 which the defendants are alleged to
         have suffered in his favour. The executing court as per its order dated
         14.8.1995 allowed the applicant to be impleaded in the execution proceedings.
         Sarup Singh then filed objections to the execution application which were          B
         dismissed as per order dated I 0.9.1998 and it was held that he was not a bona
         fide purchaser of the suit' land. On 8.9 .1998, the judgment debtors-respondents
         moved an application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for
         short the 'Act') with.a prayer that the agreement to sell dated 25.3.1989 be
         rescinded since the plaintiff-appellant had failed to deposit the balance sale
         consideration within the time allowed by the court. This application was           C
         contested by the appellant-plaintiff and on a consideration of the contentions
         advanced by the counsel for the parties the trial court as per its order dated
          15.9.1998 allowed the application and rescinded the original contract dated
         25.3.1989 holding that the plaintiff had failed to deposit the balance sale
         consideration within the time allowed by the Court. The execution application
         filed by the plaintiff-appellant was consequently dismissed. The said order        D
         was assailed in the revision petition filed before the High Court.

                5. Before the High Court the stand of the appellant was that the order
         of the Trial Court was not sustainable as the court while decreeing the suit
         for specific performance had directed the defendants-respondents to execute E
         the sale deed within two months from the date of decree and since they failed
         to do so the plaintiff was entitled to have the sale deed executed through the
         court. According to him, there was no specific direction given.to the plaintiff
         to deposit the balance share consideration within stipulated period and,
         therefore, the Trial Court was not justified in rescinding the contract on
         account of non-deposit of the balance sale price by the plaintiff. It was also F
         contended that several imposters were set up which disentitled the applicant
         from any relief. The High Court found that para 6 of the judgment of the Trial
         Court as quoted above, clearly indicated that the defendants had been directed
         to execute the sale deed within two months from the date of the decree on
         payment of the balance sale price of Rs. l ,30,000/-. The same was, therefore, G
          a condition precedent for execution of the sale deed. It was implicit in the
          direction that the plaintiff was required to deposit the balance consideration
          within a period in the first instance and it was only then defendants were
          required to execute the sale deed. Since the plaintiff did not deposit the
          balance amount, the order of court below was perfectly in order. Revision
          petition was accordingly dismissed.                                            H
                                                                                        -t
    406                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2007] 4 S.C.R.

A         6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
    that the scope and ambit of Section 28 of the Act has been examined in
                                                                                             -
    various decisions. There was scope for extension of time and mere non
    deposit did not deprive the appellant from getting any relief. There was no
    unreasonable delay in making the request for extension of time to make
B   deposit. Strong reliance was placed on the decision in Kumar Dhirendra
    Mullick and Ors. v. Tivoli Park Apartments (P) Ltd., [2005] 9 SCC 262.

          7. In response, learned counsel fo1 the respondents submitted that
    execution of saie deed was to be done only after the payment or deposit in
    court. The conduct of the decree-holder in not depositing is full of mala tides.
C   He has not deposited the amount for long 6 years i.e. between the disposal
    of the execution proceedings/rescission application. The court had interpreted
    the decree to mean that the deposit was condition precedent. There was no
    specific prayer for deposit or for extension of time. The factual position is
    entirely different from Kumar Dhirendra 's case (supra). In that case there was
    repeated assurance of payment but in the present case there is no such
D   assurance.

          8. Section 28 of the Act reads as follows:

                28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale
            or lease of immovable property, the specific perfor.mance of which
E           has been decreed.-(!) Where in any suit a decree .for specific
            performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property
            has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period
            allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow,
            pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered
            him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which
F           the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such
            application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far
            as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case
            may require.

               (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (I), the
G           court-

            (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained
            possession of the property under the contract, to restore such
            possession to the vendor or lessor; and .
H           (b) may. direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and
       +
                  CHANDA(DEAD)THROUGHLRS.v. RATTNI[PASAYAT,J.]                          407

                  profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date           A
                  on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until
                  restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and if the j•1stice
                  of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or
                  the lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract.

                      (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other           B
                  sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period
                  referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in
                  the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he
                  may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the
                  following reliefs, namely:-
                                                                                                c
                       (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor
                       or lessor;
                       (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate
                       possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance
                       or lease.                                                                D
                       (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed
                   under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser,
                   lessor or lessee, as the case may be.

                       (5) The costs ofany proceedings under this section shall be in           E
                   the discretion of the court."

                  9. The present section corresponds to Section 35 (c) of the Specific
           Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to as the 'repealed Act') under which it
           was open to the Vendor or lessor in the circumstances mentioned in that
           Section to bring a separate suit for rescission; but this Section goes further       F
           and gives to the Vendor or lessor the right to seek rescission in the same suit,
           when after the suit for specific performance is decreed the plaintiff fails to pay
           the purchase money within the period fixed. The present section, therefore,
           seeks to provide complete relief to both the parties in terms of a decree for
           specific performance in the same suit without requiring one of the parties to
           initiate separate proceedings. The object is to avoid multiplicity of suits.         G
           Likewise under the present provision where the purchaser or lessee has paid
           the money, he is entitled in the suit for specific performance to the reliefs
....       as indicated in sub-section (3) like, partition, possession etc. A suit for
           specific performance does not come to an end on passing of a decree and
           the Court which has passed the decree for specific performance retains the           H
    408                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A   control over the decree even after the decree has been passed.

           10. The decree for specific performance has· been described as a
    preliminary decree. The power under Section 28 of the Act is discretionary
    and the Court cannot ordinarily annul the decree once passed by it. Although
    the power to annul the decree exists yet Section 28 of the Act provides for
B   complete relief to both the parties in terms of the decree. The Court does not
    cease to have the power to extend the time even though the trial Court had
    earlier directed in the decree that payment of balance price to be made by
    certain date and on failure suit to stand dismissed. The power exercisable
    under this Section is discretionary.
c         11. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the respondents the
    stand now taken was not pleaded before the trial Court attd the High Court.
    The decision in Kumar Dhirendra's case (supra) is clearly distinguishable
    on facts. In fact, it has been noted in that case that the decree-holder was
    repeatedly assured of payment. The situation is not the same here. The only
D   stand takert was that there was no direction to pay withirt a particular time.
    This plea is clearly unsustainable and untenable artd has been rightly rejected.

          12. Above being the position, there is no merit in this appeal which is
    dismissed without any order as to costs.

E D.G.                                                          Appeal dismissed.


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