BOROSIL GLASS WORKS LTD. EMPLOYEES' UNIONversusD.D. BAMBODE AND ORS.

         BOROSIL GLASS WORKS LTD. EMPLOYEES' UNION                                A
                             v.
                   D.D. BAMBODE AND ORS.

                           NOVEMBER 30, 2000

            [S. RAJENDRA BABU AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.]                              B


      Labour Laws:

      Trade Unions Act, 1926:
                                                                                  c
       Section 28-IA-lnvoking of-Held: Can only be invoked by a person
 who had been a member of a registered trade union for a period of not less
 than 6 months- A person whose application for membership is neither
 allowed nor considered is not a member for six months, and cannot invoke
 S.28-IA-Trade union-Disputes-Civil Court-Jurisdiction of-Held: is                D
barred only in respect of matters which have been referred to an Industrial
Court under S.28-IA-Jf a dispute does not fall under S.28-/A civil court has
jurisdiction-Whether a person should or should not be admitted as a member
 is a dispute within the competence of civil court.

      Interpretation of Statutes:
                                                                                  E
      Harmonious construction-Rule of-Held: If two interpretations of a
provision are possible then the one which leads of a harmonious reading of
the entire provision is to be preferred to the one which renders a portion
nugatory.

       The appellant was a trader union registered under the Trade Unions         F
 Act, 1926. The 4th respondent made an application for membership of the
 appellant-union, which was rejected. Therefore, the 4th respondent filed a
 complaint under Section 28-IA of the Act before the Registrar of Trade
 Unions for grant of a certificate. The Registrar held that since the 4th
respondent was not a member of the appellant-union for six months prior to
the date of the application no certificate under Section 28-IA of the Act could   G
be granted to him. However, the High Court held that even a person who had
applied to become a member could apply under Section 28-IA of the Act Hence,
this appeal.

     Allowing the appeal, the Court,
                                     187                                          H
    188                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         HELD: I.I. Section 28-IA of the Trade Unions Act, 1926 has been
   incorporated to ensure that inter'!al disputes in a trade union get decided.
   The Section specifically provides that it can be invoked only by a person who
   has been a member of a registered trade union for a period of not less than 6
 . months. The words "where there is a dispute as respects whether or not any
B person is an office-bearer or member of a registered trade union" have to be
   read along with the words "any member of such registered trade union for a
   period of not less than six months". A person whose application for
   T1embership has not been considered or allowed would not have been a member
   for six months. 1191-D]

C           1.2. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that if two interpretations are
    possible, one of which leads to a harmonious reading of the entire provision
    and another, which renders a portion nugatory, then the former interpretation
    has to be accepted. The interpretation given by High Court leads to the
    requirement of a person being a member for six months being rendered
    nugatory. However, if it is held that the dispute "as to whether a person is a
D   member or not" is necessarily a dispute in respect of a person who was already
    a member for a period of not less than six months, but whose membership is
    being disputed, then no portion of the Section gets rendered nugatory. Thus
    it will have to be held that dispute between persons who are not members and
    the Union would not be covered by Section 28-IA. Further a dispute between
E   a person who is not yet a member and a union would not be an internal dispute
    of the union.1191-E-GJ

          2. Under Section 28-IA of the Act the Jurisdiction of the Civil Court is
    barred only in respect of matters, which have been referred to an Industrial
    Court under Section 28-IA. If a dispute does not fall under Section 28-IA then
F   that dispute can always be taken to a civil court. As a dispute whether a person
    should or should not be admitted as a member is not a dispute falling within
    Section 28-IA, it would always be open to such persons to approach a civil
    court for resolution of their disputes. [191-H; 192-AJ

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3409of1995.
G        From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.94 of the Bombay High Court
    in W.P. No. 1758of1993.

          S.J. Deshmukh, Farrukh Rashid, Ms.Pramila S. Kumar and Ashok Kumar
    Gupta for the Appellant.

H         C.S. Vaidyanathan (A.C.) Jitendra Acharya and Shankar Anand for the .
    BOROSIL GLASS WORKS LTD. EMPLOYEES' UNION'' D.D. BAMBODE [VARIAVA, l.J J89


Respondents.                                                                       A
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     S.N. V ARIA VA, J. This Appeal is against a Judgment dated 29th
September, 1994.

      Briefly stated the facts are as follows:                                     B
The Appellant is a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926
and a recognised union of Borosil Glass Works Ltd. The 4th Respondent and
certain other persons made a joint application for membership of the Appellant
Union. As the application was not according to the procedure of the Appellant
Union no action was taken on the said application. All those persons were          C
asked to apply individually by filling in the prescribed form and make payment
of requisite fee and membership subscription.

       The Appellant received a notice dated 15th April, 1993 from the Registrar
of Trade Unions under Section JO(b) of the Trade Unions Actthreatening to
cancel the registration of the Appellant Union. The Appellant Union then           D
learnt that this was pursuant to a complaint filed by 4th Respondent under
Section 28(JA) of the Trade Unions Act. The Appellant then represented their
case before the Registrar. The Registrar of Trade Unions thereafter informed
the 4th Respondent that since he was not a member of the Appellant Union
for six months prior to the date of the application no certificate under Section   E
28(JA) of the Trade Unions Act could be granted to him.

       The 4th Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the Bombay High Court
seeking direction to the Registrar of the Trade Unions to issue a consent
certificate. That Petition came to be disposed off by the impugned Judgement
dated 29th September, 1994. The High Court has given a wide interpretation . F
to Section 28(1A) of the Trade Unions Act. It has been held that even a
person who has applied to become a member can apply under Section 28(JA)
of the Trade Unions Act. This interpretation of Section 28(JA) has been
assailed before us in this Appeal.

      For a consideration of this question it will be appropriate to set out       G
Section 28(!A) of the Trade Unions Act. It reads as follows:·

       "28(JA). Power of Industrial Court to decide certai.n disputes.- (I)
       Where there is a dispute as respects whether or not any person is an
       office-bearer or member of a registered trade union (including any
       dispute relating to wrongful expulsion of any such office-bearer or         H
    190                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

           member) or where there is any dispute relating to the property
           (including the account books) of any registered trade union, any
           member of such registered trade union for a period of not less than
           six months may, with the consent of the Registrar, and in such manner
           as may be prescribed, refer the dispute to the Industrial Court
           constituted under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1956 for
B          decision.

               (2) The Industrial Court shall after hearing the parties to the
           dispute decide the dispute; and may require an office-bearer or member
           of the registered trade union, to be appointed whether by election or
           otherwise under the supervision of such person as the Industrial
c          Court may appoint in this behalf or removed, in accordance with the
           rules of the trade union: Provided that, the Industrial Court may
           pending the decision of the dispute, make an interim order specifying
           or appointing any person or appointing a Committee of Administration
           for any purpose under the Act including the purpose of taking
D          possession or control of the property in dispute and managing it for
           the purposes of the union pending the decision.

               (3) The decision of the Industrial Court shall be final and binding
           on the parties, and shall not be called in question in any civil court.

                (4) No civil court shall entertain any suit or other proceedings in
E
           relation to the dispute referred to the Industrial Court as aforesaid and
           if any suit or proceeding is pending in any such Court, the Civil Court
           shall, on receipt of an intimation from the Industrial Court that it is
           seized of the question, cease to exercise jurisdiction in respect thereof.

F              (5) Save as aforesaid, the Industrial Tribunal may, in deciding
           disputes under this section, exercise the same powers and follows the
           same procedure as it exercises or follows for the purpose of deciding
           industrial disputes under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946."

           The Statement of Objects and Reasons for incorporating Section 28(1A)
G   is also relevant. It reads as follows:

           "STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.

               The Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, provides for the registration
           of Trade Unions, and in certain respects defines the law relating to
H          registered Trade Unions. The Act, however, does not contain any
       BOROSIL GLASS WORKS LTD. EMPLOYEES' UNION 1•. D.D. BAMBODE [VARIAVA,J.] 191


           provision for deciding internal disputes in a registered Trade Union. A
           These disputes, which are at present decided by civil courts take a
           long time to decide with the result, that pending the decision of the
           dispute, the work of the registered Trade Union, which cannot function,
           is paralysed. To tide over this difficulty, it is proposed to take power
           to members of Trade Unions with the consent of the Registrar of B
           Trade Unions to refer such disputes to the Industrial Court constituted
           under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and to bar the
           jurisdiction of civil courts from entertaining such disputes. It is also
           proposed to empower the Industrial Court to pass interim orders, and
           its decisions are to be made final and binding on parties."

          In our view, on a plain reading of Section 28(IA), the interpretation
                                                                                      c
    given by the High Court cannot be sustained. Section 28(1A) has been
    incorporated to ensure that internal disputes in a trade union get decided. The
    Section specifically provides that it can be only invoked by a person who has
    been a member of such registered trade union for a period of not less than
    6 months. The words "where there is a dispute as respects whether or not          D
    any person is an office-bearer or member of a registered trade union" has to
    be read along with the words "any member of such registered union for a


J   period not Jess than six months''. A person whose application for membership
    has not been considered or allowed would not have been a member for six
    months. It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that if two interpretations are   E
    possible, one of which leads to a harmonious reading of the entire provision
    and another which renders a portion nugatory then the former interpretation
    has to be accepted. The interpretation given by the High Court leads to the
    requirement of a person being a member for six months being rendered
    nugatory. However if it is tield that the dispute "as to whether a person is
    a member or not" is necessarily a dispute in respect of a person who was          F
    already a member for a period of not less than six months, but whose
    membership is being disputed then no portion of the Section gets rendered
    nugatory. Thus it will have to be held that dispute between persons who are
    not members and the Union would not be covered by Section 28(1A). Further
    a dispute between a person who is not yet a member and a union would not          G
    be an internal dispute of the union.

          Under Section 28(1A) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred only
    in respect of matters which have been referred to an Industrial Court under
    Section 28(1A). If a dispute does not fall under Section 28(IA) then that
    dispute can always be taken to a Civil Court. As a dispute whether a person       H
    192                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   should or should not be admitted as a member is not a dispute falling within
    Section 28(1A), it would always be open to such persons to approach a Civil
    Court for resolution of their dispute. Needless to say that if the law permits
    they may also raise an industrial dispute before the Industrial Court in that
    behalf.

B         In our view, therefore, the Judgment .of the High Court cannot be
    sustained and is set aside. Accordingly the Appeal is allowed. There will be
    no order as to costs.

    V.S.S.                                                       Appeal allowed.




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