BRIJMANI DEVIversusPAPPU KUMAR & ANR.
- Citation
- 2021 INSC 919
- Decided
- 17 December 2021
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- L NAGESWARA RAO
Holding
Bail cannot be granted in serious offences such as murder and attempted murder without a prima facie assessment and a reasoned order, and the High Court's cryptic bail orders were set aside.
Summary
The appellant, mother of the deceased Rupesh Kumar, filed two FIRs alleging that the respondent, Pappu Kumar, attempted to murder her son in 2017 and murdered him in 2020, also violating the Arms Act. The respondent was arrested after absconding for seven months and was denied bail by the Sessions Court, but the Patna High Court later granted bail in both cases with minimal conditions and without adequate reasoning. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court correctly exercised its discretion, focusing on the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's criminal antecedents, the likelihood of witness tampering, and the requirement of a reasoned order under natural justice. Citing numerous precedents, the Court held that bail in such serious offences must be granted only after a prima facie assessment and clear reasons, which were absent in the High Court's orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the bail orders, directed the respondent to surrender, and allowed the appeals.
Issues considered
- The appropriateness of granting bail to an accused of murder and attempted murder under Sections 302, 307, 341 IPC read with Section 34, considering the seriousness of the offences.
- Whether the High Court's bail orders, lacking detailed reasons, violated principles of natural justice and the requirement for a reasoned decision.
- The impact of the accused's criminal antecedents and alleged threats to witnesses on the grant of bail.
Legislation cited
- Arms Act, 1959s. 25, s. 27
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 307, s. 34, s. 341
Subjects
Judgment
[2021] 9 S.C.R. 533 533
BRIJMANI DEVI A
v.
PAPPU KUMAR & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No.1663 of 2021)
DECEMBER 17, 2021 B
[L. NAGESWARA RAO, B. R. GAVAI AND
B. V. NAGARATHNA]
Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302 r/w 34; 341, 307 r/w 34 – Bail –
Respondent accused of murder of appellant’s son – Bail rejected by
Sessions Court –Granted by High Court with certain conditions – C
On appeal, held: Offences alleged against respondent are serious
vis-a-vis the appellant’s son at two points of time, in 2017 alleging
attempt to murder him and in 2020 alleging his murder – Respondent
has criminal antecedents – There is a likelihood of him absconding
or threatening the witnesses if on bail which would have a vital D
bearing on the trial – Present cases not fit for grant of bail to the
respondent in respect of the two serious accusations against him
vis-a-vis the very same person – High Court lost sight of the vital
aspects of the case and granted bail by very cryptic orders –
Impugned orders set aside – Respondent to surrender – Arms Act –
ss.25, 27 – Maxims – cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. E
Bail – Grant of – Factors to be considered – Discussed.
Bail – Order of – Recording of reasons – Held: While
elaborating reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail, at the
same time an order de hors reasoning or bereft of relevant reasons
F
cannot result in grant of bail – It would be only a non speaking
order which is an instance of violation of principles of natural justice
– In such a case the prosecution or the informant has a right to
assail the order before a higher forum – Principles of natural justice.
Gudikanti Narsimhulu & Ors. vs. Public Prosecutor,
High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240 : G
[1978] 2 SCR 371; Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of
Delhi & ORS (2001) 4 SCC 280 : [2001] 2 SCR 684;
Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3
SCC 598 : [2002] 2 SCR 526; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar
H
533
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav & Anr. (2004) 7
SCC 528 : [2004] 7 SCC 528; Gobarbhai Naranbhai
Singala vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. etc. etc. (2008) 3
SCC 775 : [2008] 2 SCR 131; Panchanan Mishra vs.
Digambar Mishra (2005) 3 SCC 143 : [2005] 1 SCR
484; State of UP vs. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC
B
21 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 454; Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv
Raj Singh @ Lalla Bahu & Anr. (2012) 9 SCC 446 :
[2012] 7 SCR 584; Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP & Anr.
(2016) 15 SCC 422 : [2015] 10 SCR 802; Anil Kumar
Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129 :
C [2017] 11 SCR 195; Bhoopindra Singh vs. State of
Rajasthan & Anr. Cr.A. 1279 of 2021; Mahipal vs.
Rajesh Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118 : [2019] 14 SCR 529;
Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Masood
Ahmed Khan & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 496 : [2010] 10
SCR 1070 – relied on.
D
Case Law Reference
[1978] 2 SCR 371 relied on Para 17
[2001] 2 SCR 684 relied on Para 21
E [2002] 2 SCR 526 relied on Para 21
[2004] 7 SCC 528 relied on Para 21
[2008] 2 SCR 131 relied on Para 21
[2005] 1 SCR 484 relied on Para 21
F [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 454 relied on Para 21
[2012] 7 SCR 584 relied on Para 21
[2015] 10 SCR 802 relied on Para 21
[2017] 11 SCR 195 relied on Para 21
G Cr.A. 1279 of 2021 relied on Para 21
[2019] 14 SCR 529 relied on Para 21
[2010] 10 SCR 1070 relied on Para 22
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 535
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal A
No.1663 of 2021.
From the Judgment and Order dated 22.07.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous No.11683 of 2021.
With
B
Criminal Appeal No.1664 of 2021.
Smarhar Singh, Ms. Shweta Kumari, Nagendra Sharma, Ramakant
Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Yogesh Ahirraj, Ajit Pravin Wagh, Ms. Astha
Prasad, A. Karthik, Arsh Khan, Saket Singh, Ms. Niranjana Singh, Manish C
Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Order of the Court was passed by
NAGARATHNA J.
Leave granted. D
2. These appeals have been preferred by the informant - appellant
assailing the orders dated 22.07.2021 and 13.09.2021 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.11683 of
2021 and 26463 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has been granted to
the accused who is the common respondent in the appeals, in connection E
with Naubatpur P.S. Case No.93 of 2020 and Parsa Bazar P.S. Case
No.316 of 2017 respectively.
3. The facts in a nutshell are that the appellant is the mother of
the deceased Rupesh Kumar. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the
killing of her son and also the person who lodged the First Information F
Report being FIR No.93 of 2020 for offence of murder of her son under
section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the
‘IPC’) and section 27 of the Arms Act against common respondent-
accused herein viz., Pappu Kumar and one other person named Deepak
Kumar.
G
4. That FIR No.93/2020 dated 19.02.2020 is stated to have been
filed by the appellant herein between 2.30 hrs and 3.00 hrs in the night
stating that her son Rupesh Kumar aged about 35 years was sleeping in
the room constructed on the roof top of her house. A relative, Deepak
Kumar was also sleeping there. She was sleeping in another room which
H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A is beside the aforesaid room. She has further stated that she heard the
sound of a person walking and also talking and then she saw that
respondent–accused was present and he had a pistol in his hand and
when he saw her, he caught her and forcefully tied her mouth with his
Gamchha (towel) and he shot her son on the head from his pistol in front
of her and Deepak Kumar too shot once at her son’s head. As a result,
B
her son died. Other family members reached the spot upon hearing the
firing sound. But the accused ran away waiving their pistols.
5. Earlier, FIR No.316 of 2017 was lodged at Police Station Parsa
Bazar by appellant’s deceased son himself viz., Rupesh Kumar for causing
serious bullet injury to him, under sections 341, 307 read with section 34
C of IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act, by giving a ferdbeyan against
the very same respondent-accused herein and his two acquaintances to
K.K. Verma, ASI, Shashtri Nagar PS, District Patna, on 28.12.2017 at
7.57 pm at Emergency Ward, Paras Hospital, Patna. This ferdbeyan
was given in respect of an incident which occurred on the previous day
D i.e. 27.12.2017 when he had gone to meet his friend Shailendra at Sipara.
While Rupesh Kumar was returning from his friend’s house, the
respondent-accused along with his two acquaintances caught him and
respondent-accused fired and caused bullet injury to him. When Rupesh
Kumar ran and reached a farmer’s house in the nearby village and
narrated the entire story to him, he was taken to the police station on a
E motorcycle and had lodged FIR No.316/2017.
6. According to the appellant, the respondent-accused herein had
attempted to kill her son viz., Rupesh Kumar in the year 2017 by firing at
him and an FIR was lodged being FIR No.316 of 2017. But after lodging
FIR No. 93 of 2020, the respondent-accused had absconded for about
F seven months. He had also threatened the appellant herein and exerted
pressure on the appellant-informant and her family to withdraw the
complaint, failing which he would eliminate the entire family. That a
written complaint of the appellant dated 30.09.2020 was filed to the
police, in pursuance of which complaint the respondent-accused was
G nabbed in connection with murder of Rupesh Kumar.
7. While on the run respondent-accused was arrested on
30.09.2020. The respondent-accused has been in judicial custody for a
period of nine months till he was granted bail by the High Court.
8. In fact, the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate at
H Patna, took cognizance of the offences and issued summons to the
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 537
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
respondent-accused herein in connection with FIR No.316/2017. An order A
of remand to judicial custody was passed in connection with Naubatpur
P.S. Case No.316/2017 under section 307 of IPC on 06.01.2021.
9. That the accused made an application seeking bail before the
Sessions Court, which was rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge-I,
Danapur by Order dated 08.12.2020. Thereafter, the respondent-accused B
filed an application for grant of bail by suppressing his criminal antecedents
and by the impugned order dated 22.07.2021, the High Court granted
him bail in connection with the case being FIR No.93/2020 registered at
Naubatpur P.S. for offence under section 302 read with section 34 of
IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act, subject to certain conditions.
C
10. Subsequently, the High Court, vide order dated 13.09.2021,
also granted bail to respondent-accused in connection with the other
case being FIR No.316/2017 registered at Parsa Bazar P.S. for offences
under sections 341, 307 read with section 34 of IPC and section 25 of
the Arms Act. Being aggrieved, the appellant has preferred these appeals
before this Court. D
11. We have heard Sri Smarhar Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant and Sri R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel for respondent-
accused and perused the material on record.
12. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the E
respondent-accused has been named in eight cases. Even though, the
said accused may have been acquitted in a few cases, there are still
three cases pending against him. He had attempted unsuccessfully to
kill the deceased Rupesh Kumar in the year 2017. Later in the year
2020, he killed the deceased and absconded for about seven months.
The mother of the deceased appellant herein, is the informant and she F
has been threatened by respondent. He was in judicial custody only for
a period of nine months as he had earlier absconded but has now been
granted bail by the High Court contrary to the settled principles of law
and the judgments of this Court.
13. Further it is urged that the High Court has not assigned reasons G
for grant of bail in the instant cases whereas the respondent-accused is
alleged to have committed heinous crimes which could result in life
imprisonment or even death penalty. Respondent-accused, being a
habitual offender, could not have been granted bail by the High Court.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High Court in a
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A very cryptic order de hors any reasoning has granted bail to the
respondent-accused. It is the submission of learned counsel for the
appellant, who is mother of the deceased, to allow these appeals by
setting aside the impugned orders. In support of his submission, reliance
has been placed on certain decisions of this Court which shall be referred
to later.
B
14. Per contra, Sri Basant, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent-accused, supported the impugned orders and contended that
accused no.2 in the case is the brother-in-law of the deceased and both
of them were accused in another case in which the respondent-accused
herein has been enlisted as a witness. The deceased and Deepak Kumar
C – accused no.2 were living together in the same house. He may have
fired at the deceased but not the respondent-accused herein. This is a
case of false implication of the respondent-accused by the informant.
15. That the gun was recovered from accused no.2 and there has
been no recovery made from respondent-accused. There have been
D several cases against the deceased and accused no.2 also.
16. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused further
contended that respondent-accused was 350 kms away on the intervening
night of 18th and 19th February, 2020. He was not at the spot of the crime
at all. This is evident from the mobile phone details. Therefore, the High
E Court was justified in considering these aspects and granting bail to the
respondent-accused.
17. In support of his submission, Sri Basant, learned Senior Counsel,
placed reliance on Gudikanti Narsimhulu & Ors. vs. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh - (1978) 1 SCC 240,
F which prescribes the approach of a Court while granting bail. The Court
considering an application seeking bail cannot enter into an in-depth
analysis of the case so as to hold a mini trial of the case. It is also
unnecessary to give lengthy reasons at the time of granting bail. It was
contended that bail is the norm and jail is the exception. Once bail has
G been granted by a Court, it is only in very rare cases that there is
interference as it would have the effect of cancellation of bail. That the
liberty of a person cannot be interfered with unless the situation warrants.
18. It was further submitted that learned counsel for the appellant
was not right in contending that the respondent -accused had absconded.
In fact, there was no chargesheet against him. It was only when a protest
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 539
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
petition was filed, that a chargesheet was filed against him and he was A
arrested.
19. It was further submitted that the allegations against the
respondent-accused are false and hence the impugned orders of the
High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals.
20. Having regard to the contention of Sri Smarhar Singh, learned B
counsel for the appellant that the impugned orders granting bail to the
respondent-accused are bereft of any reasoning and they are cryptic
and bail has been granted in a casual manner, we extract those portions
of the impugned orders dated 22nd July, 2021 and 13th September, 2021
passed by the High Court, which provides the “reasoning” of the Court C
for granting bail, as under :
“Impugned Order dated 22.7.2021
During course of investigation, it has come that at the time and
date of occurrence petitioner was at Araria. Petitioner is in custody
since 30.09.2020. D
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact
that false implication against the petitioner cannot be rule out, the
petitioner above-named, is directed to be enlarged on bail on
furnishing bail bond of Rs. 10,000/- (Ten thousand) with two
sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned E
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate III, Patna in connection with
Naubatpur P.S. Case No.93 of 2020, subject to following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall co-operate in the trial and shall be
properly represented on each and every date fixed by
the court and shall remain physically present as directed F
by the Court and in the event of failure on two
consecutive dates without sufficient reasons, his bail
bond shall be liable to be cancelled by the court below.
(ii) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or the
witnesses of the case, in that case, prosecution will be G
at liberty to move for cancellation of bail of the petitioner.”
Impugned Order dated 13.09.2021
“Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the
fact petitioner is in custody since 06.01.2021, let the petitioner,
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A mentioned above, be enlarged on bail on furnishing bail bond of
Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) with two sureties of the like amount
each to the satisfaction of learned Sub Judge-VIII, Patna, in
connection with Parza Bazar P.S. Case No. 316/2017, subject to
the following conditions:
B (1) Petitioner shall co-operate in the trial and shall be properly
represented on each and every date fixed by the Court and shall
remain physically present as directed by the Court and on his/her
absence on two consecutive dates without sufficient reason, his/
her bail bond shall be cancelled by the Court below.
C (2) If the petitioner tampers with the evidence or the witnesses, in
that case, the prosecution will be at liberty to move for cancellation
of bail.”
21. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an accused as
D under:
a) In Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra), Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content and meaning of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, has also elaborated the factors that
have to be considered while granting bail which are
E extracted as under:
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
F upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course
of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the
benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the
time being.
G 9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the
antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 541
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
whether he has a bad record – particularly a record A
which suggests that he is likely to commit serious
offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part
of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has
enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict
further about the criminal record of a defendant, is
B
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.”
b) Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi & ORS – (2001)
4 SCC 280 is a case wherein this Court proceeded to state
the following principles which are to be considered while
granting bail:
C
“(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind
not only the nature of the accusations, but the severity
of the punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction
and the nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being D
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat
for the complainant should also weigh with the court in
the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable E
doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have
to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the F
event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness
of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the
accused is entitled to an order of bail.”
c) This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan
Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee,
G
J., observed as under:
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order —
but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
H
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always
vary from case to case. While placement of the accused
in the society, though may be considered but that by
itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of
B
bail and the same should and ought always to be coupled
with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail.
The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the
C bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix
of the matter.”
d) In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias
Pappu Yadav & Anr. – (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court
observed in paragraph 11 as under :
D “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very
well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of
course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed
examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of
E the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a
need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie
concluding why bail was being granted particularly, where
the accused is charged of having committed a serious
offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer
from non -application of mind. It is also necessary for the
F court granting bail to consider among other circumstances,
the following factors also before granting bail; they are:
a) The nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment in case of conviction and the nature
of supporting evidence.
G
b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the
witness or apprehension of threat to the
complainant.
(c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of
the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v.
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 543
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Puran A
v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338.”
e) Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala vs. State of Gujarat &
Ors. etc. etc. – (2008) 3 SCC 775, is a case which
concerns cancellation of bail by this Court in a petition filed
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. In the said B
case reliance was placed on Panchanan Mishra vs.
Digambar Mishra – (2005) 3 SCC 143 wherein in para
13 it was observed as under:
“13. The object underlying the cancellation of bail is to
protect the fair trial and secure justice being done to the C
society by preventing the accused who is set at liberty
by the bail order from tampering with the evidence in
the heinous crime … It hardly requires to be stated that
once a person is released on bail in serious criminal cases
where the punishment is quite stringent and deterrent,
the accused in order to get away from the clutches of D
the same indulge in various activities like tampering with
the prosecution witnesses, threatening the family
members of the deceased victim and also create
problems of law and order situation.”
Further on referring to the State of UP vs. Amarmani Tripathi – E
(2005) 8 SCC 21, this Court noted the facts of the case therein
to the effect that the respondent therein had been named in ten
other criminal cases in the last 25 years or so, out of which five
cases were under section 307 IPC for attempt to murder and
another under section 302 IPC for committing murder. That in F
most of the cases he was acquitted for want of sufficient evidence.
Without saying anything further this Court noted that the High
Court in the said case completely ignored the general principle for
grant of bail in a heinous crime of commission of murder in which
the sentence, if convicted, is death or life imprisonment.
G
It was further observed that in the impugned order therein the
findings recorded touched upon the merits of the case and the
learned Judge had proceeded as if an order of acquittal was being
passed, contrary to what had been said in Amarmani Tripathi
which is that only a brief examination has to be made to satisfy
about the facts and circumstances or a prima facie case. H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A f) This Court in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla
Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446, observed that though
the period of custody is a relevant factor, the same has to
be weighed simultaneously with the totality of the
circumstances and the criminal antecedents. That these are
to be weighed in the scale of collective cry and desire and
B
that societal concern has to be kept in view in juxtaposition
to individual liberty, was underlined.
g) In Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15
SCC 422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this
Court on the consideration of factors for grant of bail
C observed through Dipak Misra, J. (as His Lordship then
was) in paragraphs 15 and 18 as under:
“15. This being the position of law, it is clear as cloudless
sky that the High Court has totally ignored the criminal
antecedents of the accused. What has weighed with
D the High Court is the doctrine of parity. A history-sheeter
involved in the nature of crimes which we have
reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences so that
he is not to be retained in custody, but the crimes are of
heinous nature and such crimes, by no stretch of
E imagination, can be regarded as jejune. Such cases do
create a thunder and lightening having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical mind. The
law expects the judiciary to be alert while admitting these
kind of accused persons to be at large and, therefore,
the emphasis is on exercise of discretion judiciously and
F not in a whimsical manner.
xxx
18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat with
profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation of bail as
G the cancellation is not sought because of supervening
circumstances. The annulment of the order passed by
the High Court is sought as many relevant factors have
not been taken into consideration which includes the
criminal antecedents of the accused and that makes the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result is
H the lancination of the impugned order.”
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 545
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
h) In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018) A
12 SCC 129, this Court has spelt out some of the significant
considerations which must be placed in the balance in
deciding whether to grant bail:
“17. While granting bail, the relevant considerations are:
(i) nature of seriousness of the offence; (ii) character B
of the evidence and circumstances which are peculiar
to the accused; and (iii) likelihood of the accused fleeing
from justice; (iv) the impact that his release may make
on the prosecution witnesses, its impact on the society;
and (v) likelihood of his tampering. No doubt, this list is
not exhaustive. There are no hard-and-fast rules C
regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be
considered on its own merits. The matter always calls
for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court.”
i) Recently in Bhoopindra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021), this Court D
has observed as under in the matter of exercise of an
appellate power to determine whether bail has been granted
for valid reasons as distinct from an application for
cancellation of bail by quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar-
(2020) 2 SCC 118: E
“16. The considerations that guide the power of an
appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order
granting bail stand on a different footing from an
assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail.
The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on F
the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is
whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or
unjustified. On the other hand, an application for
cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of
the existence of supervening circumstances or violations G
of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted.”
22. On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision
arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi-judicial authority, it
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546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in Kranti Associates
Private Limited & Anr. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. – (2010) 9
SCC 496, wherein after referring to a number of judgments this Court
summarised at paragraph 47 the law on the point. The relevant principles
for the purpose of this case are extracted as under:
B (a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done
it must also appear to be done as well.
(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial
C or even administrative power.
(c) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the
decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding
extraneous considerations.
(d) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
D component of a decision-making process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule
of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
E reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually
the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the
principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(f) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be
as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them.
F All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been
objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the
litigants’ faith in the justice delivery system.
(g) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
G accountability and transparency.
(h) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough
about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible
to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the
doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 547
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and A
succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons”
is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.
(j) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non
of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in
decision-making not only makes the judges and decision- B
makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to
broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of
Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-
37)
(k) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role C
in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.
23. Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context D
of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, reliance could be placed on
the said judgment on the need to give reasons while deciding a matter.
24. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”
meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any E
particular law ceases, so does the law itself”, is also apposite.
25. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual
is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application
for bail Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, F
particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious
in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so
as to enable a Court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for grant of bail a prima facie conclusion
must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard
to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must G
be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that
would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence/s alleged against an
accused.
H
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A 26. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned orders
above. At the outset, we observe that the extracted portions are the only
portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High court while granting
bail. As noted from the aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a
Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the
case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences by the
B
accused would not have been crystalised as such. There cannot be
elaborate details recorded to give an impression that the case is one that
would result in a conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing
an order on an application for grant of bail. At the same time, a balance
would have to be struck between the nature of the allegations made
C against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations are
proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result in a conviction;
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced by the
accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of the
prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a prima facie
satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge against the accused.
D
27. Ultimately, the Court considering an application for bail has to
exercise discretion in a judicious manner and in accordance with the
settled principles of law having regard to the crime alleged to be
committed by the accused on the one hand and ensuring purity of the
trial of the case on the other.
E
28. Thus, while elaborating reasons may not be assigned for grant
of bail, at the same time an order de hors reasoning or bereft of the
relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. It would be only a non
speaking order which is an instance of violation of principles of natural
justice. In such a case the prosecution or the informant has a right to
F assail the order before a higher forum.
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider the
facts of the present case. The allegations against respondent-accused
as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have been narrated in detail
above. On a consideration of the same, the following aspects of the
G case would emerge:
a) Allegations against the respondent-accused are under
Sections 341, 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC and
Section 27 of the Arms Act in respect of FIR No. 316 of
2017 lodged at Police Station Parsa Bazar which is with
H
BRIJMANI DEVI v. PAPPU KUMAR & ANR. 549
[B. V. NAGARATHNA J. ]
regard to attempt to murder Rupesh Kumar the injured, A
who had himself given the Ferdbayan against the
respondent - accused herein. The other case, namely, FIR
No. 93 of 2020 is with regard to the offence of murder of
appellant’s son Rupesh Kumar under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against
B
respondent-accused herein and accused no.2 Deepak
Kumar. Thus, offences alleged against respondent-accused
herein are serious offences vis-a-vis the very same Rupesh
Kumar at two points of time, namely, in 2017 when attempt
to murder him is alleged and in 2020 allegation of murder
has been cast by the appellant, mother of the deceased C
who is stated to be an eyewitness. Thus, the allegations
against the respondent - accused vis-a-vis the same person,
namely, the informant Rupesh Kumar in both the cases.
b) According to the respondent-accused, there has been a
history of enmity between the accused and the deceased. D
c) The accusation against the respondent-accused is that he
shot Rupesh Kumar with a fire arm, namely, a pistol on two
occasions.
d) The respondent-accused herein has been named in about
eight cases and though he may have been acquitted in a E
few of them, there are still cases pending against him. Thus,
it is inferred that respondent-accused has criminal
antecedents.
e) It has also come on record that the respondent - accused
had absconded for a period of seven months after the F
complaint in respect of the second offence was lodged
against him. Therefore, his arrest was delayed.
f) It is also the case of the appellant that the respondent-
accused had threatened the informant mother of the
deceased. G
g) Thus, there is a likelihood of the respondent-accused
absconding or threatening the witnesses if on bail which
would have a vital bearing on the trial of the cases.
H
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 9 S.C.R.
A h) Also, for securing the respondent-accused herein for the
purpose of commencement of the trial in right earnest in
both the cases, as the accused had earlier absconded,
discretion could not have been exercised in favour of the
respondent-accused in the instant cases.
B i) In the impugned order dated 13.09.2021, the High Court
has noted that there was a previous enmity between the
deceased and the petitioner with regard to contesting an
Election as Mukhiya of Chhotki Tangraila Gram Panchayat
but this fact has not been taken into consideration in the
context of the allegation against the accused and with regard
C to grant of bail.
30. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case in
juxtaposition with the judgments referred to above, we do not think that
these cases are fit cases for grant of bail to respondent-accused in respect
of the two serious accusations against him vis-à-vis the very same person
D namely deceased Rupesh Kumar.
31. The High court has lost sight of the aforesaid vital aspects of
the case and in very cryptic orders has granted bail to the respondent-
accused. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the High Court was not
right in allowing the applications for bail filed by the respondent-accused.
E Hence, the impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside.
The appeals are allowed.
32. The respondent-accused is on bail. His bail bonds stand
cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the concerned jail
authorities within a period of two weeks from today.
F
Divya Pandey Appeals allowed.
G
H
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