Holding

The Punjab Town Improvement Act does not incorporate the Land Acquisition Act, so the three‑year limitation under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act applies, rendering the Section 42 notification issued on 30 June 1980 invalid.

Summary

The Bhatinda Improvement Trust framed a development scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and published notices under Section 36 in May‑June 1977. A notification sanctioning the scheme under Section 42 was issued on 30 June 1980. Respondents contended that the notification was beyond the three‑year period prescribed by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court held that the Punjab Town Improvement Act does not incorporate the Land Acquisition Act, so the three‑year limitation applies. Consequently, the notification was issued after the permissible period and is void, causing the acquisition proceedings to lapse. The appeal by the Trust was dismissed with costs.

Issues considered

Whether the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (especially the first proviso to Section 6) are incorporated into the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.
Whether the amendment introducing a three‑year time limit in the Land Acquisition Act applies to the scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act.
Whether the notification under Section 42 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act was issued within the statutory time limit.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5-A, s. 6, s. 6 (first proviso)
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967
Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922s. 28, s. 36, s. 42, s. 58, s. 59

Subjects

statutory interpretationincorporation by referenceamendment effectland acquisitiondevelopment schemenotification time limitPunjab Town Improvement ActLand Acquisition Actthree-year period

Judgment

J

'\
\

A \\\ BHATINDA IMPRvOVEMENT, TRUST

BALWANT SINGH AND OTHERS '
\
)
i SEPTEMBER 11, 1991
\ I •

B ,M.H. KANIA AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Interp}etation of Statutes-Reference of Sections 6, 28, 58, 59 of
Land Acqui$ition Act, 1894 in the Punjab Town Improvement Act,
1922-Amen,dment of those provisions of Land Acquisition Act, after
reference-Wi1ether affects the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922.
c Punjab ~own
Improvement Act, 1922-Sections 36, 42 read with
section 6, L4~d Acquisition Act, 1894--Notice under Section 36 on
30.5. I977 a1d publication of Notification sanctioning development
scheme u/s. 2 on 30.6. 1980-First Proviso of Section 6, Land Acquisi-
tion Act-A ,plicability of. .
' .
D I
The a1;3pellant-the Improvement frost-framed a development
scheme undoer the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and notices
under Sectio\i 36 of the Act were published in the Daily Tribune on May
31, 1977, Juine 7, 1977 and June 14, 1977 and in the local Daily Ajit on
May 30. 19'77, June 6, 1977 and June 13, 1977 and in the Punjab
•
E Government Gazette on June 17, 1977, June 24, 1977 and July 1977,
respectively'.
i
A no~ification as required under Section 42 of the Act was
published ~·n June 30, 1980 sanctioning the development scheme.

F The iltotification was challenged by the Respondents in a writ peti-
tion in the High Court on the ground that the notification was not issued
'
within the :stipulated period of three years from the first publications of
the notice,
i
The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ application
G and the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Letters Patent
Appeal, against which the present petition has been filed by the
Improvement Trust, contending that the time limit of three years for
the issue of the notification under section 42 of the ,-\ct was not pre-
scribed under the Act; that the first proviso to section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, was not applicable tn the scheme in question,
H . and; that the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were

928
IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. BALWANT SINGH 929

incorporated in the Act from the very time of its enactment and hence,
A
any amendment to the said section after that date would not be applic-
able to acquisitions under Act.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,
B
HELD: I. In a case where a statute is incorporated by a reference
into another statute, an amendment of the statute so incorporated after
the date of incorporation does not affect the liecom! statute and the
provisions of the latter statute remain the same as they were at the time
of incorporation. [934F-G I
c
2. Where one statute is referred to in another, it may be merely
by way of reference or by way of incorporation of the same. This
depends on the language used in the latter statute and other relevant
circumstances. [934G I
D
3. In the present case, there is no question of incorporation of any
of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the Punjab
Improvement Act 1922 at all as the latter Act does not deal with acquisi-
• tion of land for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the Act.
The acquisition of such land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the
general law of the land in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition E
Act, which has to be resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land
for the purposes of a scheme as contemplated under the Punjab Town
Improvement Act. The only difference is that some of the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to in the relevant sections of the
Act, are given effect to as amended by the relevant sections of the Act.
In these circumstances; it cannot be held that any provisions of the Land F
Acquisition Act have been incorporated into the Act and the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions
as they stood at the relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in
the absence of a contrary intention. [934G-C]

G
4. The notification under Section 42 should have been published with-
<in the period of three years of the date of publication of the notification under
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, as required under the first
proviso to Section 6ofthe Land Acquisition Act. Under sub-clause (J) of
Clause (2) of the Scheaule to the said Act, the first publication of a
notice of any improvement scheme under section 36 of the said Act, is
H
_930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 .S.C.R.

A substituted for and bas the same effect as the publication in the Govern-
ment Gazette of a notification under sub-section (I) of Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition Act. The notice under section 36 of the said Act is
required to be published, inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as set ~-
out In secion 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the present case, such a notice
was first published In the daily 'Ajit' on May 30, 1977, and hence, the
B notification under Section 42 of the said Act should have been published
on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under Seclion 42 of
the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30. 1980 and hence. was
clearly beyond time. [93SC-F]

Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India and Another,
[1979] 2 SCR 1038 and Secretary of State for India in Council v.
c Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd., [1958] IA 259 at 267,
referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3574
of 1991.
D
From the Judgment and Order dated 5.9.1990 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in L.P.A. No. 127 of 1983.

S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta and Aman Vachher for the
Appellant.
E
O.P. Sharma, K.R. Gupta, Vivek Sharma, R.C. Gubrele and
Ms. Nanita Sharma for the Respondents.
!
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by )

F KANIA, J. Leave granted. Counsel heard.

The appellant, Bhatinda Improvement Trust, framed a develop-
ment scheme under the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (refer-
red to hereinafter as "the said Act"). Notices under Section 36 of the
said Act in respect of the said scheme, setting out the particulars
G referred to in the said Section, were published in the Daily Tribune on
May 31, 1977, June '7, 1977, and June 14, 1977. The said notices were
also published in the local daily Ajit on May 30, 1977, June 6, 1977,
and June 13, 1977 and in Punjab Government Gazette on June 17,
1977, June 24, 1977 and July 1977, respectively. A Notification as
required under Section 42 of the said Act was published on June 30,
H 1980 sanctioning the said development scheme. The said Notices and
IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. BALWANT SINGH (KANIA. J.J 931

Notifications were challenged by the respondents in Civil Writ No.
A
2508 of 1982 filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, inter alia,
on the ground that the Notification under Section 42 was not issued
within the stipulated period of three years from the first publication of
the Notice under Section 36 and on that account it was bad in law. This
contention found favour with the learned Single Judge of Pun jab and
Haryana High Court who allowed the writ petition and set aside the B
Notification under Section 42 which was issued on June 30, 1980. A
Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the said Judgment was dismis-
sed by a Division Bench of the said High Court and the present peti-
tion is directed against the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench,
dismissing the said Letters Patent Appeal.

It was submitted by Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel for the appel-
c
lant that the time limit of three years for the issue of the Notification
under Section 42 of the said Act was not prescribed under the said Act
and that the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
· 1894, was not applicable to the scheme in question. It was submitted
by him that the provisions of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act D
were, in effect, incorporated into the said Act which was enacted in
1922 from the very time of its enactment and hence, any amendment to
.the said section after that date would not be applicable to acquisitions
' under the said Act. It was pointed out by him that the aforesaid time
. limit of three years was inserted,in the Land Acquisition Act in 1984,
long after the said Act was enacted as set out particularly, hereinafter E
and hence, it could not have any application to the acquisitions made
for the purposes of the said Act.

In order to examine the correctness of the submissions of Mr.
Mehta, it is necessary to take note of the relevant provisions of the said
Act and the Land Acquisition Act. Section 28 of the said Act sets out F
the matters which may be provided for in a scheme. Under sub-.;ection
(2) clause (i) of the said section it is inter alia provided that a scheme
under said Act may provide for the acquisition under the Land Acqui-
sition Act as modified by the saicl Act. Section 36 of the said Act
provides that when a scheme under the said Act has been framed, the
trust shall prepare a notice setting out the particulars contained in the G
said section. The relevant part of sub.,;ection (2) of the said Section
runs as follows:

(2) The trust shall:

"(a) notwithstanding anything contained in Section 78 H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

A cause the said notice to be published weekly for three con-
secutive weeks in the official Gazette and in a newspaper or
newspapers with a statement of the period within which
objections will be received .... ".
~-

Sub-section (1) of Section 42 provides that the State Government
"
B shall notify the sanction of every scheme under the said Act and the
trust shall forthwith proceed to execute the scheme and so on. Sub-
section (2) of the said Section provides that a Notification under sub-
section (1) thereof shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has
been framed and sanctioned. Section 58 provides for the constitution
of a tribunal for the purposes of performing the functions of a court ·in ' -
c a reference to acquisition of land for improvement "trust under the
•
Land Acquisition Act. Section 59 provides for modification of the
Land Acquisition Act, as set out therein for the purposes of acquiring
the land under the Land Acquisition Act for the said trust. We are not
concerned with the actual modifications referred to in Section 59. We
need only note that under sub-section (b) of Section 59 it is provided
D that the Land Acquisition Act may be subject to further modifications
as indicated in the Schedule to the said Act. Sub-clause (1) of Clause 2
of the Schedule to the said Act, referred to .in Section 59, runs as
follows:
,
"(2) Notification under section 4 and declaration under
E section 6 to be replaced by notification under sections 36 and
42 of this Act-

(1) The first publication of a notice of any improvement
scheme under section 36 of this Act shall be substituted for
and have the same effect as publication in the Official )
F Gazette and in the locality of a notification under sub-
section ( 1) of section 4 of the said Act, except where a
declaration under section 4 or section 6 of the said Act has
previously been made and is still in force."

G Sub-sectiol) ( 1) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, inter alia,
provides that whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that
land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public
purpose, a notification.to that effect shall be published in the Official
..
Gazette as prescribed in the said section. Section 5-A deals with hear-
ing of objections. Sub-section ( 1) of Section 6, inter alia provides that
H when the appropriate Government is satisfied 'after considering the
IMPROVEMENT TRUSTv. BALWANT SINGH {KANIA, J.J 933

report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2), that any
A
particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration to that
effect shall be made as prescribed in the said section. The relevant part
of the first proviso to the said sub-section as substituted by Act 68 of
1984 runs as follows:

"Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular B.
land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (I)

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acqui-
sition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 (I of
1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisi-
- .. tion (Amendment) .Act, 1984, shall be made after the C
expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the
notification; or".

It was by this substituted proviso that the said time-limit of three
years was prescribed. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 provides for the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 and prescribes the D
manner in which the same shall be done.

It is the submission of learned Counsel for the appellant that by
the aforesaid provisions, and in particular, Sections 28,. 58 and 59 of
the said Act certain provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and
particularly, Section 6 thereof were, in effect, incorporated into the E
said Act by reference and hence, it is only such provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act as were in existence at the time when the said Act was
enacted in 1922 which could be said to be incorporated into the said
Act. In support of his submission he placed strong reliance on the
decision of a Bench comprising three learned Judges Bench of this
Court in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India F
and Another., [1979) 2 SCR 1038. In that case it has been pointed out
that Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
1969 (referred to hereinafter as the "MRTP Act") provides that any
person aggrieved by the order made by the Central Government or the
Commission (The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Com-
mission) under Section lJ or Section 37 of the MRTP Act may prefer G
an appeal to the Supreme Court on one or more of the grounds
specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was pointed
out in the judgment that on the "date on which the MRTP Act came
into force, Section JOO of the Code of Civil Procedure specified 3
grounds on which a second appeal could lie to the High Court, one of
them being that the decision appealed against, was contrary to law. By H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1991] 3 S.C.R.

an amendment made in 1976, Section 100 of the Code was subsituted
A
by a new section which provides that a second appeal shall lie to the
High Court 01;ily if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a
substantial question of law. The appellant took the stand that under
the provisions of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, as it Blood
when the MRTP Act was enacted, the appeal was clearly maintainable
B as the impugned order was contrary to law. The respondents con-
tended that, although this might be so, no substantial question of law
was involved in the. second appeal and hence, the appeal was not
maintainable. It was submitted by the respondents that the maintaina-
bility of the appeal would have to be determined on the basis of
Section 100 of the Code as amended. This Court took the view that the
appeal was maintainable. It was held that on a proper interpretation of
c Section 55 it must be held that the grounds specified in Section 100 of
the Code as it stood when the MRTP Act was enacted in 1969, were
incorporated in Section 55 of the MRTP Act and the substitution of
the new Section 100 did not affect or restrict the grounds as incor-
porated in Section 55. In the said judgment this Court cited with
D approval the judgment of the Privy Council in Secretary of State for
India in Council v. Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd.,
[ 1958] I.A. 259 at 267. where the Judicial Committee observed:

"In this country it is accepted that where a statute is •
incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal
E of the first statute does not affect the second; (see the c&sc
collected in Craies on Statute Law, 3rd edn. pp. 349, 350)".

We find ourselves unable to accept the submissions of learned
Counsel for the appellant. As pointed out by the Supreme Court and '
the Judicial Committee in the aforesaid decisions, it is well-settled law
F that where a statute is incorporated by a reference into a second
statute, the repeal of the first statute does not affect the second. Simi-
larly, in a case where a statute is incorporated by a reference into
another statute an amendment of the statute so incorporated after the
date of incorporation docs not affect the second statute and the provi-
sions of the latter statute remain the same as they were at the time of
G incorporatien. It is again well-settled that where one statute is referred
to in another, it may be merely by way of reference or by way of
incorporation of the same. This depends on the language used in the
latter statute and other. relevant circumstances. In the present case,
however, we find that there is no question of incorporation of any of
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act into the said Act at all. The
H said Act does not deal with acquisition of land for the purposes of a
IMPROVEMENT TRUST v. BALWANT SINGH [KANIA, J.l 935

scheme as contemplated under the said Act. The acquisition of such
A
land for the purposes of the scheme is left to the general law of the land
in that connection, namely, the Land Acquisition Act, which has to be
} resorted to for the purposes of acquisition of land for the purposes of
the schemes contemplated under the said Act. The only difference is
that some of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as referred to
in the relevant sections of the said Act, are given effect to as a.mended B
by the relevant sections of the said Act. In these circumstances, it
cannot be held that any provisions of the Land Acquisition Act have
been incorporated into the said Act and the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act which have to be applied, are the provisions as they
stand atthe relevant time, namely, at the time of acquisition, in the
• absence of-a contrary intention. There is nothing to indicate that there C
was any such contrary intention in the present case. In these cir-
cumstances, the notification under Section 42 should have been
published within the period of three years of the date of publication of
the notification under Section 4( 1) of the Lane! Acquisition Act, as
required under the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act. Under sub-clause (1) of clause (2) of the Schedule to the said Act, D
which we have referred to earlier, the first publication of a notice of
any improvement scheme under Section 36 of the said Act, is sub-
stituted for and has the same effect as the publication in the Govern-
ment Gazette of a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the
Land Acquisitipn Act. The notice under section 36 of the said Act is
required to be published, inter alia, in a newspaper or newspapers as E
set out in section 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the present case, such a
notice was first published in the daily 'Ajit' on May 30, 1977, and
hence, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act should have
been published on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification
under Section 42 of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June
30, 1980, and hence, wm; clearly beyond time. In these circumstances, F
the notice under Section 36 of the said Act lapsed on the expiry of
three years from May 30, 1977, and no action pursuant to the said
notice could be taken thereafter. The notification under Section 42 of
the said Act was clearly beyond time and bad. in law, as it was not
published within the period provided. The acquisition proceedings
lapsed. The submission of learned Counsel for the. appellant must be G
rejected. No other point was canvassed before us.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

V.P.R. Appeal dismissed.