BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONversusSAIYED HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI & ANR.

                         [2012] 11 S.C.R. 1032


A              BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
                                    v.
              SAIYED HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI & ANR.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 9052 of 2012)
                        DECEMBER 13, 2012
B
          [SWATANTER KUMAR AND SUDHANSU JYOTI
                   MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

         RIGHT TO INFORMATON ACT, 2005
c
           s. 2(h) - 'Public authority' - Held: Public Service
    · Commission shall be a public authority within the scope of
      s.2(h).

          ss. 8(1 )(g), and 11 - Disclosure of names and addresses
D    of members of interview board constituted by State Public
     Service Commission - Held: If in the opinion of the authority
     concerned there is danger to life or possibility of danger to
     physical safety of members, the State Information
     Commission would be entitled to bring such case within the
E    exemption of s. 8(1)(g) - Direction to furnish the names and
     addresses of the members of Interview Board would certainly
     be opposed to the very spirit of s. 8(1)(g) and would ex facie
     endanger their lives or physical safety - Further, such
     disclosure would serve no fruitful much less any public
F    purpose - Marks are required to be disclosed but disclosure
     of individual names would hardly hold relevancy either to the
     concept of transparency or for proper exercise of the right to
     information within the limitation of the Act - Therefore the
     Commission is not bound to disclose such information -
G    Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 21.

          ss.2(f) and 2(j)) - Expressions 'information: and 'right to
     information' - Explained.

         Respondent No. 1, claiming himself to be a public
H                            1032
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1033
            HUSSAIN ABB.fl,S RIZWI
spirited person, filed an application seeking certain        A
information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 in
connection with the selection of 'State Examiner of
Questioned Documents' conducted by the State Public
Service Commission. The Commission furnished
information nearly to all the queries except the names,      B
designations and addresses of the members of the
Interview Board. The writ petition filed by respondent
No. 1 was dismissed by the Single Judge of the High
Court. But the Division Bench directed the Commission
to provide the names of the members of the Interview         c
Board while denying the disclosure of their addresses.
    Allowing the appeal, the Court
     HELD: 1. Public Service Commission is established
under Art.315 of the Constitution of India and, as such,     D
there cannot be any escape from the conclusion that the
Commission shall be a public authority within the scope
of s.2(h) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. [Para 14]
[1043-B-C]
     2.1. Right to information is a basic and celebrated E
fundamental/basic right but is not uncontrolled. It has its
limitations. The right is subject to a dual check. Firstly,
this right is subject to the restrictions inbuilt within the
Act and secondly the constitutional limitations emerging
from Art.21 of the Constitution. The right to information F
has to be balanced with the right to privacy within the
framework of law. Section 8 of the Right to Information
Act gives the category of cases where the public authority
is exempted from providing the information. To such
exemptions, there are inbuilt exceptions under some of G
the provisions, where despite exemption, the Information
Commission may call upon the authority to furnish the
Information in the larger public interest. This shows the
wide scope of these provisions as intended by the
framers of law. In such cases, the Information H
   1034    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A Commission has to apply its mind whether it is a case of
  exemption within the provisions of the said section. The
  expression 'public interest' has to be understood in its
  true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the
  relevant provisions of the Act. The expression 'public
B interest' must be viewed in its strict sense with all its
  exceptions so as to justify denial of a statutory exemption
  in terms of the Act. [Para 11 - 13 and 23] [1042-A-C-F;
  1046-G-H; 1047-A]
       Namit Sharma v. Union of India 2012 (8) SCALE 593 -
C referred to
       Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) - referred to
       2.2. The expression 'information' as defined in s. 2(f)
  is exhaustive in nature. The Legislature has given
D meaning to the expression 'information' and has stated
  that it shall mean any material in any form including
  papers, samples, data material held in electronic form, etc.
  Right to information u/s. 2(j) means the 'right to
  information' accessible under the Act which is held by or
E under the control of any public authority and includes the
  right to inspection of work, documents, records, taking
  notes, extracts, taking certified sample of materials,
  obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies
  and video cassettes, etc. The right sought to be exercised
F and information asked for should fall within the scope of
  'information' and 'right to information' as defined under
  the Act. [Para 15] [1043-D-F]
       2.3. If the information called for falls in any of the
G categories specified u/s. 8 or relates to the organizations
  to which the Act itself does not apply in terms of s.24 of
  the Act, the public authority can take such stand before
  the Commission and decline to furnish such information.
  Another aspect of exercise of this right is that where the
  information asked for relates to third party information,
H the Commission is required to follow the procedure
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1035
           . HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI
prescribed u/s.11 of the Act. [Para 16] [1043-G-H; 1044-A]      A
     2.4. Section 8(1)(e) carves out a protection in favour
of a person who possesses information in his fiduciary
relationship. In the instant case, the examining body (the
Commission), is in no fiduciary relationship with the           B
examiners (interviewers) or the candidate interviewed.
Once the fiduciary relationship is not established, the
obvious consequence is that the Commission cannot
claim exemption as contemplated u/s. 8(1)(e) of the Act.
The question of directing disclosure for a larger public
interest, therefore, would not arise at all. [para 22 and 26]   C
[1046-B; 1051-G-H]
   Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya
Bandopadhyay & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 497 - relied on
     2.5. Section 8 opens with the non obstante language        D
and is an exception to the furnishing of information as is
required under the relevant provisions of the Act. In terms
of s.8(1 )(g), the public authority is not obliged to furnish
any such information the disclosure of which would
endanger the life or physical safety of any person or           E
identify the source of information or assistance given in
confidence for law enforcement and security purposes.
[Paras 21- 221 [1045-C-E-F]
     2.6. The interviewers hold the position of an 'agent' F
vis-a-vis the examining body which is the 'principal'. This
relationship per se is not relatable to any of the
exemption clauses but there are some clauses of
exemption, the foundation of which is not a particular
relationship like fiduciary relationship. Section 8(1 )(g) can G
come into play with any kind of relationship. It concerns
with the cases where no obligation is cast upon the
public authority to furnish information, the disclosure of
which would endanger (a) the life (b) physical safety of
any person. The legislature, in its wisdom, has used two
                                                               H
    1036   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A distinct expressions. They cannot be read or construed
  as being synonymous. 'Physical safety' is a restricted
  term while 'life' is a term of wide connotation. The
  expression 'life' also appears in Art. 21 of the Constitution
  and has been provided a wide meaning. The expression
B life u/s. 8(1 (g) the Act, thus, has to be understood in
  somewhat similar dimensions. If in the opinion of the
  authority concerned there is danger to life or possibility
  of danger to physical safety, the State Information
  Commission would be entitled to bring such case within
C the exemption of s. 8(1)(g) of the Act. The disclosure of
  information which would endanger the life or physical
  safety of any person is one category and identification
  of the source of information or assistance given in
  confidence for law enforcement or security purposes is
  another category. The expression 'for law enforcement
0
  or security purposes' is to be read ejusdem generis only
  to the expression 'assistance given in confidence' and
  not to any other clause of the section. On the plain
  reading of s.8(1)(g), it becomes clear that the said clause
  is complete in itself. It cannot be said to have any
E reference to the expression 'assistance given in
  confidence for law enforcement or security purposes'.
  Neither the language nor the object of the Section
  requires such an interpretation. The High Court though
  has referred to s. 8(1 )0) but it has, in fact, dealt with the
F language of s. 8(1)(g). The reasoning of the High Court,
  therefore, is neither clear in reference to provision of the
  Section nor in terms of the language thereof. [Para 27-28]
  [1052-A-C, F-H; 1053-A-C-G]
G      2.7. The consequences that the interviewers or the
  members of the interview board would be exposed to in
  the event their names and addresses or individual marks
  given by them are disclosed, would be: Firstly, the
  members of the Board are likely to be exposed to danger
H to their lives or physical safety. Secondly, it will hamper
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1037
            HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI
effective performance and discharge of their duties as A
examiners. This is the information available with the
examining body in confidence with the interviewers.
Declaration of collective marks to the candidates has
been permitted by the authorities as well as the High
Court. There is no error of jurisdiction or reasoning in this 8
regard. But direction to furnish the names and addresses
of the interviewers would ex facie endanger their lives or
physical safety and would certainly be opposed to the
very spirit of s. 8(1)(g) of the Act. The Commission is not
bound to disclose the information asked for by the c
applicant under Query No.1 of the application. The
judgment of the High Court is set aside. [Para 29-31)
[1053-H; 1054-A-C; 1056-C-D]
                      Case Law Reference:
                                                                      D
    2012 (8) SCALE 593            referred to           Para 10
    (2011 > a sec 4971             referred to          para 25
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
9052 of 2012.                                                         E
    From the Judgment & Order dated 20.01.2011 of the High
Court of Patna in LPA No. 102 of 2010.
     Navin Prakash for the Appellant.
    Mamta Tiwari, Pranav Vyas (for Fox Manda! & Co.) Anjan            F
Chakraborty, Shekhar Kumar for the Respondent.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                      G
      2. The Bihar Public Service Commission (for short, 'the
Commission) published advertisement No.6 of 2000 dated 10th
May, 2000 in the local papers of the State of Bihar declaring
its intention to fill up the posts of 'State Examiner of Questioned
Documents', in Police Laboratory in Crime Investigation               H
    1038     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A Department, Government of Bihar, Patna. The advertisement,
  inter a/ia, stated that written examination would be held if
  adequate number of applications were received. As very limited
  number of applications were received, the Commission, in
  terms of the advertisement, decided against the holding of
B written examination. It exercised the option to select the
  candidates for appointment to the said post on the basis of viva
  voce test alone. The Commission completed the process of
  selection and recommended the panel of selected candidates
  to the State of Bihar.
c        3. One Saiyed Hussain Abbas Rizwi, respondent No.1
   herein, claiming to be a public spirited citizen, filed an
   application before the Commission (appellant herein) under the
   Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short "the Act") on 16th
   December, 2008 seeking information in relation to eight
D queries. These queries concerned the interview which was held
   on 30th September, 2002 and 1st October, 2002 by the
   Commission with regard to the above advertisement. These
   queries, inter a/ia, related to providing the names, designation
   and addresses of the subject experts present in the Interview
E Board, names and addresses of the candidates who appeared,
   the interview statement with certified photocopies of the marks
   of all the candidates, criteria for selection of the candidates,
  tabulated statement containing average marks allotted to the
   candidates from matriculation to M.Sc. during the selection
F process with the signatures of the members/officers and
  certified copy of the merit list. This application remained
   pending with the Public Information Officer of the Commission
  for a considerable time that led to filing of an appeal by
  respondent No.1 before the State Information Commission.
G When the appeal came up for hearing, the State Information
  Commission vide its order dated 30th April, 2009 had directed
  the Public Information Officer-cum-Officer on Special Duty of
  the Commission that the information sought for be made
  available and the case was fixed for 27th August, 2009 when
H the following order was passed :
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1039
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)

    "The applicant is present. A letter dated 12.08.2009 of the       A
    Public Information Officer, Bihar Public Service
    Commission, Patna has been received whereby the
    required paragraph-wise information which could be
    supplied, has been given to the applicant. Since the
    information which could be supplied has been given to the         B
    applicant, the proceedings of the case are closed."

      4. At this stage, we may also notice that the Commission,
vide its letter dated 12th August, 2009, had furnished the
information nearly to all the queries of respondent No.1. It also     C
stated that no written test had been conducted and that the
name, designation and addresses of the members of the
Interview Board could not be furnished as they were not required
to be supplied in accordance with the provisions of Section
8(1 )(g) of the Act.
                                                                      D
     5. Aggrieved from the said order of the Information
Commission dated 27th August, 2009, respondent No.1
challenged the same by filing a writ before the High Court of
Judicature at Patna. The matter came up for hearing before a
learned Judge of that Court, who, vide judgment dated 27th            E
November, 2009 made the following observations and
dismissed the writ petition :

     "If information with regard to them is disclosed, the secrecy
     and the authenticity of the process itself may be
     jeopardized apart from that information would be an              F
     unwarranted invasion, into privacy of the individual.
     Restricting giving this information has a larger public
     purpose behind it. It is to maintain purity of the process of
     selection. Thus, in view of specific provision in Section
     8(1)0), in my view, the information could not be demanded        G
     as matter of right. The designated authority in that
     organization also did not consider it right to divulge the
     information in larger public interesi, as provided in the said
      provision."
    1040     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A        6. Feeling aggrieved, respondent No.1 challenged the
    judgment of the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench
    of that Court by filing a letters patent appeal being LPA No.102
    of 2010. The Division Bench, amongst others, noticed the
    following contentions :
B
         (i) that third party interest was involved in providing the
         information asked for and, therefore, could properly be
         denied in terms of Section 2(n) read with Sections 8(1)0)
         and 11 of the Act.
c       (ii) that respondent No.1 (the applicant) was a mere
        busybody and not a candidate himself and was attempting
        to meddle with the affairs of the Commission needlessly.
       7. The Division Bench took the view that the provisions of
D Section 8(1)0) were not attracted in the facts of the case in
  hand inasmuch as this provision had application in respect of
  law enforcement agency and for security purposes. Since no
  such consideration arose with respect to the affairs of the
  Commission and its function was in public domain, reliance on
E the said provision for denying the information sought for was
  not tenable in law. Thus, the Court in its order dated 20th
  January, 2011 accepted the appeal, set aside the order of the
  learned Single Judge and directed the Commission to
  communicate the information sought for to respondent No.1.
F The Court directed the Commission to provide the names of
  the members of the Interview Board, while denying the
  disclosure of and providing photocopies of the papers
  containing the signatures and addresses of the members of the
  Interview Board.
G        8. The Commission challenging the legality and
    correctness of the said judgment has filed the present appeal
    by way of special leave.
      9. The question that arises for consideration in the present
H case is as to whether the Commission was duty bound to
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1041
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

disclose the names of the members of the Interview Board to         A
any person including the examinee. Further, when the
Commission could take up the plea of exemption from
disclosure of information as contemplated under Section 8 of
the Act in this regard.
                                                                    B
     10. Firstly, we must examine the purpose and scheme of
this Act. For this purpose, suffice would it be to refer to the
judgment of this Court in the case of Namit Sharma v. Union
oflndia [2012 (8) SCALE 593], wherein this Court has held as
 under:
                                                                    c
     "27. In terms of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
     the Act of 2002, it was stated that this law was enacted in
     order to make the government more transparent and
     accountable to the public. It was felt that in the present
     democratic framework, free flow of information for citizens    D
     and non-Government institutions suffers from several
     bottlenecks including the existing legal framework, lack of
     infrastructure at the grass root level and an attitude of
     secrecy within the Civil Services as a result of the old
     framework of rules. The Act was to deal with all such          E
     aspects. The purpose and object was to make the
     government more transparent and accountable to the
      public and to provide freedom to every citizen to secure
      access to information under the control of public
     authorities, consistent with public interest, in order to      F
      promote openness, transparency and accountability in
      administration and in relation to matters connected
      therewith or incidental thereto."

     11. The scheme of the Act contemplates for setting out the
practical regime of right to information for citizens to secure     G
access to information under the control of public authorities, in
order to promote transparency and accountability in the working
of every public authority. It was aimed at providing free access
to information with the object of making governance more
transparent and accountable. Another right of a citizen             H
     1042     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 11 S.C.R.


A protected under the Constitution is the right to privacy. This right
  is enshrined within the spirit of Article 21 of the Constitution.
  Thus, the right to information has to be balanced with the right
  to privacy within the framework of law.

8       12. Where Section 3 of the Act grants right to citizens to
   have access to information, there Section 4 places an obligation
   upon the public authorities to maintain records and provide the
   prescribed information. Once an application seeking
   information is made, the same has to be dealt with as per
  Sections 6 and 7 of the Act. The request for information is to
C be disposed of within the time postulated under the provisions
   of Section 7 of the Act. Section 8 is one of the most important
  provisions of the Act as it is an exception to the general rule of
  obligation to furnish information. It gives the category of cases
  where the public authority is exempted from providing the
D information. To such exemptions, there are inbuilt exceptions
  under some of the provisions, where despite exemption, the
  Commission may call upon the authority to furnish the
  information in the larger public interest. This shows the wide
  scope of these provisions as intended by the framers of law.
E In such cases, the Information Commission has to apply its mind
  whether it is a case of exemption within the provisions of the
  said section.

        13. Right to information is a basic and celebrated
F fundamental/basic right but is not uncontrolled. It has jts
  limitations. The right is subject to a dual check. Firstly, this right
  is subject to the restrictions inbuilt within the Act and secondly
  the constitutional limitations emerging from Article 21 of the
  Constitution. Thus, wherever in response to an application for
G disclosure of information, the public authority takes shelter
  under the provisions relating to exemption, non-applicability or
  infringement of Article 21 of the Constitution, the State
  Information Commission has to apply its mind and form an
  opinion objectively if the exemption claimed for was sustainable
  on facts of the case.
H
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1043
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
     14. Now, we have to examine whether the Commission is A
a public authority within the meaning of the Act. The expression
'public authority' has been given an exhaustive definition under
section 2(h) of the Act as the Legislature has used the word
'means' which is an expression of wide connotation. Thus.
'public authority' is defined as any authority or body or institution B
of the Government, established or constituted by the
Government which falls in any of the stated categories under
Section 2(h) of the Act. In terms of Section 2(h)(a), a body or
an institution which is established or constituted by or under the
Constitution would be a public authority. Public Service c
Commission is established under Article 315 of the Constitution
of India and as such there cannot be any escape from the
conclusion that the Commission shall be a public authority within
the scope of this section.

     15. Section 2(f) again is exhaustive in nature. The D
Legislature has given meaning to the expression 'information'
and has stated that it shall mean any material in any form
including papers, samples, data material held in electronic form,
etc. Right to information under Section 20) means the 'right to
information' accessible under this Act which is held by or under E
the control of any public authority and includes the right to
inspection of work, documents, records, taking notes, extracts,
taking certified sample of materials, obtaining information in the
form of diskettes, floppies and video cassettes, etc. The right
sought to be exercised and information asked for should fall F
within the scope of 'information' and 'right to information' as
defined under the Act.
     16. Thus, what has to be seen is whether the information
sought for in exercise of right to information is one that is G
permissible within the framework of law as prescribed under
the Act. If the information called for falls in any of the categories
specified under Section 8 or relates to the organizations to
which the Act itself does not apply in terms of section 24 of the
Act, the public authority can take such stand before the H
    1044     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 11 S.C.R.

A commission and decline to furnish such information. Another
  aspect of exercise of this right is that where the information
  asked for relates to third party information, the Commission is
  required to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 11
  of the Act.
B
        17. Before the High Court, reliance had been placed upon
  Section 8(1 )(j) and Section 11 of the Act. On facts, the
  controversy in the present case falls within a very narrow
  compass. Most of the details asked for by the applicant have
  already been furnished. The dispute between the parties
C related only to the first query of the applicant, that is, with regard
  to disclosure of the names and addresses of the members of
  the Interview Board.
       18. On behalf of the Commission, reliance was placed
D upon Section 8(1 )0) and Section 11 of the Act to contend that
  disclosure of the names would endanger the life of the
  members of the interview board and such disclosure would also
  cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the interviewers.
  Further, it was contended that this information related to third
E party interest. The expression 'third party' has been defined in
  Section 2(n) of the Act to mean a person other than the citizen
  making a request for information and includes a public authority.
  For these reasons, they were entitled to the exemption
  contemplated under Section 8(1)(j) and were not liable to
F disclose the required information. It is also contended on behalf
  of the Commission that the Commission was entitled to
  exemption under Sections 8(1)(e) and 8(1)(g) read together.
        19. On the contrary, the submission on behalf of the
  applicant was that it is an information which the applicant is
G entitled to receive. The Commission was not entitled to any
  exemption under any of the provisions of Section 8, and
  therefore, was obliged to disclose the said information to the
  applicant.

H       20. In the present case, we are not concerned with the
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1045
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

correctness or otherwise of the method adopted for selection A
of the candidates. Thus, the fact that no written examination was
held and the selections were made purely on the basis of viva
voce, one of the options given in the advertisement itself, does
not arise for our consideration. We have to deal only with the
plea as to whether the information asked for by the applicant B
should be directed to be disclosed by the Commission or
whether the Commission is entitled to the exemption under the
stated provisions of Section 8 of the Act.

     21. Section 8 opens with the non obstante language and C
is an exception to the furnishing of information as is required
under the relevant provisions of the Act. During the course of
the hearing, it was not pressed before us that the Commission
is entitled to the exemption in terms of Section 8( 1)0) of the Act.
In view of this, we do not propose to discuss this issue any
further nor would we deal with the correctness or otherwise of D
the impugned judgment of the High Court in that behalf.
      22. Section 8(1)(e) provides an exemption from furnishing
of information, if the information available to a person is in his
fiduciary relationship unless the competent authority is satisfied E
that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such
information. In terms of Section 8(1)(g), the public authority is
not obliged to furnish any such information the disclosure of
which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person
or identify the source of information or assistance given in F
confidence for law enforcement and security purposes. If the
concerned public authority holds the information in fiduciary
relationship, then the obligation to furnish information is
obliterated. But if the competent authority is still satisfied that
 in the larger public interest, despite such objection, the G
information should be furnished, it may so direct the public
authority. The term 'fiduciary' refers to a person having a duty
to act for the benefit of another, showing good faith and
 condour, where such other person reposes trust and special
 confidence in the person owing or discharging the duty. The H
     1046    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A term 'fiduciary relationship' is used to describe a situation or
   transaction where one person places complete confidence in
    another person in regard to his affairs, business or
   transactions. This aspect has been discussed in some detail
    in the judgment of this Court in the case of Central Board of
B Secondary Education (supra). Section 8(1)(e), therefore,
   carves out a protection in favour of a person who possesses
   information in his fiduciary relationship. This protection can be
   negated by the competent authority where larger public interest
   warrants the disclosure of such information, in which case, the
c authority is expected to record reasons for its satisfaction.
   Another very significant provision of the Act is 8(1 )U). In terms
   of this provision, information which relates to personal
   information, the disclosure of which has no relationship to any
   public activity or interest or which would cause unwarranted
   invasion of the privacy of the individual would fall within the
0
   exempted category, unless the authority concerned is satisfied
  that larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such
   information. It is, therefore, to be understood clearly that it is a
  statutory exemption which must operate as a rule and only in
E exceptional cases would disclosure be permitted, that too, for
  reasons to be recorded demonstrating satisfaction to the test
  of larger public interest. It will not be in consonance with the
  spirit of these provisions, if in a mechanical manner, directions
  are passed by the appropriate authority to disclose information
  which may be protected in terms of the above provisions. All
F information which has come to the notice of or on record of a
  person holding fiduciary relationship with another and but for
  such capacity, such information would not have been provided
  to that authority, would normally need to be protected and would
  not be open to disclosure keeping the higher standards of
G integrity and confidentiality of such relationship. Such exemption
  would be available to such authority or department.
        23. The expression 'public interest' has to be understood
  in its true connotation so as to give complete meaning to the
H relevant provisions of the Act. The expression 'public interest'
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMl3SION v. SAIYED 1047
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
                                                                       A
must be viewed in its strict sense with all its exceptions so as
to justify denial of a statutory exemption in terms of the Act. In
its common parlance, the expression 'public interest', like
'public purpose', is not capable of any precise definition . It
does not have a rigid meaning, is elastic and takes its colour
from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with time     B
and state of society and its needs. [State of Bihar v.
Kameshwar Singh (AIR 1952 SC 252)]. It also means the
general welfare of the public that warrants recommendation and
protection; something in which the public as a whole has a
stake [Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition)].                       C

      24. The satisfaction has to be arrived at by the authorities
objectively and the consequences of such disclosure have to
be weighed with regard to circumstances of a given case. The
decision has to be based on objective satisfaction recorded            o
for ensuring that larger public interest outweighs unwarranted
invasion of privacy or other factors stated in the provision.
Certain matters, particularly in relation to appointment, are
required to be dealt with great confidentiality. The information
may come to knowledge of the authority as a result of disclosure       E
by others who give that information in confidence and with
complete faith, integrity and fidelity. Secrecy of such information
shall be maintained, thus, bringing it within the ambit of fiduciary
capacity. Similarly, there may be cases where the disclosure
has no relationship to any public activity or interest or it may
                                                                       F
even cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual.
All these protections have to be given their due imp!ementation
as they spring from statutory exemptions ..It is not a decision
simpliciter between private interest and public interest. It is a
matter where a constitutional protection is available to a person
with regard to the right to privacy. Thus, the public interest has     G
to be construed while keeping in mind the balance factor
between right to privacy and right to information with the
purpose sought to be achieved and the purpose that would be
served in the larger public interest, particularly when both these
                                                                       H
    1048    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A
    rights emerge from the constitutional values under the
    Constitution of India.

        25. First of all, the Court has to decide whether in the facts
  of the present case, the Commission holds any fiduciary
B relationship with the examinee or the interviewers. Discussion
  on this question need not detain us any further as it stands fully
  answered by a judgment of this Court in the case of Central
  Board of Secondary Education & Anr. v. Aditya
  Bandopadhyay & Ors. [(2011) 8 SCC 497] wherein the Court
C held as under :

        "40. There are also certain relationships where both the
        parties have to act in a fiduciary capacity treating the other
        as the beneficiary. Examples of these are: a partner vis-
D       a-vis another partner and an employer vis-a-vis employee.
        An employee who comes into possession of business or
        trade secrets or confidential information relating to the
        employer in the course of his employment, is expected to
        act as a fiduciary and cannot disclose it to others. Similarly,
        if on the request of the employer or official superior or the
E
        head of a department, an employee furnishes his personal
        details and information, to be retained in confidence, the
        employer, the official superior or departmental head is
        expected to hold such personal information in confidence
        as a fiduciary, to be made use of or disclosed only if the
F       employee's conduct or acts are found to be prejudicial to
        the employer.
        41. In a philosophical and very wide sense, examining
        bodies can be said to act in a fiduciary capacity, with
G       reference to the students who participate in an
        examination, as a Government does while governing its
        citizens or as the present generation does with reference
        to the future generation while preserving the environment.
        But the words "information available to a person in his
H
BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1049
HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
  fiduciary relationship" are used in Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI A
  Act in its normal and well-recognised sense, that is, to refer
  to persons who act in a fiduciary capacity, with reference
  to a specific beneficiary or beneficiaries who are to be
  expected to be protected or benefited by the actions of the
  fiduciary-a trustee with reference to the beneficiary of the B
  trust, a guardian with reference to a minor/physically infirm/
  mentally challenged, a parent with reference to a child, a
  lawyer or a chartered accountant with reference to a client,
  a doctor or nurse with reference to a patient, an agent with
  reference to a principal, a partner with reference to another c
  partner, a Director of a company with reference to a
  shareholder, an executor with reference to a legatee, a
  Receiver with reference to the parties to a.lis, an employer
  with reference to the confidential information relating to the
  employee, and an employee with reference to business 0
  dealings/transaction of the employer. We do not find that
  kind of fiduciary relationship between the examining body
  and the examinee. with reference to the evaluated answer
  books. that come into the custody of the examining body.
  42. The duty of examining bodies is to subject the E
  candidates who have completed a course of study or a
  period of training in accordance with its curricula, to a
  process of verification/examination/testing of their
  knowledge, ability or skill, or to ascertain whether they can
  be said to have successfully completed or passed the F
  course of study or training. Other specialised examining
  bodies may simply subject the candidates to a process of
  verification by an examination, to find out whether such
  person is suitable for a particular post, job or assignment.
  An examining body, if it is a public authority entrusted with G
  public functions, is required to act fairly, reasonably,
  uniformly and consistently for public good and in public
  interest.
  43. This Court has explained the role of an examining body    H
    1050   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A      in regard to the process of holding examination in the
       context of examining whether it amounts to "service" to a
       consumer, in Bihar School Examination Board v. Suresh
       Prasad Sinha in the following manner: (SCC p. 487, paras
       11-13)
B
             "11. ... The process of holding examinations,
             evaluating answer scripts, declaring results and
             issuing certificates are different stages of a single
             statutory non-commercial function. It is not possible
             to divide this function as partly statutory and partly
c            administrative.

               12. When the Examination Board conducts an
              examination in discharge of its statutory function, it
              does not offer its 'services' to any candidate. Nor
D             does a student who participates in the examination
              conducted by the Board, hire or avail of any service
              from the Board for a consideration. On the other
              hand, a candidate who participates in the
              examination conducted by the Board," is a person
E             who has undergone a course of study and who
              requests the Board to test him as to whether he has
              imbibed sufficient knowledge to be fit to be
              declared as having successfully completed the said
              course of education; and if so, determine his
F             position or rank or competence vis-a-vis other
              examinees. The process is not, therefore, availment
              of a service by a student, but participation in a
            · general examination conducted by the Board to
              ascertain whether he is eligible and fit to be
              considered as having successfully completed the
G
              secondary education course. The examination fee
              paid by the student is not the consideration for
              availment of any service, but the charge paid for the
              privilege of participation in the examination.
H            13. ... The fact that in the course of conduct of the
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1051
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
            examination, or evaluation of answer scripts, or        A
            furnishing of marksheets or certificates, there may
            be some negligence, omission or deficiency, does
            not convert the Board into a service provider for a
            consideration, nor convert the examinee into a
            consumer ... ."                                         B

    It cannot therefore be said that the examining body is in a
    fiduciary relationship either with reference to the examinee
    who participates in the examination and whose answer
    books are evaluated by the examining body.
                                                                    c
    xxx           xxx             xxx
    49. The examining body entrusts the answer books to an
    examiner for evaluation and pays the examiner for his
    expert service. The work of evaluation and marking the          0
    answer book is an assignment given by the examining
    body to the examiner which he discharges for a
    consideration. Sometimes, an examiner may assess
    answer books, in the course of his employment, as a part
    of his duties without any specific or special remuneration.     E
    In other words, the examining body is the "principal" and
    the examiner is the •agent" entrusted with the work. that
    is. the evaluation of answer books. Therefore. the
    examining body is not in the position of a fiduciarv with
    reference to the examiner."
                                                                    F
                                           (emphasis supplied)
     26. We, with respect, would follow the above reasoning of
the Bench and, thus, would have no hesitation in holding that
in the present case, the examining body (the Commission), is        G
in no fiduciary relationship with the examinee (interviewers) or
the candidate interviewed. Once the fiduciary relationship is not
established, the obvious consequence is that the Commission
cannot claim exemption as contemplated under Section 8(1)(e)
of the Act. The question of directing disclosure for a larger       H
public interest, therefore, would not arise at all.
    1052     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A       27. In CBSE case (supra), this Court had clearly stated the
  view that an examiner who examines the answer sheets holds
  the relationship of principal and agent with the examining body.
  Applying the same principle, it has to be held that the
  interviewers hold the position of an 'agent' vis-a-vis the
B examining body which is the 'principal'. This relationship per
  se is not relatable to any of the exemption clauses but there
  are some clauses of exemption, the foundation of which is not
  a particular relationship like fiduciary relationship. Clause
  8(1)(g) can come into play with any kind of relationship. It
c requires that where the disclosure of information would
  endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the
  source of information or assistance given in confidence for law
  enforcement or security purposes, the information need not be
  provided. The High Court has rejected the application of Section
  8(1 )(g) on the ground that it applies only with regard to law
0
  enforcement or security purposes and does not have general
  application. This reasoning of the High Court is contrary to the
  very language of Section 8(1 )(g). Section 8(1 )(g) has various
  clauses in itself.
E        28. Now, let us examine the provisions of Section 8(1)(g)
  with greater emphasis on the expressions that are relevant to
   the present case. This section concerns with the cases where
   no obligation is cast upon the public authority to furnish
   information, the disclosure of which would endanger (a) the life
F (b) physical safety of any person. The legislature, in its wisdom,
  has used two distinct expressions. They cannot be read or
  construed as being synonymous. Every expression used by the
  Legislature must be given its intended meaning and, in fact, a
  purposeful interpretation. The expression 'life' has to be
G construed liberally. 'Physical safety' is a restricted term while
  life is a term of wide connotation. 'Life' includes reputation of
  an individual as well as the right to live with freedom. The
  expression ' life' also appears in Article 21 of the Constitution
  and has been provided a wide meaning so as to inter atia
H include within its ambit the right to live with dignity, right to
  BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1053
  HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.)
shelter, right to basic needs and even the right to reputation.         A
The expression life under section 8(1 (g) the Act, thus, has to
be understood in somewhat similar dimensions. The term
'endanger' or 'endangerment' means the act or an instance of
putting someone or something in danger; exposure to peril or
such situation which would hurt the concept of life as understood       B- -
in its wider sense [refer Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth
Edition)]. Of course, physical safety would mean the likelihood
of assault to physical existence of a person. If in the opinion of
the concerned authority there is danger to life or possibility of
danger to physical safety, the State Information Commission             c
would be entitled to bring such case within the exemption of
Section 8(1 )(g) of the Act. The disclosure of information which
would endanger the life or physical safety of any person is one
category and identification of the source of information or
assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security          0
 purposes is another category. The expression 'for law
 enforcement or security purposes' is to be read ejusdem
 generis only to the expression 'assistance given in confidence'
 and not to any other clause of the section. On the plain reading
 of Section 8(1)(g), it becomes clear that the said clause is           E
 complete in itself. It cannot be said to have any reference to
 the expression 'assistance given in confidence for law
 enforeement or security purposes'. Neither the language of the
 Section nor the object of the Section requires such
 interpretation. It would not further the cause of this section.
 Section 8 attempts to provide exemptions and once the                  F
 language of the Section is unambiguous and squarely deals
with every situation, there is no occasion for the Court to
 frustrate the very object of the Section. It will amount to
 misconstruing the provisions of the Act. The High Court though
 has referred to Section 8(1)0) but has, in fact, dealt with the        G
 language of Section 8(1)(g). The reasoning of the High Court,
 therefore, is neither clear in reference to provision of the Section
 nor in terms of the language thereof.
     29. Now, the ancillary question that arises is as to the           H
    1054    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A consequences that the interviewers or the members of the
  interview board would be exposed to in the event their names
  and addresses or individual marks given by them are directed
  to be disclosed. Firstly, the members of the Board are likely to
  be exposed to danger to their lives or physical safety. Secondly,
B it will hamper effective performance and discharge of their
  duties as examiners. This is the information available with the
  examining body in confidence v. 'h the interviewers. Declaration
  of collective marks to the ca 'idate is one thing and that, in
  fact, has been permitted by th authorities as well as the High
c Court. We see no error of jurisdiction or reasoning in this
  regard. But direction to furnish the names and addresses of the
  interviewers would certainly be opposed to the very spirit of
  Section 8(1)(g) of the Act. CBSE case (supra) has given
  sufficient reasoning in this regard and at this stage, we may
  refer to paragraphs 52 and 53 of the said judgment which read
0
  as under:
        "52. When an examining body engages the services of an
        examiner to evaluate the answer books, the examining
        body expects the examiner not to disclose the information
E       regarding evaluation to anyone other than the examining
        body. Similarly the examiner also expects that his name
        and particulars would not be disclosed to the candidates
        whose answer books are evaluated by him. In the event
        of such information being made known, a disgruntled
F       examinee who is not satisfied with the evaluation of the
        answer books, may act to the prejudice of the examiner
        by attempting to endanger his physical safety. Further, any
        apprehension on the part of the examiner that there may
        be danger to his physical safety, if his identity becomes
G       known to the examinees, may come in the way of effective
        discharge of his duties. The above applies not only to the
        examiner, but also to the scrutiniser, co-ordinator and head
        examiner who deal with the answer book.
        53. The answer book usually contains not only the signature
H
 BIHAR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v. SAIYED 1055
 HUSSAIN ABBAS RIZWI [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
    and code number of the examiner, but also the signatures A
    and code number of the scrutiniser/co-ordinator/head
    examiner. The information as to the names or particulars
    of the examiners/co-ordinators/scrutinisers/head
    examiners are therefore exempted from disclosure under
    Section 8(1 )(g) of the RTI Act, on the ground that if such B
    information is disclosed, it may endanger their physical
    safety. Therefore, if the examinees are to be given access
    to evaluated answer books either by permitting inspection
    or by granting certified copies, such access will have to
    be given only to that part of the answer book which does c
    not contain any information or signature of the examiners/
    co-ordinators/scrutinisers/head examiners, exempted from
    disclosure under Section 8(1)(g) of the RTI Act. Those
    portions of the answer books which contain information
    regarding the examiners/co-ordinators/scrutinisers/head D
    examiners or which may disclose their identity with
    reference to signature or initials, shall have to be removed,
    covered, or otherwise severed from th~ non-exempted part
    of the answer books, under Section 10 of the RTI Act.•
     30. The above reasoning of the Bench squarely applies E
to the present case as well. The disclosure of names and
addresses of the members of the Interview Board would ex
facie endanger their lives or physical safety. The possibility of
a failed candidate attempting to take revenge from such
 persons cannot be ruled out. On the one hand, it is likely to F
expose the members of the Interview Board to harm and, on
the other, such disclosure would serve no fruitful much less any
public purpose. Furthermore, the view of the High Court in the
judgment under appeal that element of bias can be traced and
would be crystallized only if the names and addresses of the G
examiners/interviewers are furnished is without any substance.
The element of bias can hardly be co-related with the disclosure
of the names and addresses of the interviewers. Bias is not a
ground which can be considered for or against a party making
 an application to which exemption under Section 8 is pleaded H
    1056    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A as a defence. We are unable to accept this reasoning of the
  High Court. Suffice it to note that the reasoning of the High
  Court is not in conformity with the principles stated by this Court
  in the CBSE case (supra). The transparency that is expected
  to be maintained in such process would not take within its ambit
B the disclosure of the information called for under query No.1 of
  the application. Transparency in such cases is relatable to the
  process where selection is based on collective wisdom and
  collective marking. Marks are required to be disclosed but
  disclosure of individual names would hardly hold relevancy either
c to the concept of transparency or for proper exercise of the right
  to information within the limitation of the Act.

       31. For the reasons afore-stated, we accept the present
  appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and hold that
  the Commission is not bound to disclose the information asked
D for by the applicant under Query No.1 of the application.
    R.P.                                           Appeal allowed.