CA RAMCHANDRA DALLARAM CHOUDHARYversusADANI INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEVELOPERS PRIVATE LIMITED

                  [2026] 7 S.C.R. 208 : 2026 INSC 629

             CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary
                               v.
      Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited
                    (Civil Appeal Diary No. 5988 of 2026)
                                  01 June 2026
           [Dipankar Datta* and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]


                            Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose that where an appeal u/s.62 IBC is filed within time,
       i.e., 45 (forty-five) days or beyond the said period but before expiry
       of 60 (sixty) days as contemplated in the sub-sections thereof and
       are marked defective, for whatever reason, whether this Court
       can condone the delay in refiling of the appeal when the defects
       pointed out are not cured within 28 (twenty-eight) days.

                                   Headnotes†
       Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.62 – Supreme Court
       Rules, 2013 – Ord.VIII r.6 Sub-rules (3) and (4) – Condonation
       of delay – Appeal u/s.62, at the instance of liquidator of a
       corporate debtor under liquidation challenging the order
       passed by NCLAT – Appeal presented beyond the period of
       limitation prescribed in s.62(1), but within the grace period
       stipulated in sub-section (2) – Office reported a delay of 7
       days in filing the appeal – Application seeking condonation of
       delay filed – Office also marked the appeal defective – Upon
       curing the defects, the appeal came to be re-filed after a further
       delay of 82 days, for which a separate application seeking
       condonation of the delay in re-filing also filed:
       Held: 45 (forty-five) days is available under subsection (1) of s.62
       from date of receipt of the order of the NCLT to file an appeal
       involving a substantial question of law before this Court – As
       per sub-section (2), subject to sufficient cause being shown, the
       Supreme Court may allow an appeal to be filed within 15 (fifteen)
       days after the expiry of the said 45 (forty-five) days but not beyond –
       Curing of defects arising out of a defectively filed appeal u/s.62
       is permissible within 28 (twenty-eight) days of notification thereof
       by the Registry – If the defects are cured within 28 (twenty-eight)
       days, the appeal would deserve registration upon removal of the

* Author
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                                 209

                CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
          Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

     “D No.” – However, there being no scope for curing defects after
     lapse of the period of 28 (twenty-eight) days in respect of an
     appeal u/s.62, filing of an application for condonation of the delay
     in re-filing does not arise – Thus, no question of condonation of
     delay [even for a day beyond 60 (sixty) days (in case of an appeal
     which, apart from the little delay in filing beyond 45 (forty-five days),
     is otherwise defect-free) and 28 (twenty-eight) days (in case of
     a defective appeal)] arises for consideration – Where the statute
     itself erects an insurmountable jurisdictional bar, no enquiry into the
     adequacy of the cause shown would alter the legal consequence
     that inexorably follows – Upon a perusal of the applications
     seeking condonation of delay in filing and in re-filing, sufficient
     cause not shown to satisfactorily explain the delay – Absent any
     cogent or convincing justification, the delay in both the filing of
     the defective appeal and re-filing of the appeal not liable to be
     condoned – Defective appeal dismissed as time-barred having
     been filed beyond the maximum period condonable in terms of
     the IBC. [Paras 25-28]

                                Case Law Cited
     Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd [2017]
     10 SCR 1006 : (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak
     Investment Advisors Limited [2021] 2 SCR 677 : (2021) 10
     SCC 401; National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Dunar Foods Ltd.
     (Resolution Professional) [2021] 7 SCR 1024 : (2022) 11 SCC
     761; V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd [2021] 14 SCR 736 :
     (2022) 2 SCC 244; Tata Steel Limited v. Raj Kumar Banerjee
     & Others [2025] 5 SCR 814 : (2025) 9 SCC 483; PEC Ltd. v.
     M/s Phulchand Exports Private Ltd., Civil Appeal (Diary) No.
     37293 of 2022; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S.
     Gopalakrishnan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484; CA Ramchandra
     Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd.,
     2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
     Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Supreme Court Rules,
     2013; Constitution of India.

                               List of Keywords
     Appeal u/s.62 IBC; Marked defective; Condone the delay in
     refiling of appeal when defects pointed out not cured within 28
210                                                            [2026] 7 S.C.R.

                             Supreme Court Reports


       (twenty-eight) days; Condonation of delay; Liquidator of corporate
       debtor under liquidation; Appeal presented beyond the period of
       limitation; Curing of the defects.

                               Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Diary No.
       5988 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2025 of the National
       Company Law Appellate Tribunal in CAAT (I) No. 2316 of 2024

                             Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Sunil Fernandes, Abhijeet Sinha, Sr. Advs., Atul Sharma, Pankaj
       Jain, Ms. Aditi Sharma, Vikram Choudhary, Shubham Bhalla.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Balbir Singh, Sr. Adv., Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, Anirudh Bhat, Siddarth
       Agarwal, Shamik Bhatt, Sanidhya Kumar, Vedant Kohli.

                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Dipankar Datta, J.

1.     This is an appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
       Code, 20161, at the instance of the liquidator of a corporate debtor
       under liquidation. Under challenge is the judgment and order dated
       08th December, 20252 passed by the National Company Law Appellate
       Tribunal, Principal Bench at New Delhi3 in Comp. App. (AT) (Ins)
       No.2316 of 2024.
2.     Having regard to the point on which we propose to decide the appeal,
       we see no reason to comment on the correctness or otherwise of
       the impugned order.
3.     The appeal was presented on 29th January 2026, beyond the period
       of limitation prescribed in sub-section (1) of Section 62, IBC but within


1    IBC
2    impugned order
3    NCLAT
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                                 211

                  CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
            Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

      the grace period stipulated in sub-section (2) thereof. Office reported
      a delay of 7 (seven) days in filing the appeal. An application seeking
      condonation of the said delay has been filed. Office had also marked
      the appeal defective. Upon curing the defects, the appeal came to
      be re-filed after a further delay of 82 (eighty-two) days for which a
      separate application seeking condonation of delay in re-filing has
      also been filed.
4.    At the outset, it must be borne in mind that the scheme of limitation
      under the IBC is a strict and time-bound one. The concept of
      condonation of delay itself is alien to the statutory framework beyond
      the period expressly contemplated under the statute. Section 62
      of the IBC permits an appeal to be filed before this Court within
      45 (forty-five) days, with a further grace period of only 15 (fifteen)
      days, and that too, only upon sufficient cause being shown. Thus,
      the outer limit statutorily permissible is 60 (sixty) days, beyond
      which the appeal itself becomes barred and the Court’s jurisdiction
      to condone the delay ceases.
5.    The importance of strict adherence to timelines under the IBC has
      been enunciated by this Court succinctly in its decision in Mobilox
      Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd.4 as follows:
             36. … Even in appeals to the Supreme Court from the
             Appellate Tribunal under Section 62, 45 days’ time is
             given from the date of receipt of the order of the Appellate
             Tribunal in which an appeal to the Supreme Court is to be
             made, with a further grace period not exceeding 15 days.
             The strict adherence of these timelines is of essence to
             both the triggering process and the insolvency resolution
             process. … .
6.    Time bound resolution is the essence of the IBC was reiterated
      in respect of an appeal under Section 61 thereof in Kalparaj
      Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited5 in the following
      words:
             158. This Court has held, that it is not open to the adjudicating
             authority or appellate authority to reckon any other factor


4    (2018) 1 SCC 353
5    (2021) 10 SCC 401
212                                                             [2026] 7 S.C.R.

                                   Supreme Court Reports


              other than specified in Sections 30(2) or 61(3) of the I&B
              Code. It has further been held, that the commercial wisdom
              of CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial
              intervention for ensuring completion of the stated processes
              within the timelines prescribed by the I&B Code. … .
                                                           (emphasis ours)

7.     Reference can also be made to the decisions in National Spot
       Exchange Ltd. v. Dunar Foods Ltd. (Resolution Professional)6, V.
       Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd7 and Tata Steel Limited v. Raj
       Kumar Banerjee and Others8 which, though arising in the context
       of appeals under Section 61 of the IBC, reaffirm that condonation
       of delay beyond the period expressly prescribed by the statute itself
       would be impermissible.
8.     Furthermore, this Court in PEC Ltd. v. M/s Phulchand Exports
       Private Ltd.9 held pithily as follows:
              1 There is a delay of 21 days in filing the appeal under
              Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
              2016. The delay is beyond the maximum period which is
              condonable in terms of the statute.
              2 Hence, the civil appeal is dismissed on the ground of
              limitation.
              3 Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
9.     In Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan10,
       delay of two days in presentation of an appeal under Section 62 of
       the IBC was not condoned reasoning that the Court has no power
       to condone the delay.
10. Let us now ascertain what the position is under the Supreme Court
    Rules, 201311. Sub-rules (3) and (4), of Rule 6 of Order VIII, SCR,
    lay down the regime governing re-filing of, inter alia, petitions and


6    (2022) 11 SCC 761
7    (2022) 2 SCC 244
8    (2025) 9 SCC 483
9    Civil Appeal (Diary) No. 37293 of 2022
10   2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484
11   SCR
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                               213

                  CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
            Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

      appeals after curing defects. A period of 28 (twenty-eight) days is
      earmarked for curing of defects. A litigant not curing the defects within
      28 (twenty-eight) days may re-file the petition or the appeal, as the
      case may be, together with an application seeking condonation of
      re-filing delay. Needless to observe, condonation of re-filing delay
      for petitions and appeals is discretionary.
11. Is it open to this Court [where an appeal under Section 62, IBC is
    filed within time, i.e., 45 (forty-five) days or beyond the said period but
    before expiry of 60 (sixty) days as contemplated in the sub-sections
    thereof and are marked defective, for whatever reason] to condone
    the delay in re-filing of the appeal when the defects pointed out are
    not cured within 28 (twenty-eight) days? This was the question we
    posed to Mr. Fernandes, learned senior counsel for the appellant
    to answer.
12. Mr. Fernandes contends that the appellant is a neutral officer acting
    under the aegis of this Court for the benefit of all stakeholders as
    well as the corporate debtor under liquidation and having regard
    to the nature of duties imposed on him, the insignificant delay in
    filing the appeal as well as re-filing thereof ought to be considered
    liberally rather than strictly. He also contends, notwithstanding that the
    defects were not cured within 28 (twenty-eight) days of such defects
    being notified, this Court’s power to condone re-filing delay of any
    number of days beyond 28 (twenty-eight) days is not fettered and if
    sufficient cause be shown to exist, which did preclude a party from
    acting within the timelines provided in the IBC, re-filing delay of any
    length of time is invariably condoned. According to him, under the
    SCR, delay in re-filing after curing of the defects is treated differently
    from delay in initial filing. If initially the appeal is filed within 45 (forty-
    five) days, or even within the grace period of 15 (fifteen) days and
    sufficient cause for condonation of filing delay is shown, the Court
    would generally condone the delay – in filing and re-filing - if the
    same is satisfactorily explained.
13. Mr. Fernandes has, in this connection, invited our attention to
    a coordinate Bench decision between the same parties in CA
    Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure &
    Developers (P) Ltd.12 where re-filing delay in filing an appeal before


12   2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406
214                                                           [2026] 7 S.C.R.

                          Supreme Court Reports


       the NCLAT under Section 61 of the IBC was condoned. Particular
       reliance was placed on the following passages:
           9. Be that as it may, it is well-recognised principle of law
           that the courts view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses
           more leniently than applications relating to litigant’s lapses.
           The classic example is the difference in approach of courts
           to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal
           and applications for the condonation of delay in refilling
           the appeal after rectification of defects. Useful reference
           may be made to the decision of the co-ordinate Bench of
           this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi
           Amma [(2008) 8 SCC 321; 2008 SCC OnLine SC 1049.]
           10. Having regard to the fact that the appellant despite
           limitations had done all that was necessary for filing of the
           appeal within 30 days, and then 15 days, i.e., within the
           prescribed and extended period of limitation, respectively,
           as well as dependency of the appellant on its lawyers who,
           in turn, were dependent on their clerk to refile the appeal,
           and there were some missteps contributing to the present
           situation, coupled with the fact that the issue sought to
           be raised by the appellant in the appeal filed before the
           National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, if answered in
           its favour, would enure to the benefit of the debtors, and
           also that better justice is always achieved when a lis is
           decided on a contested hearing rather than on default,
           we need to take an overall view of the matter. We are of
           the considered opinion that the words “sufficient cause” in
           this case ought to have been construed liberally and that
           interest of justice would be best served if, upon condonation
           of delay in refilling of the appeal, the National Company
           Law Appellate Tribunal proceeds with the hearing of the
           appeal on merits. Ordered accordingly.
14. We propose to advert to the decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram
    Choudhary (supra) a little later.
15. Having regard to the statutory scheme of the IBC, since validated
    by this Court in numerous decisions by holding that the strict
    timelines are meant to prevent misuse by dilatory tactics, it is
    difficult to accept Mr. Fernandes’ contention. It is axiomatic that an
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                         215

                CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
          Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

     appeal under Section 62 of the IBC to be regarded as having been
     instituted within the prescribed period of 45 (forty-five) days must be
     a defect-free appeal, which is capable of being acted upon by the
     Registry for being immediately placed before the appropriate Bench
     for consideration. Any appeal which is not filed within the stipulated
     period in a form shorn of defects, for all practical and legal purposes,
     remains a defective appeal.
16. Can or should a litigant be permitted to circumvent the rigours of
    limitation by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation
    and, thereafter, to opt to cure the notified defects at leisure? Can or
    should this Court countenance such a practice? The answers to both
    questions have to be a resounding ‘NO’. To hold otherwise would defeat
    the object of the IBC and render nugatory the discipline of timelines
    engrafted both in Section 62 as well as the SCR. Any such practice
    of filing a defective appeal, if encouraged, could result in a litigant
    dragging the process of re-filing for months and still being heard on
    his application for condoning re-filing delay premised on the ground
    that the IBC says nothing about re-filing delay and that the SCR being
    a procedural law must be read in a manner to aid the rendering of
    substantive justice to a party who is shown to be above board.
17. Consequently, no litigant can be permitted to subvert the statutory
    scheme by seeking condonation of re-filing delay beyond the period of
    28 (twenty-eight) days after having initially lodged a defective appeal.
    Once the window of 60 (sixty) days prescribed by the IBC, followed
    by the window of 28 (twenty-eight) days in re-filing the appeal upon
    curing of defects permitted by the SCR is shut, the right to appeal
    stands extinguished.
18. The argument that the SCR does not impose a cap beyond which
    re-filing delays cannot be condoned and, hence, it is the acceptability
    of the cause shown amounting to ‘sufficient cause’ which is and
    should be decisive, irrespective of the length of time taken to cure
    the defects, is equally unimpressive. The SCR is the subordinate
    legislation in the field and whenever the IBC and the SCR clash, the
    latter cannot override the express provisions of the former. The IBC
    must prevail being the statutory edict. Though indisputable that the
    standards for examining a prayer for condoning a re-filing delay is
    certainly less rigorous than a filing delay but such standard would
    stand true and be applicable for the general laws, like proceedings
216                                                            [2026] 7 S.C.R.

                                     Supreme Court Reports


       arising from the Codes of Civil and Criminal Procedure, as well as
       from remedies provided by the Constitution of India. Section 62,
       IBC is, however, a complete code in itself for filing of appeals and is
       different from other laws. An appeal under Section 62, IBC does not
       remain alive after the 28 (twenty-eight) day period allowable under
       the SCR for curing defects and the lis would stand frozen once
       the defects are not cured within such period. An extended window
       cannot be granted de hors the legislative intent behind stipulation
       of the strict timelines in the IBC.
19. We may also observe that the fact of the appellant being a neutral
    officer acting under the aegis of this Court for the benefit of all
    stakeholders and the corporate debtor under liquidation is not
    sufficient for us to invoke our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article
    142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory
    timeframes engrafted under the IBC. Pertinently, the IBC does not
    mark a different threshold for officers like the appellant and hence,
    reading words into the statute which are not used by the legislature
    would not be a permissible interpretational exercise.
20. Moving on to the decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary
    (supra), which has been pressed into service by Mr. Fernandes, the
    peculiar factual matrix of the said appeal assumes significance and
    warrants a recapitulation of the events.
       a.     Appellant had earlier challenged the order dated 21st June,
              2024 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal13 before
              the NCLAT in an appeal under Section 61, IBC. However, the
              appeal before the NCLAT itself was not filed within the prescribed
              period and was beset by delay in re-filing.
       b.     Vide its order dated 6th February, 2025, the NCLAT declined to
              condone the delay. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached
              this Court by filing an appeal14 under Section 62, IBC. This
              Court, by its order dated 5th May, 2025, set aside the order
              of the NCLAT and remanded the matter for consideration on
              merits, whereupon the NCLAT proceeded to decide the appeal
              and delivered the impugned order.


13   NCLT
14   Civil Appeal No. 5106 of 2025
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                         217

                CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
          Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

     c.    Significantly, while concluding its order dated 5th May, 2025,
           this Court specifically recorded that such order is not to be
           treated as a precedent.
21. It would, therefore, appear that notwithstanding the indulgence shown
    by this Court to the self-same appellant at an earlier stage, the appeal
    presently under consideration has been re-filed after substantial delay.
    The explanation for the re-filing delay reads as follows:
           4. That it is most humbly submitted that essentially the
           delay in refiling arose due to an internal oversight within
           the Office of the Liquidator. While the defects were duly
           communicated by the Registry, a concerned officer within
           the Liquidator’s office either mistakenly believed that the
           requisite details had already been conveyed or did not
           promptly relay them to the Advocate-on Record. It is also
           pertinent to mention that this officer has since left the
           position, leading to a gap in communication. The delay,
           thus, was neither intentional nor negligent but arose from
           a bona fide administrative lapse within the office.
                                                     (emphasis ours)

22. The circumstance that this Court had earlier interdicted refusal of the
    NCLAT to condone the delay in re-filing the appeal under Section 61
    of the IBC does not advance the appellant’s case, rather even on
    a cursory comparison of the two situations, it only accentuates the
    reason as to why the earlier exercise of discretion cannot be extended
    to the present proceedings. While setting aside the order of the
    NCLAT, this Court had emphasized the differing degrees of liberality,
    which ought to be extended in the cases of lapses attributable to
    the advocate-on-record and to the litigant, as far as re-filing delay
    is concerned. It was in this factual milieu, the controversy warranted
    examination on merits, thereby necessitating the condonation of
    delay in re-filing of the appeal before the NCLAT and restoration of
    the appeal before it.
23. The decision in CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary (supra)
    reiterates the principle which must guide the exercise of judicial
    discretion in matters of condonation of delay. The present case
    stands on an entirely different pedestal, wherein the appellant
    seeks condonation not merely of delay in re-filing but also of delay
218                                                            [2026] 7 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       in invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Section 62,
       IBC. Importantly so, the appellant approaches this Court after having
       availed the benefit of a liberal construction of “sufficient cause” at the
       previous stage of the same litigation. A litigant who has once secured
       indulgence in relation to delay cannot legitimately proceed on the
       assumption that further defaults engendered at the next appellate
       stage would automatically attract a similar exercise of discretion.
       To hold otherwise would render the law of limitation under the IBC
       progressively elastic at every successive stage of challenge, defeating
       the legislative objective of expedition and finality.
24. Restating what has already been enunciated, the appellant can
    derive no advantage from the earlier order condoning the delay in
    re-filing the appeal under Section 61, IBC before the NCLAT. That
    exercise of discretion was confined to the peculiar facts of that case
    and cannot be construed as a warrant for repeated indulgence. The
    discipline of limitation, particularly in the context of the IBC, does
    not countenance serial condonations of delay across successive
    appellate stages. Having once availed the benefit of a liberal
    approach, the appellant cannot legitimately seek a further relaxation
    when the present appeal under Section 62 is itself beset by delay
    both in filing and in re-filing.
25. To sum up our discussion, 45 (forty-five) days is available under sub-
    section (1) of Section 62, IBC from date of receipt of the order of the
    NCLT to file an appeal involving a substantial question of law before
    this Court. As per sub-section (2), subject to sufficient cause being
    shown, the Supreme Court may allow an appeal to be filed within
    15 (fifteen) days after the expiry of the said 45 (forty-five) days but
    not beyond. Curing of defects arising out of a defectively filed appeal
    under Section 62, IBC is permissible within 28 (twenty-eight) days
    of notification thereof by the Registry. If the defects are cured within
    28 (twenty-eight) days, the appeal would deserve registration upon
    removal of the “D No.”. However, there being no scope for curing
    defects after lapse of the period of 28 (twenty-eight) days in respect
    of an appeal under Section 62, IBC, filing of an application for re-filing
    delay does not arise. Consequently, no question of condonation of
    delay [even for a day beyond 60 (sixty) days (in case of an appeal
    which, apart from the little delay in filing beyond 45 (forty-five days),
    is otherwise defect-free) and 28 (twenty-eight) days (in case of a
    defective appeal)] arises for consideration.
[2026] 7 S.C.R.                                                        219

                  CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v.
            Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited

26. Thus, the legal position being settled beyond cavil, it is unnecessary
    for us to venture into the merits of the explanations furnished in
    support of the applications for condonation of delay in filing and
    re-filing herein. Where the statute itself erects an insurmountable
    jurisdictional bar, no enquiry into the adequacy of the cause shown
    would alter the legal consequence that inexorably follows.
27. Apart from what has been held above, upon a perusal of the
    applications seeking condonation of delay in filing and in re-filing,
    we find sufficient cause not having been shown to satisfactorily
    explain the delay(s). Absent any cogent or convincing justification,
    the delay(s) in both the filing of the defective appeal and re-filing of
    the appeal are not liable to be condoned.
28. Be that as it may, the defective appeal stands dismissed as time-
    barred having been filed beyond the maximum period condonable
    in terms of the IBC.
29. Connected applications too stand dismissed.

      Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.




      †
          Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain