BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR.versusSTATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

                        [2012] 2 S.C.R. 696


A                  BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR.
                                 v.
                 STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.
                (Criminal Appeal No. 612 of 2012)
                          APRIL 4, 2012
B
        [P. SATHASIVAM AND J. CHELAMESWAR, JJ.]

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

c       ss. 190, 204 - Cognizance of offence and summoning
  order - Distinction between - Held: Cognizance is taken of
  cases and not of persons - It is the condition precedent to the
  initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge - A
  summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a
0 person to appear before a Magistrate - It is used for the
  purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to
  appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law
  - s.204 states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking
  cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for
E proceeding, then the summons may be issued.
        s. 204 - Requirement of assigning reasons for
  summoning a person - Held: Summoning order u/s. 204 does
  not mandate the Magistrate to state reasons for issuance of
  summons since it is imperative that the Magistrate must have
F taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the
  a/legations made in the police report and the materials filed
  therewith.

      Respondent No. 2 lodged FIR under Section 420 IPC
G against the appellants. The Magistrate summoned the
  appellants. The appellants challenged the summoning
  order before the High Court. By impugned order dated
  30.07.2010, the High Court rejected the prayer for
  quashing the summoning order.
H                               696
                                                           \
   BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                 697
              DELHI) & ANR.
    The questions which arise for consideration in these        A
appeals were: whether taking cognizance of an offence
by the Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to
appear; and whether the Magistrate, while considering
the question of summoning an accused, is required to
assign reasons for the same.                                    B

    Dismissing the appeals, the Court

     HELD: 1. Under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, it is the application of judicial mind to the
averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance.         C
At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether
there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether
there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the
evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can
be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of         D
enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then
the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process
under Section 204 of the Code. A summon is a process
issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before
a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an        E
individual of his legal obligation to appear before the
Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other
words, the summons will announce to the person to
whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been
started against that person and the date and time on            F
which the person must appear in Court. A person who
is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court
on the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable
to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for
contempt of court. Section 204 of the Code does not             G
mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for
issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion
of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may
be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form         H
   698     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 2 S.C.R.

A an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground
  for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned
  in the section that the explicit narration of the same is
  mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite
  for deciding the validity of the summons issued. The
B order passed by the Magistrate could not be faulted with
  only on the ground that the summoning order was not a
  reasoned order. [Paras 8-10, 16] [703-E-H; 704-A-C;706-
  F]

       S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon
C International Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 492: 2008 (2) SCR
  36; Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. v. State of West Bengal (2000)
  1 SCC 722: 2000 (1) SCR 27; Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna
  Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 736: 1976 (0)
  Suppl. SCR 123; Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports
D v. Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 139: 2003 (2)
  SCR 621 - relied on.

      2. It is inherent in Section 251 of the Code that when
  an accused appears before the trial court pursuant to
E summons issued under Section 204 of the Code in a
  summons trial case, it is the bounden duty of the trial
  Court to carefully go through the allegations made in the
  charge sheet or complaint and consider the evidence to
  come to a conclusion whether or not, commission of any
F offence is disclosed and if the answer is in the affirmative,
  the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the
  accusation to the accused and ask him whether he
  pleads guilty otherwise, he is bound to discharge the
  accused as per Section 239 of the Code. The petition filed
G before the High Court under Section 482 of the Code was
  maintainable. However, on merits, the impugned order
  dated 30.07.2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi is
  confirmed. [Paras 17-19] [706-G-H; 707-A-D]

      U. P. Pollution Control Board v. Dr. Bhupendra Kumar
H Modi & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 147: 2008 (17) SCR 349; Pepsi
    BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                 699
               DELHI) & ANR.

Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. (1998)   A
5 SCC 749: 1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 12; Dhariwal Tobacco
Products Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2009) 2
SCC 370: 2008 (17) SCR 844; M.A.A. Annamalai v. State
of Karnataka & Anr. (2010) 8 SCC 524: 2010 (9) SCR 1124
• relied on.                                                     B
                     Case Law Reference:
    2008 (2) SCR 36               relied on        Para 7
    2000 (1) SCR 27               relied on        Para 12
                                                                 c
    1976 (0) Suppl. SCR 123       relied on        Para 13
    2003 (2) SCR 621              relied on        Para 14
    2008 (17) SCR 349             relied on        Para 15
                                                                 D
    1997 (5) Suppl. SCR 12        relied on        Para 18
    2008 (17) SCR 844             relied on        Para 18
    2010 (9) SCR 1124             relied on        Para 18
    CRIMINAL APP ELLATE_JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal           E
No. 612 of 2012.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 30.07.2010 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Crl. M.C. No. 3376 of 2009.
                              WITH                               F
Crl. A. No. 613 of 2012.

    Ranjit Kumar, Mohit Mathur, S. Prasad, Atul Kumar,
Subramonium Prasad for the Appellants.
                                                                 G
      Vljay Aggarwal, Dibyadyoti Banerjee, R.P. Wadhwani,
Sadhna Snadhu, B.V. Bairam Das, Asha G. Nair, Anil Katiyar
for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                 H
     700       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012) 2 S.C.R.


 A         P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.

        2. These appeals are directed against the final judgment
   and order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi
   at New Delhi in Crl.M.C. Nos. 3376 & 3375 of 2009 whereby
   the High Court rejected the prayer of the appellants herein for
 8
   quashing the summoning order dated 16.01.2009 passed by
   the Metropolitan Magistrate in FIR No. 290 of 2002 registered
   at Police Station, Okhla Industrial Area, New Delhi under
   Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
 C referred to as "the IPC").

           3. Brief facts:

        (a) The present cases pertain to a property" dispute
   regarding distribution of the assets left behind by late Shri
 0 Gulshan Kumar (of T-Series fame). On 19.02.1998, a
   handwritten note was executed between the appellants and
   Respondent No. 2 wherein distribution of certain assets and
   shares in different companies was provided for. Subsequently,
   on 21.02.1998, a fresh agreement was entered into between
 E the appellants and the Respondent No. 2 which superseded the
   handwritten note.

           (b) However, disputes arose soon after the above said
     second agreement dated 21.02.1998, giving rise to multifarious
     litigations at the behest of Respondent No. 2 which are presently
 F   pending adjudication before the High Court.

        (c) However, after 4 years, due to non-materialization of
   the agreement dated 21.02.1998, the Respondent No. 2 got
   registered the present FIR under Section 420 IPC against all
 G the other signatories to the said agreement wherein only one
   of the signatory was a party to it. For quashing the said FIR,
   the appellants herein filed Crl.M.C. No. 59 of 2005 before the
   High Court.

        (d) On being informed by the State that chargesheet has
· H been filed before the Magistrate, the High Court disposed of
    BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                      701
        DELHI) & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
 the Crl.M.C. No. 59 of 2005 vide order dated 30.03.2009 giving A
 liberty to the appellants to take appropriate steps in case they ·
 are summoned.

      (e) By order dated 16.01.2009, the Magistrate summoned
 the appellants herein. Challenging the said summoning order,
                                                                       8
 the appellants herein filed Criminal M.C. Nos. 3376 and 3375
 of 2009 before the High Court.

      (f) By the impugned order dated 30.07.2010, the High
 Court rejected the prayer of the appellants for quashing the
 summoning order passed by the Magistrate. Aggrieved by the            C
 said order, the appellants have filed these appeals by way of
 special leave before this Court.

       4. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
   appellants and Mr. Vijay Aggarwal, learned counsel for              o,
.. respondent No.2.

     5. The questions which arise for consideration in these
 appeals are:

       (a)   Whether taking cognizance of an offence by the            E
             Magistrate is same as summoning an accused to
             appear?

       (b)   Whether the Magistrate, while considering the
             question of summoning an accused, is required to          F
             assign reasons for the same?

      6. In this context, it is relevant to extract Sections 190 and
 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
 referred to as ''the Code") which read as under:
                                                                       G
      "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. (1)
      Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate
      of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class
      specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2),
      may take cognizance of any offence-                              H
    702       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 2 S.C.R.

A         (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute
          such offence ;

          (b) upon a poliQe report of such facts;

          (c) upon information received from any person other than
B         a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such
          offence has been committed.

        (2) The Chief JudiQial Magistrate may empower any
        Magistrate of the set:;ond class to take cognizance under
c     . sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his
        competence to inquire into or try."

          "204. Issue of process. (1) If in the opinion of a
          Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is
          sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to
D         be-

          (a) a summons-case, he shall issue his summons for the
          attendance of the accused, or

E         (b) a warrant-case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks
          fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or
          to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if
          he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate
          having jurisdiction.
F          (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the
           accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution
          ·witnesses has been filed.

          (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in
G         writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-
          section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such
          complaint.

          (4) When by any law for the time being in force' any
          process-fees or other fees are payable, no process shall
H
    BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                      703
        DELHI) & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not       A
     paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss
     the complaint.

     (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the
     provisions of section 87."                                        B

     7. In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer vs. Videocon
International Ltd. & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression
"cognizance" was explained by this Court as it merely means
"become aware of' and when used with reference to a court
or a Judge, it connotes"to take notice of judicially". It indicates    C
the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of
an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of
such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is
entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it
is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by         D
the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of cases and
not of persons.

     8. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of
judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes       E
cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not
whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the
evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be
determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If       F
there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is
empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the
Code.

     9. A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon
a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the             G
purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to
appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law.
In other words, the summons will announce to the person to
whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started
against that person and the date and time on which the person          H
    704      SUPREM~· COURT REPORTS                [2012) 2 S.C.R.


A must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally
  bound to appear before the Court on the given date and time.
  Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174
  IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court.

8      10. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the
  Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of
  summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate
  taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for
  proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section
C mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as .to whether there
  exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is
  nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of
  the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-
  requisite for deciding t.he validity of the summons issued.

D      11. Time and again it has been stated by this Court that
  the summoning order under Section 204 of the Code requires
  no explicit reasons to be stated because it is imperative that
  the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and
  applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report
E and the materials filed therewith.

          12. In Kanti Bhadra Shah & Anr. vs. State of West Bengal
    (2000) 1 sec 722, the following passage will be apposite in
    this context:

F         "12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court
          should write an order showing the reasons for framing a
          charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be
          further burdened with such an extra work. The time has
          reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the
G         court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all
          roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to
          write detailed orders at different stages merely because
          the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the
          snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would
H         further be slowed down. We are coming across
   BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                       705
       DELHI) & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
     interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges           A
     running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a
     detailed order has been passed for culminating the
     proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to
     write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing
     process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of             B
     charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.. ....... "
     (emphasis supplied)

     13. In Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa
Konjalgi & Ors. (1976) 3 SCC 736, this Court held that it is           C
not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed
discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. It was further
held that in deciding whether a process should be issued, the
Magistrate can take into consideration improbabilities
appearing on the face\of the complaint or in the evidence led
by the complainant in support of the allegations. The Magistrate       D
has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the
discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further
held that once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion, it
is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own
discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on        E
merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in
the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of
the accused.

   14. In Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports vs.                F
Roshanlal Agarwal & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court, in
para 9, held as under:

     "9. In determining the question whether any process is to
     be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied
     is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not      G
     whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether
     the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can
     be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of
     inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused,
     the Magistrate is not required to record re~sons. This            H
    706      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2012] 2 S.C.R.

A         question was considered recently in UP. Pollution Control
          Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd.(2000) 3 SCC 745 and after
          noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State
          of WB. (2000) 1 sec 722, it was held as follows: (SCC
          p. 749, para 6)
8
                "The legislature has stressed the need to record
          reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a
          complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal
          requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed
          order while issuing summons. The process issued to
c         accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the
          Magistrate had not passed a speaking order."

       15. In U.P. Pollution Control Board vs. Dr. Bhupendra
    Kumar Modi & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC 147, this Court, in
D paragraph 23, held as under:

          "23. It is a settled legal position that at the stage of issuing
          process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the
          allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in
          support of the same and he is only to be prima facie
E
          satisfied whether there are sufficient grounds for
          proceeding against the accused."

       16. This being the settled legal position, the order passed
  by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the ground
F that the summoning order was not a reasoned order.

         17. It is inherent in Section 251 of the Code that when an
  accused appears before the trial Court pursuant to summons
  issued under Section 204 of the Code in a summons trial case,
G it is the bounden duty of the trial Court to carefully go through
  the allegations made in the charge sheet or complaint and
  consider the evidence to come to a conclusion whether or not,
  commission of any offence is disclosed and if the answer is in
  the affirmative, the Magistrate shall explain the substance of the
H accusation to the accused and ask him whether he pleads guilty
    BHUSHAN KUMAR & ANR. v. STATE (NCT OF                  707
        DELHI) & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
otherwise, he is bound to discharge the accused as per             A
Section 239 of the Code.

     18.The conclusion of the High Court that the petition filed
under Section 482 of the Code is not maintainable cannot be
accepted in view of various decisions of this Court. (vide Pepsi   8
Foods Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.
(1998) 5 SCC 749, Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. & Ors.
vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2009) 2 SCC 370 and M.A.A.
Annamalai vs. State of Kamataka & Anr. (2010) 8 SCC 524).

     19. In the light of the above discussion, we conclude that    C
the petition filed before the High Court under Section 482 of
the Code was maintainable. However, on merits, the impugned
order dated 30.07.2010 passed by the High Court of Delhi is
confirmed, consequently, the appeals fail and the same are
dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeals, MM/South       D
East 02, Patiala House, New Delhi is free to proceed further
in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any observation made
in these appeals.

D.G.                                      Appeals dismissed.