Holding

A judicial officer does not acquire a right to continue in service up to age 60; the benefit of extended superannuation is conditional on a High Court evaluation, and absent such benefit the officer must retire at the statutory age of 58.

Summary

The petitioners, senior judicial officers in Bihar, challenged a High Court order that denied them the benefit of extending their superannuation age from 58 to 60 years, arguing that the Supreme Court’s directions in the All India Judges' Association cases automatically conferred such a right. The Court held that the Supreme Court’s direction was an ad‑hoc benefit, not a statutory right, and that continuation beyond 58 years is subject to a performance‑based evaluation by the High Court. The Evaluation Committee’s finding that the petitioners lacked utility was based on material records and was not arbitrary. Consequently, the petitioners had no right to remain in service beyond the existing superannuation age and could not claim compulsory retirement or a mandamus for rule‑making. The writ petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the Supreme Court’s directions in All India Judges' Association cases automatically extend the superannuation age to 60 years, creating a vested right for judicial officers.
Whether a High Court can retire a judicial officer at 58 years without a Governor’s order, and whether such retirement amounts to compulsory retirement under service law.
Whether the Evaluation Committee’s denial of the benefit of extended superannuation was arbitrary, unsupported by material, and thus liable to be set aside.
Whether the petitioner is entitled to a mandamus directing the State to frame rules for enhanced superannuation age.
Interpretation of the term ‘compulsory retirement’ in the context of Article 311 and service rules.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 235, s. Article 311, s. Article 32
Fundamental Ruless. Rule 56

Subjects

service lawsuperannuationjudicial officercompulsory retirementevaluation committeeArticle 311Article 235Article 32judicial independenceservice rulesbenefit of extended retirement age

Judgment

A BISHWANATH PRASAD SINGH ETC.
v.
STA TE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

DECEMBER 15, 2000

B [DR. A.S. ANAND, CJ., R.C. LAHOTI AND
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]

Service Law:
c Superannuation-Age of-Judicial Officer challenging the decision
not to confer on him the benefit of enhancement of the age of superannuation
from 58 years to 60 years-Contention that such a benefit granted by Supreme
Court and it has the effect of amending the service rules and extending by
its own force, the age of retirement ofjudicial officers to 60 years-Tenability
D of-Held, by force of the judgement judicial officer does not acquire a right
to continue in service upto the extended age of 60 years-It is only a benefit
conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation as to their continued
utility to the judicial system, to be carried out by the respective High Courts-
!f the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit ofextension
in superannuation age, he would retire at the age of superannuation as per
E the service rules-Evaluation Committee forming an opinion taking an overall
view of the service record, with requisite emphasis on recent performance-
The opinion so formed was neither arbitrary nor based on no material-
Held, no right inhers in the petitioner to continue in service beyond the age
of 58 years which is the age of retirement of judicial officers under the
p existing Rules applicable to the petitioner.

Judicial Officers-Evaluation of pe1formance by the High Court-
Opinion that the officer concerned does not have utility for continued service
so as to be retained beyond 58 years of age and thar the officer concerned
be allowed to retire at the normal age of superannuation-Implication of-
G Held, such superannuation cannot be called 'compulsory retirement "because
the officer has neither been given the benefit of extended age of
superannuation nor was being retired prematurely nor was he being
'compulsorily retired' in the sense the expression is known to service
jurisprudence but was being allowed to retire at the age of superannuation
H appointed by the service rules governing him-Constitution of India, 1950-
718
B.P. SINGH v. STATE 719

Article, 235. A
Words and Phrases:
"Compulsory Retirement "-Meaning of in the context of Constitution
of India, 1950-Artic/e 311-Fundamental Rules-Rule 56 0).

Constitution of India, 1950-Artic/e 235-Administrative and B
disciplinary control of the High Court over the subordinate judiciary-
Assessment of performance of judicial officers being an ongoing process,
periodical inspections and timely entries in service records to be made-·
Communication thereof to judicial officers- -Affording right of representation
in case of adverse entry-Need for-Emphasised. C
The petitioner-both of them judicial officers, challenged the order
denying them the benefit of increase in superannuation age from 58 to 60
years. The Evaluation Committee of the High Court consisting of 8 judges
and presided over by the Chief Justice, held its meeting for consideration of
the agenda of granting benefit of increase in the retirement age from 58 to D
60 years to judicial officers as per the directions of this Court in All India
Judges 'Association v. Union of India & Ors., (1992) 1 SCC 119 and All India
Judges' Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., 11993] 4 SCC 288. As
regards the petitioners, the Evaluation Committee formed the opinion that
their further continuance in service would not be in public interest as they
did not have potential for continued useful service. Hence the present petitions. E
On behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that in view of the decision
of this Court in 11992] 1SCC119and11993] 4 SCC 288, the retirement age
of judicial officers stood increased to 60 years and before attaining such age
of retirement, the petitioners could not have been made to retire at the age of
58 years except by following the procedure applicable to compulsory F
retirement; that the order of retirement could be passed only by the Governor;
that as the State/Governor had not passed any order of retirement, the
petitioners could not be made to retire by the High Court acting on its own;
that the impugned order was arbitrary, based on no material and hence vitiated;
and that the direction made by this Court had the effect of amending the G
service rules and extending by its own force, the age of retirement of judicial
officers to 60 years.

Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. 1. No right much less any fundamental right in hers in the
petitioner to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years which is the age H
720 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of retirement of judicial officers in the State under the existing Rules
applicable to the petitioner. Direction with regard to the enhancement of
superannuation age of judicial officers given in All India Judges' Association
& Ors. v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 288 does not result in automatic
enhancement of the age of superannuation. By force of the judgement a judicial
officer does not acquire a right to continue in service upto the extended age
B of 60 years. It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an
evaluation as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out
by the respective High Court before attaining the age of 58 years and
formation of an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service.
Else the judicial officers retire at the superannuation age appointed in the
C service rules governing conditions of services of the judicial officers. In the
present case, the Evaluation Committee of the High Court consisting of 8
judges and presided over by the Chief Justice held its meeting for considering
the 11genda of extending the benefit of enhancement of age of superannuation
from 58 to 60 years to the Judicial Officers. As regards the petitioners, the
Evaluation Committee formed its opinion that their further continuance in
D service will 11ot be in public interest as they did not have potential for continued
useful service. An overall view of the service record, with requisite emphasis
on recent performance, was taken into consideration by the Evaluation
Committee of the High Court The opinion formed by the High Court is thus,
11either arbitrary 11or based on no material or is vitiated for any other reason.
E [737-E, F; 733-F, G; 736-E]

1.2. The direction given in [1993) 4 SCC 288 is by way of ad hoc
arrangement so as to operate in the interregnun, commencing from the date
of judgement and until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules
by the State Govt Once the service rules governing superannuation age have
F been amended, the direction ceases to operate. (733-H; 734-AI

1.3. If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit
of extension in superannuation age, he would retire at the age of
superannuation appointed by the service rules. No specific order or
G communication in that regard is called for either by the High Court or by the
Governor of the State. Such retirement is not 'compulsory' retirement in the
sense of its being by way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by
way of'compulsory retirement in the public interest.' No right of the judicial
officer is taken away. (734-CI

H All India Judges' Association v. Union of India & Ors., (1992] I SCC
B.P. SINGH v. STATE 721

119 and All India Judges'; Association & Anr. v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (19931 A
4 sec 288, relied on.

Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (1999] 4 SCC
7 235; High Court ofJudicature at Allahabad through Registrar v. Sarnam Singh
\ & Anr., (20001 2 SCC 339 and Ramesh Chandra Acharya v. Registrar High B
I
) Court ofOrissa & Anr., (20001 6 SCC 332, referred to.
J
2.1. The word 'compulsory retirement' is not a very appropriate
expression to be employed in the instant case because the petitioners have
neither been given the benefit of 'extended age of superannuation' nor were
they retired prematurely nor were being 'compulsorily retired' in the sense C
the expression is known to service jurisprudence but were being allowed to
retire simplicitor at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules.
The length ofservice was neither being extended nor snapped mid way. In
this category of cases, the employment of words 'compulsory retirement'
denotes only this much that the High Court having undertaken the exercise
of evaluation and having formed the opinion that the officer was not entitled D
to benefit of extension, there was no other option left available except to allow
the officer concerned to retire at the normal age of his superannuation.
1732-F, G, HJ

2.2. Compulsory retirement in service jurisprudence has two meanings. E
Under the various disciplinary rules, compulsory retirement is one of the
penalties inflicted on a delinquent government servant consequent upon a
finding of guilt being recorded in disciplinary proceedings. Such penalty
involves stigma and cannot be inflicted except by following the procedure
prescribed by the relevant rules or consistently with the principles of natural
justice. Such compulsory retirement in the case of government servant must F
also withstand the scrutiny of Article 311 of the Constitution. Then there are
service rules, such as Rule 56(j) of Fundamental Rules, which confer on the
government or the appropriate authority, an absolute right to retire a
government servant on his attaining a particular age or on his having
completed a certain number of years of service on formation of an opinion G
that in public interest it is necessary to compulsorily retire a government
servant. In that case, it is neither a punishment nor a penalty with loss of
retiral benefits. More appropriately, it is like premature retirement. It does
not cast any stigma. Such an order may be subjected to judicial review on
very limited grounds such as the order being ma/afide, based on no material
or on collateral grounds or having been passed by an authority not competent H
722 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A to do so. The object of such compulsory retirement is to weed out the worthless
who have lost their utility for the administration by their insensitive,
unintelligent or dubious conduct impeding the flow of administration or
promoting stagnation. [729-G, H; 730-A-E]

Shyamlal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [I 955] 1 SCR 26; Brijmohansingh
B Chopra v. State of Punjab, [1987] 2 SCC 188; Ramchandra Raju v. State of
Orissa, 11994] Suppl. 3 SCC 424; Baikunthnath Das & Anr. v. Chief District
Medical Officer, Baripuda & Anr.. (1992] 2 SCC 299 and S. Ram Chandra
Raju v. State ofOrissa, (1994] Suppl. 3 SCC 424, referred to.

3. Article 235 of the Constitution vests administrative and disciplinary
C control over the district judiciary including the subordinate judiciary in the
High Court immunising them from the executive control of the State
Government so as to protect judicial independence. Control over subordinate
Courts vested in the High Court is a trust and confidence reposed by the
founding fathers of the Constitution in a high institution like the High Court.
D Periodical inspections of subordinate Courts have to be carried out regularly
so as to keep a vigil and watch on the functioning of the subordinate judiciary.
An assessment of quality and quantity of performance and progress of the
judicial officers should be an on going process continued round the year and
then to make a record in an objective manner of the impressions formulated
by such assessment. There is a need for vigilantly carrying out the annual
E inspections at regular intervals and making timely entries in the service
records followed by prompt communications to the judicial officers so as to
afford them a right of representation in the event of the entry being adverse.
(738-G, H; 739-A; 740-C, D; 741-C]

F High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. Ishwar Chand Jain, [1999] 4 SCC
579; High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Through Registrar v. Sarnam
Singh & Ors.. [2000] 2 SCC 339 and In re: R. Rajiah, [1998] 3 SCC 211,
referred to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (c) No. 4I9 of2000.
G (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)
WITH
Writ Petition (C) No. 505 of 2000.
R.K. Jain, Amarendra Sharan, Neeraj Shekhar and Ambhoj Kumar Sinha
H for the Appellants.
B.P. SINGH v. STATE jLAHOTI. .I.] 723
G.L. Sanghi, Sr. Adv,. Uma Nath Singh and B.B. Singh for the A
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. By this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India the petitioner, who is a member of Bihar Superior Judicial Service and B
posted as District & Sessions Judge, Giridih, seeks issuance of writ in the
nature of mandamus directing the State of Bihar to frame rules for enhancement
of age of superannuation of the judicial officers of the State as per directions
of the Supreme Court issued in the case of All India Judges' Association
case, [ 1992] I SCC 119 and also for a writ or direction quashing the
communication contained in the letter dated 17th May, 2000 of the Registrar C
General of the Patna High Court informing the petitioner that having assessed
and evaluated the services of the petitioner in the light of the decision of this
court in All India Judges' Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1993]
4 SCC 288, the High Court has been pleased to decide not to allow him the
benefit of enhancement of the retirement age from 58 years to 60 years and D
that the petitioner shall cease to be a member of the judicial service of the
State on completion of the age of 58 years in October, 2000.

The facts are jejune. Bishwanath Prasad Singh, the petitioner, was born
on I 0th October, 1942. He entered Bihar Administrative Service (Judicial
Branch) on 4.4.1974 as a Munsif. He was promoted as Assistant Subordinate E
Judge in April, 1985. In May, 1987, he was promoted in Bihar Superior Judicial
Service and confirmed on 5.3.1998 w.e.f. 1.9.1991. On 17.2.2000, selection grade
was released to the petitioner w.e.f. 1.8.1997. On 17.5.2000 the impugned
communication, as abovesaid, was issued by the High Court of Patna through
its Registrar General.
F
The impugned communication of the High Court has been challenged
by the petitioner mainly on three grounds: firstly, that in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court, the retirement age of judicial officers stood increased
to 60 years and before attaining such age of retirement, the petitioner could
not have been made to retire at the age of 58 years except by following the G
procedure applicable to compulsory retirement; secondly, that the petitioner
holds a civil post under the State of Bihar. The order of retirement can be
passed only by the Governor of Bihar; the jurisdiction of the High Court
being only advisory. As the State of Bihar/Govemor of Bihar has not passed
any order of retirement, the petitioner cannot be made to retire by the High
Court acting on its own; thirdly, that the impugned order is arbitrary, based H
724 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A on no material and hence is vitiated. We will deal with each of the pleas so
raised seriatim.

We note with concern the volume oflitigation in which judicial officers
belonging to State judicial services are being forced to indulge into because
of the inaction on the part of the State Governments in framing/amending
B service rules governing the age of retirement of the members of State judiciary
in spite of two directions made by this court respectively on November 13,
1991 and ,\ugust 24, 1993. Many High Courts of the States have also failed
to take requisite initiative to persuade the respective State Governments to
act in response to the directions of this court. We have noticed several writ
C petitions being filed in the High Courts, travelling up in appeals by either side
to this court and petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution also being filed
in this court all avoidable litigation.

In All India Judges' Association v. Union of India & Ors., (1992] l SCC
119 (hereinafter referred to as '1992 case'), the landmark decision taking care
D of betterment of service conditions of subordinate judiciary one of the directions
given in the judgment was to raise the retirement age of judicial officers to
60 years uniformly throughout the country and appropriate steps in that
regard being taken by December 31, 1992. The court was at pains in
demonstrating how the members of judicial services stand on pedastal different
from other civil services and, therefore, deserve to be dealt with by ameliorating
E service conditions so as to provide initiative for attracting better persons in
judicial services and which would tend to raise the tone and morale of the
judicial services as a whole, the services being essential bulwark of democracy.
The executives of the Union of India and various States, far from complying
with the directions, chose to prefer several review petitions which were heard
F and disposed of by this court by its judgment dated August 24, 1993, reported
as All India Judges' Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1993] 4
SCC 288 (hereinafter, '1993 case'). Feeling anguished by inaction on the part
of the executive, this court issued very many directions in continuation of and
also in modification of those made in 1992 case. In the matter of the
superannuation age the direction given vide clause (b) of para 52 was as
G under:-
"(b) The direction with regard to the enhancement of the
superannuation age is modified as follows:

While the superannuation age of every subordinate judicial officer
H shall stand extended up to 60 years, the respective High Courts
B.P. SINGH v. STATE [LAHOTI. J.] 725

should, as stated above, assess and evaluate the record of the judicial A
officer for his continued utility well within time before he attains the
age of 58 years by following the procedure for the compulsory
retirement under the Service rules applicable to him and give him the
benefit of the extended superannuation age from 58 to 60 years only
if he is found fit and eligible to continue in service. In case he is not
found fit and eligible, he should be compulsorily retired on his B
attaining the age of 58 years.

The assessment in question should be done before the attainment
of the age of 58 years even in cases where the earlier superannuation
age was less than 58 years. C
The assessment directed here is for evaluating the eligibility to
continue in service beyond 58 years of age and is in addition to and
independent of the assessment for compulsory retirement that may
have to be undertaken under the relevant Service rules, at the
earlier stage/s. D
Since the service conditions with regard to superannuation age
of the existing judicial officers is hereby changed, those judicial
officers who are not desirous of availing of the benefit of the enhanced
superannuation age with the condition for compulsory retirement at
the age of 58 years, have the option to retire at the age of 58 years. E
They should exercise this option in writing before they attain the age
of 57 years. Those who do not exercise the said option before they
attain the age of 57 years, would be deemed to have opted for
continuing in service till the enhanced superannuation age of 60 years
with the liability lo compulsory retirement at the age of 58 years.
F
Those who have crossed the age of 57 years and those who cross
the age of 58 years soon after the date of this decision will exercise
their option within one month from the date of this decision. If they
do not do so, they will be deemed to have opted for continuing in
service till the age of 60 years. In that case, they will also be subjected G
to the review for compulsory retirement, if any, notwithstanding the
fact that there was not enough time to undertake such review before
they attained the age of 58 years. However in this case, the review
should be undertaken within two months from the date of the expiry
of the period given to them above for exercising their option, and if
found unfit, they should be retired compulsorily according to the H
726 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
I
A procedure for compulsory retiremenl under the Rules.

Those judicial officers who have already crossed the age of 58 \
years, will not be subjected to the review for compulsory retirement
and will continue in service up to the extended superannuation age
of 60 years since they have had no opportunity to exercise their
B option and no review for compulsory retirement cou Id be undertaken
in their case before they reached the age of 58 years."
[emphasis supplied]

We have underlined a few passages while reproducing, as above, the direction
made in 1993 case as during the course of hearing much emphasis was laid
C by Shri R.K. Jain the learned senior counsel for the petitioner on such
passages in ~upport of his submission that the direction made by the Supreme
Court has the effect of amending the service rules and extending by its own
force, the age of retirement of judicial officers to 60 years. The learned senior
counsel maintained that without regard to the fact whether the existing service
D rules were amended or not by the State Governments so as to be brought in •
conformity with the direction of the Supreme Court, the judicial officers were
entitled to remain in service upto the completion of the age of 60 years and
retirement at the age of 58 years or at any time before attaining the age of
60 years was not permissible ever since August 24, 1993 (the date of judgment
in 1993 case) except by following the procedure applicable to compulsory
E retirement under the relevant service rules of the State. We have given our
anxious consideration to the plea so forcefully advanced but we find ourselves
not persuaded to agree with the same.

The directions made in para 52 (b) are to be read in the light of the
detailed discussion on the aspect of enhancement of superannuation age
F contained in paragraphs 25 to 34 of the judgment in 1993 case. To find out
what was intended by this court, we hereby extract and reproduce a few other
passages therefrom as under:-

" ........The benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years,
shall not be available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective
G of their past record of service and evidence of their continued utility
to the judicial system. The benefit will be available to those who, in
the opinion of the respective High Courts, have a potential for
continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall for the
indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and
H utility. The potential for continued utility shall be assessed and
B.P. Sil\CiH v. STATE [LAHOTI,J. I 727
evaluated by appropriate Committees of Judges of th~ respective A
High Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the High
Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of the judicial
officer's past record or service character rolls, quality of judgments
and other relevant matters.

The High Court should undertake and complete the exercise in B
case of officers about to attain the age of 58 years well within time
by following the procedure for compulsory retirement as laid down
in the respective Service Rules applicable to the judicial officers.
Those who will not be found fit and eligible by this standard should
not be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should be C
compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the said procedure
for compulsory retirement. The exercise should be undertaken before
the attainment of the age of 58 years even in cases where earlier the
age of superannuation was less than 58 years. It is necessary to make
it clear that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the
suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of the benefit D
of the increased age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years. It
is in addition to the assessment to be undertaken for compulsory
retirement and the compulsory retirement at the earlier stagels under
the respective Service Rules.''

[~mphasis supplied] E
It is clear that this court intended to confer a benefit on the judicial
officers by the force of the judgment of this court and to provide a mechanism
for availing the benefit during the period until the concerned State amended
the service rules governing the age of superannuation of judicial officers.
Once rules are amended, the age of superannuation would be governed by F
the service rules. But so long as that was not done, the judgment of this court
in 1993 case was intended to govern the age of superannuation. Under the
service rules, if amended, the right to hold the judicial office shall be a
statutory right subject to satisfying the requirements, if any, contemplated by
the rules. Till then, the extended age of superannuation to 60 years shall be G
a benefit available to judicial officers subject to their satisfying the test of
suitability at the evaluation or assessment to be made by the High Courts in
accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court. Such evaluation is
independent of and other than an assessment undertaken for compulsory
retirement in public interest which could be resorted to earlier or later also.
The abovesaid view finds support from a number of decisions rendered by H
728 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. S S.C.R.

A this court which may be referred to briefly.
In Rajat Baran Roy & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors., [1999] 4 SCC 235,
the State of West Bengal did not frame or amend the service rules for the
purpose of conferring the benefit of enhanced age of superannuation on
judicial officers as directed by this court. However, on 31.1.1998, the Government
B of India fixed the retirement age of the members of the Indian Administrative
Service at 60 years. Vide a pre-existing notification dated 20.6.1992 of the
Government of West Bengal, the members of the higher judicial services are
treated on par with the members of the Indian Administrative Service in all
matters and, therefore, automatically the retirement age of members of the
C West Bengal Higher Judicial Service also got enhanced to 60 years. A 3-
Judges Bench of this court held that in view of the age of superannuation
of the judicial officers having stood extended statutorily from 58 years to 60
years, the right of the petitioners to continue in service till the age of 60 years
was not derived from the 1993 case. After the directions in the 1993 case, in
the case of such States which had framed rules consequent upon which the
D members of the subordinate judiciary in those States became entitled to
continue in service till the age of 60 years, it will have to be held that the
enhancement has come into force by virtue of such rules framed and de-hors
the directions of this court. The need for pre-retirement assessment, as directed
by this court, shall cease to exist once the appropriate rule governing the age
E of superannuation is amended unless such pre-retirement assessment is
specifically provided under the rules. Vide para 10, this court held that the
direction enhancing the retirement age of the members of the subordinate
judiciary in India to 60 years made in 1993 case was subject to the rider that
this benefit of increased retirement age shall not be available automatically to
all judicial officers irrespective of their past record of service and evidence
F of their continued utility to the judicial system; the benefit, according to this
court, was available to those, who in the opinion of the respective High
Courts, have the potential for continued useful service.

The same view was taken by the 2-Judges Bench of this court in High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad through Registrar v. Sarnam Singh &
G Anr., (2000] 2 sec 339. Vide para 13, the Court said that the procedure evolved
in 1993 case was a temporary measure and was not to be adopted as a
permanent feature.

In Ramesh Chandra Acharya v. Registrar, High Court of Orissa & Anr.,
H (2000] 6 SCC 332, Orissa Service Code governing the age ofretirement of the
B.P. SINGH v. STATE [LAHOTI, J.] 729

petitioner was not amended. The petitioner, retired at the age of 58 years, filed A
a petition under Article 32 contending that the age of superannuation had
stood extended to 60 years by 1993 case. A 2-Judges Bench of this court
held:-

"There can be no right of an employee to continue in service de-hors
statutory or administrative rule prescribing superannuation age and B
con.tinuation in service could be only subject to the conditions
provided."

Xxx xxx xxx xxx

.................. in the absence of a specific rule made by the State no C
judicial officer has a right as such to continue beyond the age of 58.
It is only when the High Court, after reviewing all aspects of service
including the past record of the officer concerned, specifically orders
that in the interest of the judicial service of the State it is necessary
to retain the particular officer beyond that age-limit and allow him to D
superannuate at the age of 60. In other words, continuation beyond
58 years is permissible only when the High Court makes a positive
recommendation in favour of that officer for such continuation.
Otherwise the judicial officer has to retire at the age of 58. This can
be departed from only when the State makes a specific rule otherwise."
E
The use of the words 'compulsory retirement' for the judicial officers
allowed to superannuate at the age of 58 years and the expressions such as
'compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 58 years according to the
procedure for compulsory retirement under the rules' have emboldened the
petitioner to raise the plea that subsequent to the judgment of this court in
1993 case, the retirement of a judicial officer at the age of 58 years is not F
retirement in ordinary course but compulsory retirement and, therefore, the
procedure for compulsory retirement has to be followed. In our opinion such
a submission cannot be entertained on an overall reading of the judgment of
this court in 1993 case.
G
Compulsory retirement in service jurisprudence has two meanings. Under
the various disciplinary rules, compulsory retirement is one of the penalties
inflicted on a delinquent government servant consequent upon a finding of
guilt being recorded in disciplinary proceedings. Such penalty involves stigma
and cannot be inflicted except by following procedure prescribed by the
relevant rules or consistently with the principles of natural justice if the field H
730 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A for inflicting such penalty be not occupied by any rules. Such compulsory
retirement in the case of a government servant must also withstand the
scrutiny of Article 311 of the Constitution. Then there are service rules, such
as Rule 560) of Fundamental Rules, which confer on the Government or the
appropriate authority, an absolute (but not arbitrary) right to retire a government
B servant on his attaining a particular age or on his having completed a certain
number of years of service on formation of an opinion that in public interest
it is necessary to compulsorily retire a government servant. In that case, it
is neither a punishment nor a penalty with loss of retiral benefits. (See
Shyam/al v. State of UP., (1955] 1 SCR 26; Brijmohansingh Chopra v. State
of Punjab, [1987] 2 SCC 188; Ramchandra Raju v. State of Orissa, (1994]
C Supple 3 SCC 424; Baikunth Nath Das & Anr. v. Chief District Medical
Officer, Baripada & Anr., (1992] 2 SCC 299. More appropriately it is like
premature retirement. It does not cast any stigma. The government servant
shall be entitled to the pension actually earned and other retiral benefits. So
long as the opinion forming basis of the order for compulsory retirement in
D public interest is formed bonafide, the opinion cannot be ordinarily interfered
with by a judicial forum. Such an order may be subjected to judicial review
on very limited grounds such as the order being malafide, based on no
material or on collateral grounds or having been passed by an authority not
competent to do so. The object of such compulsory retirement is not to
punish or penalise the government servant but to weed out the worthless
E who have lost their utility for the administration by their insensitive,
unintelligent or dubious conduct impeding the flow of administration or
promoting stagnation. The country needs speed, sensitivity, probity, non-
irritative public relation and enthusiastic creativity which can be achieved by
eliminating the dead wood, the paper-logged and callous (see S. Ram Chandra
F Raju v. State ofOrissa, (1994] Supp. 3 SCC 424. We may with advantage quote
the following passage from this decision :

"Though the order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and
the Government servant on being compulsorily retired is entitled to
draw all retiral benefits, including pension, the Government must
exercise its power in the public interest to effectuate the efficiency of
G
service. The dead wood needs to be removed to augment efficiency.
Integrity of public service needs to be maintained. The exercise of
power of compulsory retirement must not be a haunt on public servant
but act as a check and reasonable measure to ensure efficiency in
service, and free from corruption and incompetence. The officer would
H go by reputation built around him. In appropriate case, there may not
B.P. SINGH v. STATE \LAHOTI, J.] 731
be sufficient evidence to take punitive act of removal from service. A
But his conduct and reputation is such that his continuance in service
would be a menace in public service and injurious to public interest."

We would like to state, even at the risk of repetition, that 1993 case is
not intended to operate as a piece of legislation and certainly it could not
have been so. It is only on account of inaction of the executive to carry out B
the directions of this court made in the 1992 case that persuaded this court
into issuing suitable directions, ad-hoc in nature, to remain in operation for
the period for which the field was not occupied by statutory rules by amendment
made to bring the rules in conformity with the directions in 1993 case. The
direction in 1993 case, enhancing the age of retirement from 58 to 60 years C
is a benefit and not a right. The availability of benefit is conditional upon the
exercise of evaluation undertaken by the High Court and the individual judicial
officer having satisfied the test of continued utility to the judicial system in
the opinion of the High Court. Extension of service is neither automatic nor
a windfall.
D
In 1993 case this court mandated that the exercise of evaluation for the
purpose of finding out the suitability of the concerned officer for entitlement
of the benefit of the increased age of superannuation has to be undertaken
before the officer attains the age of 58 years. At such evaluation the High
Court may arrive at one of the three conclusions with respective consequences
as~~- E
(i) The High Court may find the officer having the potential for
rendering continued useful service whereupon the officer would
be given an extension in the age of superannuation;
(ii) The High Court may find the officer not only not entitled for p
being conferred the benefit of extended age of superannuation
but may also find that the officer is a burden on public exchequer
with no utility for judicial service, intolerable even to be retained
upto the age of 58 years, the normal superannuation age, then
the High Court may undertake further exercise by following the
procedure prescribed by the statutory rules governing compulsory G
retirement and, in the event of such an opinion being formed
bonajide, may compulsorily retire him forthwith. The later exercise
can be undertaken before or after crossing the age of 58;
(iii) The High Court may form an opinion that the officer does not
have utility for continued service so as to be retained beyond 58 H
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A years of age but at the same time he is not such a dead wood
as cannot be tolerated even upto the normal age of
superannuation, i.e. 58 years, as appointed by the statutory rules,
then the High Court may simply observe silence and allow the
officer concerned to retire at the normal age of superannuation.
B In the first case, the only follow-up action required by the High Court
is to inform the Government of its decision so that the Government knows that
the officer which, according to its records, was going to retire on completing
...
the age of 58 years would be continuing upto the age of 60 years. The officer
concerned may also be informed so as to feel assured that he has to serve
C upto the age of 60 years and also feel encouraged that his performance in
office, honesty, uprightness and hard work have earned him the benefit of
holding the post for another two years beyond the normal age of
superannuation; the judicial system acknowledges his utility for continuing
the association ahead. In the second case, the High Court, having followed
D the statutory procedure applicable to compulsory retirement in public interest,
shall communicate its finding by way of recommendation to the State
Government and the State Government shall act on the recommendation as
required by Article 235 of the Constitution and pass the consequential order
of compulsory retirement whereupon the compulsory retirement shall take
effect. In the third case, no order is required to be passed or communicated
E either to the State Government or to the officer concerned. The officer would
be retiring on his reaching the normal superannuation age. The State
Government and the officer both know as soon as the officer enters the
service as to what his date of retirement is. However, for the sake of convenience
and by way of courtesy, the High Court may inform the officer that he was
not being given the benefit of extended age of superannuation under the 1993
F case.

The word 'compulsory retirement' is not a very appropriate expression
to be employed in the cases covered by category (iii) because the officer has
neither been given the benefit of 'extended age of superannuation' nor was
G being retired prematurely nor was being 'compulsorily retired' in the sense the
expression is known to service jurisprudence but was being allowed to retire
simplicitor at the age of superannuation appointed by the service rules
governing him. His length of service was neither being extended nor snapped
mid-way. In this third category of cases, the employment of words 'compulsory
retirement' denotes only this much that the High Court having undertaken the
H exercise of evaluation in the terms of 1993 case and having formed the opinion
B.P. SINGH v. STATE [LAHOTI, J.] 733

that the officer was not entitled to benefit of extension, there was no other A
option left available except to allow the officer concerned to retire at the
normal age of his superannuation. Even assuming, without conceding that the
retirement at the normal age of superannuation, viz. 58 years, has been
consciously called 'compulsory retirement' in the 1993 case, the same would
at the most be a 'compulsory retirement in public interest' and certainly not B
by way of penalty casting any stigma. But in any case other than the exercise
of evaluation undertaken by the High Court, an order of so called 'compulsory
retirement' would not need to be passed by the State Government in a~ much
as such retirement was not under the service rules but only in terms of the
judgment of the Supreme Court which judgmrnt does not require an order by
the State Government to be passed for its validity or efficacy. Thus, there is C
no scope for raising the pleas sought to be raised by the petitioner herein.

The observation of the Supreme Court contained in clause (b) of para
52 - "since the service conditions with regard to superannuation age of the
existing judicial officers is hereby changed" read in the context where it
occurs is intended to mean this much and nothing more than that the judicial D
officers not desirous of availing the benefit of the enhanced superannuation
age have to give an option failing which they will be subjected to the exercise
of evaluation by the High Court (in terms of the Supreme Court directions)
to consider their suitability for allowing the benefit of extended superannuation
age. The observation are required to be construed in the context in which
they appear and not de-hors the same.
E

We may sum up our conclusions on this aspect as under:-

I. Direction with regard to the enhancement of superannuation age of
judicial officers given in All India Judges' Association & Ors. v. Union of F
India & Ors .. [1993] 4 SCC 288 does not result in automatic enhancement of
the age of superannuation. By force of the judgement a judicial officer does
not acquire a right to continue in service upto the extended age of 60 years.
It is only a benefit conferred on the judicial officers subject to an evaluation
as to their continued utility to the judicial system to be carried out by the
respective High Courts before attaining the age of 58 years and formation of G
an opinion as to their potential for their continued useful service. Else the
judicial officers retire at the superannuation age appointed in the service rules
governing conditions of services of the judicial officers.

2. The direction given in 1993 case is by way of ad hoc arrangement
so as to operate in the interregnum, commencin~ the date of judgment and H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R. \

A until an appropriate amendment is made in the service rules by the State
Government. Once the service rules governing superannuation age have been
amended, the direction ceases to operate.

3. The High Court may, before or after the normal age of superannuation,
compulsorily retire a judicial officer subject to formation of an opinion that
B compulsory retirement in public interest was needed. The decision to
compulsorily retire must be in accordance with relevant service rules
independent of the exercise for evaluation of judicial officer made pursuant
to 1993 case. Recommendation for compulsory retirement shall have to be
-
sent to State Government which would pass and deliver the necessary orders.

C 4. If the High Court finds a judicial officer not entitled to the benefit of
extension in superannuation age he would retire at the age of superannuation
appointed by the service rules. No specific order or communication in that
regard is called for either by the High Court or by the Governor of the State.
Such retirement is not 'compulsory retirement' in the sense of its being by
D way of penalty in disciplinary proceedings or even by way of 'compulsory
retirement in public interest'. No right of the judicial officer is taken away.
Where the High Court may choose to make any communication in this regard,
it would be better advised not to use therein the expression 'compulsory
retirement'. It creates confusion. It would suffice to communicate, if at all, that
the officer concerned, having been found not fit for being given the benefit
E of extended age of superannuation, would stand retired at the normal age or
date of superannuation.
The next ground of challenge submitted by the learned senior counsel
for the petitioners is that the impugned order refusing the benefit of extension
of superannuation age to the petitioner is arbitrary, based on no material and
F hence is liable to be struck down on that ground. It will be necessary to notice
a few relevant facts in this regard.
Vide proceedings of the meeting of the Standing Committee of the High
Court held on 28th and 29th of June, 1996 the following resolution was passed:

G "Agenda
To consider the proposal for granting first level and second level of
promotion to the Officers of the rank of Munsif and Sub Judge as on
I. I. 96 on the need based posts.

Decision
H Having considered the proposal of the Office the same be and is
B.P. SINGH v. STATE [LAHOTI, J.) 735

hereby accepted and approved with a modification that the benefit of A
granting first level and second level promotion to the officers of the
rank of Munsif and Sub Judge be allowed to all the officers according
to seniority also including the officers who have been retired
compulsorily.

B
However, it is made clear that the grant of aforesaid benefit will
not confer any right upon the officers concerned for making any
further claim on this account."

This decision applied to the petitioners also. It is pointed out by the
respondents that the decision was 'need based' and more by way of C
compassion so as to give some monetary benefit to the beneficiary judicial
officers but the same did not confer any right upon the officers concerned
as the resolution itself speaks. It was not a promotion based on merits which
would have the effect of washing away unsatisfactory records anterior to the
date.
D
The service record of the petitioner Bishwanath Prasad Singh (as av-
ailable on the record) is as under :

"August, 1987 : 'C' - Integrity doubtful. 'C'Grade.
He is a Judicial Officer with
doubtful integrity. E
I had already submitted a note
to Hon'ble C.J. Details have
been mentfoned in my
inspection notes as well. F
[Sd/- Inspecting Judge]

May, 1988: 'B'

"On the whole satisfactory G
since he had recently joined,
it is difficult to express any
opinion on these points, in
respect of cols. 6, 7, & 8
relating to reputation for
honesty and impartiality, H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A attitude towards his superiors,
subordinates and colleagues
and behaviour towards
members of the Bar and Public.

May, 1989 - B - (Satisfactory)
B
Jan, 1996 - B Plus, Good

April, 1997 - (Satisfactory)
c
November, 1997 - 'B' in respect of Col.No.3,
i.e. regarding quality of order
and judgments. No comments
in respect of Col. No. 10."

D
The Evaluation Committee consisting of 8 judges and presided over by
Hon'ble the Chief Justice held its meeting on 2nd May, 2000. Cases of 27
officers came up for consideration. As to 19 the Evaluation Committee resolved
to give them the benefit of increase in the retirement age from 58 to 60 years.
As to 8 officers, including the petitioner, the Evaluation Committee formed an
-
E unanimous opinion that their further continuance in service will not be in
public interest as they do not have potential for continued useful service.

Bishwanath Prasad Singh was posted as Additional Judicial Commissioner
between 28.5.1997 and 23.3.2000 at Lohardagga. Then he was transferred on
F promotion as District & Sessions Judge, Giridih. Periodical inspections of the
work and conduct of the petitioner at Lohardagga were not carried out and
therefore the High Court directed a special inspection to be made and entrusted
the same to a Judge of the High Court. Intimation of the proposed inspection
was given to the petitioner so that if he so liked he could remain present at
G Lohardagga at the time of inspection. Though the petitioner did not come to
Lohardagga but the inspecting judge came to know that "he had sent messages
to his 'contacts' including lawyers and judicial officers that nothing should '
(__

leak out". Some of them on condition of anonymity disclosed to the inspecting
judge having received calls in this regard from Giridih. The inspecting judge
.
I-
C

also learnt that the petitioner had accepted illegal gratifications on a large
H scale. Files of all the bail applications disposed of by the petitioner and all
B.P. SINGH v. STA TE [LAHOTI, J.] 737

the criminal cases decided by him during the last six months of his posting A
at the station were called for and inspected. The inspecting judge formed an
opinion that the bail orders passed by the petitioner suffered from
inconsistency in judicial approach and also to some extent exposed perversity
apart from the fact that the disposal of some of the applications was delayed
while some were disposed of expeditiously. He also found the judgments B
suffering from injudicious approach of the officer. The inspecting report in
conclusion said "in overall view of the matter considering in particular the
reputation which the officer has left behind, I do not think he deserves the
benefit of the extended age of superannuation".

The petitioner has not alleged any bias much less any ma/a fides C
against the High Court. No such allegation could have been made either,
obviously because the evaluation as directed by the 1993 case having been
undertaken by an Evaluation Committee consisting of 9 judges including
Hon 'ble the Chief Justice. It cannot, therefore, be said that there was no
material available with the High Court whereon the finding arrived at by it D
could be based. The High Court took an extra care to carry out a special
inspection by sending a judge of the High Court on the spot. The reliability
of information collected by the judge and placed on record cannot be doubted.
An overall view of the service record, with requisite emphasis on recent
performance, was taken into consideration. We do not think the opinion
formed by the High Court is either arbitrary or based on no material or is E
vitiated for any other reason.

As we have already held no right much less any fundamental right
inhers in the petitioner to continue in service beyond the age of 58 years
which is the age of retirement of judicial officers in the State of Bihar under F
the existing Rules applicable to the petitioner. The question of granting any
relief to the petitioner in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution does not arise. We find the petitioner not
entitled to any relief and the petition filed by him liable to be dismissed. It
is dismissed accordingly. We make no order as to costs.
G
W.P. (C) No.505 of 2000 - Swaroop Lal Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.

Swaroop Lal, the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No.505 of2000, born on
September 4, 1942 entered the Bihar Administrative Service (Judicial Branch)
on 15.3.1974 as a Munsif. On 14.6.1982 the petitioner was promoted and H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A appointed as Additional Subordinate Judge. On 3.4.1985 powers of Chief
Judicial Magistrate were conferred on the petitioner. There were further
promotions and on 19.3.1994 the petitioner acting as Additional District &
Sessions Judge was confirmed in the cadre of Bihar Subordinate Judicial
Service. On 23.8.1995 senior selection grade was released to the petitioner
with effect from 20.8.1986. On 5.9.1998 the petitioner was appointed and
B posted as District & Sessions Judge, Madhubani.

His case was also before the Evaluation Committee on May 2, 2000
along with the case of Bishwanath Prasad Singh and several others. The
same opinion was formed about this petitioner also by the High Court in
C accordance with the directions of Supreme Court in 1993 case. The grounds
of challenge are the same as in Writ Petition (Civil) No.419/2000 and the same
fate follows. The pleas raised by this petitioner are covered by the view of
the law which we have taken hereinabove in the case of Bishwanath Prasad
Singh. This petition too merits a dismissal. It is dismissed accordingly. No
order as to the costs.
D
Before p11rting with this judgment, we wish to observe that these two
writ petitions have brought certain disturbing features to our notice and we
would be failing in our constitutional duty if we over look those. We would,
therefore, like to highlight those features along with our observations.
E
The facts brought to light in the counter-affidavit filed by the High
Court in the case of petitioner Bishwanath Prasad Singh go to show that for
a long period of more than 6 years, between May 1989 and January 1996,
apparently there was no inspection of the work and conduct of the petitioner
F and no timely entry was made in the confidential rolls. Again between 1997
and 2000 regular periodical inspections were not carried out and therefore a
special inspection by a judge had to be arranged under the orders of the
Hon'ble Chief Justice so as to meaningfully carry out the task of evaluation
ordained by Supreme Court in 1993 case.

G Article 235 of the Constitution vests administrative and disciplinary
control over the district judiciary including the subordinate judiciary in the
High Court immunising them from the executive control of the State
Government so as to protect judicial independence. Control over subordinate
courts vested in the High Court is a trust and confidence reposed by the
founding fathers of the Constitution in a high institution like the High Court.
H The trust has to be discharged with a great sense of responsibility. All the
B.P. SINGH v. STATE [LAHOTI, J.] 739

High Courts have framed rules dealing with executive and administrative A
business of the Court. There are administrative committees and inspecting
judges in the High Court. Periodical inspections of subordinate courts have
to be carried out regularly so as to keep a vigil and watch on the functioning
of the subordinate judiciary, the importance and significance whereof needs
no emphasis. In High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. lshwar Chand Jain - B
[1999) 4 SCC 579 this Court observed:

'The object of such inspection is for the purpose of assessment
of the work performed by the Subordinate Judge, his capability,
integrity and competency. Since Judges are human beings and also
prone to all the human failings, inspection provides an opportunity C
for pointing out mistakes so that they are avoided in future and
deficiencies, if any, in the working of the subordinate court, remedied.
Inspection should act as a catalyst in inspiring Subordinate Judges
to give best results. They should feel a sense of achievement. They
need encouragement. They work under great stress and man the
courts while working under great discomfort and hardships. A D
satisfactory judicial system depends largely on the satisfactory
functioning of courts at grass-roots level. Remarks recorded by the
Inspecting Judge are normally endorsed by the Full Court and become
part of the annual confidential reports and are foundations on which
the career of a judicial officer is made or marred. Inspection of E
subordinate court is thus of vital importance. It has to be both
effective and productive. It can be so only if it is well regulated and
is workman-like. Inspection of subordinate courts is not a one-day or
an hour or a few minutes' affair. It has to go on all the year round
by monitoring the work of the court by the Inspecting Judge. The
casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial system. It does F
more harm than good."

The abovesaid observations were reiterated by this Court in High
Court of Judicature At Allahabad Through Registrar v. Sarnam Singh Ors.,
[20001 2 sec 339 with a note that they indicated the attitude and objectivity G
to be adopted by the inspecting judges while objectively expected considering
the work and conduct of the judicial officers who have to work under difficult
and trying circumstances. Observation in R. Rajiah 's case - [1988] 3 SCC 211
were also noticed cautioning against acting on ill-conceived or motivated
complaints and rumour-mongering which may seriously jeopardise the efficient
working of the subordinate courts. H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A A number of decisions dealing with the object and purpose of writing
confidential reports and care and caution to be adopted while making entries
in the confidential records of government officers have been referred to in the
cases of Sarnam Singh (supra, vide para 31, 32) as also in the case of lshwar
Chand Jain (supra). We need not repeat the same. Suffice it to observe that
B the well-recognised and accepted practice of making annual entries in the
confidential records of subordinate officials by superiors has a public policy
and purposive requirement. It is one of the recognised and time-tested modes
of exercising administrative and disciplinary control by a superior authority
over its subordinates. The very power to make such entries as have potential
for shaping the future career of a subordinate officer casts an obligation on
C the High Courts to keep a watch and vigil over the performance of the
members of subordinate judiciary. An assessment of quality and quantity of
performance and progress of the judicial officers should be an ongoing
process continued round the year and then to make a record in an objective
manner of the impressions formulated by such assessment. An annual entry
D is not an instrument to be wielded like a teachers cane or to be cracked like
a whip. The High Court has to act and guide the subordinate officers like a
guardian or elder in the judicial family. The entry in the confidential rolls
should not be a reflection of personal whims, fancies or prejudices, likes or
dislikes of a superior. The entry must reflect the result of an objective
assessment coupled with an effort at guiding the judicial officers to secure
E an improvement in his performance where need be; to admonish him with the
object of removing for future, the shortcoming found; and expressing an
appreciation with an idea of toning up and maintaining the immitable qualities
by affectionately patting on the back of meritorious and deserving. An entry
consisting of a few words, or a sentence or two, is supposed to reflect the
F sum total of the impressions formulated by the inspecting judge who had the
opportunity of forming those impressions in his mind by having an opportunity
•
of watching the judicial officer round the period under review. In the very
nature of things, the process is complex and the formulation of impressions
is a result of multiple factors simultaneously playing in the mind. The
perceptions may differ. In the very nature of things there is a difficulty
G nearing an impossibility in subjecting the entries in confidential rolls to
judicial review. Entries either way have serious implications on the service
career. Hence the need for fairness, justness and objectivity in performing the
inspections and making the entries in the confidential rolls.

Rules · where they are, else the executive instructions, require that
H entries in confidential records are made within a specified time soon following
B.P. SINGH v. S IAI E ILAHOTI, J.] 741

the end of the period ur.Ger review, generally within three months from the A
end of the year. Delay in carrying out inspections or making entries frustrates
the very purpose sought to be achieved. The mental impressions may fade
away or get embellished, not to be restored. Events of succeeding year may
cast their shadow on assessment of previous years. Recording of entries for
more than pne period in one go must be avoided as it is pregnant with the B
risk of causing such harm as may never be remedied or granting undeserved
benefits. We trust and hope the High Courts would have regard to what we
have said and streamline the procedure and practice of inspections and
recording of entries in confidential rolls so as to achieve regularity, promptness
and objectivity inspiring confidence of subordinate judiciary controlled by
them. We can only emphasise upon the High Courts the need for vigilantly C
carrying out the annual inspections at regular intervals and making timely
entries in the service records followed by prompt communications to the
judicial officers so as to afford them a right of representation in the event of
the entry being adverse. We leave the matter at that.

D
We are conscious of the fact that we are dealing with an administrative
decision taken by a High Court occupying a place of supremacy under the
Constitution. The High Court as an institution is administratively totally
independent and is not subject to superintendence by any other institution.
We hope our observations are read in the right spirit-these are by way of
suggestions and not intended in any way to be criticism of the working of E
the High Court.

We have already noted the failure on the part of some of the State
Governments in amending the service rules governing the judicial officers in
accordance with the directions of this court given on November 13, 1991 and F
August 24, 1993. More than 7 years have elapsed when 1993 case the second
one - was decided. We request High Courts of such of the States as are stiH
in default in carrying out the directions of this court to take up the matter with
the respective State Governments and impres> upon them the need to expedite
amending of the rules. We are informed that some of the State Governments G
which have amended the rules have not kept the intent and purpose of the
directions of this court in the 1993 case in view. A blanket extension in the
age of superannuation is not what was intended by this Court nor is it going
to serve the pubtic interest and larger interest of the society. The rules need
to be so framed or amended as to give bendit of extended superannuation
age only to such judicial officers about whom the High Court feels satisfied H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A of their continued utility to the judicial system, subject to evaluation of their
potential by making an objective assessment of their work, conduct and
integrity and also keeping in view the reputation acquired by them as judicial
officers.

B M.P. Petitions dismissed

r