Holding

The Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 does not apply to eviction suits instituted before a building attains ten years, and Section 39 cannot be invoked in such cases.

Summary

The landlord, Bhola Nath Varshney, served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and filed an eviction suit in 1981 against his tenant, Mulk Raj Madan, for a building constructed in 1974. The issue was whether the Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 would apply because the building became ten years old during the pendency of the suit, and whether Section 39 of that Act could be invoked. The Supreme Court held that the Act does not become applicable merely because the ten‑year period expires while the suit is pending; the law in force on the date of institution governs the case. Consequently, Section 39 also does not apply since the suit was not pending on the Act’s commencement date. The Court allowed the landlord’s appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and restored the revision court’s decree in favour of the landlord.

Issues considered

Whether the Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 applies to an eviction suit when the building becomes ten years old during the pendency of the suit.
Whether Section 39 of the Act can be invoked when the suit was instituted after the Act’s commencement date.

Legislation cited

Provincial Small Causes Courts Acts. 25
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106
Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 20(2), s. 2(2), s. 39

Subjects

evictionUttar Pradesh Buildings Actten‑year ruleSection 39landlord‑tenantstatutory interpretationTransfer of Property Actcivil appeal

Judgment

BHOLA NATH VARSHNEY (SINCE DEAD) THROUGH HIS LRS. A
v.
MULK RAJ MADAN

JANUARY 25, 1994
B
[S. MOHAN AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

The Uttar Pradesh .Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evictions

- --- Act, 1972-Ss. 2(2), 20(2), 39-Residential premises-Leased out on
rent-Suit for eviction-Premises not being JO years old on date of suit-Ex- C
emption from operation of Act-JO years elapsed pending litigation-Ap-
plicability of Act-Held, Act does not become applicable merely because JO
years elapsed during pending of suit-For purposes of s. 39, suit must be
pending on date of commencement of Act-When Act itself was not ap-
plicable, s. 39 would not apply.
D
The landlord-appellant, after serving a notice under s. 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1982 on the respondent, filed a suit for his
eviction in the Court of Small Causes in 1981. His case was that the
tenanted building was constructed in 1974 and as 10 years had not elapsed
since then, the Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and
Eviction) Act, 1972 did not apply to it, and if at all, the tenant was not E
entitled to its benefit since he had not comp!ied with s. 39 of the Act. The
trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the Act applied to the building;
none of the grounds mentioned in s. 20(2) of the Act was made out; and
the tenant not being in arrears of rent was not required to comply with s.
39. The revisional court accepted landlord's case and decreed the suit. F
The respondent tenant filed a petition which was allowed by the High
Court, holding that as 10 years elapsed during the pendency of the suit,
the Act would apply. Hence the landlord's appeal, by special leave.

Allowing the appeal setting aside the judgment of High Court and G
restoring that of the revisional court, this Court

HELD: 1.1. The Uttar Pradesh· Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 has no application to the facts of the instant
case. [334-F] H
327
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A 1.2. The law applicable on the date of the institution of the suit alone
governs the suit and the mere fact that the statutory period of ten years
expires during the pendency of the suit/appeal/revision, the Uttar Pradesh
Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and. Eviction) Act, 1972 does· not
become applicable. The suit has to be tried and· decided without teference
to the Act. [334-D-E]
B
Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge, [1992] 1 S.C.C. 751,
Nand Ki.shore Marwah v. Somundri Devi, [1987] 4 S.C.C. 382 and Om
Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 2 S.C.C. 61, relied on.

C Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 352, Pasupleti
Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Tranders, [1975] 1 S.C.C. 770 andA.K
Gupta & Sons v.Damodar Valley Corporation, A.I.R.1967 S.C. 96, referred
to.

2.1. In order to attract s. 39 of the Uttar Pradesh Buildings (Regula-
D lion of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, the suit must be pending on
the date of commencement of the Act, i.e.15.7.1972. The legislature desired
to limit the scope of the application of Ss. 39 and 40, to suits, appeals and
revisions pending on the date of commencement of the Act, relating to
buildings to which the old Act did not apply and to whtch the new Act was
E to apply forthwith and not at a later date. [334-H; 335-C]

2.2. In the instant case the suit was filed in 1981, long after the
commencement of the Act. Further, when the Act itself was not applicable,
s. 39 would not apply. [335-D]

F Om Prakash Gupta v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 2 S.C.C. 61 and
Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 897, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1766 of
1986.
G
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.11.1985 of the Allahabad
High Court in W.P. No. 14149 of 1985.

Ms. S. Goswami for the Appellants.

H P. Swamp, Praveen Swamp and P. Choudhary for the Respondent.
BHOLANATII v. MULKRAJ [M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.] 329

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
M.K. MUKHERJEE, J.1. This appeal by special leave has been filed
by the landlord against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High
Court alloWing the Civil Writ Petition of the respondent-tenant.

2. After serving a notice in accordance with Section 106 of Transfer B
of Property Act, the landlord instituted a suit for eviction in the Court of
Small Causes, Moradabad on July 23, 1981. He contended that the
tenanted building was constructed in 1974 and as ten years had not elapsed
since then the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings ( Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ('Act' for short) did not apply to it. He C
further contended that even if it was assum~d that the Act applied the
tenant was not entitled to its benefits as he has not complied with the
requirement of Section 39. In resisting the suit the tenant refuted both the
above contentions of the landlord and submitted that as none of the
grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, on which
only a tenant could be evicted, was made out no decree for ejectment could D
be passed against him.

3. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the Act applied to
the building and none of the grounds referred to in Section 20(2) was made
out. The trial court further held that as the tenant was not in arrears of E
rent he was not required to deposit rent in terms of Section 39 of the Act
to obtain the benefit thereof.

4. Assailing the above judgment the landlord preferred a revision
under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act which was
allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Moradabad. The learned F
Judge held that on the date of institution of the suit the building was less
than 10 years' old and therefore the Act, and, for that matter, Section 20(2)
thereof was not applicable. The learned Judge also held that the benefit of
Section 39 was not available to the tenant as he did not deposit the rent,
interest and cost in accordance therewith. Accordingly, the learned Judge G
decreed the suit for eviction and for rent.

- I
5. Aggrieved by the above judgment and order of the learned Judge,
the tenant filed a Civil Writ Petition in the Allahabad High Court. The
High Court held that as the suit building completed 10 years of its existence
during pendency of the suit, the Act would apply and, therefore, the tenant H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A could be evicted only on one or more grounds mentioned in sub-section
(2) of Section 20 of the Act. Since, admittedly, none of the grounds
mentioned therein was satisfied the High Court held that the suit was liable
to be dismissed. The High Court observed that if compliance of Section 39
was considered essential, although in such a suit it was not, the tenant
should have been afforded an opportunity to pay the arrears or it should
B have been made a part of the decree but eviction should not have been
ordered. On the above findings, the High Court allowed the Writ Petition.

6. In view of the undisputed fact that the building was constructed in
the year 1974 the basic question which requires an answer in this appeal
C is whether the building, which was not ten years' old on the date of the suit
and was exempted from the operation of the Act, can be governed by it if
ten years elapsed during the pendency of the litigation. To answer this
question, in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Courts below,
it will be appropriate at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the
Act. Section 2(2) of the Act, to the extent it is germane for our present
D purpose, reads as under:

"(2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-sec-
tion (1-A) of Section 21, Sub-section (2) of Section 24, Section
24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this
E Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the
date on which its construction is completed."

7. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides that except as provided in
sub-section (2) no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from
a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of
F time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner - save
in the limited situations contemplated by the proviso thereof. Sub-section
(2) enumerates the grounds on which the tenant can be evicted.

8. The other Section relevant for our purpose is Section 39 and the
G same reads as under: -
"39. Pending suits for eviction relating to buildings brought under
regulation for and first time. In any suit for eviction of a tenant
from any building to which the old Act did not apply, pending on
the date of commencement of this Act where the tenant within one
H month from such date of commencement or form the date of his
BHOLANA1H v. MULKRAJ[M.K.MUKHERJEE,J.] 331

knowledge of the pendeacy of the suit, whichever be later, deposits A
in the Court before which the suit is pending, the entire amount
of rent and damages for use and occupation (such damages for
use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent)
together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per
annum and the landlord's full cost of the suit, no decree for the B
eviction shall be passed except on any of the grounds mentioned
in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 20, and the parties shall
be entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and
to adduce additional evidence where necessary.

Provided that a tenant the rent payable by whom does not exceed C
twenty-five rupees per month need not deposit any interest as
aforesaid."

In interpreting Section 2(2) of the Act in the case of Om Prakash Gupta
v. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta, [1982] 2 S.C.C. 61, this Court held that there was D
no ambiguity in the language of sub-section (2) of Section 2 and in the
absence of any ambiguity there was no question of taking any external aid
for interpreting the same. The learned Judges observed that in plain words
the sub-section contemplated that the Act should not apply to a building
puring a period of ten years from the date on which its construction was
completed and that the sub-section no where said that the building should E
have been con~tructed after the enforcement of the Act. According to the
learned Judges the language of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act was
not capable of any other interpretation.

9. The applicability of Section 2(2) of the Act again came up for
consideration before this Court in the case of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain F
Wadhera, [1984] 3 S.C.C. 352. In interpreting the above sub-section, the
Bench first observed that the moment a building became ten years' old to
be reckoned from the date of completion, the Act would be applicable;
and then posed the question as to whether the Act would be attracted if
the building completed ten years during the course of litigation. In answer- G
ing the same, the Court distinguished its earlier decision ~ the case of Om
Prakash Gupta, (supra) on the ground that it was not necessary in that case
to deal with the question whether the tenant would be entitled to the
benefit of Section 39 of the Act as the building had not become ten years'
old when the revision petition was heard and decided by the High Court. H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 1 S.C.R.

A The Court next dealt with the argument whether it was required to decide
a case on the basis of the cause of action that accrued prior to the date of
the institution of the suit and not on a new cause of action. In answering
this question the Court first noted its earlier observations made in the case
of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders, [1975] 1 S.C.C.
B 770 and said:

"Normally amendment is not allowed if it changes the cause of
action. But it is well recognised that where the amendment does
not constitute an addition of a new cause of action, or raise a new
case, but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on
c the record, the amendment would be allowed even after the
statutory period of limitation. The question in the present case is
whether by seeking the benefit of Section 39 of the new Act there
is a change in the cause of action."

D The Court then referred to the case of A.K Gupta & Sons v. Damodar
Valley Corporation, A.LR. 1967 S.C. 96 and concluded as follows: -

"The appellant in the present case only seeks the protection of the
new Rent Act which became applicable to the premises in question
E during the pendency of the litigation. We see no reason why the
benefit of the new Rent Act be not given to the appellant. Section
20 of the new Rent Act provides a bar to a suit for eviction of a
tenant except on the specified grounds as provided in the section.
Sub-section (4) of Section 20 stipulates that in any suit for eviction
F on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) to sub-section (2), viz. the
arrears of rent, if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant in default
pays all arrears of rent to the landlord or deposits in court the
entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the
building due from him, such damages for use and occupation being
calculated at the same rate as rent together with interest thereon
G at ~he rate of nine per co;t per annum and the landlord's cost of
the suit in respect thereof after deducting there-from any amount
already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section
30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that
ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for
H eviction on that ground."
BHOLANATII v. MULKRAJ [M.K. MUKHERJEE,J.] 333

On such conclusion the Court set aside the judgment and decree of the A
-+ High Court in so for as it related to eviction.

10. In opposing the instant appeal the learned counsel for the tenant
relied primarily rtpon the judgment in the case of Vineet Kumar (supra) to
contend that as none of the grounds referred, to in sub-section (2) of B
Section 20 for eviction of the tenant the appeal was liable to be dismissed.
If the case of Vineet Kumar (supra) had operated ·in the field even now, we
might have pursuaded ourselves to accept the above contention of the
.,.... tenant but then our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel for
the appellant to later judgments of this Court which have dissented from
~~~- c
11. In the case of Nand Kishore Marwah v. Somundri Devi, [1987] 4
S.C.C. 382, this Court dissented from the view expressed in the case of
Vineet Kumar, (supra) observing, inter alia, that the law laid down in the
case of Om Prakash, (supra) was binding on them, being a decision of a D
Bench of three Judges .
. +-
12. Referring to Section 20 -of the Act, the Court then observed as
under:-

"This is put in Chapter IV with the heading "Regulation and E
Eviction" and the section starts with title which is printed in bold.
"Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds" and
again in the wording of the section itself it provides: "No suit shall
be instituted for eviction." This clearly indicates that the restriction
put under section 20 is to the institution of the suit itself and F
therefore it is clear that if the provisions of this Act applies then
no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the grounds
specified in the sub- sections of this section. Keeping in view the
language of this section if we examine the provisions contained in
sub-section (2) of Section 2 it will be clear that for a newly
constructed building the provisions of this Act will not apply for G
10 years and therefore so far as the restriction under section 20 is

- concerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within
10 years as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 2 restriction
on the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 sub-section
(2) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear that H
y---
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) 1 S.C.R.

A during the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired the
restriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted +-
within 10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in Section
20 cannot be attracted."

13. Lastly, we may refer to the case of Ramesh Chandra v. III-Addi-
B tional District Judge, [1992) 1 S.C.C. 751. In this case also the judgment was
delivered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of three Judges. In
negativing a similar contention raised on behalf of the tenant relying upon
the case of Vineet Kwnar (supra) the Court observed:

c "Yet another contention urged by the learned counsel for the
tenant on the strength of Vineet Kumar (supra) is that inasmuch
as the statutory period of ten years expired during the pendency
of the suit, the Act became applicable and the suit must be
disposed of only in accordance with the provisions of the Act and
D in particular sub-section (2) of Section 20. This decision has,
however, been explained in a subsequent decision in Nand Ki,shore
Marwah, (supra) wherein it has been held that the law applicable
on the date of the institution of the suit alone governs the suit and
the mere fact that the statutory period of 10 years expires during
E the pendency of the suit/appeal/revision, the Act does not become
applicable. It was held that the suit has to be tried and decided
without reference to the Act. We are in respectful agreement with
the view expressed in Nand Ki,shore Marwah (supra)."

In view of the law as now laid down by this Court is must be held that the
F
Act has no applicatfon to the facts of the instant case. It was however '
contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that even if the Act did
not apply to the suit premises section 39 did. This contention cannot also
be accepted having regard to the following observations made in the case
of Om Prakash Gupta (Supra).
G
, "Further, in order to attract Section 39 the suit must be pending
on the date of commencement of the Act which is July 15, 1972
but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on March
23, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet
-
/

\ - ~/
H another reason why Section 39 will have no application to the
BHOLANATH v. MULKRAT[M.K.MUKHERJEE,J.] 335

present case. In view of sub-section (2) ef Section 2 of the Act is A
not applicable to a building which has not a standing of 10 years
and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say
that Section 39 thereof would be applicable."

14. The above quoted view has been affirmed by another Division
Bench of this Court in the case of Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti, A.I.R. B
1990 S.C. 897, with the following amongst other observations: -

''It therefore seems to us that the legislature desired to limit the
scope of the applicable of Sections 39 and 40 to suits, appeals and
revisions pending on the date of commencement of the Act, i.e. C
15th July, 1972, relating to buildings to which the old Act did not
apply and to which the new Act was to apply forthwith and not at
a later date."

15. The above quoted principles laid down by this Court in interpret-
ing Section 39 apply in all fours in this case also as the suit was instituted D
in 1981, long after the Act came into force.

16. On the conclusions as above, we allow this appeal, set aside the
judgment of the High Court and restore that of the. Addl. District &
Sessions Judge, Moradabad in Civil Revision Application No. 19/1985.
However, there will be no order as to costs.

RP. Appeal allowed.