BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLAversusHARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR.

                     [2013) 1 S.C.R. 589


     BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA                            A
                               v.
               HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR.
               (Civil Appeal No. 153 of 2013)

                     JANUARY 09, 2013
                                                                    B
     [T.S. THAKUR AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.]

     LEASE:

       Termination of /ease - Vesting of title in lessor - Lease    c
 of subject land terminated and possession thereof taken over
.as per Panchnama - Suit by transferee of lessee for
 declaration and injunction - Held: With the termination of
 /ease, title to suit property vested in lessor, ipso jure - That
 being so, possession of a vacant property would follow title
                                                                    0
 and also vest in the lessor - Panchnama drawn up at site
 recorded the factum of actual takeover of possession from
 /es,see, whereafter possession too legally vested in lessor -
 Besides, there could be no better evidence to prove
 dispossession of lessee from plot jn question than her own
 admission contained in her communication addressed to the          E
 Senior Estate Manager of the appellant-Trust, genuineness
whereof was not disputed - It is, therefore, held that
dispossession of lessee had taken place pursuant to
termination of /ease in terms of the Panchnama.
                                                                    F
     LIMITATION ACT, 1963: ·

     Suit for declaration - Limitation - Held: A suit for
declaration not covered by Article 57 of the Schedule to the
Act must be filed within 3 years from the date when the right       G
to sue first arises - A suit for declaration that the termination
of the lease was invalid and, therefore, ineffective could have
been instituted by lessee as and when the right first accrued
and for that purpose, dispossession of lessee was not
                              589                                   H
    590      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A necessary as dispossession is different from termination of
  lease - However, dispossession having taken place, lessee
  ought to have filed suit within three years of date of
  dispossession - Suit having been instituted after nearly
  eighteen years was clearly barred by limitation - Courts below
B fell in error in holding the suit as within time.
          The subject-land admeasuring 1891.64 square metres
    was leased to respondent no. 2 by the appellant Port-
    Trust. However, as the lesse committed default in
    payment of the outstanding amount and interest, the
C   lease was terminated by order dated 08-08-1977 w.e.f.
    13.12.1978. Possession of the subject land was taken
    under the Panchnama dated 14.12.1978, a copy whereof
    was sent to the lessee on 20-12-1978 with a certificate that
    the possession had been taken. Respondent no. 1 filed
D   suit Suit No. 77 of 1996 for a declaration and permanent
    injunction, questioning the termination of the lease by the
    appellant Port-Trust. The plaintiff-respondent no. 1
    claimed that he had purchased the suit land from
    respondent no. 2 in the year 1991, and on that basis had
E   asked the Port-Trust in the year 1994 to transfer the lease
    rights in his favour. The trial court decreed the suit. The
    first appellate court held that the lease had not been
    validly terminated and the same continued to be
    subsisting. However, it set aside the part of the judgment
F   of the trail court whereby it has directed to transfer the
    lease rights in favour of plaintiff-respondent no. 1. The
    second appeal of the Port-Trust having been dismissed,
    it filed the instant appeal.
          Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
         HELD: 1.1. It is manifest that there is no clear finding
    of fact regarding possession of the suit property having
    continued with the lessee, no matter the lease stood
    terminated and a panchnama evidencing takeover of the
H
. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.              591
         HARGOVINO JASRAJ & ANR.
 possession drawn and even communicated to her. The          A
-question whether the possession of the suit plot was
 taken over did not engage the attention of the first
 appellate court or the High Court although the latter
 proceeded on the basis that the findings of fact recorded
 by the courts below were concurrent, without pointing       B
 out as to what those findings were and how the same put
 the issue regarding takeover of possession from the
 lessee beyond the pale of any challenge. [Para 14-15)
 [599-D-E; 600-E-G]

     1.2. Suffice it to say that the respondents are not C
correct in urging that the dispossession of the lessee
pursuant to the termination of the lease was not proved
as a fact. It is significant to note that with the termination
of the lease, the ti.tie to the suit property vested in the
lessor, ipso jure. That being so, possession of a vacant D
property would follow title and also vest in the lessor. Even
so, the Panchnama drawn up at site recorded the factum
of actual takeover of the possession from the lessee,
whereafter the possession too legally vested in the lessor,
growth of wild bushes and grass notwithstanding. This E
court is of the view that there could be no better evidence
to prove that the lessee had been dispossessed from the
plot in question than her own unequivocal and
unconditional admission contained in her communication
dated 22-2-1979 addressed to the Senior Estate Manager F
of the appellant-Trust. The genuineness of the said
document was not disputed by the respondents. This
Court, therefore, holds that dispossession of the lessee
had taken place pursuant to the termination of the lease
deed in terms of panchnama dated 14-12-1978. [Para 15 G
and 16] [600-G; 601-C-E; 603-A]
     2.1. A suit for declaration not covered by Article 57
of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 must be filed
within 3 years from the date when the right to sue first
                                                             H
    592    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A arises. The rtght to sue in the instant case first accrued
  to the lessee on 13-12-1978 when in terms of order dated
  8.8.1977 the lease in favour of the lessee was terminated.
  A suit for declaration that the termination of the lease was
  invalid and, therefore, ineffective for any reason including
B the reason that the person on whose orders the same
  was terminated had no authority to do so, could have
  been instituted by the lessee on 14-12-1978. For any such
  suit it was not necessary that the lessee was
  dispossessed from the leased property as dispossession
C was different from termination of the lease. However, such
  a dispossession having taken place on 14-12-1978, the
  lessee ought to have filed the suit within three years of
  15-12-1978 so as to be within the time stipulated under
  Article 58. The suit in the instant case was, however,
  instituted in the year 1996 i.e. after nearly eighteen years
0
  and was, therefore, clearly barred by limitation. The
  Courts below fell in error in holding that the suit was
  within time and decreeing the same in whole or in part.
  [Para 17 and 21] [603-B-C; 605-G-H; 606-A-D]

E      State of Punjab & Ors. V. Gurdev Singh 1991
               =
  (3) SCR 663 (1991) 4 SCC 1; Daya Singh & Anr. V. Gurdev
  Singh (dead) by LRs. & Ors. 2010 (1) SCR 194 = (2010) 2
  SCC 194; Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Union of India &
  Anr. 2011 (15) SCR 299 = 2011 (9) SCC 126; Krishnadevi
F Malchand Kamathia & Ors. v. Bombay Environmental Action
                                     =
  Group and Ors. 2011 (3) SCR 291 (2011) 3 SCC 363; and
  Pune Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.
  2007 (3) SCR 277 = (2007) 5 SCC 211; R. Thiruvirkolam
  v. Presiding Officer and Anr. 1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 687 =
G (1997) 1 SCC 9; State of Kera/a v. M.K. Kunhikannan
  Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and Ors. 1995
                       =
  (6) Suppl. SCR 139 (1996) 1 sec 435; and Tayabbhai M.
  Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc.
                       =
  1997 (2) SCR 152 (1997) 3 SCC 443 - referred to.
H
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                   593
         HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR.
    Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council (1956) 1 All ER    A
855- referred to.

     2.2. The impugned judgments and decrees passed
by the courts below are set aside and the suit filed by the
respondents is dismissed. [Para 28] [610-D]
                                                                  8
                     Case Law Reference:

   1991 (3) SCR 663             referred to         para 18

   2010 (1) SCR 194             referred to         para 19
                                                                  c
   2011 (15) SCR 299            referred to         para 19

   (1956) 1 All ER 855          referred to         para 22
   2011 (3) SCR 291             referred to         para 23
   2007 (3) SCR 277             referred to         para 24       D

   1996 (8) Suppl. SCR 687      referred to         para 25
   1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 139 referred to              para 25
   1997 (2) SCR 152             referred to         para 25       E
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 153
of 2013.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 26.12.2007 of the High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Second Appeal No. 17 of          F
2007 with Civil Application No. 1791 of 2007.

    Pravin H. Parekh, Nitin Thakral, Rajat Nair, Ritika Sethi,
Vishal Prasad (for Parekh & Co.) for the Appellant.

    Huzefa Ahmadi, Ejaz Maqbool, Mrigank Prabhakar, Anas          G
Tanwir, Aishwarya Bhati, Dr. Prikhshayat Singh, Sanjoli Mittal,
Karmendra Singh for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                  H
    594      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A         T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted.

          2. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated
    26th December, 2007 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
    Ahmedabad whereby Civil Second Appeal No.17 of 2007 filed
    by the appellant has been dismissed and the judgment and
8
    decree passed by the Courts below affirmed. The facts giving
    rise to the filing of this appeal may be summarised as under:

         3. A parcel of land admeasuring 1891.64 square meters
    situated in Sector 30, Gandhidham in the State of Gujarat was
C   granted in favour of Smt. Pushpa Pramod Shah-respondent
    No.2 in this appeal on a long-term lease basis. A formal lease-
    deed was also executed and registered in favour of the lessee
    stipulating the terms and conditions on which the lessee was
    to hold the land demised in her favour. The respondent-lessee
D   it appears committed default in the payment of the lease rent
    stipulated in the lease-deed with the result that the appellant-
    lessor issued notices dated 12th December, 1975 and 17th
    July, 1976 calling upon the lessee to pay the outstanding
    amount with interest and stating that the lease of the plot in
E   question shall stand determined under Clause 4 thereof and
    possession of the demised premises taken over by the
    appellant-Port Trust in case the needful is not done.

         4. In response to the notices aforementioned the lessee
    by communication dated 18th November, 1976 requested the
F   appellant-Port Trust to permit her to resell the plots for a
    symbolic consideration and to obtain the refund of the
    instalment amount already paid to the Port Trust. The letter
    sought to justify the default in the payment of arrears on the
    ground of an untimely demise of her husband, resulting in
G   cancellation of expansion programme including any further
    acquisition of land by the lessee.

        5. Failure of the lessee to remit the outstanding instalment
    amount culminated in the termination of the lease by the
H   appellant-Port Trust in terms of an order dated 8th August, 1977
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                     595
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
w.e.f. 13th December, 1978. A panchnama prepared on 14th             A
December, 1978 evidenced the takeover of possession of the
plot in question by the appellant-Port Trust, copy whereof was
forwarded even to the lessee along with a certificate that the
possession had been taken over by the Assistant Estate
Manager of the appellant-Port Trust under his letter dated 20th      B
December, 1978.

      6 ..on receipt of the letter aforementioned the lessee by
her letter dated 22nd February, 1979 requested the appellant-
Port Trust to refund the amount and in case a refund could not
be made, to return the possession of the plot to her. One year       C
and four months after the issue of the said letter the lessee-
respondent No.2 herein filed Civil Suit No.152 of 1980 in the
Court of Civil Judge, Gandhidham, in which she prayed for a
decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, its
officers and servants from interfering with her peaceful             D
possession over the plot in question. The immediate
provocation for the filing of the said suit was provided by the
appellant-Port Trust proposing to re-auction the plot in question.
The plaintiff's case in the suit was that she was in actual
physical possession of the plot which rendered the proposed          E
auction thereof unreasonable. An interim application was also
filed in the said suit in which the Court granted an ex-parte
order of injunction that was subsequently vacated by a detailed
order passed on 5th September, 1980 holding that the plaintiff
was not entitled to the relief of injunction. It is common ground    F
that suit No.152 of 1980 was eventually dismissed on 18th
January, 1985 for non-prosecution.
     7. Almost six years after the dismissal of the first suit,
another Suit No.126 of 1991 was filed, this time by respondent       G
No.1-Hargovind Jasraj against respondent No.2-Smt. Pushpa
Pramod Shah for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining
defendant No.2-lessee of the plot, her agents, servants and
representatives from interfering with the plaintiffs possession
over the plot in dispute. According to averments made in the
said suit the lessee had not been carrying on any business           H
    596      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013) 1 S.C.R.

A activities in Gandhidham nor was she using the plot in question
  and that she was finding it difficult to look after and administer
  the plot after the death of her husband. She had, therefore, sold
  the plot to the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in this appeal in terms
  of a registered document. It was further alleged that the cause
B of action to file the suit accrued a few days before the filing of
  the suit when defendant-lessee had through her representative
  asked the plaintiff to vacate the suit plot which demand was in
  breach of the sale agreement between the parties.
  Apprehending dispossession from the plot in question plaintiff-
C respondent No.1 sought a decree for injunction against
  respondent No.2. The appellant-Port Trust, it is noteworthy, was
  not impleaded as a party to the suit which too was dismissed
  for non-prosecution on 15th March, 2002.

        8. Five years later and pending disposal of the second suit
D mentioned above, a third suit being Suit No. 77 of 1996 was filed
  by respondent No.1 this time asking for a declaration and
  permanent injunction in which the plaintiff for the first time
  questioned the termination of the lease by the appellant-Port
  Trust. A declaration that the said lease was still subsisting with
E an injunction restraining the defendant-appellant in this appeal
  and its employees from acting in any manner injurious to the
  title and the possession of the plaintiff over the disputed land
  was prayed for. Plaintiff's case in this suit was that he had
  purchased the plot in question from Smt. Pushpa Pramod Shah
F in the year 1991 in terms of a transfer deed registered with the
  concerned Sub-Registrar at Gandhidham and that he had
  based on the said transfer asked for transfer of the lease rights
  which request had been declined by the appellant-Port Trust in
  the year 1994. It was further alleged that he had come to know
G about the purported cancellation of the lease in favour of Smt.
  Pushpa Pramod Shah and the purported takeover of the
  possession of the plot from her which was according to him
  both fraudulent and invalid in the eyes of law.

          9. The suit was contested by the appellant-Port Trust on
H
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                      597
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.)
several grounds giving rise to as many as seven issues framed         A
by the trial Court for determination. The suit was eventually
decreed by the said Court, aggrieved whereof the appellant-
Port Trust filed an appeal before the First Appellate Court who
partly allowed the said appeal by its judgment and order dated
16th November, 2006. The Appellate Court affirmed the decree          B
passed by the Courts below in so far as the trial Court had
declared that the lease-deed in question had not been validly
terminated by the lessor and the same continued to be
subsisting but allowed the appeal setting aside that part of the
judgment passed by the trial Court whereby the trial. Court had       C
directed the appellant-Port Trust to transfer the lease rights in
favour of the plaintiff-respondent No.1 in this appeal.

      10. The appellant-Port Trust appealed to the High Court
against the above judgment and decree which has been
dismissed by the High Court in terms of the order impugned            D
before us holding that no substantial question of law arose in
the light of the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts
below. The High Court found that since the earlier suits had not
been decided on merits, no final adjudication had taken place
in the same so as to attract the doctrine of res judicata to the      E
issues raised in the third suit out of which the present
proceedings arise.

     11. Appearing for the appellant Mr. Pravin H. Parekh,
learned senior counsel, strenuously argued that the courts
                                                                      F
below had fallen in serious error in holding that the termination
of the lease by the appellant-Port Trust was invalid or that the
lease continued to be valid and subsisting. The question
whether the Senior Estate Manager was competent to
terminate the lease and enter upon the suit property was not,         G
argued Mr. Parekh, joined as an issue by the courts below and
could not be made a basis for holding the termination to be
unauthorised or invalid. Alternatively, he submitted that the
termination order had been passed as early as in the year
1977 whereas the suit in question was filed in the year 1996
                                                                      H
    598     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2013] 1 S.C.R.


A after a lapse of nearly 18 years. The possession of the plot was
  also taken over on 14th December, 1978 which fact was
  acknowledged unequivocally by the lessee in her letter dated
  22nd February, 1979. That being so, any suit aimed at
  challenging the validity of the termination or assailing validity
B of the process by which the possession was taken over from
  the lessee should have been filed within a period of six months
  from the date the cause of action accrued to the lessee in terms
  of Section 120 of the Major Port Trust Act. At any rate, such a
  suit could be filed, at best within three years from the date the
C cause of action accrued to the lessee. Neither the lessee nor
  her transferee who came on the scene long after the termination
  order had been passed and the possession taken over could
  question the validity of the termination of the lease or demand
  protection of their possession in the light of a clear and
  unequivocal admission made by the lessee in her letter dated
0 22nd February, 1979 that the possession of the plot in question
  stood taken over from her. The courts below have, in that view,
  committed a mistake in holding that the suit was within time.

        12. Mr. Ahmadi, counsel appearing for the respondent, on
E the other hand, submitted that the courts below had recorded
  a concurrent finding of fact that the lessee continued to be in
  possession of the suit property even after the termination of the
  lease which finding of fact could not be assailed nor was there
  any legal impediment for the plaintiff transferee or the original
F lessee who too was joined as a plaintiff in the year 1999 to seek
  protection of their possession. It was further argued by Mr.
  Ahmadi that the admission made by the lessee in her letter
  dated 22nd February, 1979 was not unequivocal and stood
  explained by the attendant circumstances including the demise
G of her husband and resultant inability of the lessee to go ahead
  with the expansion programme or to pay remainder of the lease
  amount.

         13. The Trial Court has, while dealing with the questioo of
    dispossession of the lessee from the disputed plot, recorded
H
   BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                    599
    HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
  a rather ambivalent finding. This is evident from the following   A
· observations made by it in its judgment:

      " ..... Further Panchnama submitted alongwith Ex.49
     cannot be said to be panchnama of taking physical
     possession of the plot because the plot is open. Even at
                                                                    8
     present it is open and there are bushes of the Babool
     Trees and as such it is difficult to hold anything about
     possession that of Pushpaben or K. P. T. IT cannot be
     believed that by mere preparing panchnama the
     possession has been taken from the person who is in
     possession of the plot. The K.P. T. has not taken the          C
     possession vide Ex. 49 in the presence of Pushpaben.
     Under the said circumstances the plot is open and it is
     as it is ....... "

                                            (emphasis supplied)     D

      14. It is manifest that there is no clear finding of fact
regarding possession of the suit property having continued with
the lessee, no matter the lease stood terminated and a
panchnama evidencing takeover of the possession drawn and           E
even communicated to her. The first Appellate Court in appeal
filed against the above judgment and decree also did not record
a specific finding that the possession of the plot had not been
taken over by the Port Trust no matter the documents relied
upon by it evidenced such take over. The first Appellate Court
instead held that the termination of the lease was not valid        F
inasmuch as no notice regarding termination in terms of
Sections 106 and 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
had been proved and served upon the lessee nor was it proved
that the person who signed notice Exhibit 47 and who took over
possession in terms of panchnama enclosed with Exhibit 49           G
had been authorised by the Kandla Port Trust, the lessor, to do
so. The conclusions .drawn by the first Appellate Court were
summarised in paragraph 59 of its judgment in the following
words:
                                                                    H
    600      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A          "59. In view of what is stated in foregoing paras of this
          judgment this Court come to the following conclusions: -

          1. The appellant/original defendant has failed to prove the
          service of notice terminating the lease as required under
          Section 111 (g} and 106 of the Transfer of Prop~rty Act
B
          upon the lessee i.e. the Respondent No. 2/original plaintiff
          No. 2.

          2. The defendant/the present appellant failed to prove that
          the person who signed the notice Ex. 47 and the person
c         who is alleged to have made re-entry on the suit plot and
          signed Ex.49 and panchnama produced along with Ex.
          49 were specifically authorised by Kand/a Port Trust i.e.
          the lessor and the Chairman of Kand/a Port Trust.

D
          3. The lease dated 1411211966 is not legally and validly
          determined by the lessor hence, it is subsisting till date
          and alive, and the lessee Smt. Pushapaben Shah i.e. the
          respondent No. 2 is entitled to hold and enjoy the suit plot
          No. 30 sector No. 8."

E      15. In the second appeal filed by the appellant, the High
  Court was of the view that the matter was concluded by
  concurrent findings of fact regarding the validity of the
  termination of the lease and the authority of those who purported
  to have brought about such a termination. The question whether
F the possession of the suit plot was taken over did not engage
  the attention of the first Appellate Court or the High Court
  although the latter proceeded on the basis that the findings of
  fact recorded by the Courts below were concurrent, without
  pointing out as to what those findings were and how the same
G put the issue regarding takeover of the possession from the
  lessee beyond the pale of any challenge. Suffice it to say that
  the respondents are not correct in urging that the dispossession
  of the lessee pursuant to the termination of the lease was not
  proved as a fact. None of the Courts below has recorded a
H clear finding on this aspect even though the trial Court has in
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                   601.
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
its judgment briefly touched that issue but declined to record A
an affirmative finding in the matter. That apart a careful reading
of the passage extracted above from the order passed by the
trial Court shows that the. trial Court was labouring under the
impression as though possession of the vacant piece of land
cannot be taken over by the lessor unless some overt act of B
actual occupation of the plot is established. The fact that wild
bushes were growing on the plot was, in our opinion, no reason
to hold that the panchnama prepared by the Port Trust .
authorities evidencing the takeover of the plot was
inconsequential or insufficient to establish that the process of c
dispossession of the lessee had been accomplished. We need
to remember that with the termination of the lease, the title to
the suit property vested in the lessor, ipso jure. That being so,
possession of a vacant property would follow title and also vest
in the lessor. Even so, the Panchnama drawn up at site 0
recorded the factum of actual takeover of the possession from
the lessee, whereafter the possession too legally vested in the
lessor, growth of wild bushes and grass notwithstanding. We
need not delve any further on this aspect for we are of the view
that there could be no better evidence to prove that the lessee E
had been dispossessed from the plot in question than her own
admission contained in her communication dated 22nd
February, 1979 addressed to the Senior Estate Manager of the
appellant-Trust. The letter may at this stage be extracted in
extenso:
                                                                   F
    "Dear Sir,

     I am in receipt of your letter No. ESILU72316319180
    dated 20th December 1978 informing that the Assistant
    Estate Manager has taken over the plot No. 30 Sector          G
    8. Please note, you have not informed me to be present
    on 4 PM on 14.12.1978 at the site of the aforesaid plot
    and your letter No. ESILL/72316316248 dated 8th August
    1977 said to have been sent to me has not yet been
    received and hence you do not have the authority to re-       H
    enter the plot.        ·
    602       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A          As you have taken the possession of the plot. you are
          now requested to kindly refund all the amounts forthwith
          otherwise you may return back the possession of plot to
          me. If I do not hear anything from you within seven days
          from the date of receipt of this letter, appropriate legal
B         proceedings will be adopted against you, holding you
          entirely responsible for the cost of consequences thereof.
                                                   Yours faithfully,
                                                   Sd/- P.P. Shah
                                           (Smt. Pushpa P. ShahY
c                                              (emphasis supplied)

          16. The genuineness of the above document was not
    disputed by learned counsel for the respondents. All that was
    argued was that the admission regarding the dispossession of
D   the lessee had been made in circumstances that (a) cannot
    constitute an admission and (b) absolve the lessee, the maker,
    of its binding effect. The husband of the lessee having passed
    away, the letter in question was written in a state of shock and
    distress and any admission made therein could not argued Mr.
E   Ahmadi and Ms. Bhati be treated as an admission in the true
    sense. We regret our inability to accept that submission. The
    question is whether possession had indeed been taken over
    from the lessee pursuant to the termination of the lease. The
    answer to that question is squarely provided by the letter in
F   which the-lessee makes an unequivocal and unconditional
    admission that possession had indeed been taken over by the
    appellant-Port Trust. What is significant is that the lessee had
    asked for refund of the amount paid by her towards instalments
    and in case such a refund was not possible to return the plot
G   to her. We do not think that such an unequivocal admission as
    is contained in the letter can be wished away or ignored in a
    suit where the question is whether the lessee had indeed been
    dispossessed pursuan1 to the termination of the lease. There
    is no worthwhile explanation or any other reason that can
H   possibly spell a withdrawal of the admission or constitute an
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES .OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                     603
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
explanation cogent enough to carry conviction with the Court.        A
We have in that view no hesitation in holding that dispossession
of the lessee had taken place pursuant to the termination of the
lease deed in terms of panchnama dated 14th December,
1978.
                                                                     B
      17. The next question then is whether the suit for
declaration to the effect that the termination of the lease was
invalid and that the lease continued to subsist could be filed
more than 17 years after the termination had taken place. A
suit for declaration not covered by Article 57 of the Schedule       C
to the Limitation Act, 1963 must be filed within 3 years from
the date when the right to sue first arises. Article 58 applicable
to such suits reads as under:

         Description of suit   Period of      Time from which
                               Limitation      period begins         D
                                              to run

58. fo obtain any other        Three years    When the right to
    declaration.                              sue first accrues.
                                                                     E
     18. The expression right to sue has not t;>een defined. But
the same has on numerous occasions fallen for interpretation
before the Courts. In State of Punjab & Ors. V. Gurdev Singh
(1991) 4 sec 1, the expression was explained as under:
    ..                                                               F

           The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right
    to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally,
    the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action
    arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by      G
    legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right
    asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear
    and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the
    defendant against whom the suit is instituted."

    19. Similarly in Daya Singh & Anr. V. Gurdev Singh               H
    604      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 194 the position was re-
  stated as follows:

          "13. Let us, therefore, consider whether the suit was barred
          by limitation in view of Article 58 of the Act in the
          background of the facts stated in the plaint itself. Part Ill
B
          of the Schedule which has prescribed the period of
          limitation relates to suits concerning declarations. Article
          58 of the Act clearly says that to obtain any other
          declaration, the limitation would be three years from the
          date when the right to sue first accrues.
c
          14. In support of the contention that the suit was filed
          within the period of limitation, the learned Senior Counsel
          appeariflg for the appellant-plaintiffs before us submitted
          that there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual
D         of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at
          least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right
          by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. In
          support of this contention the learned Senior Counsel
          strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in
E         reported in AIR 1930 PC 270 Bolo v. Kok/an. In this
          decision Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed
          as follows:

                 ' ... There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an
                 accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its
F                infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal
                 threat to infringe that right, by the defendant
                 against whom the suit is instituted. '

        15. A similar view was reiterated in C. Mohammad Yunus
G       v. Syed Unnissa AIR 1961 SC 808 in which this Court
      ·observed: (AIR p.810, para 7)

                  ' . . . The period of six years prescribed by Article
                 120 has to be computed from the date when the
                 right to sue accrues and there could be no right
H
                               I
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                        605
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
            to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted A
            in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear
            and unequivocal threat to infringe that right.'
     In C. Mohammad Yunus, this Court held that the cause
    of action for the purposes of Article 58 of the Act accrues
                                                                   8
    only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there
    is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that
    right. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry
    in the revenue records cannot give rise to cause of
    action.
                                                                        c
    ........ .. Accordingly, we are of the view that the right to sue
    accrued when a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe
    that right by the defendants ....... •
     20. References may be made to the decisions of this Court          0
in Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr. (2011)
9 SCC 126 where this Court observed:
    "While enacting Article 58 of the 1963 Act, the legislature
    has designedly made a departure from the language oi
    Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word "first" has been used E '
    between the words •sue" and "accrued". This would mean
    that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the
    period of limitation will begin to run from the date when
    the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently.
    successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh F
    cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is
    beyond the period ·of limitation counted from the day
    when the right to sue first accrued."
                                             (emphasis supplied)        G
     21. The right to sue in the present case first accrued to
the lessee on 13th December, 1978 when in terms of order
dated 8th August, 1977 the lease in favour of the lessee was
terminated. A suit for declaration that the termination of the
                                                                        H
    606      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A lease was invalid hence ineffective for any reason including the
  reason that the person on whose orders the same was
  terminated had no authority to do so, could have been instituted
  by the lessee on 14th of December 1978. For any such suit it
  was not necessary that the lessee was dispossessed from the
B leased property as dispossession was different from
  termination of the lease. But even assuming that the right to sue
  did not fully accrue till the date the lessee was dispossessed
  of the plot in question, such a dispossession having taken place
  on 14th of December, 1978, the lessee ought to have filed the
c suit within three years of 15th December, 1978 so as to be
  within the time stipulated under Article 58 extracted above. The
  suit in the instant case was, however, instituted in the year 1996
  i.e. after nearly eighteen years later and was, therefore, clearly
  barred by limitation. The Courts below fell in error in holding
D that the suit was within time and decreeing the same in whole
  or in part.

        22. Mr. Ahmadi next argued that the termination of the
  lease being illegal and non est in law, the plaintiff-respondents
  could ignore the same, and so long as they or any one of them
E remained in possession, a decree for injunction restraining the
  Port Trust from interfering with their possession could be
  passed by the Court competent to do so. We are not
  impressed by that submission. The termination of the lease
  deed was by an order which the plaintiffs ought to get rid of by
F having the same set aside, or declared invalid for whatever
  reasons, it may be permissible to do so. No order bears a label
  df its being valid or invalid on its forehead. Any one affected
  by any such order ought to seek redress against the same
  within the period permissible for doing so. We may in this
G regard refer to the following oft quoted passage in Smith v. East
  Elloe Rural District Council (1956) 1 All ER 855. The following
  are the observations regarding the necessity of recourse to the
  Court for getting the invalidity of an order established:

          "An order, even if not made in good faith is still an act
H
  BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                   607
   HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
    capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of            A
    invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary
    proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of
    invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will
    remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most
    impeccable of orders.                                          B

    This must be equally tme even where the brand of
    invalidity is plainly visible : for there also the order can
    effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the
    decision of the court. The necessity of recourse to the C
    court has been pointed put repeatedly in the House of
    Lords and Privy Council without distinction between
    patent and latent defects. n

    23. The above case was approved by this Court in
Krishnadevi Malchand Kamathia & Ors. v. Bombay                     D
Environmental Action Group and Ors. (2011} 3 SCC 363,
where this Court observed:

     "19. Thus, from the above it emerges that even if the
     order/notification is void/voidable, the party aggrieved by   E
     the same cannot decide that the said order/notification
     is not binding upon it. It has to approach the court for
     seeking such de_claration. The order may be
     hypothetically a nullity and even if its invalidity is
   . challenged before the court in a given circumstance, the      F
     court may refuse to quash the same on various grounds
     including the standing of the Petitioner or on the ground
   . of delay or on the doctrine of waiver or any other legal
     reason. The order may be void for one purpose or for one
     person, it may not be so for another purpose or another
   ·person."                                                       G
    24. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Pune
Municipal Corporation v. State of Maharashtra and Ors (2007} ·
5 SCC 211, where this Court discussed the need for
determination of invalidity of an order for public purposes:     H
    608      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 1 S.C.R.

A         "36. It is well settled that no order can be ignored
          altogether unless a finding is recorded that it was illegal,
          void or not in consonance with law. As Prof. Wade states:
          "The principle must be equally true even where the
          'brand of invalidity' is plainly visible: for there also the
B         order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining
          the decision of the Court''.
          He further states:
          "The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an
C         order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person
          in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order
          may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse
          to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing,
          because he does not deseNe a discretionary remedy,
D         because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal
          reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains
          effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order
          may be void for one purpose and valid for another, and
          that it may be void against one person but valid against
E         another."
          xx xx xx xx
          38. A similar question came up for consideration before
          this Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Gurdev
F         Singh (1992) ILLJ 283 SC ...
          39. Setting aside the decree passed by all the Courts and
          referring to several cases, this Court held that if the party
          aggrieved by invalidity of the order intends to approach
G         the Court for declaration that the order against him was
          inoperative, he must come before the Court within the
          period prescribed by limitation. "If the statutory time of
          limitation expires, the Court cannot give the declaration
          sought for".•
H         25. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this
    BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PORT OF KANDLA v.                      609
     HARGOVIND JASRAJ & ANR. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
 Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer and Anr. (1997) A
 1 SCC 9, State of Kera/a v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar
 Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) and Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 435
 and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. v. Hind Rubber
 Industries Pvt. Ltd. etc. (1997) 3 SCC 443, where this Court
 has held that an order will remain effective and lead to legal B
 consequences unless the same is declared to be invalid by a
 competent court.
        26. It is true that in some of the above cases, this Court
   was dealing with proceedings arising under Article 226 of the
   Constitution, exercise of powers whereunder is discretionary         C
 . but then grant of declaratory relief under the Specific Relief Act
   is also discretionary in nature. A Civil Court can and may in
   appropriate cases refuse a declaratory decree for good and
   valid reasons which dissuade the Court from exercising its
   discretionary jurisdiction. Merely because the suit is within time   D
   is no reason for the Court to grant a declaration. Suffice it to
   say that filing of a suit for declaration was in the circumstances
· essential for the plaintiffs. That is precisely why the plaintiffs
   brought a suit no matter beyond the period of limitation
   prescribed for the purpose. Such a suit was neither                  E
   unnecessary nor a futility for the plaintiffs right to remain in
   possession depended upon whether the lease was subsisting
   or stood terminated. It is not, therefore, possible to fall back
   upon the possessory rights claimed by plaintiffs over the leased
   area to bring the suit within time especially when we have, while    F
   dealing with the question of possession, held that possession
   also was taken over pursuant to the order of termination of the
  lease in question.
      27. In the light of what we have said above, we consider it G
 unnecessary to examine the question whether the suit in
 question was barred by Section 120 of the Major Ports Act
 which stipulates a much shorter period of limitation of six
 months. We also consider it unnecessary to examine whether
 the suit filed by the original plaintiff-transferee of the lessee was H
    610      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 1 S.C.R.


A barred by the principle of constructive res judicata or Order II,
  Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in view of the fact
  that the first suit filed by the lessee in the year 1980 for
  permanent prohibitory injunction could and ought to have raised
  the question of validity of the termination of the lease as the
B termination of the lease had by that time taken place. So also
  the question whether the transferee, who had not been
  recognised by the Port Trust, could institute a suit against the
  Port Trust so as to challenge the termination of the lease in
  favour of his vendor also need not be examined. All that we
c need mention is that the addition of the lessee as a co-plaintiff
  in the suit also came as late as in the year 1999 when the
  original plaintiff transferee of the lease appears to have realised
  that it is difficult to assert his rights against the Port Trust on
  the basis of a transfer which was effected without the
0 permission of the lessor-Port Trust.
         28. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the
    impugned judgment and decree passed by the Courts below
    and dismiss the suit filed by the respondents but in the
    circumstances without any order as to costs.
E
    R.P.                                           Appeal allowed.