C.P. SUBHASHversusINSPECTOR OF POLICE CHENNAI & ORS.
- Citation
- 2013 INSC 54
- Decided
- 23 January 2013
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- T S THAKUR
Holding
A High Court may not quash an FIR on the ground that the complaint does not prima facie constitute an offence unless rare, compelling circumstances exist, and Section 195(1)(b)(ii) does not apply where the alleged forgery occurred before the document entered court custody.
Summary
The appellant, C.P. Subhash, the General Manager of SNP Ventures, filed a criminal complaint alleging that senior managers of Gorden Woodroff Ltd. forged two 1922 sale deeds to fraudulently claim title over land he possessed. An FIR was registered under IPC sections 468 and 471, but the respondents obtained a quashing order from the Madras High Court, which held that the complaint did not prima facie constitute an offence and that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the CrPC barred cognizance. The Supreme Court examined whether a High Court may use its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution to quash pending criminal proceedings. It held that such power is to be exercised only in rare, compelling circumstances and that the complaint here did make out a prima facie case of forgery, warranting investigation. The Court also clarified that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies only when the alleged forgery occurs while the document is in court custody, which was not the case. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, dismissed the respondents' petition, and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- The scope of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC and Article 226 to quash an FIR pending investigation.
- Whether the complaint alleged offences under Sections 468 and 471 IPC prima facie.
- Whether Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC bars cognizance of the alleged forgery offences.
- Whether the civil suit pending on the same documents precludes criminal investigation.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 195(1)(b)(ii), s. 482
- Constitution of Indias. 226
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 468, s. 471
Subjects
Judgment
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 545
C.P. SUBHASH A
v.
INSPECTOR OF POLICE CHENNAI & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 2013)
. JANUARY 23, 2013
B
[T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Pending
criminal proceedings including FIRs under investigation -
Exercise of powers u/s.482 CrPC or u/Article 226 of the C
Constitution by the High Court - Scope - Private respondents
filed suit for declaration of title over landed property by placing
reliance upon two sale deeds/documents - Appellant filed
complaint alleging commission of offences punishable u/
· ss.468 and 471 /PC - High Court quashed the complaint/FIR D
- On appeal, held: In cases where the complaint, whether
lodged before a Court or before the jurisdictional police
station, makes out the commission of an offence, High Court
would not in the ordinary course invoke its powers to quash
such proceedings except in rare and compelling E
circumstances enumerated in the Supreme Court decision in
Bhajan Lat's case - In the case at hand, it cannot be said that.
the a/legations made in the complaint did not constitute any
offence or that the same did not prima facie allege the
complicity of the accused - Complaint filed by the appellant F
stated the relevant facts and alleged that documents had
been forged and fabricated only to be used as genuine to
make a fraudulent and illegal claim over the land owned by
the appellant - It was wrong for the High Court to hold that
the respondents concerned were not the makers of the G
documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the same
did not constitute an offence - Whether or not the respondents
concerned had forged the documents and if so what offence
was committed by them was a matter for investigation which
545 H
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A could not be prejudged or quashed by the High Court in
exercise of its powers u/s.482 CrPC or u/Article 226 of the
Constitution - High Court was thus wrong in quashing the FIR
- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Penal Code, 1860
- ss.468 and 471.
B
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.195(1)(b)(ii) -
Applicability of - Held: s.195{1)(b)(ii) CrPC is attracted only
when offences enumerated in the said provision have been
committed with respect to a document after it has been
produced or given in evidence in any court and during the
C time the same was in custodia legis - Bar contained in s. 195
against taking of cognizance not attracted to the case at hand
as the sale deeds relied upon for claiming title to the property
in question had not been forged while they were in custodia
legis -Penal Code, 1860 - ss.468 and 471.
D
The appellant was the General Manager of SNP
Ventures Pvt. Ltd. while respondents 2, 3 and 4 were
working with M/s Gorden Woodroff Limited ('GWL') as
legal advisers/Senior Managers. GWL filed suit for
E declaration of title qua 11.75 acres of land placing reliance
upon two sale deeds, dated 10th March, 1922 and 27th
June, 1922 respectively. SNP Ventures Pvt. Ltd. claiming
to be in actual physical possession of the said property
approached the Sub-Registrar's office to verify the
F genuineness of the two sale deeds relied upon by GWL.
Verification revealed that both the sale deeds in question
pertained to transactions between some private parties
and had no connection whatsoever with GWL. The Sub-
Registrar also informed the appellant that there was no
G transaction during the year 1922 in respect of the subject
lands. The appellant filed complaint against respondent
nos.2, 3 and 4 alleging commission of offences
punishable under Sections 468 and 471 IPC and FIR was
accordingly registered.
H
C.P. SUBHASH v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE 547
CHENNAI & ORS.
Aggrieved, respondents 2, 3 and 4 filed petition for A
quashing of the FIR as also investigation in connection
therewith. The petition was allowed by the High Court
which quashed registration of the case as also the
proceedings based on the same. The High Court called
in aid two precise reasons for doing so - firstly, that the B
allegations made in the complaint even if accepted in their
entirety did not prima facie constitute an offence or make
out a case against the respondents and secondly, that no
Court could, in view of the bar contained in Section 195
CrPC, take cognizance of offences in question except on c
a complaint in writing made by the court or the public
servant concerned. Hence the present appeal.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. The legal position regarding the exercise D
of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226
of the Constitution of India by the High Court in relation
to pending criminal proceedings including FIRs under
investigation is fairly well settled by a long line of
decisions of this Court. In cases where the complaint E
lodged by the c·Qmplainant whether before a Court or
before the jurisdictional police station makes out the
commission of an offence, the High Court would not in
the ordinary course invoke its powers to quash such
proceedings except in rare and compelling F
circumstances enumerated in the decision of this Court
in Bhajan La/'s case. [Para 7] [552-D-F]
1.2. In the case at hand, it cannot be said that the
allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any
offence or that the same do not prima facie allege the G
complicity of the persons accused of committing the
same. The complaint filed by the appellant sets out the
relevant facts and alleges that the documents have been
forged and fabricated only to be used as genuine to make
a fraudulent and illegal claim over the land owned by H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 1 S.C.R.
A complainant. [Para 10) [554-B-D]
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Rajesh Bajaj v. State, NCT of Delhi
(1999) 3 SCC 259; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh
B Kishore Gupta (2004) 1 SCC 691; V. Y. Jose and Anr. v. State
of Gujarat and Anr. (2009) 3 SCC 78 Harshendra Kumar D.
v. Rebatilata Koley etc. (2011) 3 SCC 351 - relied on.
State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Pastor P. Raju (2006) 6
sec 728 - cited.
c
2. Equally untenable is the view taken by the High
Court that the bar contained in Section 195(1 )(b)(ii) CrPC
could be attracted to the case at hand. Section 195(1 )(b)(ii)
CrPC is attracted only when the offences enumerated in
D the said provision have been committed with respect to
a document after it has been produced or given in
evidence in any court and during the time the same was
in custodia /egis. Therefore, the bar contained in Section
195 against taking of cognizance was not attracted to the
E case at hand as the sale deeds relied upon by GWL for
claiming title to the property in question had not been
forged while they were in custodia legis. [Paras 11, 12)
[555-E-G; 556-C]
Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi Marwah and
F Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370 and Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. v.
State of Bihar & Anr. (1998) 2 sec 493 - relied on.
3. The High Court was thus wrong in quashing the
FIR on the ground that the allegations did not constitute
. G an offence even when the same were taken to be true in
their entirety. It was also wrong for the High Court to hold
that the respondents were not the makers of the
documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the
same would not constitute an offence. Whether or not the
H respondents had forged the documents and if so what
C.P. SUBHASH v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE CHENNAI 549
& ORS.
offence was committed by the respondents was a matter A
for investigation which could not be prejudged or
quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The judgment passed by the High Court is
set aside and criminal petition filed, by the said B
respondents 2, 3 and 4 is dismissed. [Paras 13, 14] [556-
0-0] .
Case Law Reference:
(2006) 6 sec 128 cited Para 5 c
(2005) 4 sec 310 relied on Para 5
1992 supp (1) sec 335 relied on Para 7
(1999) 3~SCC 259 relied on Para 7
D
(2004) 1 sec 691 relied on Para 8
(2009) 3 sec 78 relied on Para 9
(2011) 3 sec 351 relied on Para 9
E
(1998) 2 sec 493 relied on Para 11
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 176 of 2013.
From the Judgment & Order dated 15.2.2011 of the High
F
Court of Judicature at Madras in Crl. O.P. No. 15917 of 2010.
K.K. Venugopal, D. Ramkrishna Reddy, D. Bharathi
Reddy, Ankur Talwar for the Appellant
Jayant Bhushan, U.A. Rana, Mrinal Majumdar, Himanshu
Mehta, Gagrat & Co., Praveen Jain, T.S. Sidhu, Tanu Pirya, M.V. G
Kini & Associaties, B. Balaji, Guru Krishna Kumar, Yogesh
Kanna, Prasanna Venkat for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A 2. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated
15th February, 2011 passed by the High Court of Madras
whereby Criminal O.P. No. 15917 of 2010 filed by respondents
2, 3 and 4 has been allowed, FIR No.41/10 dated 25th March,
2010 registered in Police Station Tambaram for offences
B punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 and the ongoing investigation into the said FIR
quashed.
3. The complainant-appellant in this appeal is the General
Manager of SNP Ventures Pvt. Ltd. while respondents 2, 3 and
C 4 were during the relevant period working with Mis Gorden
Woodroff Limited (for short 'GWL') as legal advisers/Senior
Managers. GWL has, it appears, filed O.S. No.169 of 2008
before the District Court, Chengalpattu seeking a decree for
declaration of its title qua 11. 75 acres of Iarid situated at
D Jameen Pallavaram Village, Tambaram in the State of Tamil
Nadu. In support of its claim of ownership over the suit property
GWL appears to be placing reliance upon two sale deeds one
dated 10th March, 1922 (document No.1551 of 1922) and the
other dated 27th June, 1922 (document No.1575 of 1922).
E SNP Ventures Pvt. Ltd. who claims to be in actual physical
possession of the suit property in the meantime appears to
have approached the Sub-Registrar's office at Saidapet to
verify the genuineness of the two sale deeds relied upon by
GWL. Verification revealed that both the sale deeds in question
F pertained to transactions between some private parties and had
no connection whatsoever with GWL. The Sub-Registrar also
informed the complainant that there was no transaction during
the year 1922 in respect of the subject lands at Jameen
Pallavaram.
G 4. It was on the basis of the above information that the
complainant filed a complaint against the respondents alleging
commission of offences punishable under Sections 468 and
471 of the IPC. Crime No.41/10 was accordingly registered in
the Central Cr'.me Branch, Chennai Suburban, St. Thomas
H Mount for the said offences against respondents 2; 3 and 4.
C.P. SUBHASH v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE 551
CHENNAI & ORS. {T.S. THAKUR, J.]
Aggrieved, the respondents filed Criminal O.P. No.15917 of A
2010 for quashing of the FIR as also investigation in connection
therewith which petition was heard and allowed by a Single
Judge of the High Court of Madras by an order dated 15th
February, 2011 quashing registration of the case as also the
proceedings based on the same. The High Court called in aid B
two precise reasons for doing so. Firstly, the High Court held
that the allegations made in the complaint even if accepted in
their entirety did not prima facie constitute an offence or make
out a case against the respondents herein. Secondly, the High
Court held that no Court could, in view of the bar contained in c
Section 195 Cr.P.C., take cognizance of offences in question
except on a complaint in writing made by the court or the public
servant concerned. The present appeal assails the correctness
of the said order passed, as already no~iced above.
5. Appearing for the appellant, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, D
learned senior counsel, argued that the High Court had fallen
in a palpable error in interfering with the ongoing investigation.
The complaint filed by the appellant, argued the learned
counsel, made specific allegations against the respondents
which could not be brushed aside without a proper verification E
of the correctness thereof in the course of investigation. In
support of his submission he placed reliance upon the decision
of this Court in State of Karnataka and Anr. v. Pastor P. Raju
(2006) 6 sec 728. He urged that the High Court could not
interfere with an ongoing investigation except under compelling F
circumstances or where the complaint did not make out any
case even if the allegations made therein were taken at their
face value. He further contended that the High Court was in
error in relying upon Section 195 of Cr.P.C. while quashing the
investigation. Section 195, argued Mr. Venugopal, was
G
applicable to cases in which the alleged fabrication of the
document had taken place while the same was in the custody
of the court. That was not the position in the case at hand.
Reliance in support of that contention was placed by Mr.
Venugopal upon a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
H
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anr. v. Meenakshi
Marwah and Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370.
6. Per contra, Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents 2, 3 and 4 argued that while the
complaint and the registration of the case was not hit by the
B provisions of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. in the light of the
decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court referred to
above, yet keeping in view the fact that the question of validity
and genuineness of the sale deeds relied upon by GWL was
the subject matter of a pending civil suit it would be an
C unnecessary and avoidable harassment for the respondents if
the investigation is allowed to proceed even before the Civil
Court records a finding regarding the genuineness of the sale
deeds.
7. The legal position regarding the exercise of powers
0
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India by the High Court in relation to pending
criminal proceedings including FIRs under investigation is fairly
well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. Suffice it
to say that in cases where the complaint lodged by the
E complainant whether before a Court or before the jurisdictional
police station makes out the commission of an offence, the High
Court would not in the ordinary course invoke its powers to
quash such proceedings except in rare and compelling
circumstances enumerated in the decision of this Court in State
F of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335. Reference may also be made to the decision of
this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State, NCT of Delhi (1999) 3
SCC 259 where this Court observed:
"... If factual foundation for the offence has been laid down
G
in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash
criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely
on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been
stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is
permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information
H
C.P. SUBHASH v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE CHENNAI 553
& ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts A
which are absolutely necessary for making out the
offence."
8. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta (2004) 1 SCC
691 where this Court said: B
"... The powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very
plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision
in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. C
The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a
legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest
Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a
prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not D
been collected and produced before the Court and the
issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule
can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High E
Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of
quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be
proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the
complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to
determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and F
on such premises, arrive at a c·onclusion that the
proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the
complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding
instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers G
to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where
the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which
cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open H
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 1 S.C.R.
A to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code ... "
9. Decisions of this Court in V. Y. Jose and Anr. v. State
of Gujarat and Anr. (2009) 3 SCC 78 and Harshendra Kumar
D. v. Rebatilata Kotey etc. (2011) 3 SCC 351 reiterate the
B above legal position.
10. Coming to the case at hand it cannot be said that the
allegations made in the complaint do not constitute any offence
or that the same do not prima facie allege the complicity of the
C persons accused of committing the same. The complaint filed
by the appellant sets out the relevant facts and alleges that the
documents have been forged and fabricated only to be used
as genuine to make a fraudulent and illegal claim over the land
owned by complainant. The following passage from the
complaint is relevant in this regard:
0
" ..... Thus evidently these two sale deeds being produced
by GWL i.e. 155111922 dated: 10th March 1922 and
157511922 dated 27th June 1922 are forged and
fabricated and after making the false documents they
E were used as genuine to make fraudulent and illegal
claim over our lands and go grab them. The
representatives of GWL Properties with dishonest motive
of grabbing our lands having indulged in committing
forgery and fabrication of documents and with the aid of
the forged documents are constantly attempting to
F
criminally trespass into our lawful possessed lands and
have been threatening and intimidating the staffs of our
company in an illegal manner endangering life and
damaging the land. The representatives of GWL
properties also have been making false statements to the
G Government Revenue Authorities by producing these
forged and fabricated documents with dishonest intention
to enter their name in the Government Records. The
present Director-in-charge and responsible for the affairs
of the GWL Properties Limited is Mrs. V.M. Chhabria
H
C.P. SUBHASH v. INSPECTOR OF POLICE CHENNAI 555
& ORS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
and all the above mentioned acts and commission of A
offences have been committed with the knowledge of the
Directors of GWL Properties Ltd., and connivance for
which they are liable. Mr. A. V.L. Ramprasad Varma
representing Mis GWL Properties Limited has registered
a civil suit in the District Court, Chengalpet using the B
forged documents. Mr. Salish, Manager (Legal), Mr.
Shanmuga Sundram, Senior Manager, (Administration),
have assisted in fabricating the forged documents and
used the same to get patta from Tahsildar, Tambaram,
thus cheating the Govt. Officials. Hence we request you c
to register the complaint and to investigate and take
action in accordance with law as against the said
company Mis GWL Property Limited represented by Mr.
Satish, Manager (Legal) Mr. Shanmudga Sundaram,
Senior Manager (Administration), A. V.L. Ramprasad
0
Varma, Directors, and their accomplice who have
connived a.nd indulged in fabricating and forging
documents for the purpose of illegally grabbing our lands
and for all other offences committed by them."
11. Equally untenable is the view taken by the High Court E
that the bar contained in Section 195(1 )(b)(ii) could be attracted
to the case at hand. In Iqbal Singh Marwah's case (supra) a
Constitution Bench of this Court had authoritatively declared
that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. was attracted only when the
offences enumerated in the said provision have been F
committed with respect to a document after it has been
produced or given in evidence in any court and during the time
the same was in custodia legis. This Court while taking that
view approved the ratio of an earlier decision in Sachida Nand
Singh & Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (1998) 2 SCC 493 where G
this Court held:
"12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence
involving forgery of a document if committed far outside
the precincts of the Court and long before its production
in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 1 S.C.R
A administration of justice merely because that document
later reached the court records.
xx xx xx xx
23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar
B contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not
applicable to a case where forgery of the document was
committed before the document was produced in a court."
12. Mr. Venugopal was, therefore, correct in contending
that the bar contained in Section 195 against taking of
C cognizance was not attracted to the case at hand as the sale
deeds relied upon by GWL for claiming title to the property in
question had not been forged while they were in custodia legis.
13. In the light of the above, the High Court was wrong in
quashing the FIR on the ground that the allegations did not
0
constitute an offence even when the same were taken to be true
in their entirety. It was also, in our view, wrong for the High Court
to hold that the respondents were not the makers of the
documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the same
E would not constitute an offence. Whether or not the respondents
had forged the documents and if so what offence was
committed by the respondents was a matter for investigation
which could not be prejudged or quashed by the High Court in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
F
14. In the result this appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The judgment and order dated 15th February, 2011
passed by the High Court is set aside and Criminal O.P.
No.15917 of 2010 filed by the respondents dismissed. We
G make it clear that neither the investigating agency nor the Court
before whom the matter may eventually come up for trial and
hearing upon conclusion of the investigation shall be influenced
by any observation made by this Court regarding the merit of
the case.
H B.B.B. Appeal allowed.
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