Holding

Eye‑witness testimony of relatives is admissible unless a specific allegation of interest is proved, and the doctrine falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in India; consequently, the conviction under Sections 302 and 34 IPC stands.

Summary

The appellants Bur Singh and others were convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC for the killing of Surjan Singh. The prosecution relied on the testimony of two eye‑witnesses who were relatives of the deceased. The appellants argued that the witnesses were interested and that the doctrine of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus required the entire prosecution case to be rejected. The Supreme Court held that a witness’s familial relationship does not, by itself, render the testimony inadmissible; an allegation of interest must be specifically proved. It further ruled that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no statutory force in India and can only affect the weight, not the admissibility, of evidence. The Court found the eye‑witness testimony credible, rejected the appellant’s challenges regarding semi‑digested food, lack of observed bloodstains, and the absence of weapon details in the post‑mortem report, and upheld the conviction. The appeal was dismissed and the appellants were ordered to surrender to serve the remainder of their sentences.

Issues considered

The credibility and admissibility of eye‑witness testimony from relatives of the deceased.
Whether the doctrine falsus in uno falsus in omnibus mandates rejection of the entire prosecution case.
The relevance of semi‑digested food, lack of observed bloodstains, and omission of weapon type in the post‑mortem report to the prosecution case.
The correctness of conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.

Legislation cited

Subjects

eye‑witness testimonyinterested witnessfalsus in uno falsus in omnibusIPC Section 302IPC Section 34murder convictionevidence evaluationcredibility of witnesses

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 334
J'

!.
A BUR SINGH AND ANR.
v.
r·,~
STATE OF PUNJAB
(Criminal Appeal No. 1598 of 2008)
OCTOBER 13, 2008 >
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
+-
.. Penal Code, 1860: s. 302 r. w. s. 34.:.. Conviction under, by
c trial court - Affirmed by High Court - Correctness of - Held:
On facts, correct- Evidence of witnesses established the pros-
' ecution case.
Evidence: Related witness - Testimony of - Evidentiary
value of - Held: Can be relied upon unless ·allegation of
D interestedness is established.
Doctrines/Principles: of 'falsus in uno falsus in omnibus'
- Applicability of ~

Pros·ecutipn case was that a day prior to incident, t
E accused-appellant no.1 gave beating to a boy to which
deceased objected. The accused was annoyed with him
and challenged to teach him a lesson. The next day at
6.00 A.M.; deceased was going towards his well alongwith
his son, complainant. The accused persons came there
F and started inflicting several blows to hir:n with their re- j
spective weapons. The deceased succumbed to injuries.
~
The complainant went to the police ~tation, but ASI met
him on the way and he recorded statement of complain-
ant which was completed at 7.30 AM on the basis of which
FIRwas registered at 8.30 AM. The distance of police sta-
G
tion was 4 Kms. from the place of occurrence. The lllaqa
{
Magistrate received the FIR at 9 A.M.
Accused persons were arrested and weapons were
,~
•
recovered in pursuance of their disclosure statements.
H 334
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 335

Y, The trial Court found the evidence of eye witnesses PW-2 A
\
and 3 to be cogent and credible and recorded conviction
of appellants under s.302 r.w. s.34 IPC. High Court upheld
the conviction. Hence the instant appeal.
Appellants contended that the evidence of PW-2 and
B
3 cannot be believed and their presence at the spot was
highly improbable; that they were interested witnesses
~~
·"' and their evidence cannot be relied upon; that the pres-
ence of semi-digested food showed that the occurrence
~ could not have taken place in the morning as claimed by
the prosecution; that in the FIR and the application made
c
for postmortem, the investigating officer had not staled
that the injuries on the person of the deceased were
caused by sharp weapon; that evidence tendered by PW-
3 was not accepted and thu$ would throw out the entire
D
prosecution case and the principle of "fa/sus in uno falsus
in omnibus" was applicable.
-:\'
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. Merely because the eye-witnesses are tam-
E
ily members their evidence cannot per se be discarded.
When there is allegation of interestedness, the same has
to be established. Mere statement that being relatives of
the deceased they are likely to falsely implicate the accused
cannot be a ground to discard the evidence which is oth-
....
F
erwise cogent and credible. Relationship is not a factor to
·1
affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not that
a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make alle-
gations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be
laid if plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the
G
court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence
,,...,, fo find out whether it is cogent and credible. The ground
that the witness being a close relative and consequently
being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has
no substance. [Paras 6, 9] [342-C-D-E; 343-D] H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A Oalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab AIR (1953)
SC 364; Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974) 3
SCC 698 Vadive/u Thevar v. State of Madras AIR (1957) SC
614; Masalti and Ors. v. State of U. P AIR (1965) SC 202; State
of Punjab v. Jagir Singh AIR (1973) SC 2407; Lehna v. State
B of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 76; Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v.
State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381; Babula/ Bhagwan Kbandare
and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 10 SCC 404; Salim
Saheb v. State of M.P (2007) 1 SCC 699 - relied on.
2.1 The plea to apply the principle of "falsus in uno
C falsus in omnibus" is untenable. Falsity of particular mate-
rial witness or material particular would not ruin it from
the beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno fa/sus in
omnibus" has no application in India and the witnesses
cannot be branded as liars. It is merely a rule of caution.
D All that it amounts to, is that in such cases testimony may
be disregarded, and not that it must be discarded. The
doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evi-
dence which a Court may apply in a given set of circum-
stances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory rule
E of evidence. [Para 13] [344-G-H; 345-A-B]
2.2. The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in In-
dia for if a whole body of the testimony was to be rejected,
because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in
some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of crimi-
F nal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just
cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true
in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case
as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance,
and merely because in some respects the Court consid-
G ers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the
testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a
matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as
well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The afore-
said dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one
H hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 337

~ contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, em- A
broideries or embellishment. [Para 13] [345-D-F]
Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR (1957) SC
366; Gurcharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR (1956)
SC 460; Sohrab slo Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of
B
Madhya Pradesh (1972) 3 SCC 751; Ugar Ahir and Ors. v.
The State of Bihar AIR (1965) SC 277; Zwinglee Ariel v. State
-'~
of Madhya Pradesh AIR (1954) SC 15; Ba/aka Singh and Ors.
v. The State of Punjab AIR (1975) SC 1962; Rajasthan v. Smt.
~
Ka/ki and Anr. AIR (1981) SC 1390; Krishna Machi and Ors.
v. State of Bihar etc. JT (2002) (4) SC 186 - relied on. c
3. The trial court and High Court noticed that though
PW2 was working as a Development Officer at Gurdaspur,
there was no evidence to show that he could not have
been present at the time of occurrence in the village which
D
was not very far off from Gurdaspur. Merely because the
.i investigating officer had not noticed any blood stains on
the clothing of PW 3, would not mean that PW 3 was tell-
ing a lie. PW 11 stated that he had not noticed the
bloodstains. That was not the same thing to say that there
was no bloodstain. There can be several reasons for E
which blood stains may not have been noticed by PW 11
because he may not have focussed his attention to that
aspect. So far as the presence of semi-digested food was
concerned, High Court stated that the people in the vii-
.. f) lages get up early in the morning, take some food and F
then start their daily pursuits. No question was asked to
the witnesses as to when the deceased woke up and when
he took his food if any. It is of significance to find that
PW1 conducted the autopsy and found the presence of
rigor mortis on the upper limbs whereas it was partially G
......,,_. present on the lower limbs when the autopsy was con-
ducted on 6.10.1999 at 1.15 P.M. This indicates that rigor
mortis was just in the process of setting and had not com-
pletely set towards the body. In view of all this the pres-
ence of 150cc food in the stomach of the deceased can- H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A not be a factor to disbelieve the evidence of PWs 2 and 3. -r:
FIR was very promptly lodged, occurrence is supposed
to have taken place around 6 AM and the statement of the
complainant was recorded at 7 A.M. So far as the non-
mention about the use of blunt weapon in the inquest re-
B port for post mortem is concerned, there is no require-
ment in law that the police officials making inquest or con-
ducting of post mortem should describe in detail as to -'!-
the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased and/
or by the type of weapons used. That cannot be a factor ir:

c to discard the prosecution version. [Para 15] [346-E-H;
347-A-D]
CASE LAW REFERENCE
AIR (1953) SC 364 relied on Paras 7, 9
D (1974) (3) sec 698 relied on Para 8
AIR (1957) SC 614 relied on Para 8
AIR (1965) SC 202 relied on Para 10
AIR (1973) SC 2407 relied on Para 11
E (2002) 3 sec 76 relied on Para 11
(2002) 8 sec 381 relied on Para 11
(2005) 1o sec 404 relied on Para 12
(2007) 1 sec 699 relied on Para 12
F AIR (1957) SC 366 relied on Para 13 ( ).
..
\
AIR (1956) SC 460 relied on Para 13
(1972) 3 sec 751 relied on Para 13
AIR (1965) SC 277 relied on Para 13
G
AIR (1954) SC 15 relied on Para 13
~
AIR (1975)' SC 1962 relied on Para 13
AIR (1981) SC 1390 relied on Para 13
JT (2002) (4) SC 186 relied on Para 13
H
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 339

,)t:'.
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal A
No. 1598 of 2008
From the final Judgment and Order dated 11.9.2007 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crimi-
nal Appeal No. 217 DB of 2005
B
Sushil Kumar, Aditya Kumar, Sudarshan Singh Rawat,
< ->:~
Vinay Arora and Sanjay Jain for the Appellants.
Adish C. Agarwala, Ajay Pal for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Divi-
sion Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding
the conviction of the appellants for conviction punishable under
D
Section 302 for appellant no.1 and Section 302 read with Sec-
tior1 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') for
appellant no.2 while directing acquittal of co-accused Parminder
Singh. Four persons faced trial. The learned Sessions Judge
Gurdaspur directed acquittal of Lakhbir Singh, while holding the
E
present appellants and Parminder Singh to be guilty of offence
punishable under Section 302 and Section 302 read with Sec-
tion 34 IPC as noted above. By the impugned judgment the High
Court as noted above directed acquittal of the co-accused while
confirming the conviction and sentence so far as the appellants
"~ are concerned. F

3. Prosecution versions as unfolded during trial is as fol-
lows:
On 5.10.1999 Bur Singh had given beatings to the son of
Manjit Singh for passing through their fields to which Surjan G
,.J.
Singh had objected, therefore, the accused were annoyed and
challenged to teach him a lesson.

On 6.10.1999 at about 6 AM Sukhraj Singh (hereinafter
referred to as the 'complainant') along with his father Surjan
H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A Singh was going towards his well to milch the cattle: Surjan Singh
was ahead of complainant. When they came near the field of
Hazara Singh, the accused came there. Bur Singh raised lalkara
that they be caught and taught a lesson for showing sympathy
with the police. Kulwinder Singh accused inflicted datar blow
B on the right arm of Surjan Singh, Bur Singh inflicted sua blow on
his right temporal region, and, resultantly, he fell down. Thereaf-
ter Parminder Singh accused inflicted dang blow to him on his
shoulders. Thus, all the accused inflicted several blows to him
with the respective weapons. The hue and cry raised by Sukhraj
c Singh attracted Jasbir Singh and Kulbir Singh to the spot. At
this, the accused fled away with their respective weapons.
Surjan Singh succumbed to the injuries at the spot.
After leaving Jasbir Singh and Kulbir Singh near the dead
body, the complainant went to the police station, butASI Lakhbir
D Singh met him at Aliwal Chowk to whom he got recorded his
statement Ex.PD, which was completed at 7.30 AM on the ba-
sis of which FIR Ex. PD/2 was registered at 8.30 AM. The dis-
tance of police station Sadar, Batala is 4Kms. from the place of
occurrence. The FIR was received by the illaqa Magistrate at 9
E A.M. ASI Lakhbir Singh visited the place of occurrence; pre-
pared the rough site plan; lifted blood stained earth from the
spot; took into possession one shoe of plastic; got conducted
postmortem examination the dead body of the deceased; and
took the clothes of the deceased .into possession. Accused Bur
F Singh was arrested on 11.10.1999 and he got recovered dang
fitted with sua under the chaff in his residential house and
Kulwinder Singh accused got recovered datar from underneath
the heap of chaff lying in his verandah in pursuance of their dis-
closure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
G 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'). On 28.10.1999, Parminder
Singh accused was arrested by Inspector Lakhbir Singh CIA
staff, Batala. Completion of the investigation was followed by a
. report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in· short 'Code').
H In order to substantiate the accusations twelve witnesses
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 341
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
-~ were examined. PWs 2&3 were stated to be eye witnesses. A
The accused persons abjured guilt as noted above and in the
examination under Section 313 of the Code stated that they
had been falsely implicated. Acquitted accused Parminder Singh
stated that he was staying at the different State and was not
present at the date. Four witnesses were examined to further B
the defence version about false implication. The trial Court found
'
'- the evidence of PWs 2 & 3 to be cogent and credible and re-
corded conviction. In appeal, High Court upheld their convic-
tion.
4. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appel- c
lant submitted that the evidence of PWs 2 & 3 cannot be be-
lieved. Their presence at the spot is highly improbable. The
conspiracy angle as projected by the prosecution having been
disbelieved that defence version of false implication stand sub-
stantiated. The two witnesses are interested witnesses and their D
r version should not have been relied upon. In any event when on
the self same evidence, two of the accused persons were ac-
quitted the present appellants should not have been convicted.
With reference to evidence of PW 3 it was stated that he claimed
that there were bloodstains on his clothes when the deceased E
was taken by him. PW 11 the Investigating Officer (in short the
'1.0.') has categorically stated that so far as PW 2 is concerned,
it is stated he was working as a Development Officer and was
staying at a different place. Added to that, the time of the al-
• leged occurrence has been varied. Presence of semi-digested F
}) food clearly shows that the occurrence could not have taken
place in the morning as claimed by the prosecution. It is also
submitted that in the First Information Report (in short the 'FIR')
and the application made for postmortem, the I. 0. had not stated
that the injuries on the person of the deceased were caused by
G
sharp weapon. There was no mention of any blunt weapon. With
,.._,... reference to Exhibits 01 and 02 it is stated that there were
blank spaces and, therefore, there was scope for manipulation.

5. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submitted that the police officials were not investigating prop- H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A erly and, therefore, lapse had been committed. These lapses f
were committed with a view to help the accused persons for
which complaint was made to the higher officials. The accused
persons cannot take any advantage of the lapses committed
by the police officials, if any, with a view to help them. It is also
B submitted that the evidence of PWs 2& 3 is clear, cogent and
credible and therefore the trial court and the High Court had
rightly convicted them. ~ '

6. Merely because the eye-witnesses are family members
their evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is alle-
c gation of interestedness, the same has to be established. Mere
statement that being relatives of the deceased they are likely to
falsely implicate the accused cannot be a ground to discard the 1

evidence which is otherwise cogent and credible. We shall also
deal with the contention regarding interestedness of the wit-
D nesses for furthering prosecution version. Relationship is not a
factor to affect credibility of a witness. It is more often than not o,

that a relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allega-
tions against an innocent person. Foundation has to be laid if
plea of false implication is made. In such cases, the court has
E to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to find out
whether it is cogent and credible.
n
7. In Dalip Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab (Al R
1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-

F "A witness is normally to be considered independent unless "'
he or she springs from sources which are likely to be j·
taintec;:I and that usually means unless the witness has
cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to
implicate him falsely. Ordinarily a close relation would be
the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an
G
innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there
is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to ""-'""
drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has
a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid
for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far
H
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 343
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

-'\
'>,.
from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. A
However, we are not attempting any sweeping
generalization. Each case must be judged on its own facts.
Our observations are only made to combat what is so
often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of
prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must B

- be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

-
-'
8. The above decision has since been followed in Gu/i
Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in
which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)
was also relied upon. c
9. We may also observe that the ground that the witness
being a close relative and consequently being a partisan wit-
ness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory
was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh's case
D
(supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression
which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that
relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through
Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:
"We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the E
High Court that the testimony of the two eyewitnesses
requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an
observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are
women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their
testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the F
>~ reason that they are closely related to the deceased we
are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many
criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court
endeavoured to dispel in - 'Rameshwar v. State of
Rajasthan' (AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). We find, however,
G
that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of
~
the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel."
10. Again in Masalti and Ors. v. State of UP (AIR 1965
SC 202) this Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):
H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

:,./
A "But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that 11'
evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on
the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested
witnesses ....... The mechanical rejection of such evidence
on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead
B to failure of justice. No hard and fast rule can be laid down
as to how much evidence should be appreciated. Judicial
approach has to be cautious in dealing with such evidence; J.. ~

but the.plea that such evidence should be rejected because

c
it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct."
11. To the same effect is the decisions in State of Punjab
•• '- ......:_

v. Jagir Singh (AIR 1973 SC 2407), Lehna v. State of Haryana
(2002 (3) sec 76) and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. V. State
of Orissa (2002 (8) SCC 381 ).
12. The above position was also highlighted in Babula/
D
Bhagwan Khandare and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [2005(10)
SCC 404] and in Salim Saheb v. State of M.P (2007(1) SCC "'-

699).

E
13. As noted above, stress was laid by the accused-ap-
pellants on the non-acceptance of evidence tendered by PW-3
.
·•
to contend about desirability to throw out the entire prosecution
case. In essence the prayer is to apply the principle of "fa ls us in
uno falsus in omnibus" (false in one thing, false in everything).
This plea is clearly untenable. Even if major portion of evidence
F is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove
J4r;
.. ~

guilt of an accused, notwithstanding acquittal of number of other
co-accused persons, his conviction can be maintained. It is the
duty of Court to separate the grain from the chaff. Where the
chaff can be separated from the grain, it would be open to the
Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evi-
G
dence has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other
accused persons: Falsity of particular material witness or ma- /"-f. ~

terial particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The '

maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has no application in
India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim
H
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 345
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

,
v" "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has not received general ac- A
ceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a
rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is
that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that
it must be discarded. The doctrine merely involves the question
of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of B
circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory
rule of evidence'. (See Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
"!--
(AIR 1957 SC 366). Merely because some of the accused per-
sons have been acquitted, though evidence against all of them,
so far as direct testimony went, was the same does not lead as c
a necessary corollary that those who have been convicted must
also be acquitted. It is always open to a Court to differentiate
accused who had been acquitted from those who were con-
victed. (See Gurcharan Singh and Anr v. State of Punjab (AIR
1956 SC 460). The doctrine is a dangerous one specially in
D
India for if a whole body of the testimony was to be rejected,

• ' because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some
aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice
would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giv-
ing embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore,
it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evi- E
dence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some
respects the Court considers the same to be insufficient for plac-
ing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessar-
ily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all
respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The F
'1.). aforesaid dictum is not a ·sound rule for the reason that one
hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not con-
tain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries
or embellishment. (See Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh 1972 3 SCC 751) and Ugar Ahir G
and Ors. v. The State of Bihar (AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt
-~ has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous meta-
phor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood.
Where it is not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, be-
cause grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the pro- H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A cess of separation an absolutely new case has to be recon-
structed by divorcing essential details presented by the pros-
ecution completely from the context and the background against
which they are made, the only available course to be made is to
discard the evidence in tote. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of
s Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 15) and Ba/aka Singh and
Ors. v. The State of Punjab. (AIR 1975 SC 1962). As observed
by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Kalki and Anr (AIR
1981 SC 1390), normal discrepancies in evidence are those
which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of
c memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are al-
ways there, however honest and truthful a witness may be. Ma-
terial discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category
to which a discrepancy may be categorized. \Nhile normal dis-
0
crepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's case,
material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted
in Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. (JT 2002 (4)
SC 186).
E 14. It is to be noted that the trial court and the High Court
have noticed that though PW2 was working as a Development
Officer at Gurdaspur, there was no evidence to show that he
could not have been present at the time of occurrence in the
village which is not very far off from Gurdaspur. Merely because
F the investigating officer had not noticed any blood stains on the
dothing of PW 3, that does not mean that PW 3 was telling a lie.
PW 11 has stated that he had not noticed the bloodstains. That
is not the same thing to say that there was no bloodstain. There
can be several reasons for which blood stains may not have
G been noticed by PW 11 because he may not have focussed his
attention to that aspect. So far as the presence of semi-digested
food is concerned, the High Court has stated that the people in
the villages get up early in the morning, take some food and
then start their daily pursuits. No question was asked to the wit-
nesses as to when the deceased woke up and when he took
H
BUR SINGH AND ANR. v. STATE OF PUNJAB 347
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
'),/
-1--, his food if any. It is of significance to find that Dr. Harbhajan A
Singh, PW1 conducted the autopsy and found the presence of
rigor mortis on the upper limbs whereas it was partially pres-
ence on the lower limbs when the autopsy was conducted on
6.10.1999at1.15 P.M.
15. This indicates that rigor mortis was just in the process 8
of setting and had not completely.set towards the body. In view
of all this the presence of 150cc food in the stomach of the de-
ceased cannot be a factor to disbelieve the evidence of PWs
2&3. FIR was very promptly lodged, occurrence is supposed to
have taken place around 6 AM and the statement of the com- C
plaint was recorded at 7 A.M. So far as the non-mention about
the use of blunt weapon in the inquest report for post mortem is
concerned, there is no requirement in law that the police offi-
cials making inquest or conducting of post mortem should de-
scribe in detail as to the 11ature of the injuries sustained by the D
deceased andfor by the type of weapons used. That cannot be
a factor to discard .the prosecution version.
16. Looked at from any angle, the appeal is without merit,
deserves dismissal, which we direct. Appellant No.1 was ex-
empted from surrendering considering his age. Both the ac- E
.I

· cused appellants shall surrender to custody forthwith to serve
remainder of sentence.
17. Appeal is dismissed.
D.G. Appeal dismissed. F