Holding

The Court held that the State’s subjective satisfaction of urgency under Section 17(4) is valid even for non‑waste, non‑arable land, and that acquisition for a public purpose such as housing for Dalits does not violate Article 21.

Summary

The appellants, owners of land in Bairam Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, challenged a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 23 July 1983, which, together with a declaration under Section 6, invoked the urgency clause of Section 17(4) and dispensed with the inquiry required by Section 5‑A, for the purpose of constructing houses for Dalits. They contended that the land was neither waste nor arable, that there was no genuine urgency given the three‑year pre‑ and post‑notification delay, and that the acquisition violated their right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court examined whether the State could validly invoke the urgency provision, whether Section 17(4) could be used for non‑waste, non‑arable land, and whether the deprivation of livelihood amounted to a violation of Article 21. Relying on earlier decisions, the Court held that the opinion of urgency is a subjective satisfaction of the Government, not invalidated by administrative delay, and that the statutory power under Section 17(4) (as amended for Uttar Pradesh) extends to lands required for sanitary improvements or planned development. It further held that acquisition for a public purpose, such as providing housing for Dalits, does not constitute deprivation of livelihood under Article 21, provided compensation is paid. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the validity of the notification and the State’s exercise of the urgency clause.

Issues considered

The validity of a Section 4 notification when the land is neither waste nor arable
The propriety of dispensing with the Section 5‑A inquiry by invoking the urgency clause of Section 17(4) despite pre‑ and post‑notification delays
Whether acquisition for constructing houses for Dalits deprives owners of their right to livelihood under Article 21
Whether Section 17(4) can be exercised for lands other than waste or arable land under the Uttar Pradesh amendment to Section 17(1A)

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(e), s. Article 21, s. Article 39(b), s. Article 46
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 17(1), s. 17(1A), s. 17(4), s. 23, s. 23(1A), s. 28, s. 31, s. 4, s. 5-A, s. 6, s. 9

Subjects

land acquisitionurgency clauseSection 5-Aright to livelihoodArticle 21right to shelterpublic purposeDalitscompensationconstitutional law

Judgment

CHAMELI SINGH A
v.
THE STATE OF U.P.

DECEMBER 15, 1995
B
[K. RAMASWAMY, FAIZAN UDDIN AND B.N. KIRPAL, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act 1894, Ss. 4, 5-A and 17(1) r/w 17 (4)-Acquisition
of land for consfJUcting houses for dalits-Jnvocation of urgency clause and
dispensing with enquiry under s.5-A-Pre and post-notification delay of three C
year~Whether S.4 notification invalid-Held, government'.< opinion on ur-
gency subjective; court will not inteifere unless opinion malafide-Held further,
till problem of providing houses to dalits remains unsolved, urgency subsists.

Constitution of India, Article 21-Land Acquisition Act 1894,
S.4-W/1ether acquisition of lands for constrncting houses for dalits deprives D
right to livelihood of land owners-Held, no; individual's right must yield to
large public purpose.

Land Acquisition Act 1894, Ss.4 r/w S. 17(1), 17(1A) (U.P. Amend-
ment) and 17 (4}-Wliether lands that are neither waste nor arable can be
acquired under S.17(4)-Held, yes; under UP. amendment to S.17( 1A) power E
under S.17(4) can be invoked in case of lands other than waste or arable
land.

Simultaneous with the notification under S.4(1) of the Land Acquisi-
tion Act, 1894, acquiring the appellants' lands for the purpose of construct- F
ing houses for dalits, the declaration under S.6 was published dispensing
with the enquiry under S.5-A. The appellants challenged the notification
before the High Court on the ground that the lancis not being arable or
waste lands and there being no urgency the State Government was not
justified in resorting to its powers under S.17(1) read with S.17(4) of the
Act. They further contended that the acquisition took away their only G
source of livelihood and was violative of their fundamental rights under
Article 21. The High Court negatived these contentions and dismissed the
writ petitions. Hence these appeals.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court H
827
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A HELD : 1.1. So long as the nnhygienic conditions and deplorable
housing needs of dalits, tribes and the poor are not solved or fulfilled, the
urgency continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the
material, constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion
of urgency, the Court, not being an appellate fornm, would not disturb the
B finding unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power ma/a
fide. [841-D]

1.2. The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and post-notifica-
tion delay would not render the exercise of the power to invoke urgency
clause invalid on that account. Larger the delay, greater would be the
c; urgency. [842-A]

Kasiredi Papaiah v. Govemment of A.P., AIR (1975) AP 269, State of
U.P. v. Pista Devi & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 251; Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. governor
of Delhi, [1985] 1 SCR 588; Af/atoon & Ors. Etc. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi &
Ors., [1975] 4 SCC 285; Jage Ram & Ors. v. State of Ha1yana & Ors., [1971]
D 1 SCC 671; Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors., [1993]
2 SCC 84 and State of U.P. & Ors. v. Keshav Prasad Singh, [1995] S SCC
587, relied on.

Narayan Govind Gavate Etc. v. State of Maharashtra, [1977] 1 SCR
E 763, explained and distingnished.
1.3. To bring the dalits and tribes into tho mainstream of national
life providing these facilities and opportunities to them is the dnty of the
state as fundamental to their basic human and constitutional rights.
[834-F]
F 2.1. The Plea of deprivatiou of the right to livelihood under Article
21 is unsustainable. So long as the exercise of the power is for public
purpose, the individual's right of an owner must yield place to the larger
public purpose. For compulsory nature of acquisition, sub-section (2) of
Section 23 provides payment of solatium to the owner who declines to
G voluntarily part with the possession of land. Acquisition in accordance
with the procedure is a valid exercise of the power. It would not, therefore,
amount to deprivation of right to livelihood. [842-C, E]

2.2. The right to shelter, does not mean a mere right to a roof over
one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to
H live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an

•
CHAMELISINGHv. STATE[K RAMASWAMY,J.] 829

essential requisite to the right Ip live, should be deemed to have been A
guaranteed as a fundamental right. [834-C-D]

Sli P.G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors., JT (1995) 2 SC 373; M/s.
Shantistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame & 01~., [1990] l SCC 520;
Olga Tellis & 01~. v. Bombay Municipal C01pn. & 01~., [1985] 3 SCC 545;
Francis Coralie v. Union Te11itory of Delhi, [1981] 1SCC608; Gaud Shankar B
& 01,·. v. Union of India & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 349; State of Kamataka &
Ors. v. Narasimhamurthy & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 375 and Kwra Subba Rao
v. Distt. Collector, (1984) 3 A.P.L. J. 249, referred to.

3. The State Government is statutorily empowered to exercise the C
power under S.17 (4). S.17(1A) as amended by the U.P. State Legislature
provides power to take possession under sub-section (l) which may also
be exercised in case lands other than waste or arable land, where the land
is rec1uired for or in connection with sanitary improvements of any kind
or planned development. [830-G]
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12122 of
1995 Etc.

From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.93 of the Allahabad High
·Court in C. Misc. W.P. No. 15377 of 1983.
E
R.K. Jain and P.K. Jain for the Appellants.

Dr. N.M. Ghatate and Ashok K. Srivastava, for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
K. RAMASWAMY, J. Leave granted.

CA. No. 12122/95@ SLP [C) No. 4896/93.

This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment and order
dated february 5, 1993 by the Division Bench of the Allahabad H;gh Court G
in Writ Petition No. 15377 of 1983. The appellants are o"ners of the lands
in plot No. 16 of an extent of 5 bighas 6 biswas and 14 biswas respectively
in village Bairam Nagar, Parganas, Nahtaur, Tahsil Dhampur, District
Bijnore. These lands alongwith other lands were notified by publication in
the State Gazette under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (for H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
....
A short, "the Act") on July 23, 1983 and tlte declaration under Section 6 was
also published simultaneously dispensing with the inquiry under Section
5-A. The appellants challenged the validity of the Notification under
Section 4(1) and the exercise of the power given under Section 17(1) read
with Section 17(4) dispensing the inquiry under Section 5-A. Three con-
tentions were raised and negatived by the Division Bench. The first con-
B tention was that since the lands are not waste or arable lands, notification
under Section 17(4) is invalid. Secondly, it was contended that dispensing
"1th tlic inquiry under Section 5-A is not justifiable as there is no urgency
to take possession even though the land was acquired for providing houses
to scheduled Castes (for short, 'Dalits'). Thirdly, it was contended that on .'
c account of the acquisition, the appellants will be deprived of their lands
which is the only source of their livelihood violating Article 21 of the
Constitution. Thus this appeal by special leave. Shri R.K. Jain, their learned
senior counsel reiterated with added vehemence highlighting that there was
pre and post-notification delay of more than three years. The proposal was
put up in 1979 and the notification was approved in February but published
D
in April 30, 1983 which would show that the urgency is not such which does
not brook !he dday of 30 days in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A.
Right to cooJuct an inquiry under Section 5-A is valuable right and
minimal safeguard to the owner and it would not be abrogated by exercis-
ing power of invoking urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act. He
E contended that in all the acquisitions for housing purpose conducting
inquiry under Section 5-A should be the rule and dispensing with such
inquiry should be exceptional and only in rare cases like those covered by
Section 17(2). In support thereof he placed strong reliance on the holding
of this Court in Narayan Govind Gavate Etc. v. State of Maharashtra, (1977]
1 SCR 763. Acquisition of the land deprives the owner of his source of
F
livelihood enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution which cannot be
deprived by denuding the owner of the means of livelihood, viz., the land
by resorting to compulsory acquisition.

It is found as a fact that the houses put up by the appellants do not
G form part of agricultural lands. Section 17(1A) as amended by the U.P.
State Legislature provides power to take possession under sub-section (1)
which may also be exercised in the case lands other than waste or arable
land, where the land is acquired for or in connection with sanitary improve-
ments of any kind or planned development. It would, therefore, be clear
H that the State Government is statutorily empowered to exercise the power
'
1
~
CHAMELISINGHv. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 831

under Section 17(4). When the Government forms an opinion that it is A
necessary to require immediate possession of the land for building houses
for the Dalits, it forms the opinion of urgency to take immediate possession
for the said purpose. Accordingly it is entitled to direct dispensing with the
inquiry under Section 5·A and publish the declaration under Section 6 after
the date of the publication of Section 4(1) notification. Thereafter, under
sub-section (1) of Section 17 the Land Acquisition officer, after service of B
notice under Section 9 and expiry of 15 days therefrom, becomes entitled
to take possession of land to proceed with the public purpose. The question
therefore, is whether the Government would be justified in dispensing the
~· ., inquiry under Section 5-A.
c
It is settled law that the opinion of urgency formed by the ap-
propriate Government to take immediate possession, is a subjective con-
clusion based on the material before it and it is entitled to great weight
unless it is vitiated by ma/a fide or colourable exercise of power. Article·
25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that D
"everyone has the right to standard of living adequate for the health and
well-heing of himself and his family including food, clothing, honsing,
medical care and necessary social services." Article 11(1) of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 laid down
that State Parties to the Covenant recognise "the right to everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and for his family including food, E
clothing, housing and to the continuous improvement of living conditions."
The State parties will take appropriate steps to ensure realisation of this
right. In Sri P. G. Gupta v. State of Gujarat & Ors.. JT (1995) 2 SC 373, a
Bench of three Judges of this Court considering the mandate of human
right to shelter read it into Article 19(1)(e) and Article 21 of the Constitu- F
lion of India to guarantee right to residence and settlement. Protection of
life guaranteed by Article 21 encompasses within its ambit the right to
shelter to enjoy the meaningful right to life. The Preamble to the Indian
Constitution assures to every citizen social and economic justice and equity
of status and of opportunity and dignity of person so as to fasten fraternity
among all sections of society in an integrated Bharat. Article 39(b) enjoins G
the State that ownership and control of the material resources of the
community are so distributed as to promote welfare of the people by
securing social and economic justice to the weaker sections of the society
to minimise inequality in income and endeavour to eliminate.. inequality in
status. Article 46 enjoins the State to promote with special care social, H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
....
A economic and educational interests of the weaker sections of the society,
in particular, Schedules Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Right to social and
economic justice conjointly commingles with right to shelter as inseparable
component for meaningful right to life. It was therefore, held that right to
residence and settlement is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(e) and
it is a facet of inseparable meaningful right to life under Article 21, Food,
B shelter and clothing are minimal human rights. The State has undertaken
as its economic policy of planned development of massive housing schemes.
The right to allotment of houses constructed by the Housing Board to the
weaker sections, lower income-group people under Lower Income Group
Scheme, was held to be constitutional strategy, an economic programme '
c undertaken by the State and that the weaker sections are entitled to
allotment as per the scheme.

InM/s. Sha,tistar Builders v. Narayan Khimalal Totame & Ors., [1990]
1 SCC 520, another Bench of three Judges had held that basic needs of
D man have traditionally been accepted to be three - food, clothing and
shelter. The right to life is guaranteed in any civilised society. That would
take within its sweep the right to food, the right to clothing, the right to
descent environment and a reasonable accommodation to live in. The
difference between the need of an animal and a human being for shelter ~

has to be kept in view. For an animal it is the bare protection of the body;
E for a human being it has to be a suitable accommodation which would allow
him to grow in every aspect - physical, mental and intellectual. The Con-
stitution aims at ensuring fuller development of every child. That would be
possible only if the child is in a proper home. It is not n~c~ssary that every
citizen must be ensured of living in a well- built comfortable house but a
F reasonable home, particularly for people in India can even be mud-built
thatched house or a mud- built fire-proof accommodation. When the urban
land under Sections 20 and 21 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act was ex-
empted subject to the condition of constructing houses to weaker sections
by the builders, this Court recognised the above right to shelter as an
in-built right to life under Section 21 and upheld the validity of exemption
G and gave directions to effectively implement the scheme. In Olga Tellis &
Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. & Ors., [1985J 3 SCC 545 considering the
right to dwell on pavements or in slums by the indigent was accepted as a
part of right to life enshrined under Article 21, and ejectment of them from
the place nearer to their work would be deprivation of their right to
H livelihood. They will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from

•
CHAMELISINGHv.STATE(KRAMASWAMY,J.] 833

their slum and pavement dwellings. Their eviction tantamounts to depriva- A
tion of their life. The Constitution Bench had held that if the right to
livelihood is not treated as a traditional right to life, the easiest way of
depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means
of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only
denude the life of its effect content and meaningfulness but it would make B
· life impossible to live. The deprivation, therefore, must be consistent with
the procedure established by law. It was further held that which alone
makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes livable, must be deemed
to be an integral component of the right to life. In Fra11cies Coralie v. U11io11
Tenitory of Delhi, [1981] 1 SCC 608 considering detention under Article 22
and its effect on Article 21, this Court held that the right to life includes C
the right to live with human dignity and all that goes alongwith it, namely,
the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter
over the head .re! facilities for reading. Writing and expressing oneself in
diverse {arms, free movement and commingling with fellow human beings
are part of the right to live with human dignity and they are components D
of the right to life.

In Gauri Sha11kar & Ors. v. U11io11 of !11dia & Ors., [1994] 6 SCC 349,
in the context of eviction of a tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act,
this Court observed that the right to shelter is not Constitutionally guaran-
teed right. Restrictions on the right to shelter placed by the statute on the E
statutory tenants were not violative of Article 21. The ratio must be
understood in the light of the statutory operation under the Rent Control
Act.

In State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Narasimhamurthy & Ors., JT (1995) F
6 SC 375 at 378, para 7, this Court held that right to shelter is a fundamen-
tal right under Article 19(1) of the Constitution. To make the right mean-
ingful to the poor, the State has to provide facilities and opportunity to
build house. Acquisition on the land to provide house sites to the poor
houseless is a public purpose as it is the Constitutional duty of the State
to provide house sites to the poor. G

In any organised society, right to live as a human being is not ensured
by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is
assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions
which inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve this H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A object. Right to live guaranteed in any civilised society implies the right to
food, water, decent environment, education, medical, care and shelter.
These are basic human rights known to any civilised society. All civil,
political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Universal declaration
of Hum an Rights and convention or under the Constitution of India cannot
B be exercised without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human being,
therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where
he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and
spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe
and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure
air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc.
C so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter,
therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right
to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a
human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the
right to live, should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental
D right. As is enjoined in the Directive principles, the State should be deemed
to be under an obligation to secure it for its citizens, of course subject to
its economic budgeting. In a democratic society as a member of the
organised civic community one should have permanent shelter so as to
physically, mentally and intellectually equip oneself to improve his excel-
lence as a useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties ·~'1 to be ..
E useful citizen and equal participant in democracy. The ultimate object of
making a man equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of
status is to enable him to develop himself into a cultured being. Want of
decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object of the Constitutional
animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental right to
p residence, dignity of person and right to live itself. To bring the Dalits and
Tribes into the mainstream of national life providing these facilities and
opportunities to them is the duty of the state as fundamental to their basic
human and constitutional rights.

In Kun-a Subba Rao v. Distt. Collector, (1984) 3 A.P.L.J 249 Andhra
G Pradesh High Court considering the obligation of the State to provide
shelter to the weaker sections of the society by acquiring lands for public
purpose and distribution thereof had held that in all stages of social
development a man must have some property or capacity for acquiring
property. There could be no individual liberty without a minimum of
H property. People who cannot buy bread cannot follow the suggestion that
CHAMELI SINGH v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY, J.] 835

.... they can eat cake. People bowed under the weight of poverty are unlikely A
to stand up for their constitutional rights. Welfare State exists not only to
enable the people to eke out their livelihood but also to make it possible
for them to lead good life. State strives to provide facilities and oppor-
tunities to them to improve excellence transcending all sections with diver-
sities in the society so as to enable them to lead good life assuring dignity B
of person under legal order. Equality of opportunity is not simply a matter
of legal equality. Its existence depends not merely on the absence of
disabilities but on the presence of abilities. Liberty is freedom and justice
is equality which are the bedrock of modern democracy. The challenge of
social justice is the challenge for equal opportunity not in form but in
substance and the challenge of social justice a constitutional mandate has C
to be accepted and answered on the basis of day-to-day experience of the
performance of fo·v, articulating diverse provisions of the Constitution,
while meetir~ the cl.u:'..',,ging situation in the society. The Directive Prin-
ciples are beacon light leading to reach the ultimate goal of economic
equality and social justice to all. It accordingly had upheld the power of D
the State Government invoking urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the
Act when the State discharged its constitutional mandate to provide shelter
to the poor.

The need to provide right to shelter is not peculiar to India alone
but is a global problem being faced by all the developing and developed E
nations. In 1980 the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution
No. 35/76 expressed the view that an international year devoted to the
problems of homeless people in urban and rural areas of the developing
countries could be an appropriate occasion to focus attention of the
international community on those problems. In Resolution No. 37/221 of F
1987 the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless was adopted and
request was made to member States to sustain the momentum generated
during the programme for the year and to continue implementing concrete
and innovative activities aimed at improving shelter and neighbourhoods
of the poor and the disadvantaged and requested the Secretary General of
UNO to keep it informed periodically on the progress achieved. At the G
close of the international year the General Assembly received and noted
in Resolution No. 42/191 the reports of the Executive Director of the U.N.
Centre for Human Settlement entitled "Shelter and services for the poor -
a call to action". It recognised that adequate and secure shelter is a basic
human right and is vital for the fulfilment of human aspirations and that a H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A squalid residential environment is a constant threat to health and to life
...
itself, thereby coru;tituting a drain on human resources, a nation's most
valuable asset. The General assembly expressed deep concern about the
existing situation in which, in spite of efforts of Government at the national
and local levels and of international organisations, more than one billion
people find themselves either completely without shelter or living in homes
B
unfit for human habitation; and that owning to prevailing demographic
trends, the already formidable problems will escalate in the coming years
unless concerted and determined efforts are taken immediately. As a
consequence, Global Strategy for shelter to the year 2000, including a plan
of action for its implementation monitoring and evaluation was chalked out •
C and its objective would be to stimulate measures to facilitate adequate
shelter for all by the year 2000. It requested the executive director of the
central for Human Settlements to prepare a proposal for such a global
strategy and called upon the Commission on human Settlements to formu-
late the strategy for consideration by the Assembly. Jn furtherance thereof,
D guidelines have been laid to take steps at the national level which was
accepted by the Assembly. Guidelines which are relevant for the present
purpose are as under :

"2 ...... The objectives should be based on a comprehensive view of
the magnitude and nature of the problem and 0f the available
E resource base, including the potential contribution of men and
women. In addition to finance, land, manpower and institutions,
building materials and technology also have to be considered
irrespective of whether they are held by the public or private,
formal or informal sector.

F
3. The objectives of the shelter sector need to be linked to the
goals of overall economic policy, social policy, settlement policy
and environmental policy.

4. The strategy need to outline the action through which the
G objectives can be met. In an enabling strategy actions such as the
provision of infrastructure may mean the direct involvement of the
public sector in shelter construction. The objective of "facilitating
adequate shelter for all" also implies that direct government sup-
port should mainly be allocated to the most needy population
H groups.

t
CHAMELISINGHv. STATE[KRAMASWAMY,J.] 837

x x x x x x x x x A
6. Another important component is the development of administra-
tive, institutional and legislative tasks that are the direct respon-
sibility of the Government, for example, land registration and
regulation of construction.
B
x x x x x x x x x.

8. The appropriate institutional framework for the implementation
of a strategy must be identified, which may require much institu-
tional reorganisation. Each agency involved must have a clear C
understanding of its role within the overall organisation framework
and of the tasks expected of it. Mechanisms for the co-ordination
of inter and intra-agency activities need to be developed.
Mechanism such as shelter coalitions are recommended and may
be developed in partnership with the private and non-governmen-
tal sectors. Finally, arrangements for the continuous monitoring , D
review and revision the strategy must be developed.

14. Prepare a plan of action in consultation and partnership with
non-governmental organisations, people and their representatives,
·' which:
E
(a) Lists the activities that are the direct responsibility of the
public sector;

(b) Lists 'the activities to be taken to facilitate and encourage
the other actors to carry out their part of the task;
F
(c) Outlines resource allocation to the aforementioned ac-
' - tivities;

(d) Outlines the institutional arrangements for the implemen-
tation, co-ordination, monitoring and review of the strategy; G
(e) Outlines a schedule for the activities of the various agen-
cies."

Guidelines or steps to be taken at the international level were for-
mulated Guideline Nos. 15 to 17 are relevant and are stated thus : H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A "15. International action will be necessary to support the activities
of countries in their endeavour to improve the housing situation
of their poor and disadvantaged inhabitants. Such assistance
should support national programmes and use know- how available
locally and within the international community.

B x x x x x x x x x

17. Mutual co-operation and exchange of information and exper-
tise between developing countries in human settlement work stimu-
late and enrich national human settlement work."
c (Vide "Encyclopedia of Human Rights" by Edward Lawson).

In Encyclopaedia of Social ·,vurk in India (Volume 2) at page 82 it
stated that supply of housing in India does not fully meet the present needs
of the population whether in terms of location, size tenure, type or facilita-
D tion. The share of housing sector in India's economy is fluctuating from
year to year. Of the total housing stock of7.44 crore dwelling units available
in 1971 in rural areas, 0.80 crores was unserviceable kutcha, 2.44 crores
were serviceable kutcha, 2.79 crores were semi-pucca and only 1.41 crures

E
unit were pucca. The housing accommodation as a whole in the rural areas
as dwelling units is inadequate. With ever-growing pupulation and migra- ..
tion of poor to urban areas for livelihood, sluir.s aro gctt;ng escalated and
resultantly with the passage of time housing problem is her'lming increas-
ingly acute. Under Minimum Needs Programme provision of house sites
and construction of houses for rural landless poor was envisaged in the
Sixth Plan 1980-85 which continued in the Seventh Plan. Finances are
F provided for construction of the houses under the Planned Expenditure.

Indira Awas Yojana is evolved to provide housing accommodation
on war footing exclusively for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Their appalling housing condition is judicially taken notice by this Court
upholding the pragmatic approach of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Kasiredi
G Papaiah v. Govemment of A.P., AIR (1975) AP 269 as well in the following
words: "That the housing conditions of Harijans all over the country
continue to be miserable even today is a fact of which courts are bound to
take judicial notice. History has made it urgent tha~ among other
problems, the problem of housing Harijans should be solved expeditiously.
H The greater the delay the more urg~nt becomes the problem. Therefore,
CHAMELI SINGH v. STATE [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 839

one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency A
provisions of •be Land Acquisition Act for providing house sites for
Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of
taking further action in the matter are negligent or tardy in the discharge
of their duties, unless, of course, it can be established that the acquisition
itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pressures of history are B
not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy. I am not trying to
make any pontific pronouncements. But I am at great pains to point out
that provision for house sites for Harijans is an urgent and pressing
necessity and that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the land
.. Acquisition Act cannot be said to be improper, in the absence of ma/a
fides, merely because of the delay on the part of some government officials". C

What was said by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in the context of provisions
of housing accommodation to Harijans is equally applied to the problem
of providing housing accommodation to all persons in the country in State
of U.P. v. Pista Devi and Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 251 holding that today having D
regard to the enormous growth of population ur~ency clause for planned
development in urban area was upheld by two-Judge Bench. The ratio of
Kasiredi Papaiah' case was quoted with approval by a three-Judge Bench
in Deepak Pahwa v. Lt. Govemor of Delhi, [1985] 1 SCR 588. The delay by
• the officials was held to be not a ground to set at naught the power to
exercise urgency clause in both the above decisions, it would thus be clear E
that housing accommodation to the Dalits and Tribes is in acute shortage
and the State has undertaken as its economic policy under Planned Expen-
diture to provide shelter to them on war-footing, in compliance with the
Constitutional obligation undertaken as a member of the U.N.O. to the
resolution referred to hereinbefore.
F

The question, therefore, is whether invocation of urgency clause
under Section 17 (4) dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A is arbitrary
or is unwarranted for providing housing construction for the poor. In
Aflatoon & Ors. etc. v. Lt. Govemor, Delhi & Ors;, [1975] 4 SCC 285 at 290
a Constitution Bench of this Court had upheld the exercise of the power G
by the State under Section 17 (4) dispensing with the inquiry under Section
5- A for the planned development of Delhi. In Smt. Pista Devi's case, this
Court while considering the legality of the exercise of the power under
Section 17(4) exercised by the State Government dispensing with the
inquiry under Section 5-A for acquiring housing accommodation for H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A planned development of Meerut, had held that providing housing accom- ....
modation is national urgency of which Court should take judicial notice.
The pre-notification and post-notification delay caused by the concerned
office does not create a cause to hold that there is no urgency. Housing
conditions of Dalits all over the country continue to be miserable even till
B day is a fact of which courts are bound to take judicial notice. The ratio of
Deepak Pahwa's case (supra) was followed. In that case a three-Judge
Bench of this Court had upheld the notification issued under Section 17
(4), even though lapse of time of 8 years had occurred due to inter-
departmental discussions before receiving the notification. That itself was
considered to be a ground to invoke urgency clause. It was further held
C that delay on the part of the lethargic officials to take further action in the
matter of acquisition was not sufficient to nullify the urgency which existed
at the time of the issuance of the notification and to hold that there was
never any urgency. In !age Ram & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1971]
1 SCC 671 this Court upheld the exercise of the power of urgency under
D Section 17 (4)and had held that the lethargy on the part of the officers at
an earlier stage was not relevant to decide whether on the day of the
notification there was urgency or not. Conclusion of the Government that
there was urgency, though not conclusive, is entitled to create v.eight. In
Deepak Pahwa's case this Court had held that very often persons interested
E in the land proposed to be acquired may make representations to the
concerned authorities against the proposed writ petition that is bound to
result in multiplicity of enquiries, communications and discussions leading
invariably to delay in the execution of even urgent projects. Very often
delay makes the problem more and more acute and increases urgency of
F the necessity for acquisition. Rajasthan Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kisha11
& Ors., [1993] 2 SCC 84 at 91 this Court had held that it must be
remembered that the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is subjective one and
that so long as there is material upon which Government could have
formed the said satisfaction fairly, the Court would not interfere nor would
it examine the material as an appellate authority. In State of U.P. & Ors. v.
G Keshav Prasad Singh, [1995] 5 SCC 587 at 590 this Court had held that the
Government was entitled to exercise the power under Section 17(4)
invoking urgency clause and to dispense with inquiry under Section 5-A
when the urgency was noticed on the facts available on record. In Narayana
Govind Gavate's case (supra) a three-Judge Bench of this Court had held
H that Section 17 (4) cannot be read in isolation from Section 4(1) and
CHAMELI SINGH v. STATE [K RAMASWAMY, J.] 841

Section 5-A of the Act. Although 30 days from the notification under A
Section 4(1) are given for filing objections under Section 5-A inquiry
thereunder unduly gets prolonged. It is difficult to see why the summary
inquiry could not be completed quite expeditiously. Nonetheless, this Court
held the existence of plima facie public purpose such as the one present in
those cases before the Court, could not be successfully challenged at all by B
the objectors. It further held that it was open to the authority to take
summary inquiry under Section 5-A and to complete inquiry very ex-
peditiously. It was emphasised that :

"...... The mind of the Officer or authority concerned has to be
applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a C
nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A of
the Act should be eliminated. It is not just the existence of an
urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section
50A which has to be considered".

D
It would thus be seen that this court emphasised the holding of an
inquiry on the facts peculiar to that case. Very often the officials, due to
apathy in implementation of the policy and programmes of the Govern-
ment, themselves adopt dilatory tactics to create cause for the owner of the
land to challenge the validity or legality of the exercise of the power to
defeat the urgency existing on the date of taking decision under Section E
17(4) to dispense with Section 5-A inquiry.

It is true that there was pre-notification and post-notification delay
on the part of the officers to finalise and publish the notification. But those
facts were present before the Government when it invoked urgency clause F
and dispensed with inquiry under Section 5-A. As held by this Court, the
• delay by itself accelerates the urgency: Larger the delay, greater be the
urgency. So long as the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing
needs of Dalits, Tribes and the poor arc not solved or fulfilled, the urgency
continues to subsist. When the Government on the basis of the material,
constitutional and international obligation, formed its opinion of urgency, G
the Court, not being an appellate forum, would not disturb the finding
unless the court conclusively finds the exercise of the power ma/a fide.
Providing house sites to the Dalits, Tribes and the poor itself is a national
problem, and a constitutional obligation. So long as the problem is not
solved and the need is not fulfilled, the urgency continues to subsist. The H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A State is expending money to relieve the deplorable housing condition in
which they live by providing decent housing accommodation with better
sanitary conditions. The lethargy on the part of the officers for pre and
post -notification delay would not render the exercise of the power to
invoke urgency clause invalid on that account.

B In every acquisition by its very compulsory nature for public purpose,
the owner may be deprived of the land, the means of his livelihood. The
State ,xercises its power of eminent domain for public purpose and ac·
quires the land. So long as the exercise of the power is for public purpose,
the individual's right of an owner must yield place to the larger public
C purpose. For compulsory nature of acquisition, sub-section (2) of Section
23 provides payment of solatium to the owner who declines to voluntarily
part with the possession of land. Acquisition in accordance with the
procedure is a valid exercise of the power. It would not, therefore, amount
to deprivation of right to livelihood. Section 23 (1) provides compensation
D for the acquired land at the prices prevailing as on the date of publishing
Section 4(1) notification, to be quantified at later stages of proceedings.
For dispensation or dislocation interest is payable under Section 23 (l·A)
as additional amount and interest under Sections 31 and 28 of the Act to
recompensate the loss of right to enjoyment of the property from the date
of notification under Section 23(1-A) and from the date of possession till
E compensation is deposited. It would thus be clear that the plea of depriva-
tion of right to livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable.

Thus considered, we liold that we do not find any illegality in the
notification warranting interference. The appeal is accordingly dismis~od
F but. in the circumstances, without costs.

CA. 12123/95 @SLP (C) No. 6831/93

In view of decision rendered above in Civil Appeal No. 12122/95 @
G SLP (C) No. 4896/93, this appeal is also dismissed but, in the circumstan·
ces, without costs.

S.M. Appeals dismissed.