BIJAY KUMAR MAHANTYversusJADU @ RAM CHANDRA SAHOO

                      BIJA Y KUMAR MAHANTY                                      A
                                 v.
                   JADU @ RAM CHANDRA SAHOO

                          DECEMBER 13, 2002
                                                                                B
         [Y.K. SABHARWAL AND ~.G. BALAKRlSHNAN, JJ.]


     Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 19:

      Officer-in-charge of Police Station arrested accused despite production   C
of bail order-Contempt proceedings-High Court held the Police Officer
guilty ofcontempt and sentenced him to civil-imprisonment-On appeal, held:
When Order of Court is flouted the litigant should not be left without remedy
else not only individual would suffer but administration of justice would be
brought into disrepute-Under the facts and circumstances of the case, High
Court rightly held the Police Officer guilty of contempt.                       D
       Apology tendered by the errpnt police officer at belated stage-
Acceptance of-Held: Apology was not sincere but was tendered merely to
escape punishment-Hence not accepted.

      Respondent had assaulted a police officer and a case was registered       E
against him. Sessions Judge granted him bail and in spite of production
of bail order by the respondent to the officer-in-charge of the concerned
Police Station, respondent was arrested by the appellant a police officer
and later on released by the Magistrate. On a reference by the Sessions
Court, High Court initiated Contempt proceedings against the errant
Police Officer and found him guilty of contempt and sentenced him to civil      F
imprisonment for a period of 7 days. Hence this appeal by the Police
Officer.

     It was contended for the appellant that High Court's finding was
based on probabilities and without production of any independent                G
evidence; and that respondent did not produce copy of the bail order
before appellant/SDO and SDPO.

      Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: I.I. It is of paramount public interest that the people, after      H
                                     89
    90                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A obtaining an order of the Court, should not feel helpless or without any
    remedy when such order is flouted. 192-DI

          1.2. Rule of law is the foundation of democratic society. Judiciary is
    the guardia·n of the rule of law. If the orders of the Court are disobeyed
    with impunity by those who owe an obligation to the society to preserve
B   the rule of law, not only would individual litigants suffer, the whole
    administration of justice would be brought into disrepute. 192-GJ

         1.3. The case against the appellant is required to be proved beyond
    reasonable doubt. The contempt proceedings under the Act are quasi
C   criminal. The standard of proof required is that of criminal proceedings.
    Therefore, the charge has to be established beyond mreasonable doubt.
                                                                       193-EJ

           1.4. In the instant case, the charge against the appellant was proved
    beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent was arrested at 7.30 a.m. from
D   his residence. The only other. person available at that time when the
    certified copy of the bail order was shown to the appellant was the mother
    of the respondent who was examined as a witness. The appellant crushed
    the order. Different persons have the tendency to use different language
    while narrating the same incident. It is of no consequence that the
E   respondent at one stage stated that the bail order when produced was
    'torn', at another stage stated that it was 'bundled' and with reference to
    that order, his mother used the word 'rubbed'. The said order was
    examined by the High Court before arriving at the finding that it bears
    marks of violence. The appellant admitted that as per his belief the
    respondent had been granted bail. H that was so, appellant would have
F   given an opportunity to the respondent to produce that order instead of
    arresting him despite that belief. The appellant wanted to arrest the
    respondent any way. The case related to an alleged assault on a Police
    Officer of a Police Station of which the appellant was in-charge.
                                                                  193-F-H; 94-AI

G         1.5. No fault can be found with the finding of the High Court that
    the act was a result of revenge which prompted the appellant to act against
    his belief that the respondent had been granted bail. (94-AI

         Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman and Ors., (20011
H 3 sec 739, relied on.
 BIJA Y KUMAR MAHANTY v. JADU@ RAM CHANDRA SAHOO [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.) 9 J

       2. The respondent was deprived of his personal liberty despite grant       A
of bail by the Sessions Judge. The appellant has tendered the apology only
after lapse of nearly 12 years. The apology has to be sincere and not merely
to escape the punishment. It is not a fit case where the apology tendered
at this belated stage ought to be accepted. In a matter of this nature, where
a Police Officer, disregarding the bail order, arrests a person because case      B
against him is of alleged assault on a police official, mere sentence of fine
would not meet the ends of justice. (94-C-E(

     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
441 of 1993.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 7.4.1993 of the Orissa High                C
Court in Crl. No. M.C. 124 of 1992.

     Raj Kumar Mehta, Ms. M. Sarada and Ms. Suman Kukreti for the
Appellant.
                                                                                  D
      Janaranjan Das, for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      Y.K. SABHARWAL, J. Police Officers are supposed to be the members
of a disciplined force. It is of utmost importance to curb any tendency in        E
them to flout orders of the Court. It is more so when flouting of order results
in deprivation of personal liberty of an individual. If protectors of law, to
take revenge, defy court orders they will have to be sternly dealt with and
appropriate punishment inflicted also with a view Jo send a message across
the board that such an act cannot be countenanced.
                                                                                  F
      The appellant is a police officer. At the relevant time, i.e., on 13th
November, 1990, he was the officer-in-charge of the police station in question.
A police officer of that police station had reported that the respondent had
assaulted him on 30th September, 1990 which was the immersion day of
Goddess Du'rga while he was on duty and the respondent had been asked by          G
him to give side to other image (Medha} to pass. A case was registered
against the respondent.

      Now, the admitted facts. In connection with the aforesaid case, the
respondent was arrested by the appellant on 13th November, 1990 from his
residence at 7.30 a.m. He was kept in Police Custody and was produced             H
    92                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A before the Magistrate on 14th November. The respondent in respect of this
    very case had been granted bail by the Sessions Judge on 6th November,
    1990. The respondent had obtained certified copy of the order of bail on 7th
    November. The respondent was produced before the Magistrate on 14th
    November when his advocate produced a certified copy of the order of the
B   Sessions Judge and, thus, he was released by the Magistrate.

           The only controversy is whether the respondent had produced, before
    the appellant, the certified copy of the order of bail at the time of his arrest.
    According to the respondent, it was produced. In the proceedings of contempt
    that were initiated by the High Court, on receipt of reference from the Sessions
C   Judge, Cuttack, appellant denied that the copy of the bail order was produced
    before him. The High Court, on appreciation of evidence, held that copy of
    the bail order was produced before the appellant who arrested the respondent
    despite it. The appellant was held guilty of contempt and was sentenced for
    civil imprisonment for a period of seven days. Under these circumstances,
    this appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
D   1971 (for short, the 'Act').

          It is of paramount public interest Ithat the people, after obtaining an
    order of the Court, should not feel helpless or without any remedy when such
    order is flouted.

E       In Advocate General, Bihar v. MP. Khari Industries, [1980] 3 SCC
  311, this Court said that "..... .It may be necessary to punish as a contempt a
  course of conduct, which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process
  and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the
  action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice.
p The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest and vital stake in
  the effective and orderly administration of justice, because unless justice is
  so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The
  Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due
  administration of justice and so it is contempt of Court not in order to protect
  the dignity of the Court against 'Contempt of Court' may seem to suggest,
G but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration
  of justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with."

          The rule of law is the foundation of the democratic society. The judiciary
    is the guardian of the rule of law. If the orders of the court are disobeyed
H   with impunity by those who owe an obligation to the society to preserve the
 BIJA Y KUMAR MAHANTY t'. JADU@RAM CHANDRA SAHOO [Y.K. SABHARWAL, J.) 93


rule of law, not only would individual litigants s11ffer, the whole administration   A
of justice would be brought into disrepute.

      The case against the appellant was held proved by the High Court on
appreciation of evidence, perusal of the original record of the case files
including the certified copy of the bail order that had been obtained and its
condition.                                                                           B

       Mr. Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the finding
of guilt was returned against the appellant by the High Court without
production of any independent evidence. The finding, it is contended, is
based on probabilities when the requirement of law is that the charge of             C
contempt shall be proved beyond any reasonable doubt. It was also contended
that the appellant, while forwarding the respondent to the Magistrate, had
mentioned at the end in his own hand that the respondent told him about the
bail order having been passed by the learned Sessions Judge which shows his
bona fides. The further contention is that the belief of the appellant that the
respondent had been granted bail was of no consequence since it was his duty         D
to arrest the respondent in connection with the case registered against him
and he could not release the respondent merely acting on his belief. Further,
it was submitted that the respondent did not produce the bail order before the
SDO and SDPO who had come to the police station on tension being created
after the arrest of the respondent.
                                                                                     E
       We have no difficulty in accepting the contention that the case against
the appellant is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The contempt
proceedings under the Act are quasi criminal. The standard of proof required
is that of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the charge has to be established
beyond reasonable doubt (see Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. v. Sayed Hasibur                F
Rahaman and Ors., (2001] 3 SCC 739.

       We are, howe\ler, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel
that the charge against the appellant has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The respondent was arrested at 7.30 a.m. from his residence. The only
other person available at that time when the certified copy of the bail order        G
was shown to the appellant was the mother of the respondent who was
examined as a witness. The appellant crushed the order. Different persons
have the tendency to use different language while narrating the same incident.
It is of no consequence that the respondent at one stage stated that the bail
order when produced was 'tom', at another stage stated that it was 'bundled'
and with reference to that order, his mother used the word 'rubbed'. The said        H
    94                         S'UPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A order, as already noticed, was examined by the High Court before arriving
    at the finding that it bears marks of violence. The appellant admitted that as
    per his belief the respondent had been granted bail. If that was so, appellant
    would have given an opportunity to the respondent to produce that order
    instead of arresting him despite that belief. The appellant wanted to arrest the
B   respondent any way. The case related to an alleged assault on a Police Officer
    of a Police Station of which the appellant was in-charge. No fault can be
    found with the finding of the High Court that the act was a result of revenge
    which prompted the appellant to act against his belief that the respondent had
    been granted bail and act against such a belief. There was tension as a result ·
    of the arrest of the respondent because he was arrested despite bail order.
C   There was nothing to show that the respondent was produced before the SDO
    and SDPO when they visited the Police Station. It is nobody's case that those
    officers met the respondent. The High Court has rightly held the appellant
    guilty of contempt of court.

          Learned counsel for the appellant contends that apology that has now
D been tendered by the appellant may be accepted. The incident relates to the
    year 1990. The respondent was deprived of his personal liberty despite grant
  . of bail by the Sessions Judge. The appellant has tendered the apology only
    now after lapse of nearly 12 years. This appeal was admitted in the year
    1993. The case has been on board for quite some time. The apology has been
E tendered only on 30th November, 2002. The apology has to be sincere and
    not merely to escape the punishment. In our view, it is not a fit case where
   the apology tendered at this belated stage ought to be accepted.

          Lastly, it was contended that instead of imprisonment, fine be imposed
    on the appellant. In a matter of this nature, where a Police Officer, disregarding
F   the bail order, arrests a person because case against him is of alleged assault
    on a police official, we do not think that mere sentence of fine would meet
    the ends of justice. No interference is called for in the judgment and order
    of the High Court.

          The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
G
    S.K.S.                                                        Appeal dismissed.