BHIMANNAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 377
- Decided
- 4 September 2012
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The trial court erred in not altering or adding charges to convict the two appellants for the injuries caused, and the High Court erred in convicting them of murder without reversing the finding of no common intention; therefore, all three are convicted under Sections 447, 504 and 304 Part‑I read with Section 34 IPC.
Summary
The appellants, three agricultural workers, trespassed onto the deceased's land, leading to a heated verbal altercation and an assault with axes and a wooden plough part, after which the victim fell and later died from grievous injuries. The trial court convicted the principal assailant under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34, but acquitted the other two for murder, citing lack of common intention, and convicted them only under Sections 447 and 504 IPC. The High Court reversed this, holding all three liable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34, despite the trial court's finding of no common intention. The Supreme Court examined whether the trial court erred in not altering or adding charges and clarified the doctrine of "failure of justice" and the requirement of prejudice for overturning convictions. It held that the trial court should have altered/added charges to convict the two appellants for the injuries caused, and that the High Court erred in convicting them of murder without reversing the trial court's finding of no common intention. Consequently, the Court convicted all three under Sections 447, 504 and 304 Part‑I read with Section 34 IPC, directing appropriate sentences, and disposed of both appeals.
Issues considered
- The trial court's power to alter or add charges under the CrPC when the charge sheet omits certain offences.
- Whether the non‑framing of a specific charge amounts to a failure of justice warranting reversal of conviction.
- The applicability of Section 34 IPC (common intention) to the three accused in the murder charge.
- The appropriate conviction for the two appellants who caused grievous injuries but were not found to share a common intention to murder.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 216, s. 217, s. 385(2), s. 386, s. 464, s. 465, s. 535
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 304 Part-I, s. 34, s. 447, s. 504
Subjects
Judgment
[2012] 7 S.C.R. 909
BHIMANNA A
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
(Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2005)
SEPTEMBER 4, 2012
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s.304 Part-I r/w s.34 - Applicability -
Homicidal death - Three accused - While returning home from
the agricultural fields, the accused trespassed on to the land C
of the victim - Verbal altercation ensued between the parties
whereafter the accused assaulted the victim with axe and
"meli" (wooden part of the plough) which the accused were
carrying at that time - Victim fell down after receiving injuries,
whereupon the accused stopped the assault - A-2 threw down D
the "mefi" and all the accused left the place of occurrence
saying that the victim had fallen - Victim died consequently -
Conviction of A-1 u/s 302, and A-2 and A-3 uls.302 rlw s.34 -
Challenge to - Held: The evidence on record established that
the three accused did not intend to kill the victim and it all E
happened in the spur of the moment upon a heated exchange
of words between the parties, after criminal trespass by the
accused on to the land of the victim - Therefore, it does not
seem to be a pre-determined or pre-meditated case - Ends
of justice would, therefore, be met, if all the three accused are F
convicted uls. 304 Part-I rlw s.34.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss.216, 217, 385(2),
386, 464 and 465 - Homicidal death due to grievous injuries
caused by weapons - Three accused - Trial court framed
charges against all the accused u/ss.447, 504 and 302 rlw G
s.34 /PC - However, ultimately it came to the conclusion that
A-2 was solely responsible for the death of the victim and all
the accused did not act in furtherance of any common
909 H
910 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 7 S.C.R.
A intention, and therefore, A-1 and A-3 could not be convicted
uls.302 rlw s.34 JPC, and convicted A-1 and A-3 only u/ss. 447
and 504 /PC - Trial court held that, inspite of the fact that A-
1 and A-3 were clearly responsible for causing multiple
injuries to the victim, they still could not be convicted for any
B offence for want of framing of charges under any other penal
provision - Held: The trial court did not proceed with the case
in a proper manner - If trial court was of the view that there
was sufficient evidence on record against A-1 and A-3, which
would make them liable for conviction and punishment for
c offences, other than those under ss.447 and 504134 /PC, it
was certainly not helpless to alter/add the requisite charges,
at any stage prior to the conclusion of the trial - An accused
can be convicted for an offence minor than the one, he has
been charged with (s.302 /PC in the instant case), unless the
D accused satisfies the Court that there has been a failure of
justice by the non-framing of a charge under a particular penal
provision, and some prejudice has been caused to the
accused - Further the defect must be so serious that it cannot
be covered under ss. 4641465 CrPC - The plea of prejudice
E has to be in relation to investigation or trial and not matters
falling beyond their scope - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 447, 504
and 302 rlw s. 34.
Criminal trial - Homicidal death due to grievous injuries
caused by assault with weapons - Trial court framed charges
F against all the three accused uls.s.302 rlw s.34 IPC - However,
ultimately it held that A-2 was solely responsible for the death
of the victim and all the accused did not act in furtherance of
any common intention, and therefore, A-1 and A-3 could not
be convicted uls.302 rlw s.34 /PC - High Court convicted A-1
G and A-3 u/s.302 rlw s.34 /PC - It came to the conclusion that,
as the charge uls. 302134 was also framed against A-1 and A-
3, they too, were liable to be convicted u/s.302 /PC - Held:
The conclusion of High Court was not justified, as it had not
reversed the finding recorded by the trial court that all the
H three accused did not act in furtherance of any common
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 911
intention - Penal Code, 1860 - s.302 rlw s.34. A
Criminal Jurisprudence - Right to fair trial - Rights of the
accused - Held: Though the rights of the accused have to be
kept in mind and safeguarded but they should not be over
emphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also
8
have rights.
Words and Phrases - Expression 'failure of justice' and
'prejudice' - Meaning of
A-1 owned land adjacent to the land of the 'B'. The c
prosecution case was that on the date of the incident
when A-1 alongwith A-2 and A-3 were returning home
from their agricultural fields carrying their agriculturaf
implements, they attempted to use the land of 'B' as a
pathway, upon which 'B', who was present on his land 0
alongwith his wife PW.1 and mother asked the accused
persons not to pass through his land; that A-1 then
started hurling abuses in filthy language and instigated
A-2 and A-3 to assault 'B' and thus A-2 and A-3 began
assaulting him with axes, while A-1 assaulted him with E
"Meli" (Wooden part of a plough); that thereafter the
accused persons left the place, throwing away the axes
and the "Meli". 'B' died consequently. Multiple injuries
were found on his body. PW.12, who conducted the post-
mortem, clarified in his cross-examination that the
injuries were grievous and actually responsible for the F
death of 'B'
The trial court convicted A-2 under Sections 447, 504,
302 read with Section 34 IPC and A-1 and A-3 under
Sections 447, 504 read with Section 34 IPC. In appeal, the G
High Court upheld the conviction of A-2 under Section
302 IPC and further convicted A-1 and A-3 under Section
302/34 IPC as well. Hence the present appeals by the
three accused.
H
912 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. An accused can be convicted for an
offence which is minor as compared to the one, he has
been charged with, unless the accused satisfies the
B Court that there has been a failure of justice by the non-
framing of a charge under a particular penal provision,
and some prejudice has been caused to the accused.
Further the defect must be so serious that it cannot be
covered under Sections 464/465 CrPC, which provide
that, an order of sentence or conviction shall not be
C deemed to be invalid only on the ground that no charge
was framed, or that there was some irregularity or
omission or misjoinder of charges, unless the court
comes to the conclusion that there was also, as a
consequence, a failure of justice. In determining whether
D any error, omission or irregularity in framing the charges,
has led to a failure of justice, this Court must have regard
to whether an objection could have been raised at an
earlier stage, during the proceedings or not. While
judging the question of prejudice or guilt, the court must
E bear in mind that every accused has a right to a fair trial,
where he is aware of what he is being tried for and where
the facts sought to be established against him, are
explained to him fairly and clearly, and further, where he
is given a full and fair chance to defend himself against
F the said charge(s). [Para 18) [927-G-H; 928-A-D]
1.2. The expression 'failure of justice' is an extremely
pliable or facile an expression which can be made to fit
into any situation of any case. There would be a 'failure
G of justice' not only by unjust conviction but also by
acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to
produce requisite evidence. Though the rights of the
accused have to be kept in mind and safeguarded, they
should not be over emphasised to the extent of forgetting
that the victims also have rights. It has to be shown that
H
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 913
the accused has suffered some disability or detriment with A
respect to the protections available to him under Indian
Criminal Jurisprudence. 'Prejudice', is. incapable of being
interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal
jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation
to investigation or trial and not matters falling beyond B
their scope. Once the accused is able to show that there
has been serious prejudice caused to him with respect
to either of these aspects, and that the same has defeated
the rights available to him under jurisprudence, then the
accused can seek benefit under the orders of the Court. c
[Paras 20, 21] [929-D-G]
1.3. The trial court framed charges against all the
three accused-appellants (A-1, 2 and 3) under Sections
447 and 504 and Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC,
however, it ultimately came to the conclusion that there D
was no meeting of minds and that all three appellants did
not act in furtherance of any common intention and
therefore, A-1 and A-3 could not be convicted under
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and convicted them
only under Sections 447 and 504 IPC. The trial court did E
not proceed with the case in a proper manner. It erred in
holding that, in spite of the fact that the two accused A-1
and A-3 were clearly responsible for causing multiple
injuries to the deceased 'B', they still could not be
convicted for any offence for want of framing of charges F
under any other penal provision. In such an event, the
trial court would be justified in altering/adding the
requisite charge(s) or even without such alteration/
addition, punishing them for the said offences,
considering the intensity of the injuries, as the same G
could be a minor offence, as compared to the offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC. If the trial Court was
of the view that there was sufficient evidence on record
against A-1 and A-3, which would make them liable for
conviction and punishment for offences, other than those H
914 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A under Sections 447 and 504/34 IPC, the court was
certainly not helpless to alter/add the requisite charges,
at any stage prior to the conclusion of the trial. Section
216 CrPC empowers the trial Court to alter/add charge(s),
at any stage before the conclusion of the trial. However,
B law requires that, in case such alteration/addition of
charges causes any prejudice, in any way to the accused,
there must be a fresh trial on the said altered/new
charges, and for this purpose, the prosecution may also
be given an opportunity to recall witnesses as required
C under Section 217 Cr.P.C. Such power of alteration/
addition of charge (s), can also be exercised by the
appellate court, in exercise of its powers under Sections
385(2) and 386 CrPC. [Para 14, 16, 23] [926-A-C, F; 930-
H; 931-A-C]
D Hasanbhai Va/ibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat AIR 2004
SC 2078: 2004 (3) SCR 762; Kantilal Chandulal Mehta v.
State of Maharashtra and Anr. AIR 1970 SC 359: 1970 (2)
SCR 742; Amar Singh v. State of Haryana AIR 1973 SC
2221; Sanichar Sahni v. State of Bihar AIR 2010 SC 3786:
E 2009 (10) SCR 112; Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2010) 10.SCC 259: 2010 (13) SCR 311;
Shamnsaheb M. Mult.tani v. State of Karnataka AIR (2001)
SC 921: 2001 (1) SCR 514; Nageshwar Sh. Krishna Ghobe
v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1973 SC 165: 1973 (2) SCR 377;
F State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy AIR 2004
SC 5117: 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 279; Rafiq Ahmed@ Rafi
v. State of UP. AIR 2011 SC 3114: 2011 (11) SCR 907 and
Rattiram & Ors. v. State of M.P. AIR 2012 SC 1485: 2012 (4)
sec 516 - relied on.
G Topandas v. State of Bombay AIR 1956 SC 33:1955
SCR 881; Willie (William) Staney v. State of M.P. AIR 1956
SC 116: 1955 SCR 1140; Fakhruddin v. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1967 SC 1326; State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram
Reddy AIR 1998 SC 2702: 1998 (3) SCR 1088; Ramji Singh
H and Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 2001 SC 3853: 2001 (3) Suppl.
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 915
SCR 24 and Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 2006 SC A
191: 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 90 - referred to.
2. The High Court came to the conclusion that, as the
charge under Section 302/34 was also framed against A-
1 and A-3, they too, were liable to be convicted under
8
Section 302. Such a conclusion is not justified, as the
High Court had not reversed the finding recorded by the
trial court that all three accused did not act in furtherance
of any common intention. [Para 24] [931-D-E]
3. There is ample evidence on record, particularly the C
deposition of PW.1, wife of the deceased, to show that
when her husband fell down after receiving the said
injuries, the accused stopped the assault. A-2 threw
down the "Meli" and all the accused left the place of
occurrence saying that the victim had fallen. This clearly D
establishes that the three accused-appellants did not
intend to kill the deceased and it all happened in the spur
of the moment upon a heated exchange of words
between the parties, after criminal trespass by the
appellants on to the land of the deceased. Therefore, it E
does not seem to be a pre-determined or pre-meditated
case. Ends of justice would, therefore, be met, if all the
three appellants are convicted under Section 304 Part-I,
read with Section 34 IPC and sentences are awarded
accordingly. As a result, all the appellants are convicted F
under Sections 447, 504 and 304 Part-I, read with Section
34 IPC. A-2 has already served more than 13Y:z years in
jail. Therefore, he is awarded sentence as already
undergone and it is directed that he be released forthwith,
unless wanted in some other case. A-1 and A-3 are G
awarded a sentence of 10 years RI. They be released
from jail after serving the sentence of 10 years, if not
already served and are not wanted in some other case.
[Para 25] [931-F-H; 932-A-D]
H
916 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Case Law Reference:
2004 (3) SCR 762 relied on Para 15
1970 (2) SCR 742 relied on Para 16
AIR 1973 SC 2221 relied on Para 18
B
2009 (10) SCR 112 relied on Para 19
1955 SCR 881 referred to Para 19
1955 SCR 1140 referred to Para 19
c AIR 1967 SC 1326 referred to Para 19
1998 (3) SCR 1088 referred to Para 19
2001 (3) Suppl. SCR 24 referred to Para 19
D 2005 (5) Suppl. SCR 90 referred to Para 19
2010 (13) SCR 311 relied on Para 19
2001 (1) SCR 514 relied on Para 20
E 1973 (2) SCR 377 relied on Para 21
2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 279 relied on Para 21
2011 (11) SCR 907 relied on Para 21
2012 (4) sec 516 relied on Para 21
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 46 of 2005.
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.03.2004 of the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 839
G
of 2001.
WITH
Crl. A. No. 17112005
H
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 917
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, A
Venkatakrishna K, A.S. Bhasme for the Appellant.
V.N. Raghupathy, Shivpati B. Pandey for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Both these appeals have been
filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 31st
March, 2004 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bangalore, dismissing the Criminal Appeal No. 839 of 2001
and allowing Criminal Appeal No. 1132 of 2001, filed by the c
State. The High Court has dismissed the appeal of appellant
Bhimanna, against the order of conviction under Section 302
by the trial court, but allowed the appeal of the State against
the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 2005 herein,
reversing the judgment of the trial court, acquitting them of the o
charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter called 'IPC') and awarding them life imprisonment.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
are as follows :-
E
A. As per the case of the prosecution, Yenkappa (A-1),
appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 2005 is the father of
Bhimanna (A-2), who is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
46 of 2005, and Suganna (A-3), is the nephew of Yenkappa
(A-1 ). Deceased Bheemanna was the nephew of Yenkappa(A- F
1). Yenkappa(A-1) owns land adjacent to the land of the
deceased Bheemanna in revenue estate of village Buddinni,
Police Station Ramdurga, in the district of Raichur. There was
a dispute between Yenkappa and the deceased over the land
of the deceased as, deceased refused to give him right of G
passage through his land. Thus, a Panchayat was convened
in the village, wherein it was decided that neither of the parties
will enter the others' land, to use the same as a pathway.
B. On 17.11.1999 at about 4.00 p.m., Yenkappa(A-1),
H
918 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A alongwith Bhimanna (A-2) and Suganna (A-3), was returning
home with agricultural implements i.e. axes and a plough. They
attempted to use the land of the deceased as a pathway. The
deceased Bheemanna, who was present on his land alongwith
his wife Paddamma (PW.1) and mother, namely, Bheemava,
B obstructed the accused persons asking them not to pass
through his land. Yenkappa(A-1) then started hurling abuses in
filthy language and instigated Bhimanna (A-2) and Suganna (A-
3) to assault the deceased. Thus, Bhimanna (A-2) and
Suganna (A-3) began assaulting the deceased with axes over
c his head and right hand. Yenkappa (A-1) assaulted the
deceased with "Meli" (Wooden part of a plough). Paddamma
(PW.1) and Bheemava, mother of the deceased went to save
the deceased, but they too, were threatened with assault.
Similar threats were hurled when Rangayya (PW.6), nephew of
the deceased and his father Hanumappa approached the place
0
of occurrence. The accused persons left the place after
assaulting the deceased, throwing away the axes and wooden
part of the plough. Rangayya (PW.6) brought a bullock cart as
asked by Paddamma (PW.1) from the village and the deceased
was then taken to Ramdurga Police Station. Upon the advice
E of the police, the deceased was taken in a mini lorry, driven by
Mahadevappa (PW.10) to Deodurga Hospital and when they
reached there at 8.00 p.m., the doctor declared Bheemanna
dead. On the basis of the complaint submitted by Paddamma
(PW.1), an FIR was lodged at 8.15 p.m. under Sections 143,
F 147, 148, 302, 323 and 504 read with Section 149 IPC.
Investigation was initiated by Rajashekhar (PW.14), Circle
Inspector.
C. The inquest was conducted over the dead body of the
G deceased Bheemanna in the presence of Panchas, including
Basawarajaiah (PW.2). The post-mortem was conducted by Dr.
Patil Prabhakar (PW.12). The investigating officer recovered
the axes and the wooden part of the plough used in the crime
and sent the same for FSL examination and, subsequently, the
H three appellants were also arrested. After completion of the
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 919
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the appellants for A
the offences punishable under Sections 447, 504. 302 read with
Section 34 IPC.
D. Upon conclusion of the trial in Sessions Case No. 40
of 2000, the learned Sessions Judge vide judgment and order
8
dated 19.6.2001, convicted Bhimanna (A-2) for the offences
punishable under Sections 447, 504, 302 read with Section 34
IPC and awarded him life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.
2,0001-. So far as Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3) are
concerned, they were only convicted under Sections 447, 504 C
read with Section 34 IPC.
E. Being aggrieved, Bhimanna (A-2) preferred Criminal
Appeal No. 839 of 2001 and the State of Karnataka filed
Criminal Appeal No. 1132 of 2001 against the accused
Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3). The High Court has D
dismissed the appeal of Bhimanna (A-2) and allowed the
appeal of the State convicting Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna
(A-3) also under Section 302 IPC.
Hence, these appeals.
E
3. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants, has submitted that Bhimanna (A-
2) was wrongly convicted by the courts below under Section
302 read with Section 34 IPC, as the prosecution failed to
explain adequately the genesis of the case. The deceased F
Bheemanna had no land in close proximity to the land of A-2.
Therefore, the question of any dispute could not arise. The same
was proved by way of cogent evidence and the courts below
failed to appreciate the same in the correct perspective. The
presence of witnesses, particularly Paddamma (PW.1) and G
Rangayya (PW.6), is doubtful, for the reason that Paddamma
(PW.1) had given birth to a girl child only one month before the
date of such incident, and it was thus highly unlikely, that in such
a physical condition, she would be able to do any agricultural
work. Bheemava, mother of the deceased, was in fact present H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A at the place of occurrence, and has not been examined by the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecution is guilty of withholding a
material witness. Rangayya (PW.6) could not have been present
there for the reason that he did not have land in close proximity
to the place of occurrence. More so, it was not a pre-
B determined assault and the incident clearly occurred in the spur
of the moment. The weapons used in the crime were basically
agricultural implements with which the appellants had been
working in their fields. The High Court reversed the judgment
of the trial court so far as the acquittal of Yenkappa (A-1) and
c Suganna (A-3) is concerned, without applying the parameters
laid down in this regard, by this Court. The High court erred in
convicting A-1 and A-3 for the offences punishable under
Section 302 IPC, as there is no evidence available to show,
that all the accused acted in furtherance of common intention.
Thus, conviction of either of the appellants under Section 302
0
IPC is not justified and the appeals deserve to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri V.N. Raghupathy, learned standing
counsel appearing for the State has opposed the appeals,
contending that no fault can be found with the judgment of the
E High Court. After re-appreciation of the evidence on record, the
High Court reached the correct conclusion that all three
appellants were responsible for the homicidal death of
Bheemanna. The deceased suffered 12 injuries. In the opinion
of the Dr. Patil Prabhakar (PW.12), injury nos. 1 and 12 could
F have been caused by Bhimanna (A-2), and thus, as a natural
corollary, injury nos. 2 to 11 would have been caused by
Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3). Thus, not convicting them
for the said injuries and restricting their conviction under
Sections 447 and 504 read with Section 34 IPC cannot be
G justified. The trial Court's decision cannot be justified in regard
to the fact that charges were not framed against A-1 and A-3
by it, for any other offence owing to the fact that, the same was
not provided for by the Investigating Officer in the charge sheet
filed by him. The High Court has rightly convicted Yenkappa (A-
H 1) and Suganna (A-3) for the offences punishable under Section
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 921
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
302/34 IPC. The appeals lack merit and are liable to be A
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
6. At the time of autopsy, the following injuries were found B
on the body of the deceased Bheemanna:
1. Incised wound of size 3" X 0.75" X brain deep
situated in the middle of the head. Edges everted,
blood clots and brain matter present. Underlying c
fracture of skull bone seen and felt.
2. Incised wound transversely situated in the dorsum
of the fore arm 2.5" above the right wrist joint, size
3" X 0.5" X muscle deep. Clots present, edges
D
everted and clear out.
3. Lacerated wound of size 1" X 0.5" X muscle deep
situated in the temporo-maxillary area in left side.
Clots present.
E
4. Lacerated wound of size 1" X 0.5 X muscle deep
behind the pinna of left ear. Clots present.
5. Contusion of size 5" x 1" situated in the left side of
the arm directed above downwards from shoulder.
F
6. Contusion of size 3" X 1" in the left shoulder
obliquely above downwards.
7. Lacerated wound of size 3" X 0.5" X muscle deep
situated in the anterior aspect of the fore arm in the
G
middle.
8. Lacerated wound in the middle of the right leg
anteriorly size 1" X 0.5" X muscle deep clots
present.
H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A 9. Contusion in the left side of the back obliquely in
the middle size 3" X 2".
10. Contusion in the right side of the flank side of the
chest size 3" X 0.5".
B 11. Lacerated wound in the medial aspect of the right
knee size, 2" X 0.5" X muscle deep. Clots present.
12. Contusion in the left-side of the chest in the lower
end, size 3" X 0.5".
c Upon dissection, Dr. Patil Prabhakar (PW.12)
noticed the following internal injuries.
1. Fracture of front parietal bone in the middle of the
head, size 1" X 0.25" X brain deep, brain matter
D visible and silted out. Fracture underneath, brain
lacerated, size 1" X 0.5" X 0.5".
2. Fracture of thorasic rib 9the and 10 ribs anteriorly
in the middle. Laceration of lower lobe of lung, size
E 1.5" X 0.5" Blood present in the thorax about 200
ML.
7. So far as the injuries are concerned, Dr. Patil Prabhakar
(PW.12) has clarified in his cross-examination that the injury
Nos. 1 and 12 were grievous in nature and were actually
F responsible for the death of the deceased Bheemanna.
Lacerated injuries were 5 in number, though the same were
simple in nature and they could not have been caused by the
blunt portion of an axe or by using a stick.
G 8. Paddamma (PW.1) deposed that her husband owned
land, adjacent to the land of A-2. There was some dispute
regarding the pathway between them. A Panchayat was
convened to resolve the dispute, and the parties were restrained
from using the others' land as passageway. She stated that she
H was working in the field alongwith her husband and mother-in-
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 923
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
law on 17 .11.1999. At about 4.00 p.m .. the accused persons, A
while going to the village, after finishing their work in the
adjacent field, wanted to pass through her land. Her husband
raised an objection. Yenkappa (A-1) then started abusing the
deceased and instigated the other accused persons to assault
him. The appellants used axes, and the wooden part of a plough B
to injure her husband. Her husband, as a result, fell down. When
she tried to save him, she too, was threatened by the
appellants. Once her husband had fallen, the accused, however,
stopped the assault. (A-2) threw down the "Meli" there and the
accused left the place saying that the victim had fallen. c
Rangayya (PW.6), who came to the said place, was asked to
bring a bullock cart from the village, in which they then took the
deceased to the police station. Upon the advice of the police
the deceased was taken to the hospital, where he was declared
dead. She has also admitted in her cross-examination that the
0
place of occurrence was about 1 km. away from her house and
that she had given birth to a girl child one month prior to the
date of occurrence of such incident. Her mother-in-law, who was
also present at the place of occurrence was suffering from weak
eye-sight, and no longer had good vision as a result of old age. E
9. Rangayya, in turn, (PW.6), deposed that he was the
cousin of the deceased and was working in his field. There was
a dispute between the appellants and the deceased with
respect to using the land of the deceased, as passage. He
witnessed the appellants causing injuries to the deceased and F
he corroborated the version of events as given by Paddamma.
(PW.1 ). In his cross-examination, it was also stated by
Rangayya (PW.6) that the accused persons had filed a case
against the deceased in court with respect to the
aforementioned land dispute. G
10. Venkat Rao (PW.8), Junior Engineer of PWD, after
inspection and examination of the revenue record, prepared a
site plan for the area, showing that the lands of the deceased
H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A and the appellants were, in fact, in close proximity to each other
and were merely demarcated by a bund.
11. The trial Court after appreciating the evidence on
record, came to the conclusion that all three accused (A-1 to
A-3) did not act in furtherance of any common intention.
8
Bhimanna (A-2) was solely responsible for the death of the
deceased. Therefore, Bhimanna (A-2) alone could be convicted
under Section 302 IPC and further under Sections 447and 504
read with Section 34 IPC. However, Yenkappa (A-1) and
C Suganna (A-3) acted without sharing any common intention with
Bhimanna (A-2). Thus, they could not be convicted under
Section 302 IPC and could be convicted only under Sections
447 and 504 read with Section 34 IPC. The court further held
thatYenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3) could also be convicted
for the offence of causing injury Nos. 2 to 11, but no charge had
D been framed under any of the Sections 323, 324, 325, 326 and
327 IPC in this regard. Therefore, no punishment could be
awarded to them for the same. The trial Court held as under:
"The prosecution has proved the charge under Section
E 302 read with Section 34 IPC only against Bhimanna and
further the other charges under Sections 447 and 504 read
with Section 34 IPC are proved against Yenkappa (A-1)
and Suganna (A-3). Even though this court has accepted
that A-1 and A-3 have also assaulted by Mos. 1 to 3
F respectively, on the deceased, but those assaults are not
the direct result of death of the deceased Bheemanna.
Moreover, in the charge-sheet, there is no incoporation
of charges such as Sec. 323, 324, 325, 326 or 327 of /PC
against these accused. Hence, in the absence of such
specific charge regarding causing bleeding injuries by
G
deadly weapons, by these A-1 and A-3, this court is
unable to convict them under any such charge, which is
admittedly not incorporated in the ch.arge-sheet and also
not framed against them by this court." (Emphasis added)
H
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 925
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
12. The High Court, without reversing the finding recorded A
by the trial court, that there was no meeting of minds of all the
accused with respect to causing such grievous injuries to the
deceased, held that, as Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3)
had also been charged under Section 302/34 IPC, they too,
could be convicted under Section 302 IPC and hence allowed B
the State appeal convicting them also under Section 302/34
IPC. The High Court held as under:
"In view of the above, we are of the clear view that the trial
court though rightly held that all the accused had committed c
the offences punishable under Sections 447 and 504 read
with Section 34 of IPC and A-2 has committed the offence
punishable under Section 302 of IPC, it has erroneously
held that A-1 and A-3 cannot be held guilty for the offence
of murder punishable under Section 302 of IPC, even
0
though, Section 34 of IPC was invoked by the prosecution.
So, we do not agree with the observations made in Para
Nos. 36 to 39 of the impugned judgment and conclusion
arrived at by the trial court so far as Al and A3 are
concerned with regard to their guilt for the offence under E
Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.
In the result and for the foregoing reasons, Criminal Appeal
No. 839/2001 filed by A-2 is dismissed whereas, Criminal
Appeal No. 1132/2001 filed by the State is allowed and
Accused No. 1 and 3 are held guilty for the offence F
punishable under section 302 read with 34 of IPC also and
accordingly convicted and sentenced to undergo
imprisonment for life like that of A-2." (Emphasis added)
13. Thus, it is evident that both the courts below after G
appreciating the evidence available on record, came to a
conclusion regarding the participation of all three appellants.
The trial court could convict Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-
3), only for the offences punishable under Sections 447 and 504
IPC, for want of framing of charges under any other section of
IPC. H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A 14. It is a matter of great regret that the trial court did not
proceed with the case in the correct manner. If the trial Court
was of the view that there was sufficient evidence on record
against Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3), which would make
them liable for conviction and punishment for offences, other
B than those under Sections 447 and 504/34 IPC, the court was
certainly not helpless to alter/add the requisite charges, at any
stage prior to the conclusion of the trial. Section 216 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called 'Cr.P.C.')
empowers the trial Court to alter/add charge(s), at any stage
C before the conclusion of the trial. However, law requires that,
in case such alteration/addition of charges causes any
prejudice, in any way to the accused, there must be a fresh trial
on the said altered/new charges, and for this purpose, the
prosecution may also be given an opportunity to recall
witnesses as required under Section 217 Cr.P.C.
0
15. In Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat, AIR
2004 SC 2078, this Court held:
"Therefore, if during trial the Trial Court, on a consideration
E of broad probabilities of the case, based upon total effect
of the evidence and documents produced is satisfied that
any addition or alteration of the charge is necessary, it is
free to do so, and there can be no legal bar to
appropriately act as the exigencies of the case warrant or
necessitate."
F
16. Such power empowering alteration/addition of
charge(s), can also be exercised by the appellate court, in
exercise of its powers under Sections 385(2) and 386 Cr.P.C.
G In Kantilal Chandulal Mehta v. State of Maharashtra &
Anr., AIR 1970 SC 359, this Court while dealing with the power
of the appellate Court under the earlier Code held:
"The power of the Appellate Court is set out in Section 423
of the Cr.P.C and invests it with very wide powers. A
H
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 927
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
particular reference may be made to Clause(d) of sub- A
section (1 ), as empowering it even to make any
amendment or any consequential or incidental Order that
may be just or proper. Apart from this power of the
Appellate Court to alter or amend the charge, Section 535
Cr.P.C, further provides that, no finding or sentence, B
pronounced or passed shall be deemed to be invalid
merely on the ground that no charge has been framed
unless the Court of Appeal or revision thinks that the
omission to do so, has occasioned failure of justice, and
if in the opinion of any of these courts a failure of justice c
has been occasioned by an omission to frame a charge,
it shall order a charge to be framed and direct that the trial
be recommenced from the point immediately after the
framing of the charge."
17. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the trial D
court committed a grave error in acquitting Yenkappa (A-1) and
Suganna (A-3) for the offence of causing injuries to the
deceased, in spite of there being sufficient evidence on record
against them in this respect, simply for the reason that the
police did not file a charge-sheet in relation to such offences E
committed by them. Thus, the trial court should have altered/
added the requisite charge(s) and proceeded with the case in
accordance with law.
18. In such a fact-situation, a question also arises as to F
whether a conviction under any other provision, for which a
charge has not been framed, is sustainable in law. The issue
is no longer res integra and has been considered by the Court
time and again. The accused must always be made aware of
the case against them so as to enable them to understand the G
defence that they can lead. An accused can be convicted for
an offence which is minor than the one, he has been charged
with, unless the accused satisfies the Court that there has been
a failure of justice by the non-framing of a charge under a
particular penal provision, and some prejudice has been
H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A caused to the accused. (Vide : Amar Singh v. State of
Haryana, AIR 1973 SC 2221).
Further the defect must be so serious that it cannot be
covered under Sections 464/465 Cr.P.C., which provide that,
an order of sentence or conviction shall not be deemed to be
8
invalid only on the ground that no charge was framed, or that
there was some irregularity or omission or misjoinder of
charges, unless the court comes to the conclusion that there
was also, as a consequence, a failure of justice. In determining
whether any error, omission or irregularity in framing the
C charges, has led to a failure of justice, this Court must have
regard to whether an objection could have been raised at an
earlier stage, during the proceedings or not. While judging the
question of prejudice or guilt, the court must bear in mind that
every accused has a right to a fair trial, where he is aware of
D what he is being tried for and where the facts sought to be
established against him, are explained to him fairly and clearly,
and further, where he is given a full and fair chance to defend
himself against the said charge(s).
E 19. This Court in Sanichar Sahni v. State of Bihar, AIR
2010 SC 3786, while considering the issue placed reliance
upon various judgments of this Court particularly in Topandas
v. State of Bombay, AIR 1956 SC 33; Willie (William) Slaney
v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116; Fakhruddin v. State of
F Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326; State of A.P. v.
Thakkidiram Reddy, AIR 1998 SC 2702; Ramji Singh & Anr.
v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001 SC 3853; and Gurpreet Singh v.
State of Punjab, AIR 2006 SC 191, and came to the following
conclusion :
G "Therefore, .................. unless the convict is able to
establish that defect in framing the charges has caused
real prejudice to him and that he was not informed as to
what was the real case against him and that he could not
defend himself properly, no interference is required on
H
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 929
[DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
mere technicalities. Conviction order in fact is to be tested A
on the touchstone of prejudice theory."
A similar view has been reiterated in Abdul Sayeed v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259.
20. In Shamnsaheb M. Multtani v. State of Karnataka, AIR B
2001 SC 921, this Court explained the meaning of the phrase
'failure of justice' observing that the superior court must examine
whether the issue raised regarding failure of justice is really a
failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage. The court
must further examine whether the said aspect is of such a C
nature, that non-explanation of it has contributed to penalising
an individual, and if the same is true then the court may say,
that since he was not given an opportunity to explain such
aspect, there was 'failure of justice' on account of non
compliance with the principles of natural justice. The expression D
'failure of justice' is an extremely pliable or facile an expression
which can be made to fit into any situation of a case.
21. The court must endeavour to find the truth. There would
be 'failure of justice' not only by unjust conviction but also by
E
acquittal of the guilty, as a result of unjust failure to produce
requisite evidence. Of course, the rights of the accused have
to be kept in mind and safeguaraed but they should not be over
emphasised to the extent of forgetting that the victims also have
rights. It has to be shown that the accused has suffered some
F
disability or detriment in the protections available to him under
Indian Criminal Jurisprudence. 'Prejudice', is incapable of being
interpreted in its generic sense and applied to criminal
jurisprudence. The plea of prejudice has to be in relation to
investigation or trial and not matters falling beyond their scope.
Once the accused is able to show that there has been serious G
prejudice caused to him with respect to either of these aspects,
and that the same has defeated the rights available to him under
jurisprudence, then the accused can seek benefit under the
orders of the Court. (Vide: Nageshwar Sh. Krishna Ghobe v.
State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 165; State by Police H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy, AIR 2004 SC 5117; Rafiq
Ahmed@ Rafi v. State of UP., AIR 2011 SC 3114; and
Rattiram & Ors. v. State of MP. through Inspector of Police,
AIR 2012 SC 1485).
22. The instant case is required to be examined in the light
8
of the aforesaid settled legal propositions.
The trial court has framed charges against all the
appellants under Sections 447 and 504 and Section 302 read
with Section 34 IPC and the points to be determined were also
C framed by the trial court as under:
(i) Whether the accused on account of their enmity
with the deceased, trespassed on to his land with
common object, and committed the offence under
D Section 447 read with Section 34 IPC.
(ii) Whether the accused on the said date, time and
place, intentionally insulted the deceased by
abusing him and thereby deliberately provoked him,
knowing that it would cause him to break public
E peace, and therefore, committed the offence under
Section 504 read with Section 34 IPC.
(iii) Whether the prosecution proved that the accused
on the said date, time and place after trespassing
F on to the land of the deceased picked a quarrel
with him due to earlier enmity, and assaulted him
thereby committing the said murder under Section
302 read with Section 34 IPC.
(iv) Whether the prosecution proved that the accused
G have committed the offence under Sections 447,
504 and 302 read with Section 34 IPC with
common object beyond all reasonable doubt.
23. The trial court came to the conclusion that there was
H no meeting of minds and all three appellants did not act in
BHIMANNA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 931
[DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
furtherance of any common intention. Therefore, Yenkappa (A- A
1) and Suganna (A-3) could not be convicted under Section 302
read with Section 34 IPC and they were convicted only under
Sections 447 and 504 IPC and sentences were awarded to
them setting off the period spent by them in custody during trial.
The trial court was patently in error in holding that, in spite of B
the fact that two accused were clearly responsible for causing
injury Nos. 2 to 11, they still could not be convicted for any
offence for want of framing of charges under any other penal
provision. In such an event, the trial court would be justified in
altering/adding the requisite charge(s) or even without such c
alteration/addition, punishing them for the said offences,
considering the intensity of the injuries as the same could be
an offence minor than the offence punishable under Section 302
IPC.
24. The High Court came to the conclusion that, as the D
charge under Section 302/34 was also framed a.gainst
Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3), they too, were liable to be
convicted under Section 302. Such a conclusion is not justified,
as the High Court has not reversed the finding recorded by the
trial court that all three accused did not act in furtherance of any E
common intention.
25. We have examined the number and intensity of the
injuries and the role played by each of the appellants. There is
ample evidence on record particularly the deposition of F
Paddamma (PW.1 ), wife of the deceased to show that when
her husband fell down after receiving the said injuries, the
accused stopped the assault. Bhimanna (A-2) threw down the
"Meli" and all the accused left the place of occurrence saying
that the victim had fallen. This clearly establishes that the G
appellants did not intend to kill the deceased and it all happened
in the spur of the moment upon a heated exchange of words
between the parties, after criminal trespass by the appellants
on to the land of the deceased. Therefore, it does not seem to
be a pre-determined or pre-meditated case. Ends of justice
H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 7 S.C.R.
A would, therefore, be met, if all the three appellants are convicted
under Section 304 Part-I read with Section 34 IPC and
sentences are awarded accordingly. As a result, all the
appellants are convicted under Sections 447, 504 and 304
Part-I read with Section 34 IPC.
B
Bhimanna (A-2) has already served more than 13% years
in jail. Therefore, he is awarded sentence as already undergone
and it is directed that he be released forthwith, unless wanted
in some other case. Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3) are
awarded a sentence of 10 years RI. All of them have already
C served the sentences awarded for the offences punishable
under Sections 447, 504/34 IPC.
Learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out that
Yenkappa (A-1) and Suganna (A-3) have already served near
D about 10 years. They be released from jail after serving the
sentence of 10 years, if not already served and are not wanted
in some other case.
In view of the above, both the appeals stand disposed of.
E B.B.B. Appeals disposed of.
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