C.M. SHARMAversusSTATE OF A.P. TH. I.P.

               [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1105


                        C.M. SHARMA                                  A
                                v.
                   STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.
             (Criminal Appeal No. 232 of 2006)
                      NOVEMBER 25, 2010
                                                                     B
   [HARJIT SINGH BEDI AND CHANDRAMAULI KR.
                  PRASAD, JJ.]

     Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - ss. 7 and 13 (1)(d)
rlw s. 13 (2) -Demand of illegal gratification by public servant     C
and voluntary acceptance thereof - Conviction and sentence
ulss. 7 and 13 (1 )(dj rlw s. 13(2) by courts below- Justification
of - Held: Justified - Ingredients of ss. 7 and 13(1 )(d)(ii)
satisfied - There is evidence of demand of illegal gratification
and voluntary acceptance thereof - Evidence of contractor,           o
shadow witness and Inspector who laid the trap, satisfactory
- Contractor who gave bribe, cannot be said to be an
accomplice as the same was extorted from him - Evidence
of contractor corroborated in material particulars by shadow
witness - Evidence - Testimony of a witness - Corroboration          E
of
     WORDS AND PHRASES:
     'Accomplice' -    Connotation of
     PW-1, contractor was awarded th_e contract of F
Railway Electrification. The appellant-Deputy Chief
Engineer, Railway Electrification passed the final bill and
demanded certain amount as illegal gratification from the
contractor. The pre-trap exercise was conducted. PW7,
Inspector of CBI, PW-2 Inspector of Central Excise G
(shadow witness) and PW-1, the contractor, participated
in the pre-trap exercise in which the appellant was
apprehended after he had accepted the bribe. The
appellant was convicted and sentenced u/ss. 7 and 13
                           1105                             H
    1106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (201 OJ 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A (1 )(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the appellant filed the
  instant appeal.
        Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B       HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, there does not seem
    any reason to reject the evidence of the contractor, the
    shadow-witness and the Inspector who laid the trap.
    [Para 9) [1114-A-B]
       1.2 The word 'accomplice' has not been defined
C under the Evidence Act and, therefore, is presumed to
  have been used in the ordinary sense. A person
  concerned in the commission of crime, a partner in crime
  and associate in guilt is an accomplice. He takes part in
  the crime and is privy to the criminal intent. A witness
D forced to pay on promise of doing or forbearing to do any
  official act by a public servant, is not a partner in crime
  and associate in guilt and, therefore, cannot be said to
  be an accomplice. It has long been rule of practice, which
  has become equivalent to rule of law, that the evidence
E of an accomplice is admissible but to be acted upon,
  ordinarily, it requires corroboration. Contractor who gave
  bribe, therefore, cannot be said to be an accomplice as
  the same was extorted from him. [Para 11] [1115-F-H;
  1116-A-B]
F
       Oalpat Singh and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1969
    SC 17 - referred to.
       1.3 The further corroboration of evidence of a
  witness is required when his evidence is not wholly
G reliable. On appreciation of evidence, witnesses can be
  broadly categorized in three categories viz., unreliable,
  partly reliable and wholly reliable. In case of a partly
  reliable witness, the court seeks corroboration in material
  particulars from other evidence. However, in a case in
H which a witness is wholly reliable, no corroboration is
      C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.           1107


necessary. Seeking corroboration in all circumstance of       A
the evidence of a witness forced to give bribe may lead
to absurd result. Bribe is not taken in public view and,
therefore, there may not be any person who could see
the giving and taking of bribe. In the instant case, a
shadow witness did accompany the contractor but the           B
appellant did not allow him to be present in the chamber.
Acceptance of the submission in abstract would
encourage the bribe taker to receive illegal gratification
in privacy and then insist for corroboration in case of
prosecution. Law can not countenance such a situation.        c
It is not necessary that the evidence of a reliable witness
is necessarily to be corroborated by another witness. Not
only this, corroboration of the evidence of a witness can
be found from the other materials on record. In the instant
case, there does not seem any reason to reject the
                                                              0
evidence of the contractor, PW.1. His evidence is further
corroborated by the evidence of the shadow-witness,
PW.2. The shadow-witness stated in his evidence that
when he entered the chamber, the appellant was asked
by the Inspector as to whether he had received any
amount from the contractor, he denied and then removed        E
the currency notes from his trouser's pocket and threw
the same. He further stated that sodium carbonate test
was conducted in which the solution turned pink when
the appellant's fingers and the right side trousers pocket
were rinsed. From this, one can safely infer that the         F
evidence of the contractor is corroborated in material
particulars by the shadow-witness. [Para 12) [1116-F-H;
1117-A-E]
    Pana/al Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharasthra (1979) G
4 SCC 526; Meena (Smt) WIO Ba/want Hemke v. State of
Maharashtra (2000) 5 SCC 21 - referred to.
    1.4 Demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to
constitute the offence under the Act. Mere recovery of
currency notes itself does not constitute the offence         H
    1108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A under the Act, unless it is proved beyond all reasonable
  doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money
  knowing it to be bribe. In the facts of the instant case,
  both the ingredients to bring the act within the mischief
  of Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) (ii) of the Prevention of the
B Corruption Act, 1988 are satisfied. From the evidence led
  on behalf of the prosecution, it is evident that the
  appellant demanded the money from the contractor as he
  had passed his bills. There is further evidence that when
  the contractor went along with the shadow-witness on
c the date told by the appellant for payment of the bribe,
  the appellant asked the shadow-witness to leave the
  chamber and thereafter, the demand for payment of illegal
  gratification was made and paid. The positive sodium
  carbonate test vis-a-vis the fingers and right trousers
  pocket of the appellant go to show that he voluntarily
0
  accepted the bribe. In the face of the specific and positive
  evidence of these witnesses which cannot be said to be
  inherently improbable, the plea of the appellant that the
  prosecution case is fit to be rejected on the ground of
  improbability cannot be accepted and is rejected. Thus,
E there is evidence of demand of illegal gratification and the
  voluntary acceptance thereof. [Para 15] [1118-G-H; 1119-
  A-D]
       C. M. Girish Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kera/a
F 2009 (3) SCC 779; State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar
  Laxman Rao wankhede (2009) 15 SCC 200; Pana/al
  Damodar Rathi v. State of Maharashtra 1987 Supp. SCC 266
  - referred to.
                       Case Law Reference:
G
     1987 Supp. SCC 266      Referred to        Para 6
     (1979) 4 SCC 526        Referred to        Para 10, 13
     (2000) 5 SCC 21          Referred to       Para 11,13
H
       C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.                1109


  AIR 1969 SC 17             Referred to          Para 11            A

  2009 (3) sec 779           Referred to          Para 14
  (2009) 1s sec 200          Referred to          Para 14

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal                 B
No. 232 of 2006.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 29.07.2005 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.
499 of 1999.
                                                                     c
   Nagendra Rai, Ajit Warrier, Varun Shankar, TVS
Raghavendra Sreyas, Nikhil Nayyar for the Appellant.

    T.S. Doabia, Neha Sardan, A.K. Sharma, V.K. Verma for
the Respondent.
                                                                     D
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J. 1. The appellant, at
the relevant time was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer,
 Railway Electrifications, South Central Railway. He was put on      E
trial for commission of the offences under Section 7 and 13 (1)
(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred 'the Act'). Special Judge for CBI
cases at Visakhapatnam by judgment and order dated 15th of
February, 1999 passed in C.C. No. 17 of 1997 held him guilty         F
of the aforesaid offences and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and fine of Rs.
2,000/-, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for three
months for the offence under Section 7 of the Act. The appellant
was further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a         G
period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default
to suffer simple imprisonment for three months for the offence
under Section 13 (1) (d) (ii) read with Section 13 (2) of the Act.
Both the substantive sentences were directed to run
concurrently.
                                                                     H
    1110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      2. Aggrieved by the same he preferred appeal and High
  Court by its judgment dated 29th of July, 2005 passed in
  Criminal Appeal No. 499 of 1999 had affirmed the conviction
  and sentence of the appellant and dismissed the appeal.
  Aggrieved by the same the appellant has preferred this appeal
B with the leave of the court.

         3. According to the prosecution, the appellant at the
   relevant time was posted as Deputy Chief Engineer, Railway
   Electrification, South Central Railway, Vijaywada. PW-1, M.
C Venka Reddy (hereinafter referred to as the 'contractor'), during
   the years 1992-1994, was awarded the contracts of railway
   electrification between railway stations Bhongir and
   Sanathnagar and Maulali and Sanathnagar bypass under
   agreement No. 29 dated 3.4.1992 and agreement No. 41
   dated 20.11.1992 respectively. Further by agreement No. 3
D dated 18th October, 1994 work to provide height gauges at
   railway crossing between Vijayawada and Gannavaran was
   awarded to him. According to the prosecution the contractor
   completed the works to the satisfaction of the railway authorities
   and in respect of the works covered by aforesaid agreement
E nos. 29 and 41 he received the payment. The contractor also
   completed the work covered under agreement No. 3 dated
   18.10.1994 aforesaid in the month of March, 1995. The
   appellant was the competent authority to pass the bills and
   accordingly the contractor met him on 19.4.1995 and requested
F to finalise the bill. It is alleged that the appellant told to the
   contractor that he had passed the final bill and demanded Rs.
   3,000/- as illegal gratification and reminded the contractor that
   he did not pay any amount in respect of earlier bills. The
   contractor expressed his inability to pay the illegal gratification
G bu~ the appellant insisted and asked him to bring the money
   on 20th April, 1995. The contractor was not willing to pay the        1

   illegal gratification and accordingly he met the officials of the
 · Central Bureau of Investigation and gave a written report (Exh.
   P-1dated19th of May, 1995). Being satisfied with the bonafide
H of the allegation, a pre-trap exercise was undertaken by PW-
            C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.                   1111
              [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

    7, S.B. Shankar in which PW-2, G.T. Kumar besides the                    A
    contractor participated. PW-2, G.T. Kumar at the relevant time
    was posted as Inspector of Central Excise and on the instruction
    of office Superintendent, he had gone to participate in the pre-
    trap exercise. It is alleged that the contractor alongwith the
    shadow-witness PW-2, G.T. Kumar went to the office of the                B
    appellant but he asked the shadow-witness to go out of the
    chamber. Shadow witness left the chamber. However,
    contractor brought the shadow witness in the chamber and
    explained to the appellant that he is his financeL Despite that
    shadow-witness was asked to leave the chamber and he went                c
    out. Thereafter appellant demanded the money and the
    contractor handed over the tainted money to him, which he
    received from his right hand and kept in right side pocket of
    the trouser. A signal was given, whereupon PW-7 S.B.
    Shankar, the Inspector along with his team entered in the                D
    chamber, apprehended the appellant and conducted sodium
    carbonate test on the fingers of both the hands and right trouser
    pocket of the appellant, which turned pink. The tainted notes
    were lying on the floor of the office, which were recovered.

               4. After usual investigation, the Investigating Agency        E
          submitted the charge-sheet and the appellant was put on trial,
        . where he abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried. In order to
          bring home the charge, prosecution had examined altogether
          seven witnesses and got exhibited a large number of
          documents. Out of the witnesses examined by the prosecution        F
          PW-1, M. Venka Reddy is the contractor, whereas PW-2, G.T.
          Kumar is a shadow witness, PW-7, S.B. Shankar, at the
          relevant time was Inspector of the Central Bureau of
          Investigation, who had conducted the pre-trap exercise and laid
          the trap in which appellant was apprehended after he had           G
          accepted the bribe. The plea of the appellant in his statement
          under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of
          false implication due to enmity with the contractor. In order to
·-·- ..
          prove the defence, he had examined DW-1, Bodh Raj Sharma,
          Chief Administrative Officer, Construction as defence witness.     H
    1112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A      5. The trial court on appreciation of the evidence came to
  the conclusion that the prosecution has been able to prove its
  case beyond all reasonable doubt. While doing so it considered
  the defence version and rejected the same. Accordingly the
  appellant was convicted and sentenced as above by the trial
B court, which has been affirmed in appeal by the High Court.

          6. Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Counsel appearing
    on behalf of the appellant submits that there being strained
    relationship between the appellant and the contractor it is highly
    improbable that he would demand the illegal gratification from
C   him. In this connection he has drawn our attention to the
    evidence of the contractor in his cross-examination wherein he
    had stated that as his bill was pending in the office of the
    accused, he entertained an idea to make complaint against the
    appellant. Our attention also has been drawn to the evidence
D   of DW.1, Bodhraj Sharma and the letter dated 11.3.1995
    (Exh.2) written by the appellant to the Chief Engineer, in which
    he had stated that since he has flatly refused to clear the bill
    as per contractor's claim, he had threatened him to rope in
    some false case. In the aforesaid background, it has been
E   highlighted that demand of illegal gratification alleged to have
    been made by the appellant is absolutely untrue. In support of
    the submission reliance has been placed on a decision of this
    Court in the case of Pana/al Damodar Rathi v. State of
    Maharashtra, 1987 Supp. SCC 266 and our attention has been
F   drawn to the following paragraph of the judgment:

              "26. Therefore, the very foundation of the prosecution
        case is shaken to a great extent. The question as to the
        handing over of any bribe and recovery of the same from
        the accused should be cor.sidered along with other material
G
        circumstances one of which is the question whether any
        demand was at all made by the appellant for the bribe.
        When it is found that no such demand was made by the
        accused and the prosecution has given a false story in that
        regard, the court will view the allegation of payment of the
H
        C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. 1.P.                 1113
          [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

     bribe to and recovery of the same from the accused with          A
     suspicion."

        7. We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr.
  Rai and the decision relied on has no bearing on the facts and
  circumstances of the case. Ffom the evidence of contractor          B
  PW.1, M. Venka Reddy and the shadow-witness PW.2, G.T.
  Kumar it is evident that both of them entered into the chamber
  of the appellant. The appellant asked the shadow-witness to go
  out and PW.2 accordingly left the chamber. However, he was
  brought back by the contractor stating that PW.2, G.T. Kumar
  is his financer but the appellant again asked him to go out and     C
  within few minutes after PW.2, G.T. Kumar left the chamber
  appellant demanded the money, whereupon he delivered the
. tainted notes. Appellant kept them in the right trouser's pocket.
  After the signal PW.7, S.B. Shanker Inspector of the Central
  Bureau of Investigation came and sodium carbonate test was          D
  conducted on the right hand fingers and the right trousers
  pocket and the solution turned pink.

      8. PW.7, S.B. Shanker, Inspector of the Central Bureau of
 Investigation had stated in his evidence that on 19th April, 1995    E
he received a complaint against the appellant of demanding
illegal gratification from the contractor and he conducted a pre-
trap proceedings on 20th April, 1995 at about 8 a.m. in the
presence of PW.2, G.T. Kumar and others. He has further
stated that he laid the trap on the same day at 11.45 a.m. and        F
recovered the tainted currency notes under the office table of
the appellant when the appellant had thrown the said notes on
being questioned by him. In the face of the specific and positive
evidence of these witnesses which cannot be said to be
inherently improbable, the plea of the appellant that the             G
prosecution case is fit to be rejected on the ground of
improbability does not appeal to us. It is accordingly rejected.

     9. As regards the decision of this Court in the case of
Nanjudiah (supra) the same does not advance the case of the
                                                                      H
    1114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A appellant. Whether the case of the prosecution deserves
  acceptance or not is decided on appreciation of evidence and
  no hard and fast rule can be laid in this regard. In the said case
  the Court on fact did not accept the case of the prosecution.
  Here in the present case as stated above there does not seem
B any reason to reject the evidence of the contractor, the shadow-
  witness and the Inspector who laid the trap.

       10. Mr. Rai, then submits that the conviction of the
  appellant is not fit to be sustained only on the evidence of the
  contractor without any corroboration. He submits that the
C contractor is an accomplice and, therefore, before sustaining
  the appellant's conviction it is essential that his evidence is
  corroborated by evidence of other witnesses. Reference has
  been made in this connection to a decision of this Court in the
  case of Pana/al Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharasthra,
D (1979) 4 SCC 526 and which attention has been drawn to
  paragraph 9 thereof which reads as follows:

               "9. It will be seen that the version of the complainant
        that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had
E       brought the money and that the complainant told him
        that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay the
        money to the second accused is not spoken to by the
        panch witness PW 3. According to panch witness on the
        complainant asking the appellant whether his work will be
F       achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative
        and the appellant told the complainant what was to be
        given to the second accused. It is significant that PW 3
        does not mention about the appellant asking the
        complainant whether he had brought the money and on
        the complainant replying in the affirmative asking the
G
        complainant to pay the money to the second accused.
        Omission by PW 3 to refer to any mention of money by
        the appellant would show that there is no corroboration
        of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand
        for the money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect,
H       therefore, it has to be found that the version of the
        C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.                  1115
          [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

      complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the               A
      evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be
      relied on."

      11. Yet another decision on which reliance is placed is the
 decision of this Court in the case of Meena (Smt) WIO Ba/want          8
 Hemke v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 in which it
 held as follows:

      'The corroboration essential in a case like this for what
      actually transpired at the time of the alleged occurrence
      and acceptance of bribe is very much wanting in this case. C
      Even the other panch witness, PW 5 categorically admitted
      that even as the Inspector of Police, PW 6 arrived, the
      appellant gave the same version that PW 1 tried to force
      into her hands the currency note which she turned down
      by pushing it away, and his evidence also does not lend D
      credibility to the case of the prosecution. The contradictory
      version of PW 1 of the very incident when earlier examined
      in departmental proceedings renders his testimony in this
      case untrustworthy. PW 3, the Head Copyist, seems to be
      the brain behind all this and that PW 1 as well as Jagdish E
      Bokade appear to be working as a group in this affair and
      despite the blunt denial by PW 3, his closeness to PW 1
      and Jagdish Bokade stands well substantiated. All these
      relevant aspects of the case seem to have been completely
      overlooked by the courts below."                              F

 We do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. Rai.

· The word accomplice has not been defined under the Evidence
  Act and therefore presumed to have been used in the ordinary
  sense. A person concerned in the commission of crime, a               G
  partner in crime and associate in guilt is an accomplice. He
  takes part in the crime and is privy to the criminal intent. In our
 opinion a witness forced to pay on. promise of doing or
  forbearing to do any official act by a public servant, is not a
  partner in crime and associate in guilt and therefore can not         H
    1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   be said to be accomplice. It has long been rule of practice,
    which has become equivalent to rule of law, that the evidence
    of an accomplice is admissible but to be acted upon, ordinarily
    requires corroboration. Contractor who gave bribe, therefore,
    can not be said to an accomplice as the same was extorted
s   from him. Reference in this connection can be made to a
    decision of this Court in the case of Dalpat Singh and another
    v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1969 SC 17, in which it has been
    held as follows:

        "We are unable to accept the contention of the learned
c       counsel for the appellants that PWs 1,2,3,4 and 17 and
        other prosecution witnesses to whose evidence we shall
        presently refer, should be considered as accomplices
        and therefore their evidence is required to be
        corroborated in material particulars before being
D       accepted. On the proved facts, even those who gave
        illegal gratification to the appellants cannot be
        considered as accomplices as the same was extorted
        from them. Though PWs 1,2,4 and 17 can be considered
        as interested witnesses as regards their evidence relating
E       to trap, as a matter of law, it is not correct to say that their
        evidence cannot be accepted without corroboration, see
        State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh 1959 SCR 195 = {AIR
        1958 SC 500)                   (underlining ours)

F      12. Further corroboration of evidence of a witness is
  required when his evidence is not wholly reliable. On
  appreciation of evidence, witnesses can be broadly
  categorized in three categories viz., unreliable, partly reliable
  and wholly reliable. In case of a partly reliable witness, the court
G seeks corroboration in material particulars from other evidence.
  However in a case in which a witness is wholly reliable, no
  corroboration is necessary. Seeking corroboration in all
  circumstance of the evicience of a witness forced to give bribe
  may lead to absurd resuit. Bribe is not taken in public view and,
  therefore, there may not be any p~rson who could see the
H
       C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. l.P.                1117
         [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

giving and taking of bribe. As in the present case, a shadow         A
witness did accompany the contractor but the appellant did not
allow him to be present in the chamber. Acceptance of this
submission in abstract will encourage the bribe taker to receive
illegal gratification in privacy and then insist for corroboration
in case of prosecution. Law can not countenance such                 B
situation. In our opinion it is not necessary that the evidence of
a reliable witness is necessarily to be corroborated by another
witness. Not only this corroboration of the evidence of a witness
can be found from the other materials on record. Here in the
present case there does not seem any reason to reject the            c
evidence of the contractor PW.1, M. Venka Reddy. His
evidence is further corroborated by the evidence of the shadow-
witness PW.2, G.T. Kumar. The shadow-witness has stated in
his evidence that when he entered in the chamber, appellant
was asked by the Inspector as to whether he had received any
                                                                     0
amount from the contractor, he denied and then removed the
currency notes from his trouser's pocket and threw the same.
He had further stated that sodium carbonate test was conducted
in which the solution turned pink when the appellant's fingers
and the right side trouser's pocket were rinsed. From the
                                                                     E
aforesaid one can safely infer that the evidence of the contractor
is corroborated in material particulars by the shadow-witness.

     13. In the case of Pana/al Damodar Rathi (supra) relied
on by the appellant, the version of the complainant was not
supported by the Panch witnesses and in the face thereof this        F
Court gave the accused the benefit of doubt, which is not the
situation in the present case. Similarly in the case of
Meena(supra), faced with contradictory evidence and plea of
the accused this Court found corroboration necessary to uphold
conviction.                                                          G
      14. Mr. Rai, lastly submits that from the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses the worst which can be said against the
appellant is that currency notes were recovered from him. That
itself, in his submission, does not constitute the offence. He
                                                                     H
    1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A submits that to bring home the charge the prosecution is
  required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
  had demanded the illegal gratification and accepted the same
  voluntarily. In support of the submission reliance has been
  placed on a decision of this Court in the case of C.M. Girish
B Babu v. CBI, Cochin, High Court of Kera/a, 2009 (3) SCC 779
  and our attention has been drawn to the paragraph 18 of the
  judgment which reads as follows:

            "18. In Suraj Mal v. State,(Delhi Admn.) 1979 (4)
        SCC 725 this Court took the view that (at SCC p. 727,
c       para 2) mere recovery of tainted money divorced from the
        circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to
        convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the
        case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself cannot
        prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused,
D       in the absence of any evidence to prove payment of bribe
        or to show that the accused voluntarily accepted the money
        knowing it to be bribe."

  Another decision on which reliance is placed is the decision
E of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v.
  Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede, (2009) 15 SCC 200
  in which it has been held as:

               "16. Indisputably, the demand of illegal gratification
        is a sine qua non for constitution of an offence under the
F       provisions of the Act. For arriving at the conclusion as to
        whether all the ingredients of an offence viz. demand,
        acceptance and recovery of the amount of illegal
        gratification have been satisfied or not, the court must take
        into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on
G       the record in their entirety."

        15. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting
  the broad submission of Mr. Rai that demand of illegal
  gratification is sine qua non to constitute the offence under the
H Act. Further mere recovery of currency notes itself does not
       C.M. SHARMA v. STATE OF A.P. TH. 1.P.                1119
         [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.]

constitute the offence under the Act, unless it is proved beyond A
all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the
money knowing it to be bribe. In the facts of the present case,
we are of the opinion that both the ingredients to bring tt;e act
within the mischief of Sections 7 and 13 (1) (d) (ii) of the Act
are satisfied. From the evidence led on behalf of the B
prosecution it is evident that the appellant demanded the money
from the contractor as he had passed his bills. There is further
evidence that when the contractor went along with the shadow-
witness on the date told by the appellant for payment of the
bribe, appellant asked the shadow-witness to leave the c
chamber and thereafter the demand for payment of illegal
gratification was made and paid. The positive sodium
carbonate test vis-a-vis the fingers and right trousers pocket
of the appellant go to show that he voluntarily accepted the
bribe. Thus there is evidence of demand of illegal gratification
                                                                  0
and the voluntary acceptance thereof.

     16. All the submissions made on behalf of the appellant
being devoid of any substance, we do not find any merit in this
appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. Appellant is on bail, his
bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to surrender to         E
serve out the remainder of the sentence.

N.J.                                        Appeal dismissed.