BHUPINDER SINGH BAWAversusASHA DEVI

                         [2016] 7 S.C.R. 807


                   BHUPINDER SINGH BAWA                                 A
                                  v.
                           ASHA DEVI
                  (Civil Appeal No. 9941 of2014)
                       NOVEMBER 08, 2016                                B
      [SHIVA KIRTI SINGH AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.]
     Rent Control and Eviction:
      Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - s. J.l(l){c) - Eviction - Bona
fide requirement - Eviction petition by respondent-landlady -           c
Ground of bona fide requirement of tenanted premises for the
purpose of business of her son - Allowed by the courts below by
recording concurrent findings - On appeal held: Additional Rent
Controller and the High Court rightly held that no alternative
premise was lying vacant for running business of respondent's
                                                                        D
son - it was pe1fectly open to the landlady to choose a more suitable
premises for carrying on the business by her son and that the
respondent cannot be dictated by tenant as to from which shop her
son should start the business from - Concurrent findings recorded
by the courts below based on evidence and materials on record -
Thus, no infirmity warranting interference with the impugned            E
iudgment.
      Anil Bajaj & Anr v. Vinod Ahuja 2014 (6) SCALE 572
      - relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
                                                                        F
     2014 (6) SCALE 572           relied on        Para 12
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9941
of2014.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 28.07.2014 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in R. C. Rev. No. 245 of2014                      G
       Sunil Gt!pta, Sr. Adv., Rajesh Yadav, Vinay Garg, Jaspal Singh
Sethi, Dhananjay Mehlawat, Ad vs. for the Appellant.
     Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Sr. Adv., Arunabh Chowdhury. Vaibhav Tomar,
Ms. Barnali Chowdhury, Ms. Shruti Choudhry, Anupam Lal Das, Karma
                                                                        H
                                 807
808            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 7 S.C.R.


A· Dorjee, Anirudh Singh, Advs. for the Respondent.
            The following Order of the Court was delivered
                                     ORDER
             1. The present appeal has been filed by way of special leave against
B     the final judgment and order dated 28.07.2014 passed by the High Court
      of Judicature of Delhi in R.C. Rev. No.245 of2014 dismissing the revision
      petition filed by the appellant affirming the order of eviction passed by
      the Tribunal and ordering his eviction from the suit scheduled premises.
             2. Briefly, the facts are as follows: The suit scheduled premises,
c     bearing No. C-1 (old property No. 285) Basai Dara Pur, Sharda Puri,
      Ring Road, New Delhi - I I 0015 comprises of two big rooms and one
      small room as shown in red colour in the site plan Ex. PW- I/2. Appellant/
      tenant was inducted as tenant .in the suit scheduled premises by the
      erstwhile owner of the premises vi de Rent Deed dated 20.07 .1989.
      Subsequently, the respondent/landlady acquired the premises under a
D     registered sale deed dated 11.12.2002. The respondent sought eviction
      of the appellant from the suit premises by filing a petition under Section
      14(1 )(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 on the ground of bona fide
      requirement. Respondent claimed that her son Sh. Vaibhav Maheshwari
      required the premises for running his separate business of sanitary and
E     hardware products as the suit premises has a prime location for the said
      business. Respondent's son was pursuing MBA at the time of the filing
      of the eviction petition and completed the same in June, 2011.
             3. The appellant controvetted the claim of bonajide requirement
      set up by the respondent by maintaining that the son of the landlord is
 F    employed as a Director in the company M/s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd.
      and earns Rs.50,000/- per month. The appellant further contended that
      respondent's husband is running business of marble and granite from
      several locations in the city which can be preferably used to accommodate
      the business of respondent's son. Following premises were suggested
      as an alternative accommodation for running sanitary and hardware
G     business of respondent's son: Property No. 285-B, Basai Darapur, Sharda
      Puri, Ring Road, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent,
      Property No. A-2/53, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by husband
      of the respondent, Property No. D-20 l, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi
      owned by husband of the respondent, Property Nos. 43, 44, 45 and 46
H     situated at Block-A- I, W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by the
            BHUPINDER SINGH BAWA v. ASHA DEVI                                   809


company Mis. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd, Property No. D~l2, Rajouri             A
Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi which is the registered office of the M/
s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd.
       4. On a proper appreciation of facts and evidences available on
record, the Additional Rent Controller vide order dated 26.02.2014 in E.
No. 249/2011, passed an eviction order in favour of the respondent and          B
directed the appellant to vacate the suit scheduled premises in accordance
with law. The Additional Rent Controller held that the respondent has
established that the tenanted premise is required for her dependant son
and that there is no alternative vacant accommodation suitably available
for her son for his business. Aggrieved thereof, the appellant filed revision
petition before the High Court challenging the order· of eviction passed        c
by Additional Rent Controller. The High Court vide impugned order
dismissed the revision petition holding that no case is made out to interfere
with the detailed order passed by the Additional Rent Controller decreeing
the eviction petition of bona fide necessity. It was held that the
respondent-Landlady and her son are at liberty to decide which premise          D
is more suitable for running business of sanitary and hardware.
      5. We have heard the parties at considerable length. No new
contentions have been put forth by the parties before us. The appellant
has alleged that the High Court erred in affirming the eviction decree
passed by the Addi. Rent Contra lier as no case of bona fide necessity           E
was established by the respondent. Allegedly, alternate accommodations
were available for occupation ofrespondent's son which were not suitable
for running sanitary anc hardware business which the respondent
neglected to consider. Moreover, the appellant alleged that the High Court
erred in not noticing that the respondent did not set up her bona fide
requirement; rather she set up a case of bona fide requirement of her            F
son and thus, no relief should have been granted to her without keeping
in view the comparative hardship to the appellant/tenant.
       6. On the contrary, the respondent has maintained that the courts
below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that no suitable
accommodation was available for runni1~g business of sanitary and               G
hardware by her son and have rightly passed an eviction order in favour
of the respondent. More so, the respondent cannot be dictated the terms
of occupation of her self-owned properties.
      7. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused
the impugned judgment and materials on record.                                  H
810             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2016] 7 S.C.R.



A            8. Both the courts below have allowed the eviction petition filed
      by the respondent against the appellant on the ground of bona fide
      requirement under Section 14(l)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 by
      recording concurrent findings. First and foremost, the landlord-tenant
      relationship between the parties is not in dispute. The only dispute relates
      to bonafide requirement of the respondent for business of her son and
B
      availability/non-availability of alternative suitable accommodation.
             9. The concurrent findings recorded by the courts below are as
      follows: Firstly, It was held that the fact that respondent's son is engaged
      as Director in the family company Mis. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd. and
      earns a salary of Rs.50,000/- cannot be an impediment to his running a
c     separate business of sanitary and hardware. The courts held that the
      law does not provide that if a landlord/landlady requires the premises for
      running business of his/her young son who is an MBA, and is already
      engaged in some other business, he is acting malafidely and thus, no
      relief should be granted to him/her. Secondly, the courts below considered
D     the suitability of every alternative accommodation suggested by the
      appellant which can preferably be occupied by the respondent's son for
      running his business. The appellant had suggested following alternative
      premises: Property No. 285-8, 8asai Darapur, Sharda Puri, Ring Road,
      New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent, Property no. A-2/53,
      W.H.S., Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by husband of the respondent,
E
      Property No. D-201, Mansarovar Garden, New Delhi owned by husband
      of the respondent, Property Nos. 43, 44, 45 and 46 situated at Block-A-
       l, W.H.S. Kirti Nagar, New Delhi owned by the company Mis. Jaishree
      Granites Pvt. Ltd, Property No. D-12, Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New
      Delhi which is the registered office ofM/s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd.
 F    The courts found that the properties in the name of family company, M/
      s. Jaishree Granites Pvt. Ltd. viz. Property nos. 43,44,45 and 46 situated
      at Block-A- I, W.H.S. Kirti Nagar, New Delhi and Property No. D-12,
      Rajouri Garden, Ring Road, New Delhi were not located in a market
      area and thus, they were unsuitable for occupation especially when other
      suitable premise was available in the market area.
G
            I 0. The property No. 285-B which was owned by the husband of
      the respondent was found already in occupation as a retail outlet for
      marble and granite run by the husband of the respondent. The courts
      considered the allegation of the appellant that property No. 285-8 is
      owned by the respondent and not by her husband. The appellant had
H
            BHUPINDER SINGH BAWA v. ASHA DEVI                                  811


produced a copy ofincome Tax Returns of the respondent for establishing        A
his claim. However, the High Court rejected the said claim on finding
that the alphabet 'B' appearing after number 285 under the head of
rental incomes was wrongly written in the Income Tax Return of the
respondent. Moreover, the High Court found that the appellant had himself
stated in his pleadings that property no. 285-B belonged to the husband
                                                                                B
of the respondent and not to the respondent. Also, with regard to property
No. A-2/53 at Kirti Nagar which is also owned by the husband of the
respondent, the courts found that it is being used by M/s. Jaishree Granites
Pvt. Ltd. as godown for the stock of the marble and granite.
       11. So far as property bearing No. D-20 I, Mansarovar Garden,
New Delhi is concerned, the appellant made a case that the entire               c
property including the ground floor of property No. D-20 I was available
to the respondent which could have been suitably used for running her
son's business as it was located on the main road and in a market area
also. The courts noted that the appellant has admitted in his cross-
examination that the first floor and second floor of the property No. D-        D
201 is in occupation of brother-in-law (Devar) of the respondent who is
carrying on his business in the said premises. The court also noted that
in his cross examination, the appellant has suggested that if not on the
first or second floor, respondent's son can occupy the basement of
property No. D-201. Having so noted, the High Court has observed that
the appellant impliedly admitting that the husband of the respondent is         E
not the owner of the ground floor of property No. D-20 I. The courts
also noted that the appellant has not specifically pleaded in his written
submissions that the ground floor of property No. D-20 I is owned by the
husband of the respondent. In such facts and circumstances, the courts
recorded concurrent finding of fact that ground floor of property No. D-        F
201 does not belong to husband of the respondent and thus the question
of its suitability as an alternate accommodation does not arise in the
present case.
       12. In light of the above, Additional Rent Controller and the High
Court rightly concluded that no alternative premise was lying vacant for        G
running business of respondent's son. The High Court rightly relied on
the ratio of Anil Blljaj & Anr Vs. VinodAlmja 2014 (6) SCALE 572 to
hold that it is perfectly open to the landlord to choose a more suitable
premises for carrying on the business by her son and that the respondent
cannot be dictated by the appellant as to from which shop her son should
start the business from.                                                        H
812               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2016] 7 S.C.R.


A           13. The concurrent findings recorded by the courts below are
      based on evidence and materials on record, we do not find any infirmity
      warranting interference with the impugned judgment.
            14. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Time is granted till 31st
      March, 2017 to the appellant to vacate the premises on filing of usual
B     undertaking in the Registry of this Court within four weeks from today.
      NidhiJain                                                 Appeal dismissed.