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Supreme Court of India

BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE & ORS.versusR.K. MISSION V. CENTENARY COLLEGE & ORS.

Citation
2011 INSC 309
Decided
18 April 2011
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The appeal is dismissed as the dispute is academic due to the appellants' retirement and no relief can be granted.

Summary

The appellants, senior teachers of RK Mission Vivekananda Centenary College, challenged the appointment of a monk (respondent No.3) as principal, alleging he was junior and lacked the statutory qualifications prescribed in Government Order No. 149‑Edn(CP) 1994 and the West Bengal College Acts. The High Court’s Single Judge allowed the writ, but the Division Bench set it aside. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the dispute became academic because all appellants had retired; even if the appointment were void, none could be appointed principal. No interim relief had ever restrained the monk from acting as principal, and by now he possessed the requisite experience. The petition was a personal grievance, not a public‑interest litigation, and could not be treated as a quo warranto. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without addressing the merits.

Issues considered

  • The appointment of respondent No.3 complied with the qualifications and procedures under the West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act, 1975, the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978 and the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979.
  • Whether the writ petition could be characterized as a public‑interest litigation.
  • Whether the writ petition could be treated as a writ of quo warranto.
  • Whether the appeal was maintainable given the retirement of the appellants, rendering the controversy academic.

Legislation cited

Subjects

service lawappointmentprincipalqualification requirementpublic interest litigationquo warrantoacademic issueretirementWest Bengal College Actsgovernment orderseniority

Judgment

                         [2011] 5 S.C.R. 416


A               BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE & ORS.
                                   v.
        R.K. MISSION V. CENTENARY COLLEGE & ORS.
                (Civil Appeal No. 2457 of 2006)
                           APRIL 18, 2011
B
       [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                      NIJJAR, JJ.]

         Service law:
c
          Appointment - Appointment of respondent No. 3, a monk
    as Principal of Missionary College - Challenged by
    appellants-teachers in the College - On the ground that
    respondent no.3 was junior to them and did not possess the
0   requisite qualifications - Writ Petition allowed by the Single
    Judge of the High Court - However, dismissed by the Division
    Bench of the High Court - On appeal held: Litigation in the
    instant case does not survive as the appellants have retired
    - Even if the writ petition is allowed and the appointment of
E   respondent No. 3 is declared null and void, none of the
    appellants could be appointed on the post of Principal - By
    the retirement of all the appellants the issues raised have
    been rendered academic - More so, no interim relief was
    granted by the High Court or Supreme Court restraining
    respondent No. 3 from performing the functions of a Principal
F   - By now respondent No. 3 has acquired the requisite
    experience for the post of principal - Instant dispute is a pure
    and simple service dispute - Merely because the writ
    petitioners are senior most teachers in the same institution,
    would not necessarily give rise to the presumption, that they
G   had filed the writ petition in public interest - Also, the
    submission that the writ petition can be treated as a writ in the
    nature of a quo warranto cannot be accepted - Appellants did
    not claim a writ of quo warranto either before the Single Judge
    or before the Division Bench of the High Court - The said
H                                  416
    BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.          417
            CENTENARY COLLEGE
submission was made as a weapon of last resort -          A
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226.

     Appellants-teachers in respondent No. 1 College,
filed a writ petition challenging the appointment of
respondent no. 3, a monk at RK Mission as principal of 8
respondent No. 1 College on the ground that he was.
junior to the appellants and did not possess the requisite
qualifications for the post of principal as laid down in the
Government Order. The Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the writ petition holding that the appointment of C
the Principal was not made under the provisions of the
West Bengal Act of 1975, West Bengal Act of 1978 and
the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979. The Governing
Body of the College was directed to take steps to fill the
 post either temporarily or permanently in accordance with
 laws in force. Aggrieved, respondent No. 1 College filed D
an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court
and the same was allowed. Therefore, the appellants filed
the instant.appeal.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                      E
     HELD: 1.1 There is much substance in the
submissions that at this stage, litigation in the instant
case does not survive as the appellants have retired. Even
if the writ petition is allowed and the appointment of F
respondent No.3 is declared null and void, none of the
appellants could be appointed on the post of Principal.
A perusal of the averments made in the writ petition
before the High Court would show that the gravamen of
the grievances of the writ petitioners/appellants was that G
they were all senior to respondent No. 3; that he had only
six years of teaching experience, while G.O. No. 149-
Edn(CP) dated 22nd Fe.bruary, 1994 prescribes a
minimum teaching experience of sixteen years with
administrative experience; that on the one hand,
                                                           H
    418      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A respondent No.3 did not possess the necessary
  experience and was appointed as the Principal, and on
  the other hand, the applications of the petitioner Nos. 1,
  9 and 12 for the post of Principal made through
  appropriate channel were not at all considered at any
B stage by the appropriate authority, though they were
  more qualified and senior to respondent No. 3; that the
  petitioners are suffering irreparable loss in the form of
  deprivation from being promoted as a Teacher-in-Charge
  and compelled to serve under a junior in service and
C possessing lesser qualifications; that respondent No. 3
  is junior to all the petitioners; that 'BK' was the then
  petitioner No. 1 and the then senior most Teacher who
  had put in more than three decades of lawful and
  approved service to the Institution, therefore, he was
D lawful claimant to the post of Teacher-in-Charge of the
  college. Therefore, it was a matter of great humiliation and
  injustice to all the petitioners to be forced to serve under
  an illegally appointed person, who is junior to all of them.
  It becomes evident that the grievances of the writ
E petitioners were that they have been compelled to work
  under a person, who was junior to them. The petitioners
  having retired from service, no relief could possibly be
  granted to them, even if the appointment of respondent
  No.3 is held to be illegal or void. In such circumstances,
F it would be an exercise in futility to examine the merits
  of the controversy raised in the- appeal. By the retirement
  of all the appellants the issues raised have been rendered
  academic. [Paras 18) [437-E-G; 438-A-H; 439-A-B]
G       M.L. Binjo/kar vs. State of M.P. (2005) 6 SCC 224; State
    of Manipur and Ors. vs. Chandam Manihar Singh (1999) 7
    SCC 503; Sumedico Corporation and Anr. vs. Regional
    Provident Fund Commr. (1998) 8 SCC 381 - relied on.

          1.2 Throughout the proceedings before the High
H                                                                  1
                                                                   I
    BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.              419
            CENTENARY COLLEGE
Court as well as before this Court, no interim rettetwas- -A- -
granted by restraining respondent No.3 from performing
the functions of a Principal. He has continued to function
on the said basis since his appointment on 14th May,
1999 as Acting Principal and then from 23rd March,, 2001
onward as Principal. Even according to the appellants, B
at the time of his appointment, respondent No.3 had
possessed the experience of only six years. Therefore,
by now, he would have more than fifteen years of
required experience for the post of Principal. Therefore,
the ground that the respondent No.3 was not qualified as C
he did not possess the necessary experience would also
no longer be available to the appellants. [Para 19] [441-
F-H]

    Ram Sarup vs. State of Haryana and Ors. (1979) 1 SCC       D
168 - relied on.
     1.3 The submission that the appeal would not be
rendered infructuous by the mere retirement of the
appellants; that all the appellants have been engaged in
                                                               E
the field of education throughout their lives and are
deeply interested in ensuring that tt:ie standards of
education are maintained and that the appointment for the
post of Principal should be made in accordance with the
statutory provisions, therefore, the appellants would have
                                                               F
the locus standi to continue the proceedings, cannot be
accepted. The entire pleadings in the writ petition are
founded on the personal grievance of the writ petitioners/
appellants. The writ petitioners have not come before this
Court as educationists. Merely because they are senior         G
most teachers in the same institution, would not
necessarily give rise to the presumption, that they had
filed the writ petition in public interest A pure and simple
service dispute is sought to be camouflaged as a p·ublic
interest litigation. Therefore, the said submission cannot     H
    420      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A be accepted as it is tantamount to treating the writ
  petition as a public interest litigation. The entire grievance
  of the writ petitioners/appellants was personal. They were
  all aggrieved and humiliated for being compelled to serve
  under a Principal junior to them in service. Therefore, it
B could not be treated as a public interest litigation. [Paras
  21, 22 and 23) [443-C-G; 445-G-H; 446-A-B]

      Gurpa/ Singh vs. State of Punjab and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC
  136; Seshadri vs. S.Mangati Gopal Reddy and Ors. 2011 (4)
C SCALE 41; Dr. B. Singh vs. Union of India and Ors. (2004)
  4 sec 363 - referred to.

        1.4 The submission that the writ petition can be
  treated as a writ in the nature of a quo warranto cannot
  be accepted. It appears that the appellants had not
D claimed a writ of quo warranto either before the Single
  Judge or before the Division Bench of the High Court.
  Even in this Court, it appears that the said submission
  was made as        aweapon of last resort. During the
  pendency of the proceedings, respondent No. 3 has
E acquired the experience of sixteen years. The
  requirement under Rules was of fifteen years experience,
  it would, therefore, not be appropriate to go into the
  question as to whether a writ of quo warranto would lie
  in the instant case or not. It would be an exercise in
F futility. The issue has become purely academic [Para 24)
  (446-G-H; 447-A-B]
       Bramchari Sidheswar Shai and Ors. vs. State of West
  Bengal and Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 646; Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and
G Ors. vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (1998) 7 SCC 273
    - referred to.
                         Case Law Reference:
          (1995) 4 sec 646       Referred to          Para 5
H
    BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.                421
            CENTENARY COLLEGE

    (2005) 6 sec 224          Relied on             Para 18       A

    (1979) 1 sec 168          Relied on             Para 20
    (1998) 1 sec 213          Referred to           Para 17
    (2005) 5 sec 136          Relied on             Para 22       B
    (1998) 8 sec 381          Relied on             Para 18
    (1999) 1 sec 503          Relied on             Para 18
    2011 (4) SCALE 41         Relied on             Para 22
                                                                  c
    (2004) 4 sec 363          Relied on             Para 23

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2457 of 2006.

    From the Judgment and Order 21.09.2004 of the Division        D
Bench of the High Court of Calcutta in M.A.T. 476 of 2004.

      Prashant Bhushan, Rohit Kumar Singh and Bhanoo Sood
for the Appellants.

    L.N. Rao, Dipankar P. Gupta and Bhaskar P. Gupta, D.N.        E
Ray, Lokesh K. Choudhary, Sumita Ray, Kishan Datta and Tara
Chandra Sharma for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                  F
     SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J. 1. This appeal is directed
against the final judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court
dated 21st September, 2004 in M.A.T. No. 476 of 2004 arising
out of Writ Petition No. 29805(W) of 1997 vide which the order
of the learned Single Judge of the High Court was set aside.      G

     2. We may notice the essential facts, which would have a
bearing on the determination of the issues raised in this
appeal. Admittedly, there has been a controversy with regard
to the special status enjoyed by the Ramakrishna Mission
                                                                  H
    422       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A Vivekananda Centenary College at Rahara (hereinafter
  referred to as 'respondent No.1 ') for a long period of time. The
  College was initially established in the year 1961 with a grant
  of Rs.2 lakhs given by the Government of West Bengal in the
  Education Department. The additional cost for establishing the
B College had been borne. by the State Government.
  Subsequently on 25th April, 2002, the Government of West
  Bengal, in order to advance collegiate education and with a
  view to reduce the overcrowding in good colleges in Calcutta
  decided to set up a three year degree college at Rahara. Such
c college was to be set up on the recommendations of the
  University Grants Commission (for short 'UGC'). The college
  was duly established and granted affiliation to Calcutta
  University on 13th May, 1963. It is a fully aided college; being
  sponsored and financed by the State Government.
D       3. The controversy herein relates to the appointment of the
  Principal of the College. The post of Principal is included in the
  definition of Teacher, as contained in Section 2 Clause 9 of the
  aforesaid Act.· The aforesaid Clause defines the term Teacher
  to include a Professor, Assistant Professor, Lecturer, Tutor,
E Demonstrator, Physical Instructor or any other person holding
  a teaching post of a college recognised by the University to
  which such college is affiliated and appointed as such by such
  college and includes its Principal and Vice-Principal. Section
  3 of the Act provides "appointment to the post of a Teacher shall
F be made by the Governing Body on the recommendations of
  the University and College Service Commission to be
  constituted by the State Government in the manner prescribed".
  The appointment on the post of Teachers of a college is
  governed by the College Service Commission established
G under the West Bengal College Service Commission Act, 1978.
  Section 3 of the aforesaid Act is as under:-

          "(1) The State Government shall, with effect from such date
          as may by notification, appoint, constitute Commission by
          the name of the West Bengal College Service Commission
H
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     423
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    consisting· of five members of whom one shall be the            A
    Chairman.

   · (2) Of the members one shall be person who, not being
     an educationist, occupies or has occupied in the opinion
     of the State Government, a position of eminence in public
                                                                    8
     life or in Judicial or administrative service and the other
     shall have teaching experience either as a Professor of a
     University or as a Principal for a period of not less than
     ten years or as a teacher, other .than Principal of a
     College, for .a period of not less than fifteen years."
                                                                    c
     Section 7(1) and Proviso (ii) are as under:-

    "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
    time being in force or in any contract, custom or usage to
    the contrary, it shall be the duty of the Commission to         o
    select persons for appointment to the post of Teachers of
    a College:

     Provided that-

    (i) ..                                                          E
     (ii) For selection of a person for appointment to the post
     of Principal, the Commission shall be aided by the vice-
     Chancellor of the University to which such college is
     affiliated or his nominee and a nominee of the Chancellor
                                                                    F
     of such University."

     4. Section 15 provides that "nothing contained in the Act
shall apply in relation to any college not receiving any aid from
the State Government or any college established and
administered by a minority, whether based on religion or            G
language." The State Government issued Memo No. 752-Edn
(CS) to revise the existing pattern for the composition of the
governing bodies of the Government sponsored colleges
excepting in cases where the college has a special constitution
on the basis of Trust Deeds or where the colleges are run by        H
      424      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 5 S.C.R.


  A   Missionary Societ.ies on the basis of agreement with the
      respective missions. The academic qualification prescribed for
      appointment on the post of Principal by the Government of West
      Bengal vide a G.O. No. 149-Edn(CP) dated 22nd February,
      1994.
  B
         5. It appears that earlier the controversy with regard to the
    appointment on the post of Principal was subject matter of the
    decision rendered by this Court in the case of Bramchari
    Sidheswar Shai & Ors. Vs. State of WB. & Ors. 1 • In deciding
    the controversy raised in the aforesaid case, this Court has
  C extensively traced the history with regard to the setting up of
    three year degree colleges under the auspicious of
    Ramakrishna Mission Boy's Home at Rahara. Therefore, it is
    not necessary for us to recapitulate the entire sequence of
    events in the present proceedings.
  D
         6. Suffice it to say that the aforesaid controversy had arisen
    in the context of a challenge made in Writ Petition being
    C.O.No. 12837(W) of 1980 to the appointment of Swami
    Shivamayananda, who was till then Head ofRamakrishna
, E Mission, Vidya Mandir, Bellur Math, as the Principal of
    Ramakrishna Mission College. The petitioners had claimed that
    Shivamayananda did not have the requisite qualifications for
    being appointed as the Principal and that he had not been
    appointed by a duly constituted Governing Body. The prayers
  F in the writ petition were for the issue of (i) a writ in the nature
    of mandamus commanding the Government of West Bengal to
    reconstitute the Governing Body of the Ramakrishna Mission
    College according to standard pattern for Governing Bodies of
    sponsored colleges as per Government Memo No. 752-Edn
  G (CS)/C. S. 30-3/77 dated 18th April, 1978; (ii) a writ declaring
    that the Ramakrishna Mission College is governed by West
    Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978; (iii) a writ
    in the nature of quo warranto restraining Swami

  H 1.   (1995) 4 sec 646.
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     425
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Shivamayananda as Principal of Ramakrishna Mission                   A
College and other incidental writs.

      7. During the pendency of this writ petition, the University
of Calcutta issued three notices to the Ramakrishna Mission
to reconstitute the Governing Bodies of the Ramakrishna              B
Mission Residential College, Narendrapur, Ramakrishna
Mission Shiksha Mandir, Howrah and Ramakrishna Mission
Vidya Mandir, Howrah. The legality of these notices was
challenged by the Ramakrishna Mission by filing an Interlocutory
Application in the writ petition. The writ petition was resisted     C
by the Ramakrishna Mission on the ground that being a minority
based on religion, the institutions established by it would be
protected under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, the
West Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978 would
not be applicable. The Ramakrishna Mission had also claimed
its right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and   D
charitable purposes and to manage its own religious affairs;
to own and acquire movable and immoveable property; and to
administer such property in accordance with the law. The
aforesaid rights were claimed under Article 26 of the
Constitution of India. The writ petition was dismissed by the        E
learned Single Judge. It was held that institutions established
by Ramakrishna Mission were protected under Article 30(1) of
the Constitution of India. It was also held that the West Bengal
Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978 would not be
applicable. It quashed the three notices issued by the Calcutta      F
University. It, however, rejected the claim of Ramakrishna
Mission under Article 26(a) of the Constitution of India. The
aforesaid judgment was carried in appeal before the Division
Bench by the writ petitioners as well as the State of West
Bengal and Calcutta University. The Division Bench heard all         G
the appeals together, and by a common judgment dismissed
all the appeals. The Division Bench upheld the conclusion of
the learned Single Judge that Ramakrishna Mission being a
minority based on religion was protected under Article 30(1)
of the Constitution of India. It further held that the Ramakrishna   H
    426       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A Mission had the right to establish educational institutions as
  religious denomination under Article 26(a) of the Constitution
  of India. It further held that both the West Bengal Act of 1975
  and West Bengal Act of 1978 would not be applicable as these
  enactments did not contain any express provision indicating
B their application to educational institutions established and
  maintained by the Ramakrishna Mission. It further observed that
  to hold otherwise would lead to infringement of the rights
  enjoyed by the Ramakrishna Mission under Article 26(a) and
  26(b) of the Constitution. However, it left open the question of
c legality or otherwise of the direction contained in the notices
  issued by the Calcutta University to the Ramakrishna Mission
  for reconstitution of Governing Bodies of the Ramakrishna
  Mission Residential College, Narendrapur, Ramakrishna
  Mission Shiksha Mandir, Howrah and Ramakrishna Mission
D Vidya Mandir, Howrah.

       8. The aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench was
  challenged before this Court in a number of appeals, which has
  been noticed above. These appeals were decided by this Court
  by a common judgment dated 2nd July, 1995 in the case of
E Bramchari Sidheswar Shai (supra).

         9. This Court formulated six points arising for consideration
    in the appeals, which were as follows:-

          "1. Can the citizens of India residing in the State of West
F         Bengal who are professing, practising or propagating the
          religious doctrines and teachings of Ramakrishna and
          have become his followers, claim to belong to a minority
          based on Ramakrishna religion which was distinct and
          different from Hindu religion and as such entitled to the
G         fundamental right under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of
          India, of establishing and administering educational
          institutions of their choice through Ramakrishna Mission
          or its branches in that State ?

H         2. Do persons belonging to or owing allegiance to
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     427
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
   Ramakrishna Mission belong to a religious denoi:nination       A
   or any section thereof as would entitle them to claim the
   fundamental rights conferred on either of them under Article
   26 of the Constitution of India ?

   3. If persons belonging to or owing allegiance to              B
   Ramakrishna Mission. is a religious denomination or a
   section thereof, have they the fundamen.tal right of
   establishing and maintaining institutions for a charitable
   purpose under Article 26(a) of the Constitution of India?

   4. If Ramakrishna Mission as c;i religious denomination or     C
   a section thereof .establishes and maintains educational
   institutions, can such institutions be regarded as
   institutions established and maintained for charitable
   purpose within the meaning of Article 26(a) of the
   Constitution of India ?                                        D

   5. Is Ramakrishna Mission College at Rahara established
   and maintained by Ramakrishna Mission and if so, will the
   constitution of its governing body by the Government of
   West Bengal amount to infringement of Ramakrishna              E
   Mission's fundarnentc;il right to establish and maintain an
   educational institution under Article 26(a) of the
   Constitution of India?

   6. Can the court direct the West Bengal Government
   because of W.B. Act 1975 and W.B. Act 1978, to                 F
   constitute governing body on a "standard pattern" of
   sponsored college envisaged under its Memo dated 18-
   4-1978 in respect of Ramakrishna Mission College when
   that memo itself says that colleges established and
   maintained by Missions on the basis of agreements cannot       G
   be treated as sponsored colleges for the purpose of
   constituting governing bodies for them on a "standard
   pattern"?"

                                                                  H
    428         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A        10. Upon consideration of the entire matter, the conclusions
    recorded were as under :-

                  Point 1

          (i)     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the citizens
B                 of India residing in the State of West Bengal, who
                  are professing, practising or propagating the
                  religious doctrines and teachings of Ramakrishna
                  and have become his followers, cannot claim to
                  belong to a minority based on Ramakrishna religion
c                 which was distinct and different from Hindu religion
                  and as such are not entitled to the fundamental right
                  under Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India, of
                  establishing and administering educational
                  institutions of their choice through Ramakrishna
D                 Mission or its branches in that State and answer
                  Point 1 accordingly, in the negative.

                  Point 2

          (ii)    For the said reasons, we hold that persons
E                 belonging to or owing their allegiance to
                  Ramakrishna Mission or Ramakrishna Math belong
                  to a religious denomination within Hindu religion or
                  a section thereof as would entitle them to claim the
                  fundamental rights conferred on either of them under
F                 Article 26 of the Constitution of India and answer
                  Point 2, accordingly, in the affirmative.

                  Point 3

          (iii)   Since we have held while dealing with Point 2 which
G                 arose for our consideration that the persons
                  belonging to or owing allegiance to Ramakrishna
                  Mission or Ramakrishna Math as followers of
                  Ramakrishna, form a religious denomination in
                  Hindu religion, as a necessary concomitant thereof,
H
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     429
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
           we have to hold that they have a fundamental right      A
           of establishing and maintaining institutions for a
           charitable purpose under Article 26(a) of the
           Constitution of India, subject, of course, to public
           order, morality and health envisaged in that very
           article. Point 3 is, accordingly answered, in the       B
           affirmative.

    (iv)   On Point Nos. 4 & 5, it was observed as follows:-

           "We think that the learned Judges of the High Court
           should not have decided on the general question         c
           whether educational institutions established and
           maintained by religious denomination including
           those established and maintained by Ramakrishna
           Mission for general education get the protection of
           Article 26(a) of the Constitution when that question    D
           in a general form, was not really at issue before
           them. Therefore, the views expressed on the
           question shall, according to us, ought to be treated
           as non est and the question is left open to be
           decided in proper case, where such question really      E
           arises and all the parties who might be concerned
           with it are afforded adequate opportunity to have
           their say in the matter."

    (v)    On Point No. 6, it was observed as follows:-
                                                                   F
           "67. As stated above, the State Government has
           excepted the Ramakrishna Mission College at
           Rahra in the matter of constituting a Governing
           Body on a standard pattern for the obvious reason
           that constituting such a governing body for a college   G
           like Ramakrishna Mission College which was all
           through allowed to have a governing body
           constituted by Ramakrishna Mission, which had
           built the College on its land conceding to the
           request made in that behalf by the State                H
    430   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2011] 5 S.C.R.


A          Government itself on the initiation of the Central
           Government, may not be just. Thus when
           Ramakrishna Mission College had come to be
           built, established and managed by the
           Ramakrishna Mission, it is difficult for us to think that
B          the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the
           High Court were not right in holding that the
           Government should not be directed by issue of a
           mandamus, to constitute a governing body for the
           Ramakrishna Mission College on a standard
c          pattern taking recourse to the W.B. Act of 1975 and
           the W.B. Act of 1978, although for its own reasons.
           Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances
           in which Ramakrishna Mission College at Rahra
           was established on Ramakrishna Mission's land
           and allowed to be administered by the
D
           Ramakrishna Mission through its own governing
           body, we feel that interests of justice may suffer by
           directing the State Government to constitute its own
           governing body on a standard pattern of the usual
           sponsored colleges, as prayed for by the writ
E          petitioners. However, the view we have expressed
           in the matter shall not come in the way of the State
           Government to change their earlier arrangement
           with the Ramakrishna Mission in the matter of
           governance of the Ramakrishna Mission College,
F          if on objective considerations such change
           becomes necessary in the larger interests of
           students, teachers and other employees of that
           College and is so permitted by law.

G          68. In the said view we have taken in the matter of
           constituting a Governing Body by the Government
           of West Bengal in respect of the Ramakrishna
           Mission College at Rahra, there is no need to go
           into the question that there has been infringement
H          by the Government of Ramakrishna Mission's
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     431
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
           fundamental rights to establish and maintain             A
           educational institutions under Article 26(a) of the
           Constitution of India inasmuch as such a question
           does not arise, in view of the answer already given
           by us on Point 3 above. So also, question of
           directing the West Bengal Government because of          B
           the W.B. Act of 1975 and the W.B. Act of 1978, to
           constitute governing body on "standard pattern" of
           sponsored college envisaged under its Memo
           dated 18-4-1978 in respect of Ramakrishna
           Mission College, cannot arise.                           c
           69. Points 4 to 6 are accordingly answered."

      11. After the decision in the aforesaid case, again Writ
Petition No.29805(W) of 1997 was filed in the Calcutta High
Court challenging initially the appointment of Swami                D
Shivamayananda (Respondent No.16 herein) and Swami
Divyananda (respondent No.17 herein) as Principal and
Honorary Vice-Principal respectively. It was alleged that
appointment of both the respondents had been made without
following the provisions of the West Bengal Act of 1975 and         E
West Bengal Act of 1978. However, both the persons during
the pendency of the writ petition before the High Court went on
open ended leave from their respective posts. Thereafter on
14th May, 1999, by an Office Order No.RKMVCC/21/99, the
college authorities elevated Swami Sukadevananda                    F
(respondent No. 3 herein) Vice-Principal of the college to the
post of Acting Principal with immediate effect, again without
following the West Bengal Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act
of 1978. He was designated as the Principal of the College on
20th March, 2001 vide Office Order No.3/RKMVCC/21/2001.             G
The appointment of Swami Sukhadevananda, as Principal of
the College led to the amendment of the writ petition
incorporating a challenge to his appointment.

    12. It is the case of the appellants, that the respondent No.
                                                                    H
    432      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011) 5 S.C.R.


A 3 was only First class M.Sc. in Biochemistry from Karnataka
  University and had worked as Scientific Officer in Bhabha
  Atomic Research Centre, Bombay for about four years. As far
  as teaching experience in the college is concerned, he had only
  six years of such experience. Thus, according to the appellants,
B he did not possess the requisite qualifications for the post of
  Principal as laid down in the above mentioned Government
  order dated 22nd February, 1994. The learned Single Judge
  by his judgment dated 29th September, 2003 allowed the writ
  petition and it was observed as under;
c         "Therefore, I hold that as regard management,
          administration and maintenance of this Institution the State
          government at present has denuded itself its authority or
          right to interfere with. But the provisions of the Acts namely
          West Bengal College Teachers (Security of Service) Act,
D         1975, West Bengal College Service Commission Act,
          1978 and the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979 will
          have application unless these laws by themselves exempt
          these organizations from being applicable. I do not find any
          such exception."
E
   The appointment of the Principal was declared not to have
   been made under the provisions of the West Bengal Act of
   1975, West Bengal· Act of 1978 and the Calcutta University
   First Statute, 1979. A direction was issued to the Governing
i= Body of the College to take steps to fill the post either
'  temporarily or permanently in accordance with laws in force.
   Aggrieved, the Ramakrishna Mission College went in appeal
   before the Division Bench. In order to consider the entire matter,
   the Division Bench analyzed the judgment of this Court in
G Bramchari Sidheswar Shai's case (supra) extensively. It noticed
   the conclusions recorded by this Court as extracted by us
   above. The Division Bench concluded as under:-

          "Thus, from the questions raised by the Hon'ble Court and
          the answers given to each of them by the Hon'ble Court
H         as indicated above, we are fully convinced that although
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     433
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
    the Hon'ble Court declined to give protection of Article        A
    30(1) or protection under Section 26(a) of the Constitution
    to the Ramakrishna Mission and the college established
    by it, the Court certainly decided in a most assertive
    manner that having regard to the background of the
    establishment of the college and having regard to the stand     B
    taken by the Government of West Bengal since inception
    of the college in the matter of its governance and
    management with special reference to office memo dated
    18th April, 1978, there is no need to ask for
    implementation of the provisions of the Act of 1975 or the      c
    Act of 1978."

       13. The Division Bench negated the contentions of the
learned counsel for the writ petitioners/ appellants that in view
of the provisions contained in the West Bengal Act of 1975,
West Bengal Act of 1978 and the Calcutta University First           0
Statute, 1979, the college could not be allowed to have the
Monk as Principal. It is observed that the Government was very
much aware of the fact that in the matter of this college, the
general procedure for selection of a Principal through the
College Service Commission shall not be made applicable. It         E
is further observed that natural consequence of the aforesaid
conclusion was that there would be no applicatio'n under the
provisions of the Calcutta University First Statute, 1979, aimed
at filling up of temporary vacancy of the post of Principal like
other Government sponsored colleges. In the concluding              F
paragraphs, the Division Bench observed as follows:-

    "After close examination of the judgment '6f the Apex Court
    rendered in the case of Bramchari Sidheswar Shai's
    (supra), we are seriously contemplating whether the             G
    present writ petition at all was maintainable before the
    learned Single Judge as the parties of the present writ
    petition are almost identical of the previous writ petition
    and almost same issues as raised in the present petition
    were matter of consideration before the Apex court and          l::L
    434       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A         further we are of the view that following the long
          established principle of judicial discipline and binding
          precedent, it was not at all permissible to make any
          departure from the conclusion reached by the Apex court
          which has a binding effect upon the writ petitioners who
B         were parties to the earlier adjudication and that apart, the
          present writ petition is also barred under the principle of
          res judicata.

          Thus, having regard to the submissions of contesting
          parties and on examination of the materials placed before
c         us, we are of firm view that following the judgment of the
          Apex Court rendered in the case of Bramchari Sidheswar
          Shai's (supra) and in view of the recent office memo of the
          Government of West Bengal dated 30th April, 2004, it was
          not permissible to reopen the issue once again and to
D         issue any writ dishonouring the mandate of the Apex Court
          when admittedly the State Government has not deviated
          form its earlier stand relating to the special status accorded
          to the college. We, therefore, find sufficient merit in the
          present appeal and in the stay petition and we are inclined
E         to allow the both.

          Accordingly, both the appeal and the stay petition are
          allowed resulting in dismissal of the writ petition and
          setting aside the judgment and order of the learned Single
F         Judge delivered in connection with Writ Petition No.
          29805(W) of 1997. We, however, make no order as to
          costs considering the fact and circumstances of the case."

        14. This judgment is the subject matter of the present
    appeal. We .have heard the learned counsel for parties.
G
       15. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for
  the appellants submitted that even if the College established
  by the Ramakrishna Mission enjoys a special status, the
  appointment on the post of Principal would still has to be made
H in conformity with the qualifications prescribed by the
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     435
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
Government of West Bengal in its Order dated 22nd February,          A
1994. Respondent No.3 does not even possess the
qualifications prescribed by the University Grants Commission.
Moreover, respondent No.3 has not cleared the eligibility test
N.E.T./S.L.E.T. for Lecturer as required by the UGC. His initial
appointment as Acting Principal and thereafter his appointment       B
as permanent Principal was null and void having been made
without following the provisions contained in the West Bengal
Act of 1975 and West Bengal Act of 1978. Learned counsel
submits that the qualifications prescribed under the
Government Order dated 22nd February, 1994 were in fact              c
amended by the subsequent G.O.s being G.O. No. 625-Edn
(CS) dated 16th June, 1999 read with G.O. No.1047-Edn (CS)
dated 20th August, 2002. These qualifications were duly
published through advertisement No. 2 of 2004. For the post
of Principal, the qualifications prescribed are as under:-           D
    "I. For General Degree Colleges:

    (A) Academic qualifications:

    (a) Master degree in Arts/Science/ Commerce/Music/Fine           E
    Arts with at least 55% marks or its equivalent grade and
    good academic record; Ph.D. Degree or evidence of its
    equivalent published work of high standard and teaching/
    research experience in an affiliated degree college or
    University/Other Institutions of Higher Education for at least
    15 (fifteen) years preferably with administrative
                                                                     F
    experience. Or

    (b) Serving as reader in any affiliated degree College or
    University/research Institute with total teaching e;xperience
    of not less than 15 years. Or                                    G

    (c) Serving as Selection Grade Lecturer in any affiliated
    degree college with at least 55% marks at the Master's
    level and good academic record with teaching experience
    not less than 15 years in any academic Institution with · H
    436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A         authenticated administrative experience of at least five
          years and further having published work equivalent to Ph.D.
          degree, the equivalence be evaluated by the University/
          Selection Committee consisting of the subject experts who
          in turn will have to mainly look in to the following aspects:-
B
                  1.    Number of research paper published,

                  2.    Quality of research paper,

                  3.    Relevance of the topic,
c                 4.    Journals where these have been published."

       16. It is submitted that respondent No.3 does not possess
  the Ph.D, degree. He also did not possess fifteen years
  administrative experience at the time of his appointment.
D Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.3 has
  been appointed on the said post merely because he is a monk
  at the Ramakrishna Mission. The very purpose of prescribing
  minimum qualifications and method of selection for an important
  post like Principal of an educational institution has been
E defeated. Learned counsel further submitted that the Division
  Bench has wrongly relied on the judgment of Bramchari
  Sidheswar Shai's case (supra). The aforesaid judgment had no
  relevance to the issue which has been raised in the present
  proceedings.
F
        17. On the other hand, Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior
  counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 2 and 3 submits
  that the litigation in this case does not survive as the appellants
  have retired. He further submits that the appellants have not
  sought a writ of quo warranto rather the relief sought is that one
G of the senior teachers should be appointed as Principal. The
  writ petition was based on individual grievances. The relief
  claimed is also for the redressal of individual grievances. All
  the appellants had made a claim based on their seniority and
  qualifications. Since all the appellants have retired in the mean
H time, the issue has become academic. This Court will,
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     437
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]

therefore, decline to examine the matter on merits. He relies          A
on the judgment of this Court in the case of M.L. Binjo/kar Vs.
State ofM.P. 2 • On merits, the learned counsel submits that the
grievances of the appellants were that the respondent No.3
lacked fifteen years of experience. However, by now
respondent No.3 possesses the required fifteen years                   B
experience. He also relies on certain observations made by this
Court in the case of Ram Sarup Vs. State of Haryana & Ors3 •
The entire controversy has been rendered academic in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. In the alternative,
the learned senior counsel submits that the writ petition would        c
have to be treated as public interest litigation. It is, however,
settled by this Court that public interest litigation would not be
maintainable in service law cases. In support of this submission,
he relies on the judgments of this Court in the cases of Dr.
Duryodhan Sahu & Ors. Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors4                 0
and Gurpa/ Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. 5 • Therefore,
again no reliefcan be granted to the writ petitioners/appellants.

      18. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties. In our opinion, there is much
substance in the submissions made by Mr. L.N. Rao, Mr.                 E
Dipankar P. Gupta and Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior
counsel that at this stage, litigation in this case does not survive
as the appellants have retired. Even if the writ petition is
allowed and the appointment of respondent No.3 is declared
null and void, none of the appellants could be appointed on the        F
post of Principal. A perusal of the averments made in the writ
petition before the High Court would show that the gravamen
of the grievances of the writ petitioners/appellants was that they
were all senior to Swami Sukhadevananda. It was further
pointed out that he had only six years o"f teaching experience,        G
while G.O. No. 149-Edn(CP) dated 22nd February, 1994
2.   {2005) 6 sec 224.
3.   {1979) 1 sec 168.
4.   {1998) 7 sec 273.
5.   {2005) 5 sec 136.                                                 H
    438       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A prescribes a minimum teaching experience of sixteen years
  with administrative experience. It was pointed out that on the
  one hand, respondent No.3 did not possess the necessary
  experience and was appointed as the Principal. On the other
  hand, the applications of the petitioner Nos. 1, 9 and 12 for the
B post of Principal made through appropriate channel were not
  at all considered at any stage by the appropriate authority,
  though they are more qualified and senior to Swami
  Sukhadevananda. It was further pointed out that petitioners are
  suffering irreparable loss in the form of deprivation from being
c promoted as a Teacher-in-Charge and compelled to serve
  under a junior in service and possessing lesser qualifications.
  Again in Paragraph 41, it is stated that Swami Divyananda is
  junior to all the petitioners. It was further pointed out that Dr.
  Biman Kumar Mukherjee, was the then petitioner No. 1 and the
0 then senior most Teacher. He had put in more than three
  decades of lawful and approved service to the Institution. He
  was, therefore, lawful claimant to the post of Teacher-in-Charge
  of the college. Therefore, it was a matter of great humiliation
  and injustice to all the petitioners to be forced to serve under
  an illegally appointed person, who is junior to them all. In
E Ground 3 of the writ petition, it is specially pleaded as follows:-

          "For that, it is incumbent upon the respondents to appoint
          the senior most teacher, as Teacher-in-Charge of the
          college in terms of the order contained in the letter No.Cl
F         31/Cir dated 1st January, 1995 and Statute 1018 (as
          amended) and for such failure of the respondents to act
          in accordance with law the petitioners have been deprived
          of their rights to the post and have suffered demotion and
          financial loss."
G From the above, it becomes evident that the grievances of the
  writ petitioners were that they have been compelled to work
  under a person, who was junior to them. The petitioners having
  retired from service, no relief could possibly be granted to
  them, even if the appointment of respondent No.3 is held to be
H
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     439
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
illegal or void. In such circumstances, in our opinion, it would A
be an exercise in futility to examine the merits of the controversy
raised in the appeal. By the retirement of all the appellants
herein, the issues raised herein have been rendered academic.
In M.L. Binjolkar's case (supra), this Court was considering the
legality of the orders passed by the Madhya Pradesh State B
Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur, setting aside the orders of
compulsory retirement passed against a number of employees
by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The four employees were
directed to be reinstated. The writ petition filed by the State of
Madhya Pradesh was dismissed. The employees concerned c
were permitted to join back pursuant to the orders of
reinstatement passed by the Administrative Tribunal. All the four
employees, who were so reinstated, retired during the
pendency of proceedings. The appeal filed by the State was
dismissed by this Court with the following observations:-
                                                                    D
    "In view of the undisputed position that the four employees
    who were directed to be reinstated had, in fact, joined back
    service and have retired on reaching the age of
    superannuation, therefore, examination in their cases as
    to the correctness of the view expressed by the High Court E
    would be an exercise in futility. Though, implementation of
    the Court's order does not render challenge to an order
    infructuous, yet the fact situation of the present case makes
    the issue academic. This Court did not grant stay on the
    High Court's order. The employees concerned, as noted F
    above after reinstatement have retired. In these peculiar
    circumstances, we do not think it necessary to examine
    correctness of the High Court's order on merits. Therefore,
    the appeals filed by the State - Civil Appeals Nos. 8695-
    97 of 2002 and 8663 of 2002 are dismissed. We make it G
    clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the
    correctness of the High Court's judgment as we have
    dismissed the appeals only on the ground that the
    employees concerned have already retired and it would not
    be in the interest of anybody to go into the merits."         H
    440       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A         Similarly, in the case of Sumedico Corporation & Anr. Vs.
    Regional Provident Fund Commr. 6 , this Court declined. to go
    into the vires of Section 7(a) of the Employees Provident Fund
    and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 as during the pendency
    of the appeal, the Legislature itself amended the provisions of
B the Act by inserting Section 7(d) providing for remedy of an
    appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. In view of this
    development, it was observed that the question of challenge to
    the vires of Section 7(a) on the ground that there was no appeal
    provided under the Act does not survive and it has become
c   academic. In the case of State of Manipur & Ors. Vs. Chandam
    Manihar Singh 7 , the respondent had been removed from the
    post of Chairman of the Manipur State Pollution Control Board
    by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh in exercise of the powers
    under Section 5(3) read with Section 6(1 )(g) of the Act by the
    order dated 19th October, 1998. The respondent carried the
0
    matter in a writ petition before the High Court of Assam, Imphal
  · Branch. The learned Single Judge, who heard this writ petition
    was pleased to allow the same on 30th April, 1999. It may be
    noted that the learned Single Judge had directed that the
    respondent has continued to hold the office of the Chairman
E as his removal was set aside and his tenure will end on 15th
    October, 1999 counting three years from 16th October, 1996
    when he was appointed as the Chairman of the Board pursuant
    to earlier order. The State of Manipur unsuccessfully carried the
    matter in an appeal before the Division Bench. When the
F appeal filed by the State of Manipur came up for hearing before
    this Court, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that
    pursuant to the orders of the High Court, the respondent has
    continued as a Chairman of the Board and his tenure is almost
    coming to end and he does not intend to continue as Chairman
G beyond 15th October, 1999. It was submitted by the learned
    counsel for the respondent that the issue iaised by the State
    of Manipur has almost become academic as no interim relief

    6.   (1998) 8 sec 381.
H   7.   (1999) 7 sec 503.
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     441
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
was granted by this Court against the order of the High Court.     A
Nor any interim relief had been granted pending appeal against
the order of the learned Single Judge by the Division Bench of
the High Court. In these circumstances, this Court observed as
follows:-
                                                                   B
    "Having given our anxious consideration to the rival
    contentions, we find that as the High Court's direction in
    favour of the respondent's tenure which is to expire on 15-
    10-1999 has almost worked itself out and less than a
    month remains for him to act as Chairman of the Board,
    the first grievance raised by· learned Senior Counsel for      C
    the appellants in connection with the removal of the
    respondent by order dated 19-10-1998 has become of
    academic interest. We, therefore, did not permit learned
    Senior Counsel for the appellants to canvass this point any
    further before us. That takes us to the consideration of the   D
    second point."

In our opinion, the aforesaid observations of this Court would
be clearly applicable in the facts and circumstances of this
case.                                                              E
     19. There is another reason why no relief, at present could
perhaps be granted to the appellants. Throughout the
proceedings before the High Court as well as before this Court,
no interim relief was granted by restraining respondent No.3
from performing the functions of a Principal. He has continued
                                                                   F
to function on the aforesaid basis since his appointment on 14th
May, 1999 as Acting Principal and then on from 23rd March,
2001 onward as Principal. Even according to the appellants,
at the time of his appointment, respondent No.3 had
possessed the experience of only six years. Therefore, by now,     G
he would have more than fifteen years of required experience
for the post of Principal. Therefore, the ground that the
respondent No.3 was not qualified as he did not possess the
necessary experience would also no longer be available to the
appellants.                                                        H
    442       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A       20. In similar circumstances, this Court, in the case of Ram
    Sarup (supra), observed as follows:-

          "The question then arises as to what was the effect of
          breach of clause (1) of Rule 4 of the Rules. Did it have the
8         effect of rendering the appointment wholly void so as to
          be completely ineffective or merely irregular, so that it could
          be regularised as and when the appellant acquired the
          necessary qualifications to hold the post of Labour-cum-
          Conci liatio n Officer. W~are of the view that the
          appointment of the qppellant was irregular since he did not
c         possess one of the three requisite qualifications but as
          soon as he acquired the necessary qualification of five
          years' experience of the working of Labour Laws in any
          one of the three caf)acities mentioned in clause (1) of Rule
          4 or in any higher capacity, his appointment must be
D         regarded as having been regularised. The appellant
          worked as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer from January
          1, 1968 and that being a post higher than that of Labour
          Inspector, or Deputy Chief Inspector of Shops or Wage
                                                                               ,.
          Inspector, the experience gained by him in the working of
E         Labour Laws in the post of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer
          must be regarded as sufficient to constitute fulfilment of the
          requirement of five years' experience provided in clause
          (1) of Rule 4. The appointment of the appellant to the post
          of Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer, therefore, became
F         regular from the date when he completed five years after
          taking into account the period of about ten months during
          which he worked as Chief Inspector of Shops. Once his
          appointment became regular on the expiry of this period
          of five years on his fulfilling the requirements for
G         appointment as Labour-cum-Conciliation Officer and
          becoming eligible for that purpose, he could not thereafter
          be reverted to the post of Statistical Officer. The order of
          reversion passed against the appellant, was, therefore,
          clearly illegal and it must be set aside."
H                                                    ;
                                                         I
    BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     443
 CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
 A perusal of the above would show that the appellant therein       A
 did not possess the necessary experience of five years of the
 working of labour laws. It was held that his appointment was
 irregular since he did not possess the necessary experience.
 However, during the pendency of the proceedings, he had
 acquired the necessary experience and, therefore, the              s
 appointment must be regarded as having been regularised. The
 aforesaid ratio would be squarely applicable to the appointment
 of respondent No.3.

       21. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, however, submitted that the        C
 appeal would not be rendered infructuous by the mere                   1




 retirement of the appellants. Learned counsel submitted that all
 the appellants have been engaged in the field of education
 throughout their lives. Therefore, deeply interested in ensuring
 that the standards of education are maintained. They are deeply
 concerned that of appointment for the post of Principal shall be   D
 made in accordance with the statutory provisions. Therefore,
 the appellants would have the locus standi to continue the
 proceedings.

        22. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submission E
• made by the learned counsel. As noticed in the earlier part of
• the judgment, the entire pleadings in the writ petition are
  founded on the personal grievance of the writ petitioners/
  appellants. The writ petitioners have not come before this Court
  as educationists. Merely .because they are senior most F
  teachers in the same institution, would not necessarily give rise
  to the presumption, that they had filed the writ petition in public
  interest. In our opinion, a pure and simple service dispute is
  sought to be camouflaged as a public interest litigation. This
  Court on numerous occasions negated such efforts in G
  disguising the personal grievances as public interest litigation.
  It is, however, not necessary to recapitulate the oft quoted
  caution, save and except the observations made by this Court
  in the case of Gurpal Singh (supra). In paragraphs 10, 11 and
  12 it is observed as follows :
                                                                    H
    444       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A         "10. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be
          used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary
          has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful
          veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest
          and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to bt: used as
B         an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering
          social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of
          public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used
          for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at
          redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not
c         publicity-oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As
          indicated above, court must be careful to see that a body
          of persons or member of the public, who approaches the
          court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or
          private motive or political motivation or other oblique
          consideration. The court must not allow its process to be
D
          abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms
          who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with
          vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with
          judicial process either by force of habit or from improper
          motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well as to
E         enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to
          win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such
          busybodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the
          threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.

F         11. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford
          Foundation in USA defined "public interest litigation" in its
          Report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:

          "Public interest law is the name that has recently been
          given to efforts which provide legal representation to
G
          previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such
          efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that
          ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such
          services to significant segments of the population and to
          significant interests. Such groups and interests include the
H
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     445
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
      proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic            A
      minorities and others." [See 8. Singh (Dr.) v. Union of
      lndia 7 , sec p. 373, para 13.]

      12. When a particular person is the object and target of a
      petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see        B
      whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really
      intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse
      or some other mala fide object. Since in service matters
      public interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope
      for taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition   C
      is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated 15-
      4-2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High Court's
      order."

The aforesaid observations have been reiterated by this Court
in the case of P.Seshadri Vs. S.Mangati Gopa/ Reddy & Ors8 ,            D
in the following words:-

       "The High Court has committed a serious error in
       permitting respondent No.1 to pursue the writ petition as
       a public interest litigation. The parameters within which        E
       Public Interest Litigation can be entertained by this Court
     · and the High Court, have been laid down and reiterated
       by this Court in a series of cases. By now it ought to be
       plain and obvious that this Court does not approve of an
       approach that would encourage petitions filed for achieving
                                                                        F
       oblique motives on the basis of wild and reckless
       allegations made by individuals, i.e., busybodies; having
       little or no interest in the proceedings. The credentials, the
       motive and the objective of the petitioner have to be
       apparently and patently aboveboard. Otherwise the petition
       is liable to be dismissed at the threshold."                     G

     23. We are, therefore, unable to accept the aforesaid
submission as it is tantamount to treating the writ petition as a
public interest litigation. As noticed above, the entire grievance
8.   2011 (4) SCALE 41.                                                 H
    446       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 5 S.C.R.


A of the writ petitioners/appellants was personal. They were all
  aggrieved and humiliated for being compelled to serve under
  a Principal junior to them in service. Therefore, it could not be
  treated as a public interest litigation. This Court has repeatedly
  disapproved the tendency of disgruntled employees disguising
B pure and simple service dispute as public interest litigation. The
  observations made by this Court in the case of Dr. 8. Singh
  vs. Union of India & Ors. 9 would be of some relevance and we
  may notice the same. In paragraph 16, it is observed as follows:

          "As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the
c         petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations
          are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that
          courts are flooded with a large number of so-called public
          interest litigations, whereas only a minuscule percentage
          can legitimately be called as public interest litigations.
D         Though the parameters of public interest litigation have
          been indicated by this Court in a large number of cases,
          yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, courts
          at times are entertaining such petitions and wasting
          valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be
E         otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though
          in Duryodhan Sahu (Dr) v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra8 this
          Court held that in service matters Plls should not be
          entertained, the inflow of the so-called Plls involving
          service matters continues unabated in the courts and
F         strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could
          do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision."

       24. We are also unable to accept the submission of Mr.
  Prashant Bhushan that the writ petition can be treated as a writ
G in the nature of a quo warranto. It appears that the appellants
  had not claimed a writ of quo warranto either before the learned
  Single Judge or before the Division Bench of the High Court.
  Even in this Court, it appears to us that Mr. Prashant Bhushan
  has made the submission as a weapon of last resort. As noticed

H   9.   (2004) 4 sec 363.
   BHOLANATH MUKHERJEE v. R.K. MISSION V.     447
CENTENARY COLLEGE [SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.]
earlier, during the pendency of the proceedings, respondent No.          A
3 has acquired the experience of sixteen years. The
requirement under Rules was of fifteen years experience, it
would, therefore, not be appropriate to go into the question as
to whether a writ of quo warranto would lie in the present case
or not. In our opinion, it would be an exercise in futility. The issue   B
has become purely academic.

       25. Before we part with this judgment, we make it clear
that we have not expressed any opinion on the correctness of
the High Court's judgment as we have dismissed the appeal
only on the ground that the concerned appellants have already            C
retired from service and it would not be in the interest of
anybody to go into the merits.

       26. In view of the above, the appeal is dismissed.
                                                                         D
N.J.                                           Appeai dismissed.


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