BHOLA MAHTOversusTHE STATE OF JHARKHAND

           [2026] 4 S.C.R. 191 : 2026 INSC 257

                       Bhola Mahto
                             v.
                  The State of Jharkhand
              (Criminal Appeal No. 1450 of 2026)
                          16 March 2026
 [Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]


                     Issue for Consideration
Impugned order challenged by the appellant-convict contending
that as he was not made aware of absence of the counsel
engaged by him to prosecute the appeal before the Division
Bench and as the Division Bench proceeded to appoint the
amicus without his knowledge, he may be allowed to raise all
such grounds which he had raised in the memorandum of appeal
that was filed in the High Court to secure an order of setting
aside the conviction u/s.304 Part II, IPC and the sentence of
5 years rigorous imprisonment and to allow the appeal by recording
an acquittal.

                            Headnotes†
Legal Aid – Appointment of amicus – Notice to convict –
Appellate court if appoints an amicus to represent a convict
whose counsel is absent, it may also consider the desirability
of issuing a notice to the convict
Held: Having regard to the dictum of the three-Judge Bench in
Anokhi Lal case and in order to curb the tendency of convicts
to raise technical pleas of the nature which were advanced in
the present case as not having knowledge of the appointment
of amicus, whenever an appellate court considers it desirable
to appoint an amicus to represent a convict whose counsel is
absent, such court may also consider the desirability of issuing a
notice from the registry to the address of the convict mentioned
in the memorandum of appeal, for such notice to be served on
him through the jurisdictional police station, with an intimation that
the convict may contact the amicus and provide him necessary
instructions so that his case is argued before the court effectively
and meaningfully – In the event the convict contacts the amicus
and provides instructions, there would ordinarily be no impediment
in proceeding with hearing of the appeal – If, indeed, the convict
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       desires to have his own counsel argue the appeal on his behalf and
       not the amicus, the court may hear such counsel in addition to the
       amicus – However, if the service report indicates that the convict
       was not found at the address or that he refused to accept notice
       despite being present, it would amount to sufficient compliance if the
       notice is pasted on the outer wall of the premises, address whereof
       is mentioned in the cause title of the memorandum of appeal –
       Should the convict still remain dormant, and it is so reported, the
       High Court may proceed to decide the appeal without waiting for
       the convict to turn up either in person or through the counsel of
       his choice engaged by him – This process would substantially
       serve the purpose of eliminating any plea of unfairness being
       raised before this Court if an appeal is disposed of upon hearing
       the amicus appointed by the court – Additionally, in a case of like
       nature where the appeal is listed two decades after grant of bail,
       this process would ensure obtaining of information as to whether
       the appeal survives for decision or stands abate – In case of
       the latter, the courts could avoid spending precious judicial time
       deciding an appeal which, by operation of law, may not require a
       decision on merits – Of course, for a convict in custody who has
       committed an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment,
       the directions in Anokhi Lal have to be scrupulously followed
       apart from the relevant rules regulating the business of the courts
       concerned. [Para 23]

       Legal Aid – Appellant-convict was on bail – His appeal was
       listed for hearing after being pending for more than two
       decades however, since no one appeared on his behalf,
       Division Bench appointed an advocate of more than 15 years’
       standing as amicus curiae to assist the Court – However, no
       notice was issued to the appellant to the effect that his counsel
       was not appearing to prosecute the appeal and that an amicus
       had been appointed by the Division Bench – Division Bench
       set aside the conviction of the appellant u/s.302, IPC and
       the sentence of life imprisonment; conviction was altered to
       one u/s.304-Part II, IPC and the appellant was sentenced to 5
       years rigorous imprisonment – Challenged by the appellant
       contending that there has been a gross failure of justice as the
       grounds which the appellant had raised in his memorandum of
       appeal filed in the High Court were not urged by the amicus;
       instead, he urged a ground which the appellant had not raised
       in such memorandum and as a result, the Division Bench was
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                           193

                    Bhola Mahto v. The State of Jharkhand


     disabled from examining whether the appellant had set up a
     strong case for acquittal:
     Held: High Court in its anxiety to deliver justice without further
     delay and to decide the appeal expeditiously upon hearing the
     amicus, had not made an attempt to inform the appellant that his
     appeal having been listed for final hearing (after two decades) and
     there being absence of representation from his side, (on the first
     day) an amicus had been appointed to represent him – High Court
     was under no obligation to inform the appellant of his counsel’s
     absence; however, it would have been a desirable precaution if the
     appellant were so informed – This is more so, because, assistance
     in the form of legal aid should be real and meaningful and not by
     way of a token gesture or to complete an idle formality – None can
     possibly doubt the High Court’s genuine intention to render legal
     assistance to a non-appearing convict by appointing an amicus on
     his behalf to assist the court render justice but, perhaps, justice
     would have been better served if an intimation by way of a notice
     been sent, bearing in mind that the appeal was listed for the first
     time for hearing twenty-one years after the appellant was released
     on bail – Matter remanded for hearing of the appeal de novo –
     Impugned order set aside. [Paras 14, 15]

                              Case Law Cited
     Anokhi Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2019] 18 SCR 1196 :
     (2019) 20 SCC 196 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Penal Code, 1860.

                              List of Keywords
     Legal aid; Legal assistance to a non-appearing convict; Appointing
     amicus; Appointment of amicus; Notice to convict; Absence of
     representation; Plea of unfairness; Technical pleas.

                             Case Arising From
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
     1450 of 2026
     From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2024 of the High Court
     of Jharkhand at Ranchi in CRADB No.58 of 2003
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                             Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Harsh Kaushik, Arpit Srivastava.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Ms. Pallavi Langar, Kumar Anurag Singh, Sujeet Kumar Chaubey,
       Zain A Khan, Dev Aaryan, Mohd. Abran Khan.

                      Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

1.     Leave granted.
2.     Appellant challenges the judgment and order dated 2nd December,
       20241 of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi2, which was rendered
       while disposing of his appeal3 under Section 374(2), Code of Criminal
       Procedure, 1973. While partly allowing such appeal by setting aside
       the conviction recorded by the relevant sessions court against the
       appellant under Section 302, Indian Penal Code, 18604 and the
       sentence of life imprisonment, a Division Bench of the High Court
       altered the conviction to one under Section 304 - Part II, IPC and
       sentenced the appellant to 5 years rigorous imprisonment.
3.     While hearing the appeal, we are reminded of the expression “give
       him an inch and he will ask for a mile”.
4.     Having regard to the final order we propose to pass, it is not
       considered necessary to examine the appeal on its own merits by
       appreciating and analysing the evidence – oral and documentary –
       presented at the trial. Suffice it to note, the appellant was convicted
       by the relevant sessions court on 25th November, 2002 in respect
       of the crime of murder committed by him on 28th October, 2000,
       whereafter he carried such conviction before the High Court in
       appeal in the early part of 2003 itself. It was initially considered on
       21st January, 2003 and then on 25th February, 2003. Right from 29th



1    impugned order
2    High Court
3    CRADB No. 58 of 2003
4    IPC
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                        195

                    Bhola Mahto v. The State of Jharkhand


      October, 2000, the appellant was in pre-trial custody. The custody
      certificate reveals that he was released from custody on 10th March,
      2003. Though the relevant order is not on record, we find from
      the impugned order that the appellant was on bail. It is, therefore,
      assumed that he obtained an order for suspension of sentence and
      was consequently released on bail. For long 20 years thence, the
      appeal was not listed for hearing. Ultimately, the appeal came to be
      listed before a Division Bench of the High Court on 14th November,
      2024. The order passed on that day records that none had appeared
      on behalf of the appellant despite repeated calls. The appeal having
      been filed in 2003, the Division Bench appointed an advocate of
      more than 15 years’ standing as amicus curiae5 to assist the Court.
      Office was directed to hand over the soft copy of the entire brief
      to the amicus and the appeal was directed to be relisted after two
      weeks. The name of the amicus was also directed to be reflected
      in the cause list on behalf of the appellant.
5.    The learned amicus argued the appeal on 2nd December, 2024. He
      raised the point that the “case cannot come within the purview of
      Section 302” of the IPC. According to him, insofar as the weapon
      of offence is concerned, the evidence of PW-2 on the one hand
      and the PW-3 and PW-4 on the other were contradictory. That
      apart, the entire incident occurred in the heat of passion when a
      sudden quarrel had taken place due to watering of the field; hence,
      Exception 4 of Section 300, IPC would be attracted in the case.
      Learned counsel appearing for the State opposed the appeal and
      argued that having regard to the nature of injuries suffered by the
      deceased (four blows on the head and one on the leg), there was
      clear intention of the appellant to commit murder. The discrepancy
      pointed out insofar as the weapon of offence is concerned, counsel
      argued, was immaterial. Since the statement of the autopsy surgeon
      (PW-1) suggested that the cause of death was due to shock and
      haemorrhage caused by hard and blunt substance, it substantiated
      and corroborated the oral evidence of PW-3 and PW-4. Dismissal
      of the appeal was, accordingly, prayed.
6.    Upon threadbare consideration of the evidence led at the trial, the
      Division Bench formed the opinion that the case falls within Exception


5    amicus
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       4 of Section 300, IPC. Accordingly, the conviction for murder was
       set aside and substituted by recording conviction under Section 304
       Part - II with a reduced sentence of imprisonment, as noted above.
       Since the appellant was on bail during pendency of the appeal,
       such concession was withdrawn and he was directed to forthwith
       surrender to serve the rest of the sentence, if not already served.
7.     The custody certificate dated 16th August, 2025 reveals that as on
       that date, the appellant suffered incarceration for two years eleven
       months twenty-seven days. Today, the appellant has served a little less
       than three years seven months out of the prison term of five years.
8.     When the special leave petition, out of which this appeal arises, was
       taken up for consideration on 7th November, 2025, learned counsel for
       the appellant had informed a coordinate bench of this Court that the
       appellant had not been made aware of absence of learned counsel
       engaged by him to prosecute the appeal before the Division Bench
       and that such bench proceeded to appoint the amicus without the
       appellant’s knowledge. Hearing the same, the coordinate bench had
       the occasion to call for a report from the registry of the High Court
       as to whether the statement of the appellant is correct.
9.     A report dated 19th November, 2025 has since been filed by the
       Registrar General of the High Court. On a reading thereof, it does
       appear that no notice was issued to the appellant to the effect that
       his learned counsel was not appearing to prosecute the appeal and
       that an amicus had been appointed by the Division Bench.
10. On perusal of such report, notice was issued on 24th November, 2025.
11. At the hearing today, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently
    contends that there has been a gross failure of justice, in that the
    appellant has suffered prejudice by not being meted out fair treatment.
    The grounds which the appellant had raised in his memorandum of
    appeal filed in the High Court were not urged by the learned amicus;
    instead, he urged a ground which the appellant had not raised in such
    memorandum. As a result, the Division Bench was disabled from
    examining whether the appellant had set up a strong case for acquittal.
12. Learned counsel, therefore, urges that he may be allowed to raise
    all such grounds which the appellant had raised in the memorandum
    of appeal that was filed in the High Court before us to secure an
    order of setting aside the conviction under Section 304 Part – II, IPC
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                     197

                    Bhola Mahto v. The State of Jharkhand


     and the sentence of 5 years rigorous imprisonment and to allow the
     appeal by recording an acquittal.
13. We are not prepared to accept this argument. It is true that whatever
    grounds the appellant did raise in the memorandum of appeal were
    not urged before the High Court by the learned amicus. However,
    nothing turns on it. If such grounds have not been urged, the blame
    cannot be placed on the learned amicus. The learned amicus came
    to be appointed by the High Court when it was noticed that the
    appeal remained pending for more than two decades and there was
    no representation from the side of the appellant despite repeated
    calls. In his wisdom, the learned amicus urged only one ground and
    succeeded. We see nothing wrong in the approach of the learned
    amicus. Also, the approach of the High Court endeavouring to expedite
    a decision on the appeal is not unjustified. Appellant was enjoying
    the concession of bail for two decades without being in any manner
    concerned about the fate of his appeal. It was not a case where the
    appellant was in custody and, thus, disabled or inconvenienced to
    contact his counsel to argue the appeal. Appellant, while enlarged
    on bail, has himself to blame for not keeping track of his appeal
    and by not persuading the High Court to decide the appeal at an
    early date, considering the vehemence with which learned counsel
    seeks to argue before us that the appellant merits an acquittal based
    on the multiple grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal. We
    hasten to add that whatever be the worth of the grounds so raised,
    the appellant cannot appeal to us to consider the same for the
    first time once it is found that such grounds were not pressed for
    consideration by the High Court.
14. Having held so, we find that the High Court in its anxiety to deliver
    justice without further delay and to decide the appeal expeditiously
    upon hearing the learned amicus, had not made an attempt to inform
    the appellant that his appeal having been listed for final hearing
    (after two decades) and there being absence of representation
    from his side, (on the first day) an amicus had been appointed to
    represent him. The High Court was under no obligation to inform the
    appellant of his counsel’s absence; however, it would have been a
    desirable precaution if the appellant were so informed. This is more
    so, because, this Court has taken the view that assistance in the
    form of legal aid should be real and meaningful and not by way of
    a token gesture or to complete an idle formality. None can possibly
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       doubt the High Court’s genuine intention to render legal assistance
       to a non-appearing convict by appointing an amicus on his behalf
       to assist the court render justice but, perhaps, justice would have
       been better served if an intimation by way of a notice been sent,
       bearing in mind that the appeal was listed for the first time for hearing
       twenty-one years after the appellant was released on bail.
15. We are, therefore, inclined to order a remand for hearing of the
    appeal de novo. The impugned order dated 2nd December, 2024
    is set aside with the result that the appellant’s appeal shall stand
    revived on the file of the High Court. It shall be decided in the manner
    observed hereafter.
16. Preferably, the very same member Judges of the Division Bench who
    had the occasion to decide the appeal on 2nd December, 2024, may
    be assigned to hear the appeal, subject to their availability. If such
    assignment is not possible or is unworkable, we request the Chief
    Justice of the High Court to assign the appeal to a Division Bench
    of which at least one of the member Judges, who earlier decided
    the appellant’s appeal, forms the quorum.
17. Since the appellant wishes to be represented by his own counsel
    before the Division Bench, there shall be no need to appoint an
    amicus if such counsel does not turn up to press the appeal on the
    date to be notified a week in advance by the Registry. In the unlikely
    event of the appellant being unrepresented again, the Division Bench
    would be well advised to decide the appeal in such manner it thinks
    fit and proper.
18. Having regard to the fact that the incident of crime dates back to 28th
    October, 2000 and that the appellant claims to be a septuagenarian
    by now, it would be eminently desirable if the Division Bench decides
    the appeal as early as possible from the date of first hearing. All
    points on merit are kept open to be urged by the appellant and the
    respondent before the High Court. While deciding the appeal, the
    High Court may not be influenced by the observations/findings made
    in the impugned order dated 2nd December, 2024.
19. Appellant was released from custody on 10th March, 2003 during
    pendency of the appeal and taken back into custody on 30th December,
    2024 when the appeal was dismissed by the impugned order dated
    2nd December, 2024. In view thereof and since the impugned order
[2026] 4 S.C.R.                                                            199

                    Bhola Mahto v. The State of Jharkhand


     has been set aside, the status quo ante ought to be restored. He
     be released on bail forthwith, subject to such terms and conditions
     as are imposed by the trial court.
20. We clarify that the liberty of the appellant shall not be curtailed till
    such time the appeal is disposed of by the Division Bench on its
    own merits in terms of this order.
21. Accordingly, the appeal stands partly allowed on the aforesaid terms.
    Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
22. Before parting, we wish to refer to the decision of this Court reported
    in Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh6. A three-Judge Bench
    speaking through Hon’ble U.U. Lalit, J. (as the learned Chief Justice
    then was) poignantly observed as follows:
            26. Expeditious disposal is undoubtedly required in criminal
            matters and that would naturally be part of guarantee of fair
            trial. However, the attempts to expedite the process should
            not be at the expense of the basic elements of fairness
            and the opportunity to the accused, on which postulates,
            the entire criminal administration of justice is founded. In
            the pursuit for expeditious disposal, the cause of justice
            must never be allowed to suffer or be sacrificed. What is
            paramount is the cause of justice and keeping the basic
            ingredients which secure that as a core idea and ideal,
            the process may be expedited, but fast tracking of process
            must never ever result in burying the cause of justice.
     Thereafter, the Court proceeded to lay down norms to avoid repetition
     of infirmities noticed in the case under consideration. It was said thus:
            31. Before we part, we must lay down certain norms so
            that the infirmities that we have noticed in the present
            matter are not repeated:
            31.1. In all cases where there is a possibility of life
            sentence or death sentence, learned advocates who have
            put in minimum of 10 years’ practice at the Bar alone be
            considered to be appointed as Amicus Curiae or through
            legal services to represent an accused.


6   (2019) 20 SCC 196
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          31.2. In all matters dealt with by the High Court concerning
          confirmation of death sentence, Senior Advocates of the
          Court must first be considered to be appointed as Amicus
          Curiae.
          31.3. Whenever any learned counsel is appointed as
          Amicus Curiae, some reasonable time may be provided to
          enable the counsel to prepare the matter. There cannot be
          any hard-and-fast rule in that behalf. However, a minimum
          of seven days’ time may normally be considered to be
          appropriate and adequate.
          31.4. Any learned counsel, who is appointed as Amicus
          Curiae on behalf of the accused must normally be granted
          to have meetings and discussion with the accused
          concerned. Such interactions may prove to be helpful as
          was noticed in Imtiyaz Ramzan Khan [(2018) 9 SCC 160].
23. In continuation of the above and in the light of what has transpired
    in course of the present proceedings, we wish to make an additional
    observation. It is a matter of common knowledge that once a convict
    obtains an order from the appellate court suspending the sentence
    of imprisonment and is, consequently, released on bail, more often
    than not, he neglects and/or fails to cooperate with the court and
    impedes an expeditious decision on his appeal by staying away from
    the proceedings with a view to ensure that his liberty is not curtailed,
    if the appeal were to fail. Drawing from experience, we can record
    that on many an occasion, such convicts become untraceable. These
    convicts, enjoying the concession of bail and misusing it, need to
    be dealt with firm and strong hands by the courts. Having regard to
    the dictum of the three-Judge Bench in Anokhi Lal (supra) and in
    order to curb the tendency of convicts to raise technical pleas of the
    nature which were advanced before us, we observe that, henceforth,
    whenever an appellate court considers it desirable to appoint an
    amicus to represent a convict whose counsel is absent, such court
    may also consider the desirability of issuing a notice from the registry
    to the address of the convict mentioned in the memorandum of appeal,
    for such notice to be served on him through the jurisdictional police
    station, with an intimation that the convict may contact the learned
    amicus and provide him necessary instructions so that his case is
    argued before the court effectively and meaningfully. In the event
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                    Bhola Mahto v. The State of Jharkhand


     the convict contacts the amicus and provides instructions, there
     would ordinarily be no impediment in proceeding with hearing of
     the appeal. If, indeed, the convict desires to have his own counsel
     argue the appeal on his behalf and not the amicus, the court may
     hear such counsel in addition to the amicus. However, if the service
     report indicates that the convict was not found at the address or that
     he refused to accept notice despite being present, it would amount
     to sufficient compliance if the notice is pasted on the outer wall of
     the premises, address whereof is mentioned in the cause title of the
     memorandum of appeal. Should the convict still remain dormant, and
     it is so reported, the High Court may proceed to decide the appeal
     without waiting for the convict to turn up either in person or through
     the counsel of his choice engaged by him. This process, in our
     view, would substantially serve the purpose of eliminating any plea
     of unfairness being raised before this Court if an appeal is disposed
     of upon hearing the amicus appointed by the court. Additionally, in
     a case of like nature where the appeal is listed two decades after
     grant of bail, this process would ensure obtaining of information as
     to whether the appeal survives for decision or stands abated. In
     case of the latter, the courts could avoid spending precious judicial
     time deciding an appeal which, by operation of law, may not require
     a decision on merits. Of course, for a convict in custody who has
     committed an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, the
     directions in Anokhi Lal (supra) have to be scrupulously followed
     apart from the relevant rules regulating the business of the courts
     concerned.
24. We hope and trust that a similar situation does not arise in future.

     Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey