CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS.versusA. MASILAMANI

                    (2012) 11 S.C.R. 35


            CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS.                       A
                              v.
                      A. MASILAMANI
              (Civil Appeal No. 8263 of 2012)
                   NOVEMBER 23, 2012
                                                                 B
               [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND
             JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, JJ.]
     Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings ..:. Punishment
imposed in disciplinary proceeding set aside by Court/tribunal
on technical grounds - Whether the superior court, must C
provide opportunity to the disciplinary authority, to take up and
complete the proceedings, from the point that they stood
vitiated - Held: Once the Court sets aside an order of
punishment, on the ground that the enquiry was not properly
conducted, it must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary D
authority, for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it
stood vitiated, and conclude the same.

     Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings - Punishment
imposed in disciplinary proceeding set aside by Court/tribunal E
on technical grounds - Opportunity to disciplinary authority,
to take up and complete the proceedings, from the point that
they stood vitiated - Whether may be denied on the ground
of delay in initiation, or in conclusion of the disciplinary
proceedings - Held: The court/tribunal should not generally F
set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges
on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings,
as sµch power is de hors the limitation of judicial review -
Same principle applicable in relation to there being a delay
in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings - On facts, matter
remitted to the disciplinary authority to enable it to take fresh G
decision, taking into consideration the gravity of the charges
involved, as to whether it may still be required to hold a de
novo enquiry, from the stage that it stood vitiated, i.e., after

                              35                                 H
    36       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2012) 11 S.C.R.


A issuance of charge-sheet - In the event that the authority takes
    a view, that the facts and circumstances of the case require a
    fresh enquiry, it may proceed accordingly and conclude the
    said enquiry, most expeditiously - Life Insurance Corporation
    of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 - Regulations 39(1) and
B   46(2).

      Words and Phrases - "consider" - Meaning of -
  Dictionary meaning - Term "consider" postulates
  consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter - Clear
  connotation to the effect that·there must be active application
C of mind.
        The respondent was working with the appellant-
    Corporation as a Higher Grade Assistant. Disciplinary
    proceedings were initiated against him by the appellants.
o   The proceedings were quashed by the High Court.

        The High Court after reappreciating the entire
  evidence available on record, came to the conclusion that
  in the course of enquiry proceedings, certain witnesses
E had not been examined in the presence of the delinquent
  respondent, and that hence, no proper opportunity was
  given to him to cross-examine such witnesses; that
  moreover, the documents relied upon by the Enquiry
  Officer, were not properly proved by any witness and
  ultimately, the findings of the Enquiry Officer stood
F vitiated, for non-compliance with mandatory requirements
  of the applicable regulations as well as for violating of
  the principles of natural justice. The court further held
  that the Appellate Authority had not applied its mind to
  the case, and had failed to consider the case as required
G under Regulation 46(2) of the Life Insurance Corporation
  of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. Thus, the court set
  aside the punishment imposed upon the respondent, and
  also refused to give the appellant any opportunity, to
  continue the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated.
H
CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 37


    The appellants submitted before this Court that the A
High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by quashing the
disciplinary proceedings, as well as the punishment
imposed, stating that the same did not fall within the
scope of judicial review and that moreover, the decision
to not remand the case for rf)consideration at such a B
belated stage, could also not be justified.

     The following questions therefore arise for
consideration: 1) When a court/tribunal sets aside the
order of punishment imposed in a disciplinary
proceeding on technical grounds, i.e., non-observance of C
statutory provisions, or for violation of the principles of
natural justice, then whether the superior court, must
provide opportunity to the disciplinary authority, to take
up and complete the proceedings, from the point that
they stood vitiated and; 2) If the answer to question no.1 D
is, that such fresh opportunity should be given, then
whether the same may be denied on the ground of delay
in initiation, or in conclusion of the said disciplinary
proceedings.
                                                          E
    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD: 1. It is a settled legal proposition, that once
the Court sets aside an order of punishment, on the
ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the F
Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the
concerned case to the disciplinary authority, for it to
conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated,
and conclude the same. [Para 9) [47-C]

     Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc.etc. v. B. G
Karunakar etc.etc. AIR 1994 SC 1074: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR
576; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M. School
for Girls & Ors. (2002) 10 SCC 293; U.P. State Spinning C.
Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey & Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 264: 2005 (3)
Suppl. SCR 603 and Union of India v. Y.S. Sandhu, Ex- H
    38      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A   Inspector AIR 2009 SC 161: 2008 (13) SCR 784 - relied on.

         2. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be
    given an opportunity to complete the enquiry afresh from
    the point that it stood vitiated, depends upon the gravity
    of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine
B
    the magnitude of mis.conduct alleged against the
    delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/
    tribunals, are not competent to quash the charge-sheet
    and related disciplinary proceedings, before the same are
    concluded, on the aforementioned grounds. The court/
C   tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental
    enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay
    in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power
    is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that
    the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its
D   power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore,
    a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the
    course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be
    quashed by court. The same principle is applicable in
    relation to there being a delay in conclusion of
E   disciplinary proceedings.The facts and circumstances of
    the case in question, have to be examined taking into
    consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved
    therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must
    take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance
F   and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in
    the interest of clean and honest administration, that the
    judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only
    on the ground of delay in their conclusion. [Para 10) [47-
    F-H; 48-A-C]
G
        State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr. AIR 1987 SC
    943: 1987 (2) SCR 444; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani
    Singh.& Anr. AIR 1990 SC 1308: 1990 Suppl. sec 738;
    Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok Kacker 1995 Supp (1) SCC
    180; Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise
H
CHAIRMAN, UC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI             39

Department v. L. Srinivasan (1996) 3 SCC 157: 1996 (2)          A
SCR 737; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan AIR
1998 SC 1833; M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2006
SC 3475: 2006 (3) SCR 896; Union of India & Anr. v.
Kunisetty Satyanarayana AIR 2007 SC 906: 2006 (9) Suppl.
SCR 257 and The Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Ors. v.        B.
Prabash Chandra Mirdha AIR 2012 SC 2250 - relied on .

     3. The word "consider", is of great significance. The
dictionary meaning of the same is, "to think over", "to
regard as", or "deem to be". Hence, there is a clear            C
connotation to the effect that, there must be active
application of the mind. In other words, the term
"consider" postulates consideration of all relevant
aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the
statutory authority, should reflect intense application of
mind with reference to the material available on record.        D
The order of the authority itself, should reveal such
application of mind. The appellate authority cannot
simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary
authority, and proceed to affirm its order. [Para 11) [48-
~~                                                              E
    Director, Marketing, Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v.
Santosh Kumar (2006) 11 SCC 147: 2006 (2) Suppl. SCR
880 and Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel & Ors: v. State of
Gujarat & Anr. AIR 2008 SC 1771: 2008 (4) SCR 1051 -            F
referred to.

     4. In the instant case, the impugned judgment cannot
be sustained in the eyes of law and is therefore set aside.
The matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to
enable it to take a fresh decision, taking into                 G
consideration the gravity of the charges involved, with
respect to whether it may still be required to hold a de
novo enquiry, from the stage that it stood vitiated, i.e.,
after issuance of charge-sheet. The disciplinary authority,
                                                                H
    40      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A while taking such a decision must bear in mind that
  charges are merely technical as the loan was taken for
  construction of a residential premises and the said loan
  was used effectually to construct the premises as per the
  sanctioned plan, and that it was only then that the said
B premises were put to commercial use. In the event that
  the authority takes a view, that the facts and
  circumstances of the case require a fresh enquiry, it may
  proceed accordingly, and conclude the said enquiry
  most expeditiously. [Para 12] (49-C-F]
c                    Case Law Reference:
         1993 (2) Suppl. SCR 576   relied on          Para 9
         (2002) 1o sec 293         relied on          Para 9

D        2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 603   relied on          Para 9
         2008 (13) SCR 784         relied on          Para 9
         1987 (2) SCR 444          relied on          Para 10
         1990 Suppl. sec 738       relied on          Para 10
E
         1995 Supp (1) sec 180     relied on          Para 10

         1996 (2) SCR 737          relied on          Para 10

         AIR 1998 SC 1833          relied on          Para 10
F
         2006 (3) SCR 896          relied on          Para 10

         2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 257   relied on          Para 10
         AIR 2012 SC 2250          relied on          Para 10
G        2006 (2) Suppl. SCR 880   relied on          Para 11
         2008 (4) SCR 1051         relied on          Para 11

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    8263 of 2012.
H
CHAIRMAN, UC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 41


    From the Judgment & Order dated 10.01.2011 of the High      A
Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 7 of 2011.

    Kailash Vasdev, Indra Sawhney for the Appellants.

    V. Ramasubramanian for the Respondent.
                                                                B
    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. Leave granted.

      This appeal has been preferred against the impugned
judgment and order dated 10.1.2011, passed by the High Court C
of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 7 of 2011, by way
of which, the Division Bench affirmed the judgment and order
dated 17.2.2010, passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ
Petition No.11152 of 2002, by way of which, the disciplinary
proceedings initiated by the appellants against the respondent D
have been quashed.

    2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are
as under:

     A. The respondent was working with the appellant- E
Corporation as a Higher Grade Assistant at its Namakkal
Branch. He had applied for, and obtained, a housing loan on
20.6.1991 from the India Housing Finance & Development Ltd.,
Salem, for the purpose of construction of his house to the extent
of 1095 sq.ft., and had also applied to the appellant- F
Corporation for a housing loan, under the Corporation's
Individual Employees Housing Scheme for the purpose of
completing construction of the said house. An amount to the
tune of Rs.1,30,000/-was outstanding, against the loan availed
by the respondent from the India Housing Finance & G
Development Ltd., as also a sum of Rs.48,000/- required for
completion of the said construction. The said loan was
sanctioned after completing all requisite formalities. However,
it came to the notice of the appellant-Corporation that there had
been certain irregularities and deviations with respect to the H
    42       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A   construction of the said house, and that the loan had been
    obtained upon non-disclosure of facts in entirety. Thus, a charge
    sheet dated 6.1.1998 was issued to the respondent, for
    violating the provisions of Regulations 20, 21, 27 and 39(1) of
    the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960
s   (hereinafter referred to as, the 'Regulations 1960').

         B. The respondent submitted his reply to the said charges,
    denying all of them, vide reply dated 30.1.1998. The
    Disciplinary Authority, however, was not satisfied with the
    explanation furnished by the respondent and therefore,
C   proceeded to conduct an enquiry, in relation to which, the
    Enquiry Officer submitted enquiry report dated 27.1.1999. The
    Disciplinary Authority served upon the respondent, a copy of
    the said enquiry report, alongwith a show-cause notice dated
    26.4.1999 giving him a period of 15 days to reply, to which the
D   respondent furnished his reply dated 17.5.1999.

         C. The Disciplinary Authority, after considering the reply
    and the enquiry report, imposed a penalty of reduction in the
    basic pay of the respondent, to the minimum amount specified
E   in the time scale applicable to him, in terms of Regulation
    39(1)(d) of the Regulations, 1960, as had been proposed by it
    in the aforementioned show cause notice, vide order dated
    31.5.1999.

        D. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal under
F   Regulation 40 of the Regulations, 1960, which was dismissed
    by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 11.4.2000.
    Thereafter, the respondent preferred a Memorial to the
    Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India, in Bombay,
    which was dismissed vide order dated 20.9.2001.
G
         E. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred a writ petition for
    the purposE! of quashing of enquiry proceedings, the imposition
    of penalty, and also for re-imbursement of the amount that had
    been deducted from his salary, including all attendant benefits.
H   The said writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge
CHAIRMAN, UC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 43
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

of the High Court, vide order dated 17.2.2010, observing that A
the witnesses to the case, in the process of Departmental
Enquiry, had been examined in violation of the statutory rules
applicable herein, as well as in violation of the principles of
natural justice. The delinquent was not accorded adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The Appellate 8
Authority also failed to consider whether the procedure followed
by the Enquiry Officer, as well as that followed by the
Disciplinary Authority, satisfied the requirements of Regulation
46(2)(a) of the Regulations, 1960. This is because, mere
concurrence of the Appellate Authority, with the findings c
recorded by the Enquiry Officer, without provision of adequate
reasoning, cannot be said to amount to adequate application
of judicial mind by the Appellate Authority, for the purpose of
imposing the said punishment.

    F. Aggrieved, the appellant-Corporation filed an appeal,     D
which was dismissed by the Division Bench.

    Hence, this appeal.

     3. Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned senior counsel, alongwith E
Ms. Indra Sawhney, Adv. appearing for the appellants, has
submitted that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction by
quashing the disciplinary proceedings, as well as the
punishment imposed, stating that the same does not fall within
the scope of judicial review. Moreover, the decision to not F
remand the case for reconsideration at such a belated stage,
could also not be justified. Therefore, the judgment and order
of the High Court, are liable to be set aside.

      4. Per contra, Mr. V. Ramasubramanian, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, has opposed the appeal, G
contending that the High Court had taken note of every fact, and
if after doing so, the court had come to the conclusion that the
said disciplinary proceedings, had in fact, been conducted in
violation of the principles of natural justice and applicable
statutory rules, then no interference is warranted. The fact that H
    44         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A   the appellant was refused an opportunity, to complete the said
    enquiry de novo, on the ground of delay, is fully justified in law.
    Thus, no interference is called for, and the said appeal is liable
    to be dismissed.

         5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
8
    learned counsel for the parties, and perused the record.

         It may be pertinent to refer to the relevant statutory
    provisions involved herein:

c        Regulation 39(1) of the Regulations 1960 reads as under:

         "39(1). Without prejudice to the provisions of other
         regulations, (any one or more of) "the following penalties
         for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter
         provided, be imposed (by the disciplinary authority
D
         specified in Schedule-I)" on the employee who commits a
         breach of regulations of the Corporation, or who display
         negligence, inefficiency or indolence or who knowingly
         does anything detrimental to the interest of the Corporation,
         or conflicting with the instructions or who commits a breach
E        of discipline, or is guilty of any other act prejudicial to good
         conduct -

         (a)

         (b)
F
         (c)    ............ .

         (d) reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower
         time scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale."
G
         Regulation 46(2) of the Regulations 1960 read as under:

               "In case of an appeal against the order imposing any
         of the penalties specified in Regulation 39, the appellate
         authority shall consider-
H
CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 45
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

    (a) Whether the procedure prescribed in these Regulations         A
    has been complied with, and if not, whether such non-
    compliance has resulted in failure of justice;

    (b) Whether the findings are justified; and

    (c) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate            8
    or inadequate, and pass orders ......

    xxxx          xxxx             xxxx"

    6. The charges framed against the respondent are as               c
under:

     (i)     That in your letter dated 13.5.1994 requesting for
             release of Rs.26,000/- as second instalment of
             housing loan under M.L. No. 7803003 you had
             willfully omitted to bring to the notice of the          D
             Corporation that you had constructed the rear side
             of the house (comprising of kitchen, store, toilet and
             reading room) measuring 385 sq.ft.

     (ii)    That your above action tantamounts to breach of          E
             agreement.

     (iii)   That you submitted a letter dated 20.6.1994 giving
             false information that you had completed the house
             in all aspects whereas by your, letters dated
             10.11.94 and 29.11.94 you had informed us that the       F
             rear side of the house was not constructed. It was
             found that even as on 2.9.1997 the work to
             complete the construction was not commenced.

     (iv)    That you had drawn housing loan in excess by             G
             giving false statement as mentioned above.

     (v)     That you are putting the premises to commercial
             use without the knowledge and approval of the
             Corporation.
                                                                      H
    46           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A         (vi)    That you are carrying on manufacturing of Jute bags
                  and Cotton floor mats business in the said
                  premises without the knowledge of the Corporation.

        7. In the present case, the High Court after reappreciating
B the entire evidence available on record, came to the conclusion
  that in the course of enquiry proceedings, certain witnesses had
  not been examined in the presence of the delinquent
  respondent, and that hence, no proper opportunity was given
  to him to cross-examine such witnesses. Moreover, the
C documents relied upon by the Enquiry Officer, were not properly
  proved by any witness and ultimately, it was held that the
  findings of the Enquiry Officer stood vitiated, for non-compliance
  with mandatory requirements of the regulations applicable
  herein, as well as for violating of the principles of natural justice.
  The court further held that the Appellate Authority had not
D applied its mind to the case, and had failed to consider the
  case as required under Regulation 46(2), of the Regulations,
  1960. Thus, in light of the aforementioned observations, the
  court set aside the punishment imposed upon the respondent,
  and also refused to give the appellant any opportunity, to
E continue the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated,
  consequently therefore, denying any opportunity to prove the
  documents relied upon, as also denying th~ respondent
  adequate opportunity to cross-examine the concerned
  witnesses etc., only on the ground that a long time had now
F passed.

         8. In view of the issues raised by the learned counsel for
    the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration:

          (i)     When a court/tribunal sets aside the order of
G                 punishment imposed in a disciplinary proceeding
                  on technical grounds, i.e., non-observance of
                  statutory provisions, or for violation of the principles
                  of natural justice, then whether the superior court,
                  must provide opportunity to the disciplinary
H                 authority, to take up and complete the proceedings,
CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 47
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
             from the point that they stood vitiated and;          A

      (ii)   If the answer to question no.1 is, that such fresh
             opportunity should be given, then whether the same
             may be denied on the ground of delay in initiation,
             or in conclusion of the said disciplinary
                                                                 8
             proceedings.

      9. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the Court sets
aside an order of punishment, on the ground that the enquiry
was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the
employee. It must remit the concerned case to the disciplinary C
authority, for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood
vitiated, and conclude the same. (Vide: Managing Director, ·
ECIL, Hyderabad etc.etc. v. B. Karunakar etc.etc. AIR 1994
SC 1074; Hiran Mayee Bhattacharyya v. Secretary, S.M.
School for Girls & Ors., (2002) 10 SCC 293; U.P. State D
Spinning C. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey & Anr., (2005) 8 SCC 264;
and Union of India v. Y. S. Sandhu, Ex-Inspector AIR 2009 SC
161).
     10. The second question involved herein, is also no longer E
res integra.

     Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given
an opportunity, to complete the enquiry afresh from the point
that it stood vitiated, depends upon.the gravity of delinquency
involved. Thus, the court must examine, the magnitude of F
misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in
view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent to quash
the charge-sheet and related disciplinary proceedings, before
the same are concluded, on the aforementioned grounds.
                                                                   G
     The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the
departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of
delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power
is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the
court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of H
    48       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A   judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet
    or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary
    proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same
    principle is applicable, in relation to there being a delay in
    conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and
B   circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined,
    taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges
    involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must
    take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and
    weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is intact in the interest
C   of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings
    are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their
    conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma & Anr,
    AIR 1987 SC 943; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh &
    Anr., AIR 1990 SC 1308; Union of India & Anr. v. Ashok
    Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180; Secretary to Government,
D   Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3
    SCC 157; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, AIR
     1998 SC 1833; M. V. Bijlani v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2006
    SC 3475; Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana,
    AIR 2007 SC 906; and The Secretary, Ministry of Defence &
E    Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha, AIR 2012 SC 2250).

          11. The word "consider", is of great significance. Its
    dictionary meaning of the same is, "to think over", "to regard
    as", or "deem to be".
F
      Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that, there
  must be active application of mind. In other words, the term
  "consider" postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a
  matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority,
G should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the
  material available on record. The order of the authority itself,
  should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority
  cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary
  authority, and proceed to affirm its order. (Vide: Director,
  Marketing, Indian OH Corpn. Ltd. & Anr v. Santosh Kumar,
H
CHAIRMAN, LIC OF INDIA & ORS. v. A. MASILAMANI 49
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
(2006) 11 SCC 147; and Bhikhubhai Vith/abhai Patel & Ors.             A
v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 1771).

     12. The instant case requires to be considered in the light
of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.

      After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the view   8
that the impugned judgment and order dated 10.1.2011, in Writ
Appeal No. 7 of 2011, as well as the order of the learned
                          •
Single Judge dated 17.2.2010, passed in Writ Petition No.
11152 of 2002, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and are
therefore hereby, set aside. The present appeal is allowed. The       C
matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority to enable it to
take a fresh decision, taking into consideration the gravity of
the charges involved, as with respect to whether it may still be
required to hold a de nova enquiry, from the stage that it stood
vitiated, i.e., after issuance of charge-sheet.                       D
                                                                      '
    The disciplinary authority while taking such a decision must
bear in mind that charges are merely technical as the loan was
taken for construction of a residential premises and the said
loan was used effectually to construct the premises as per            E
sanctioned plan and only then the premises was put to
commercial use.

     In the event the authority takes a view, that the facts and
circumstances of the case require a fresh enquiry, it may
proceed accordingly and conclude the said enquiry, most               F
expeditiously.

B.B.B.                                           Appeal allowed.