C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS.versusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                   [2014] 8 S.C.R. 295


               C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS.                          A
                             v.
                 STATE OF KARNATAKA
            (Criminal Appeal No.1381 of 2014)
                      JULY 15, 2014
                                                              B
     [DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - s. 324 rlw s. 34 - Voluntarily causing
hurt by dangerous weapons - Conviction - Sustainability -
Accused-appellants allegedly attacked PW1 and PW3 with C
deadly weapons and caused them injuries -Trial court gave
them benefit of doubt and ordered their acquittal - Appeal
before High Court which set aside the order of acquittal and
convicted the appellants u/s.324 rlw s.34 /PC - Propriety -
Held: High Court erred in reversing the order of trial court - o
Legal principles laid down by Supreme Court in the case of
Chandrappa v. State of Kamataka applied - High Court erred
in setting aside the order of acquittal of appellants in absence
of any legal and factual evidence on record to prove· the
findings and reasons recorded in the judgment of the trial E
court as perverse - Order of acquittal by the trial court
reinforced - Appeal against acquittal.
                        '
    The accused-appellants allegedly attacked PW1 and
PW3 with deadly weapons and caused them injuries.
They were charge-sheeted for committing offences under        F
Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 307 read with
Section 114 IPC. The trial court gave benefit of doubt to
the appellants and ordered their acquittal. Aggrieved, the
State filed appeal before the High Court which set aside
the order of acquittal as passed by the trial court; and      G
held that from the nature and manner of assault, it could
be said that the appellants were guilty under Section 324
read with Section 34 IPC for causing injuries to PW-1 and
PW-3 and accordingly convicted them.
                            295                               H
    296      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A      In the instant appeal, the question which arose for
    consideration before this Court was whether the High
    Court erred in reversing the order of the trial court.

      The appellants contended that the High Court erred
  in reversing the order of the trial court since the trial
8
  court had acquitted the accused-appellants only after
  proper appreciation of the evidence on record and
  inconsistencies and contradictions found in the evidence
  of prosecution witnesses; and that noticing the previous
C enmity between the parties, delay in recording the
  statements of the prosecution witnesses and also
  statement of eye witness, it had held that a reasonable
  doubt was created as to the guilt of the accused. The
  appellants further contended that conviction of the
  accused-appellants under Section 324 of IPC read with
D Section 34 was absolutely arbitrary, unreasonable and
  contrary to the above provisions of IPC; that there was
  discrepancy regarding the names of the assailants in the
  FIR and in the wound certificate and further that the
  motive behind the alleged assault by the accused·
E appellants was also not proved by the prosecution b~
  adducing evidence.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court

F       HELD:1.1. In the instant case, the facts and the
    evidence on record made it clear that the High Court
    erred in reversing the order of the trial court in the
    absence of any substantial material evidence on record
    which regarded the decision of the trial court as perverse.
    [Para 16] [301-E]
G
       1.2. From the legal principles laid down by this Court
  in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, and
  applying the same to the facts and evidence on record
  of this case, it is clear that the High Court erred in setting
H aside the order of the acquittal of the appellants in the
       C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS. v. STATE OF                    297
                       KARNATAK~

  absence of any legal and factual evidence on record to            A
 .prove the findings and reasons recorded in the judgment
! of the trial court as perverse. The contentions urged on
· behalf of the appellants are well founded as the same are
  in· conformity with the legal principles laid down by the
  Supreme Court. The order of the Hjgh Court is therefore           B
  set aside and the order of acquittal by the trial court is
  reinforced. [Paras 18, 19] [304-E-G]

      Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka 2007 (2) SCR
 630:(2007) 4 sec 415 - held applicable.
                                                                    c
                      Case Law Reference :
     2007 (2) SCR 630          held applicable        Para 17
     CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
 No.1381 of 2014.                                                   D

     From the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2010 in CRLA
 1256/2005 of the High Court of Karriataka at Bangalore.

     Kiran Suri, Apurva Upmanyu, Dr. Vipin Gupta for the.           E
 Appellants.

     V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

     The Judgment" of the Court was delivered by

      V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the            F
 appellants questioning the correctness of the judgment and final
 order dated 11.08.2010 passed by the High Court of
 Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1256 of 2005
 in setting aside the order of acquittal of the appellants passed
 by the trial court thereby imposing sentence of conviction on      G
 the accused for offences punishable under Section 324 read
 with Section 34 of IPC for causing injuries on separate count.

      2. Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to
                                                                    H
    298     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   appreciate the case of the appellants and also to find out
    whether they are entitled to the relief as prayed for in this
    appeal.

         3. It is the case of the prosecution that on 11.8.1999, at
    about 7:00 a.m., PW-3 Kempanna had gone to the house of
8
    the complainant on a bicycle to take milk for his children. When
    the complainant and PW-3 were coming back, accused nos.
    1 to 10 (A-1 to A-10) attacked them with deadly weapons. It is
    alleged by the prosecution that A-1 assaulted PW-3 with iron
    blade of a plough on his head. A-3 assualted PW-3 on his back
C   and thigh. A-4 assualted PW-3 on both his legs with iron blade
    of plough. A-2 assaulted PW-1 with iron rod on his left shoulder.
    A-6, A-8 and A-10 kicked PW-1. A-5 and A-7 assaulted
    Bhagyamma- PW-6 with iron blade of plough and A-9 kicked
    her.
D
         4. A complaint (Ex.-P1) was lodged on 11.8.1999'-a,t 9:00
    a.m. before the police. The Crime Case No. CC 728 ot' 2000
    was registered by the Investigating Officer. The injured were
    taken to the hospital at around 2:00 p.m. PW-3 had sustained
E   fracture of tibia, 'fibula and ankle. PW-6 had sustained simple
    injuries. PW-4 Jalaiah and PW-9- Shivanna are the eye
    witnesses to the incident.

         5. The accused after their arrest, on their voluntary
    instance, M.O. 1 to M.O. 3 (clubs), M.O. 4 & M.O. 5 (iron blade
F   of plough) and M.O. 6 (iron rod) were recovered. However, the
    said weapons had no incriminating marks like blood stains on
    them. The accused were charge-sheeted for committing
    offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 323, 324, 326, 307,
    read with Section 114 of IPC. Thereafter, the learned
G   Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offences and
    registered CC No. 728 of 2000. The learned Magistrate
    complying with the provisions of Section 209 of CrPC,
    committed the case to the Sessions Court for trial since
    offences alleged under Section 307 are to be exclusively tried
H
      C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS. v. STATE OF                   299
       KARNATAKA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
 by that court. The accused persons pleaded not guilty and        A
,claimed trial. The prosecution in support of its case, got
 examined PW-1 to PW-10 and marked Ex. P-1 to P-9 and
 MOs. 1 to 6. The accused-appellants got marked Ex. D-1 and
 had also submitted their written reply while recording their
 statements under Section 313 of CrPC.                            B

     6. In the evidence, PW-1 has stated that A-2 had assaulted
him with iron rod, A-5 held him, A-1 assaulted PW-3 with iron
rod. He further stated that A-4 assaulted PW-3 on his legs with
iron blade of plough. A-3, A-6 and A-7 were holding clubs and
assaulting PW-3. A-1 instigated other accused persons to kill     C
PW-1.

    7. The evidence of PW-3 also discloses that A-4 assaulted
him with iron blade of plough on his legs and hands. A-6, A-7
and A-5 assaulted him with clubs on his back, thigh and           D
shoulder. The other accused persons kicked him.

     8. PW-6 in her evidence, stated that she was assaulted
by the accused persons but she could not name the persons.
This witness was treated as hostile.
                                                                  E
     9. The trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on
record has held that the prosecution has failed to prove any of
the offences alleged against the accused persons. There is an
element of reasonable doubt on many counts, which have
already been explained. The benefit of doubt always goes to       F
the accused. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the acquittal
of accu::;ed-appellant nos. 1 to 10 under Section 235(1) of
CrPC for offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148,
323, 324, 326, 307 read with Section 114 of IPC. Aggrieved
by the same, the StatEt of Karnataka appealed before the High     G
Court challenging the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the learned trial judge.

    10. The High Court, on the basis of facts and evidence on
record, held that with regard to the nature of offences, the      H
    300      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014) 8 S.C.R.


A evidence and facts narrated in the FIR discloses that A-3
  assaulted PW-3 with iron blade of plough. In the evidence, it is
  further stated that A-4 also assaulted PW-3 with iron blade of
  plough. But in the wound certificate, there is no mention of
  presence or participation of A-4. It is evident that there are
B fractures in the tibia and fibula which could have occurred
  because of fall from bicycle as well. The fracture injury is not
  caused intentionally. Therefore, from the nature and manner of
  assault, as narrated, it can only be said that the accused is guilty
  under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC for causing
C injuries to PW-1 and PW-3 on separate counts. Therefore, the
  High Court convicted and sentenced the appellants to pay a
  fine of 10,000/- each on separate counts and in default, to
  undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year.

        11. The accused-appellants challenged the decision of the
D   High Court raising various facts and legal contentions and have
    prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment of the High
    Court.

         12. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants,
E   Ms. Kiran Suri contended that the High Court has erred in
    reversing the Order of the trial court since the trial court had
    acquitted the accused-appellants only after proper appreciation
    of the evidence on record and inconsistencies and
    contradictions found in the evidence of prosecution witnesses
F   and noticing the previous enmity between the parties, delay in
    recording the statements of the prosecution witnesses and alsc
    statement of eye witness, it has held that it creates a
    reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

        13. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants
G further contended that conviction of the accused-appellants
  under Section 324 of IPC read with Section 34 is absolutely
  arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the above provisions of
  IPC.

H         14. It was further contended by the learned senior counsel
          C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS. v. STATE OF                     301
           KARNATAKA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

    that there is discrepancy regarding the names of the assailants    A
    in the FIR and in the wound certificate and further the motive
    behind the alleged assault by the accused-appellants has also
    not been proved by the prosecution by adducing evidence.

         15. On the other hand, the learned counsel on behalf of the
                                                                       B
    respondent contended that PW-1 and PW-3 are injured eye
    witnesses. The fact that the accused-appellants had assaulted
    these persons with iron rod, gula and club is corroborated by
    the medical evidence of PW-5 and PW-7. It was further argued
    by the learned counsel that the appellants had assaulted the
    complainant on account of previous enmity with them.               C
    According to the learned counsel for the respondent, PW-2 is
    an independent witness. Therefore, according to the learned
    counsel, the ingredients of unlawful assembly, rioting, causing
    grievous hurt with dangerous weapons with an intention to kill,
\   have been proved.                                                  D

         16. We have perused the facts and legal evidence on
    record. We have also carefully appreciated the contentions of
    both the parties. On the basis of the facts and evidence on
    record, we are of the opinion that the High Court erred in         E
    reversing the Order of the trial court in the absence of any
    substantial material evidence on record which regarded the
    decision of the trial court as perverse.

        17. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, it
    has been held by this Court as under:                              F

         "39. In Harijana Thirupa/a v. Public Prosecutor, High
         Court of A.P., this Court said:

        12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an       G
        order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal
        has full power to review the evidence to reach its own
        independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with
        an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other
        view is possible, because with the passing of an order of      H
    302      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 8 S'.C.R.

A         acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the
          accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High
          Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of
          acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court
          it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is
8         cast on the High Court while reversing an ord€!r of
          acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by
          the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel
          those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an
          exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.

C         40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha this Court
          observed;

          21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing
          the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based.
D         Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with
          because the presumption of innocence of the accused is
          further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which
          runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal
          cases is that if two views are .possible on the evidence
E         adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
          accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
          favourable to the accused should be adopted. The
          paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that
          miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of
          justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less
F
          than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where
          admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the
          appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case
          where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of
          ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed
G         any offence or not".

          41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., this Court stated;
          8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power
H         of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised
·     C.K. DASEGOWDA & ORS. v. STATE OF                      303
       KARNATAKA [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]

    while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of       A
    appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence.
    However, one significant difference is that an order of
    acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court,
    where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence
    and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not      B
    reverse the decision of the trial court merely qecause a
    different view is possible. The appellate court will also
    bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in
    favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get
    the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere,    c
    it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of
    the trial court".

                                           (emphasis supplied)

    42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the        D
    following general principles regarding powers of appellate
    Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of
    acquittal emerge;

    (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-
                                                                     E
    appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the
    order of acquittal is founded;

    (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no
    limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power
    and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach       F
    its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;

    (\3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and
    compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very
    stro;1g circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring        G
    mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers
    of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
    phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of
    language' to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate
    Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of   H
    304       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A         the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own
          conclusion.

          (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in
          case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
          the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence
B
          available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal
          jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be
          innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court
          of law. Seco[ldly, the accused having secured his
          acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
c         reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

          (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis
          of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not
          disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
D
       18. Therefore, based on the legal principles laid down by
  this Court in the abovementioned case and applying the same
  to the facts and evidence on record of this case, we are of the
  opinion that the High Court erred in setting aside the order of
E the acquittal of the appellants in the absence of any legal and
  factual evidence on record to prove the findings and reasons
  recorded in the judgment of the trial court as perverse. The
  contentions urged on behalf of the appellants are well founded
  as the same are in conformity with the legal principles laid down
  in the aforesaid cases.
F
         19. We therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and
    reinforce the order of acquittal by the trial court. The appeal is
    allowed.
G · Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                                 Appeal allowed.