Holding

Section 34 IPC applies, making each accused liable as if he had committed the murder himself, and the convictions are upheld.

Summary

The appellants Chaman, Vinod Kumar and Naresh entered the deceased Jaswant Singh's house armed with weapons, assaulted him and caused his death. They were convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment, with Vinod also convicted under Section 323. On appeal they contended that Section 34 was inapplicable, that one accused was a juvenile, and that no overt act was required. The Supreme Court held that Section 34, which embodies joint liability for a criminal act done in furtherance of a common intention, applies even if an accused does not personally inflict the fatal injury and no overt act is shown. The Court affirmed that the prosecution had proved a common intention among the accused and dismissed the appeal, upholding the convictions.

Issues considered

Whether Section 34 IPC is applicable to the accused who did not personally cause the fatal injury.
Whether a common intention among the accused must be proved for each individual or can be inferred from the circumstances.
Whether the presence of a juvenile certificate filed after trial can affect the conviction.
Whether the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 is sustainable on the evidence.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 323, s. 34

Subjects

Section 34 IPCcommon intentionjoint liabilitymurderlife imprisonmentappealjuvenile

Judgment

.,.--
L"'
[2008] 16 s.c. R. 882

.,
•..
A CHAMAN & ANR.
v.
-· . srAtE 'oF UTTARANCHAL
, .·: (CrirpirJ~I ApP,eal ·Na.· 409. of 2,007) ·.
.~ ~ . .;~ '

DECEMBER· t, 2008 · ~
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860 - s. 34 - Common intention :---
c Applicability of - Held: s. 34 is enacted on the principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal act - Existence of a
common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the
essential element - It is applicable even if no injury has been
caused by the particular accused himself - Some overt act
D on the part of accused is not necessary- On facts and in view
of the legal position, s. 34 applicable and offence made out
in respect of accused persons - Thus, conviction u/s. 302 rlw
s. 34 by courts below justified. •• lo;

According to the prosecution case, appellant C
E hurled abuses at JS over a petty matter. During night
appellant C along with appellant V, N and KR armed with
deadly weapons entered the house of JS. Father of JS-
PW 2 raised alarm. N pointed out the gun at him and PW
c-
2 caught hold of the barrel of the gun. V gave him blows '
F with· the Khukri. Appellant struck a blow on the person .I
of JS. PW 5, 6, 7 and others reached there. They saw that ....
V struck a blow with Khukri on JS. Thereafter, the
appellants ran away from the place of occurrence. JS .....

succumbed to his injuries. Trial court relying on the
rI
I

G evidence of PW 1, 2, 5 and 7, convicted the appellants for I
,-'
offence punishable u/s.302 r/w s. 34 IPC and awarded life
impri~onment. V was also convicted for offence
punishable u/s.323 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment
for six months. KR died during pendency of appeal. High ~

H 882
.•
CHAMAN & ANR v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL 883.

Court upheld the conviction of appellant C, V a.nd N. A
Hence the present appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Section 34 IPC has been enacted on the
principle ofjoint liability in-the doing of a criminal act. The. 8
Section is· only a rule of evidence and does not create a
substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the Section
)(
is the element of participation in action. The liability of
one person for an· offence committed by another in the
course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons
arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in C
furtherance of a common intention of the persons who
join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common
intention is seldom available and, therefore, such
intention can only be inferred from the circumstances
appearing from the proved facts of the case and the o-
proved circumstances . .In order to bring home the charge
of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by
evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was
plan or meeting of mind of all the accused persons to
commit the offence for which they are charged with the t
aid of Section' 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be before the
commission of the crime. The true contents of the Section
are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act
jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of F
them has done it individually by himself. [Para 6] (888-A-
E]
1.2. The existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential element for
~ppfication of this Section. It is not necessary thatthe acts G'
of the several persons charged with commission of an
offence jointly must be the same or identically similar.
The acts may be different in character, but must have been
actuated by one and the same common intention in order
to attract the provision. [Para 6] (888-E-F] H
884 SUPREME COURT REPOtns [2008] 16 S.C.R.

A 1.3. The Section does not say "the common intention
of .all", nor. doe!:l it _say "and intentie>n ,common to. all''.
Under the ·pfovisions:of·$e·ctiC>,,11,:34...~he -es.sence of the
lial;)ili~y )s. ~9. ~e. foun_d. in ft.I~ existe.nce of a common
int~ri*ion! ariJmati11g th.~ accused leading to the doing of
B a crimin.al ad frl furtherance of such intention. As a result
oft~~ appiication of principles enunciated in Section 34,
when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read
with Section·34, in law it means that ttm ~ccused is. liable
...
for the act which caused death of the deceased in the
same manner as if it was done by him alone. The
C provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be
difficult to -distinguish between acts of individual
members. of a_,party who act in furtherance of the
common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was .
taken .by each of therri. Section 34 is applicable· even if
D no, injury. ha~ been c.aused by the particular ·accused
himself. For a.pplying Se_ction 34 it is not necessary to \
show some overt act.on the part of the accused .. [Para .9]
[889-A-E.J .. ..
· 1.4. When the· factual scenario is considered in the
E background of legal position; ther~ is no merit in the
instant appeal. [Para· 11] [889-G]
.
~

Ashok Kumar v: State of Punjab AIR 1977 SC 109; Ch.
PuilaReddy and Ors. v. State.of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1993.
F SC 1899; Anil Sharma and Ors. v. State of Jharkhand 2004
(5) SCC 679; Harbans Kaur v. State of.Haryana 2005(9) '-
SCC 195 and Amit Singh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of
Maharashtra 2007(2) SCC 310,. relied on.
Mahbub Shah v_ Emperor AIR 1945 Privy Council 118, ''I
G referred to. · .,
:.~ :
Case. Law . Reference: l
r
AIR 1977 SC 109 , Relied on. Para 6 )

· AIR. 1945 Privy Council 118 Referred to. Para 8
H AIR 1993 SC 1899 Relied on. Para 9 !
CHAMAN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL 885

2004 (5) sec 679 Relied on. Para 10 A
2005(9) sec 195 Relied on. Para 10
2001(2) sec 310 Relied on. Para 10
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 409 of 2007. B
From the Judgment and final Order dated 20.7.2006 of the
High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Crl. Appeal No. 1275
of 2001 (Old No. 991 of 1987).
Mahinder Singh Dahiya and A. Rama Devi for the c
Appellants.
Jatinder Kumar Bhatia for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT,,J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is D
to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court
of Uttaranchal at Nainital upholding the conviction of four
appellants who had filed Criminal Appeal no.1275 of 2001. One
of the appellants Khushi Ram died during the pendency of the
appeal. By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the E
conviction so far as other appellants Chaman, Vinod Kumar
and Naresh are concerned. The first two are appellants in the
present appeal. No appeal has been preferred by accused
Naresh. Each of the accused was convicted for offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian F
Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentenced to
imprisonment for life. Appellant Vinod was additionally
convicted for offence punishable under Section 323 IPC and
sentenced to imprisonment for six months.
2. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows: G
~ On 09.07.1985, at about 5:00 P.M., Jaswant Singh
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') was returning to his
home, when he met Rani, daughter of Onkar Das and they
started talking to each other. Appellant Chaman, brother of Rani,
came from his house hurling abuses at Jaswant Singh, saying H
886 SUPREME CQ_URT.REPORTS. [20R~J 16 S.C.R.

_A "TU 13AHUT BADAS~ND BANTA HAI; RUf<TL!JHEtMAJAA
CHAKHATM HUN" (You think yourself to be a big bull, wait I
wil a 1

at
teach you lesson). Thereafter, on-the $ ame day, about
1:30 AM. in the intervening night of 9th/10th of July, 1985, when
Jaswant-deceased, his father Chamela Ram (p.w. 2), brother
B · Data Ram (P.W. 1), were sleeping :in 'the verandah of their
house, they woke up on hearing the barking of their dog and
_-flashed their torches and saw that app_ellants NaresQ, (armed <-

with a gun),. Vined, (armed with a: Kr.IUKRl-a sharp edged
weapon), Chaman, (armed with SAINTA-a sharp edged
. , C Y'eapon) and)~hushi Ram,, (armed with a cquntry made pistol),
entered their house. Appellant Chaman, 'asked Jaswant to
stand up. On which, Jaswant along with Data Ram, got up from
their cots. Meanwhile, ,Chamela Ram (P .W.2) raised an alarm
"BACHAO! BACHAO!! (Save! Save!!). Naresh pointed the gun
at him. Charrtela Ram ca.ught hold the barrel of the gun to save
D him$elf. On this, appellant Vi nod gave .him blows with the butt
of Khukri. Meanwhile, -appellant Chaman struck a blow with
. SAINTA (a sharp edged weapon) on the person of Jaswant,
_ who ran to save his life. However, Jaswant could not go far and
fell down near the house _of Nain Singh! By then;· witnesses
E Bhuru-(P.W.5), Ramu, Isam (P.W.6), Nakli (P.W.7)·and,Nain
Singh had reached there. They also flashed their torches and
. saw that appellant .Vined, .struck a blow with the Khukri on injured
_-Jaswant. ;J"hereafter, all the four app,ellants ran :away from the
place of occurrence. Jaswant Singh, succumbed to the injuries
F on the spot, near, the house of Nain Singh. A written report (Ext.
A-1) of the incident was got scribed by Raj Kumar (P.W. 4) by
Chamela Ram (P.W. 2), which was lodged against all the fo1Jr
accused persons with the police station Doiwala on
10.07.1985, at about_ 5:30 AM. The distance between the place
of occurrence (Chandi Plantation) and the police station is 15
~ G kms. On' the b·asfs 'of said report (Ext. A-1), its check report (Ext.
A~18)'was prepared at the police station and necessary entry
was made in the general diary, a copy of which is Ext. A-17.
Crime .No.117 of 1985 was Jegis.tered against -all the four
accused persons, for the offence allegedly committed by them
H
CHAMAN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL 887
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
under Section 302 of l.P.C. P. W. 8 H.C. Panda, Sub Inspector, A
after aforesaid report was lodged with the police station,
proceeded to the place of occurrence on 10.07.1985 and took
the dead body of Jaswant in his possession and prepared the
inquest report (Ext. A-4). He also prepared site plan (Ext. A-
5), filled police form No.13 (Ext. A-6), prepared letter (Ext. A- B
7) addressed to Chief Medical Officer, requesting for post
.. mortem examination nf the dead body. H.C. Pandey, Sub-
.. Inspector (P.W.8) also took blood stained 'BANIYAN'
(undershirt) Ext.8 in his possession and prepared memo (Ext.
A-9). He furthertook into his possession simple soil (Ext. 12)
and blood stained- soil (Ext. 13) and prepared memo (Ext. A- 1C
10). Autopsy was conducted by Dr. A.S. Khanuja (P .W. 11) on
the very day i.e. on 10.07.1985 at 4:00 P.M, on the dead body
of the deceased, prepared post-mortem examination report
(Ext. A-26) and opined that the death has been caused due to
shock and haemorrhage, resulting from injury over the lung. D
investigating Officer also recovered the torches, in the light of
• which the crime was witnessed by the witnesses. After
• recording the statements of the witnesses and on completion
of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge
sheet (Ext. A25) before the Magistrate concerned. Since E
accused persons pleaded innocence, trial was held.
3. Relying on the evidence of eye witnesses PWs 1, 2, 5
and 7 the Trial Court found the accused persons guilty and
sentenced them as aforesaid.
F
..... 4. In appeal, the main ground was that the offence has not
been made out in respect of the accused persons. It was further
stated that one of the accused persons was a juvenile. It was
also submitted tliat Section 34 has no application.
5. Reliance is placed on a certificate dated 20.8.2008 to G
'
contend that one of the accused persons was a juvenile. The
~
same has not been brought on record earlier. In any event, the
certificate came into the existence much after the completion
of the trial and disposal of the appeal by the High Court. We,
therefore, are not inclined to take note of the certificate which H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 16 S.C.R.

is pressed into service.
..., ,, _
A
6. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint
liability in the doing of a criminal aqt. The Section is only a rule
of evidence ang ~oes not create a suostantive offence. The
distinctive feature of the Section is the element of participation
B in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed
by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several ..,
persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done ~

in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join
in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is
c seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be
inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved
. facts of the case and the· proved circumstances. In order to
bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution
has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
that there was plan or meeting of mind of all the accused
D
persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with
the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of
moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of ..
.. ,)

the crime. The true contents of the Section are that if two or
more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law
E is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by
himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (AIR
1977 SC 109), the existence of a common intention amongst
the participants in a crime is the essential element for
application of this Section. It is not necessary that the acts of
F the. several persons charged with commission of an offence
jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be
different in character, but must have been actuated by one and
the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
7. As it originally stood, Section 34 was in the following
G terms:
11
When a criminal act is done by several persons, .>-
. ·~
~
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same
manner as if the act was done by him alone."
H
CHAMAN & ANR. v. STATE OF UTTARANCHAL 889
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
....·. 8. In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words A
"in furtherance of. the common intention of all" after the word
"persons" and before the word "each", so as to make the object
of Section 34 clear. This position was noted in Mahbub Shah
v. Emperor (AIR 1945 Privy Council 118).
9. The Section does not say "the common intention of all", B
_, nor does it say "and intention common to all". Under the
~
. provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found
•I in the existence of a common intention animating the accused
' leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such
intention. As a result of the application of principles enLlnciatetl c
in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302
read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable
for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same
manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is
intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish D I

between acts of individual members of a party who act in
furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly
what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Ch.
Pu/la Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1993
SC 1899), Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been
E
caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section
34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the
accused.
10. The above position was highlighted recently in Anil
Sharma and Others v. State of Jharkhand [2004 (5) SCC 679], F
) ~
in Harbans Kaur v. State of Haryana [2005(9) SCC 195] and
Amit Singh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra
r2001(2) sec 31 OJ.
11. When the factual scenario is considered in the
background of legal position, there is no merit in this appeal. G
~ Looked from any angle the appeal is without merit, deserves
dismissal, which we direct.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.