BHUWAN MOHAN SINGHversusMEENA & ORS.

                        [2014) 8 S.C.R. 858


A                    BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH
                               v.
                          MEENA & ORS.
                (Criminal Appeal No.1331 of 2014)
                           JULY 15, 2014
B
         [DIPAK MISRA AND V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

        FAMILY COURT ACT, 1984:

C      s. 7of1984 Act rlw s. 125, CrPC- Duty of Family Court
  - Explained Application of wife and child remained pending
  in Family Court for nine years - Family Court granting
  maintenance to wife and child from the date of order - Held:
  Both the approaches, i.e., allowing adjournments in extremely
o liberal manner remaining oblivious of objects and reasons of
  the Act and restricting the grant of maintenance to the date
  of order on some kind of individual notion, not only defeat the
  command of the legislature but also frustrate the hope of wife
  and the child who are deprived of adequate livelihood *"'.7'" The
E delay in adjudication by Family Court is not only against
  human rights but also against the basic embodiment of dignity
  of an individual - Family Court Judges are to decide. the
  matters as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the
  objects and reasons of the Act and the scheme of various
F statutory provisions - Human rights.

        CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973:

       s. 125 - Maintenance of w~fe and child - Relevant date
  of grant of maintenance - Maintenance awarded by Family
G Court from date of order - High .-Court directing main"tenance
  to be paid from date of application - Held: Wife is entitled to
  get maintenance from the husband unless there is an order
  from the court that she is not entit1ed to get maintenance on
  any legally permissible grounds - As regards tire relevant
H                                858
      BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS~                    859


  date of grant of maintenance, in the instant case, there was      A
  enormous d~lay in disposal of the proceeding u/s 125 and
  most of the time husband had taken adjournments and some
  times the court dealt with the matter showing total laxity- The
; circumstances required grant of maintenance from the date
 .of application - However, While paying the monthly                B
  maintenance, as fixed by Family Court, by 5th of each
  succeeding month, the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate
  manner within a period of three years,

       s. 125, Cr. P. C. rlw s. 7 of Family Court Act - Object of -
  Explained -Application of wife and child for maintenance - C
  Adjournments - Held: In the instant case, proceedings before
  Family Court were conducted without being alive to the·
  objects and reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions
  u/s 125 - The case continued for nine years before Family
  Court - Family Court Judge, while granting adjournments, D
  is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with
, extremely delicate and sensitive issues pertaining· to the
  marriage and issues ancillary thereto - Dilatory tactics by
  any of the parties has to be sternly dealt with - Family Court
  Act, 1984 - s. 7.                                                 E
       The marriage between the appellant- husband and
  the res·pondent-wife, was solemnized on 27.11.1997, as
  per Hindu rites. The couple was blessed with a son on
  16.12.1998. The respondent was compelled to leave the             F
  marital home and she filed an application u/s 125 Cr.P.C.
  on 28.8.2002. The Family Court decided the matter on
  24.8.2011 awarding monthly maintenance of Rs. 2,500/-
  to the respondent wife and Rs. 1,500/- to the second
. respondent-son. The maintenance was directed to be                G
  paid from the date of the order. However, the High Court
  directed the maintenance to be paid from the date of the
  application.
     Dismissing the appeal, the Court
                                                                    H
    860    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2014] 8 S.C.R.

A      HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, the application of the
  wife remained pending in the Family Court for nine years.
  Further, the Family Court granted maintenance from the
  date of the order. Thus, both the approaches, i.e., allowing ,
  adjournments in extremely liberal manner remaining
B oblivious of objects and reasons of the Family Court Act,
  1984 and restricting the grant of maintenance to the date
  of order on some kind of individual notion, not only
  defeat the command of the legislature but also frustrate
  the hope of wife and the child who are deprived of
c adequate livelihood. The delay in adjudication by the
  Family Court is not only against human rights but also
  against the basic embodiment of dignity of an individual.
  [para 2] [863-E-G]

       1.2. Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
D 1973 was conceived to ameliorate the. financial suffering
  of a woman who left her matrimonial home for the
  reasons provided in the provision so that some suitable
  arrangements can be made by the court and she can
  sustain herself and also her children if they are with her.
E The concept of sustenance has to be interpreted that the
  wife is entitled in law to lead a life in the similar manner
  as she would have lived in the house of her husband.
  That is where the status and strata come into play, and
  that is where the obligations of the husband, in case of
F a wife, become a prominent one. In a proceeding of this
  nature, the husband cannot take subterfuges to deprive
  her of the benefit of living with dignity, and the wife is
  entitled to get maintenance from the husband unless
  there is an order from the court that she is not entitled to
G get maintenance from the husband on any legally
  permissible grounds. [para 3] [863-H; 864-A-C, E]
       Smt. Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohammed Farooq 1987 (1)
              =
    SCR 1086 1987 (1) SCC 624; Vim/a (K.) v. Veeraswamy
H
     BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS.                861


(K.) 1991 (1) SCR 904 =1991 (2) sec 375, Kirtikant D. A
Vadodaria v. State of Gujarat and Anr.1996 (2) Suppl. SCR
45 = 1996 (4) SCC 479 Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai 2007(12)
SCR 577 = 2008 (2) SCC 316; Nagendrappa Natikar v.
Neelamma 2Ci13 (3) SCALE 561; K.A. Abdul Ja/eel v. T.A.
Shahida 2003 (3) SCR 498 = 2003 (4) SCC 166 - referred B
to.

     1.3. In the case at hand, the proceedings before the
Family Court were conducted without being alive to the
objects and reasons of the Act and the spirit of the
provisions u/s 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the     C
case continued for nine years before the Family Court. It
has come to the notice of the Court that on certain
occasions the Family Courts have been granting
adjournment$ in a routine manner as a consequence of
which both the parties suffer and the wife becomes the         D
worst victim. The Family Court Judge is expected to be
sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with extremely
delicate and sensitive issues pertaining to the marriage
and issues ancillary thereto. Dilatory tactics by any of the
parties has to be sternly dealt with. The Family Court         E
Judges are to decide the matters as expeditiously as
possible keeping in view the objects and reasons of the
Act and the scheme of various provisions pertaining to
grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of child, property
disputes, etc. [para 14] [868-B-H]                             F

     1.4. As regards the relevant date of grant of
maintenance, in the instant case, the circumstances, in
the considered opinion of this Court, required grant of
maintenance from the date of·a·pplication and by so G
granting the High Court has not committed any legal
infirmity. Therefore, this Court concurs with the order of
the High Court. However, as prayed for the respondent,
while paying the monthly mainte~ance, as fixed by the
                                                               H
    862      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A Family Court Judge, by 5th of each succeeding month,
  the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate manner within
  a period of three years. [para 15-16] [870-F-G]

      Shai/ Kumari Devi and another v. Krishan Bhagwal
8 Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak 2008 (11) SCR 386 2008.   =
  (9)  sec
         632 - relied on

        Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain 1992 Cri LJ 1028 (MP)
    - stood approved

c        K. Sivaram v. K. Mangalamba 1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP) -
    ,stood disapproved.
                          Case Law Reference:
      '
      f987 (1) SCR 1086             referred to         para 8
D
      1991 (1) SCR 904              referred to         para 9
      1996 (2) Suppl. SCR 45        referred to         para 10
      2007 (12) SCR 577             referred to         para 11
E     2013 (3) SCALE 561            referred to         para 12
      2003 (3) SCR 498              referred to         para 13
      2008 (11) SCR 386             relied on           para 15
      1992 Cri LJ 1028 (MP)         stood approved      para 15
F
      1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP)         stood disapproved para 15
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1331 of 2014.
G      From the Judgment an.d Order dated 28.05.2012 in
    SBCRR 1526/2011 of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur.

          Jay Kishor Singh for the Appellant.

H
     BHUWAN.MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS.                      863
              [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
    Ruchi Kohli, Brijesh Sharma, Mohit Paul for the                  A
Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.
                                                                     B
     2. The two issues that pronouncedly emanate in this appeal
by special leave are whether the Family Court while deciding
an application under Section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1984
(for brevity, "the Act") which includes determination of grant of
maintenance to the persons as entitled under that provision,         c
should allow adjournments in an extremely liberal manner
remaining oblivious of objects and reasons of the Act and also
keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of
judicial responsiveness suspended to the manifest perceptibility
of vagrancy, destitution, impecuniosity, struggle-for survival and
                                                                     0
the emotional fracture, a wife likely to face under these
circumstances and further exhibiting absolute insensitivity to her
condition, who, after loosing support of the husband who has
failed to husband the marital status denies the wife to have
maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is
consumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the grant   E
of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of individual
notion. Both the approaches, as we perceive, not only defeat
the command of the legislature but also frustrate the hope of
wife and children who are deprived of adequate livelihood and
whose aspirations perish like mushroom and possibly the brief        F
candle of sustenance joins the marathon race of extinction. This
delay in adjudication by the Family Court is not only against
human rights but also against the basic embodiment of dignity
of an individual.
                                                                     G
     3. Be it ingeminated that Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (for short "the Code") was conceived to
ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a woman
who left her matrimonial home for the reasons provided in the
provision so that some suitable arrangements can be made by          H
    864      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2014] 8 S.C.R.


A the Court and she can sustain herself and also her children if
  they are with her. The concept of sustenance does not
  necessarily mean to lead the life of an animal, feel like an
  unperson to be thrown away from grace and roam for her basic
  maintenance somewhere else. She is entitled in law to lead a
B life in the similar manner as she would have lived in the house
  of her husband. That is where the status and strata come into
  play, and that is where the obligations of the husband, in case
  of a wife, become a prominent one. In a proceeding of this
  nature, the husband cannot take subterfuges to deprive her of
C the benefit of living with dignity. Regard being had to the solemn
  pledge at the time of marriage and also in consonance with the
  statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of the
  husband to see that the wife does not become a destitute, a
  beggar. A situation is not to be maladroitly created whereunder
  she is compelled to resign to her fate and think of life "dust unto
D dust". It is totally impermissible. In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty
  to render the financial support even if the husband is required
  to earn money with physical labour, if he is able bodied. There
  is no escape route unless there is an order from the Court that
  the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from the husband
E on any legally permissible grounds.

       4. Presently to the facts which lie in an extremely small
  compass. The marriage between the appellant and the husband
  was solemnized on 27.11.1997 as per Hindu rites and ritual,
F and in the wedlock a son was born on 16.12.1998. The
  respondent, under certain circumstances, had to leave the
  marital home and thereafter filed an application on 28.8.2002
  under Section 125 of the Code in the Family Court, Jaipur,
  Rajasthan, claiming Rs.6000/- per month towards maintenance.
G The Family Court finally decided the matter on 24.8.2011
  awarding monthly maintenance of Rs.2500/- to the respondent-
  wife and Rs.1500/- to the second respondent-son. Be it stated,
  during the continuance of the Family Court proceedings,
  number of adjournments were granted, some taken by the
H husband and some by the wife. The learned Family Judge being/
     13HUWAN MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS.                   865
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

dissatisfied with the material brought on record came to hold      A
that the respondent-wife was entitled to maintenance and,
accordingly, fixed the quantum and directed that the
maintenance to be·paid from the date of the order.

    5. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order the
                                                              8
respondent-wife preferred S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No.
1~6 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature atR;:ijasthan
and the learned single Judge, vide order dated 28.5.2012,
noted the contention of the wife that the maintenance should
have been granted from the date of application, and that she
had rece!ved nothing during the proceedings and suffered C
immensely and, eventually, directed that the maintenance
should be granted from the date of filing of the application.

    6. Criticizing the aforesaid order, it is submitted Mr. Jay
Kishor Singh learned counsel for the appellant that when D
number of adjournments were sought by •the wife, grant of
maintenance from the date of filing of the application by the
High Court is absolutely illegal and unjustified. It is his
submission that the wife cannot take advantage of her own
wrong.                                                          E

     7. Mr. Mohit Paul, learned counsel for the respondents
would submit that the Family Court adjourned the matter
sometimes on its own and the enormous delay took place
because of non-cooperation of the husband in the proceedings
and, therefore, the wife who was compelled to sustain herself F
and her son with immense difficulty should not be allowed to
suffer. It is proponed by him that the High Court by modifying
the order .f3nd directing that the maintenance should be granted
from the date of filing of the application has not committed any
legal infirmity and hence, the order is inexceptionable.         G

     8. At the outset, we are obliged to reiterate the principle
of law how a proceeding under Section 125 of the Code has
to be dealt with by the court, and what is the duty of a Family
Court after establishment of such courts by the Family Courts      H
    866        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   Act, 1984. In Smt. Dukhtar Jahan v. Mo{lammed Farooq', the
    Court opined that proceedings under Section 125 of the Code,
    it must be remembered, are of a summary nature and are
    intended to enable destitute wives and children, the latter
    whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, to get maintenance
B   in a speedy manner.

       9. A three-Judge Bench in Vim/a (K.) v. Veeraswamy (K.)2,
  while discussing about the basic purpose under Section 125
  of the Code, opined that Section 125 of the Code is meant to
  achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and
C destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food,
  clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

      10. A two-Judge Bench in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v. State
  of Gujarat and another3, while adverting to the dominant
D purpose behind Section 125 of the Code, ruled that:

          "While dealing with the ambit and scope of the provision
          contained in Section 125 of the Code, it has to be borne
          in mind that the dominant and primary object is to give
          social justice to the woman, child and infirm parents etc.
E
          and to prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling
          those who can support those who are unable to support
          themselves but have a moral claim for support. The
          provisions in Section. 125 provide a speedy remedy to
          those women, children and destitute parents who are in
F         distress. The provisions in Sectio"n 125 are intended to
          achieve this special purpose. The dominant purpose
          behind the benevolent provisions contained in Section 125
          clearly is that the wife, child and· parents should not be left
          in a helpless state of distress, destitution and st.arvation."
G


    1.    (1987) 1 sec 624.
    2.    (1991) 2 sec 375.
H   3.    (1996) 4 sec 479.
      BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS.                        867
               [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      11. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai", reiterating the legal position   A
tile Court held: -

     "Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is
     specially enacted to protect women and children and as
     noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal             8
     v. Veena Kaushal 5 falls within constitutional sweep of
     Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of
     India. It is meant to achieve a social purpose. The object
     is to prevent vagrancy and destitution. It provides a speedy
     remedy for the supply of food, clothing and shelter to the        C
     deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and
     natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and
     parents when they are unable to' maintain themselves. The
     aforesaid position was highlighted in Savitaben
     Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat...
                                                                       D
                                                                7
     12. Recently in Nagendrappa Natikar v. Neelamma , it
has been stated that it is a piece of social legislation which
provides for a summary and speedy relief by way of
maintenance ·lo a wife who is unable to maintain herself and
her childHm.                                                           E

     13. The Family Courts have been established for adopting
and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to deal with family
disputes in a speedy and expeditious manner. A three-Judge
Bench in KA. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida 8 , while highlighting
                                                                       F
on the purpose of bringing in the Family Courts Act by the
legislature, opined thus: -

    "The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the
establishment of Family Courts with a view to promote
                                                                       G
4.   (2008) 2 SCR 316.
5.   (1978) 4 sec 10.                                           •
6.   c2oosi 3 sec 636.
7.   2013 (3) SCALE 561.
8.   c2003) 4 sec 166.                                                 H
    868     SUPREME 'COURT REPORTS                 [2014) 8 s.C.R.


A   conciliation in·, and secure speedy ~ettlement of, disputes
    relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected
    therewith."                      ·

        14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in the
  case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court was
8
  conducted without being alive to the objects and reasons of the
  Act and the spirit of the provisions under Section 125 of the
  Code. It is unfortunate that the case continued for nine years
  before the Family Court. It has come to the notice of the Court
C that on certain occasions the Family Courts have been granting
  adjournments in a routine manner as a consequence of which
  both the parties suffer or, on certain .occasions, the wife
  becomes the worst victim. When such a situation occurs, the
  purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. The Family Judge.is
  expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with
D extremely delicate and sensitive ..issues pert.aining to the
  marriage and issues ancillary thereto. When we say this, we
  do not mean that the Family Courts should show undue haste
  or impatience, but there is a. distinction between impatience
  and to be wisely anxious and conscious about dealing with a
E situation. A Family Court J.udge should remember that -the
  procrastination is the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It
  not only gives rise to more family problems but also gradually
  builds unthinkable and Everestine bitterness. It leads to the cold
  refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if still left. The delineation
F of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the awareness and
  balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the parties has to be sternly
  dealt with, for the Family Court Judge has to be alive to the fact
  that the lis before him pertains to emotional fragmentation and
  delay can feed it to grow. We hope and trust that the' Family
G Court Judges shall remain alert to this and decide the matters
  as expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and•
  reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions.
  pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody Qf child,
  property disputes, etc.
H
       BHUWAN MOHAN SINGH v. MEENA & ORS.                      869
                [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
       15. While dealing with the relevant date of grant of            A
 maintenance, in Shail Kumari Devi and another v. Krishan
 Bhagwa/ Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak9, the Court referred
 to the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act
 50 of 2001) and came to hold that even after the amendment
 of 2001, an order for payment of maintenance can be paid by           s
 a court either from the date of order or when express order is
 made to pay maintenance from the date of application, then the
 amount of maintenance may be paid from that date, i.e., from
 the date of application. The Court referred to the decision in
 Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain 10 wherein it has been stated         c
 that to hold that, normally maintenance should be made payable
 from the date of the order and not from the date of the
 application unless such order is backed by reasons would
 amount to inserting something more in the sub-section which
 the legislature never intended. The High Court had observed
                                                                       0
 that it was unable to read in sub-section (2). laying down any
 rule to award maintenance from the date of the order or that
 the grant from the date of the application is an exception. The
 High Court had also opined that whether maintenance is
 granted from the date of the order or from the date of
 application, the Court is required to record reasons as required      E
 under sub-section (6) of Section 354 of the Code. After
 referring to the decision in Krishna Jain (supra), the Court
 adverted to the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
 in K. Sivaram v. K. Manga/amba 11 wherein it has been ruled
 that the maintenance would be awarded from the date of the            F
 order and such maintenance could be granted from the date
 of the application only by recording special reasons. The view
 of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Andhra
 Pradesh stating that it is a normal rule that the Magistrate should
.grant maintenance only from the date of the order and not'from        G
·the date of the application for maintenance was not accepted

·9.   c2008) 9 sec 632.
 10. 1922 Cri W 1028 (MP).
11. 1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP).                                             H
    870       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   by this Court. Eventually, the Court ruled thus: -
          "43. We, therefore, hold that while deciding an application
          under Section 125 of the Code,' a Magistrate is required
          to record reasons for granting or refusing to grant
          maintenance to wives, children or parents. Such
B         maintenance can be awarded from the date of the order,
          or, if so ordered, from the d~te of the application for
          maintenance, as the case may be. For awarding
          maintenance from the date of the application, express
          order is necessary. No special reasons, however, are
c         required to be recorded by the court. In our judgment, no
          such requirement can be read in sub-section (1) of Section
          125 of the Code in absence of express provision to that
          effect."
       16. In the present case, as we find, there was enormous
D delay in disposal of the proceeding under Section 125 of the·
  Code and most ·of the time the husband had taken
  adjournments and some times the court dealt with the matter
  showing total laxity. The wife sustained herself as far as she
  could in that state for a period of nine years. The circumstances,
E in our considered opinion, required grant of maintenance from
  the date of application and by so granting the High Court has
  not committed any legal infirmity. Hence, we concur with the
  order of the High Court. However, we direct, as prayed by the
  learned counsel for the respondent, that he may be allowed to
F pay the arrears along with the maintenance awarded at present
  in a phased manner. Learned counsel for the appellant did not
  object to such an arrangement being made. In view of the
  aforesaid, we direct that while paying the maintenance as fixed
  by the learned Family Court Judge per month by 5th of each
G succeeding month, the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate
  manner within a period of three years from today.
        17. Consequently, the anpeal, being devoid -0f merits;
    stands dismissed.
H Rajendra Prasad                                    Appeal dismissed.