Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s conviction was unsustainable because the prosecution failed to establish a reliable chain of circumstantial evidence, motive, and unlawful assembly, and therefore the trial court’s acquittal must stand.

Summary

The State of Maharashtra alleged that sixteen accused, including Bhaskarrao and others, murdered Shamrao by assaulting him with weapons and amputating his hand, invoking sections 147, 148, 452 r/w 149, 302 r/w 149 and 506 of the IPC. The trial court acquitted all accused after finding the prosecution’s case riddled with inconsistent, inter‑related witness statements, lack of motive, no forensic linkage of weapons, and no proof of an unlawful assembly. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused, but the Supreme Court held that the High Court had no compelling reason to disturb the trial court’s finding. The Court emphasized that appellate interference with an order of acquittal is permissible only when the lower court’s approach is manifestly erroneous, which was not the case here. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, restored the trial court’s acquittal, and discharged the bail bonds of the accused.

Issues considered

The High Court’s reversal of the trial court’s acquittal under sections 147, 148, 452 r/w 149, 302 r/w 149 and 506 IPC.
Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
The relevance and evidentiary value of motive in a case relying on circumstantial evidence.
The credibility of inter‑related (interested) witnesses and the need for independent corroboration.
Whether the appellate court can interfere with an order of acquittal absent compelling reasons.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 302 r/w 149, s. 452 r/w 149, s. 506
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Acts. 2(v), s. 3(i)(x)

Subjects

circumstantial evidenceunlawful assemblymotivewitness credibilityappellate review of acquittalIndian Penal CodeSC/ST Actcriminal lawevidence law

Judgment

[2018] 4 S.C.R. 751 751

BHASKARRAO & ORS. A
v.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 408 of 2014)
APRIL 26, 2018. B
[N. V. RAMANA AND S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860:
ss. 147, 148, 452 r/w s. 149, s.302/149 and s.506 – Prosecution
under – For murder of a person – by 16 accused – Trial Court C
acquitted all the accused – High Court reversed the acquittal order
– On appeal, held: Evidence of witnesses were not consistent –
There were lot of improvement in the statement of witnesses – There
were contradictory statements as regards the number of accused
persons involved – All the witnesses were related – Material
D
independent witnesses were not examined – Prosecution failed to
prove motive – Panch witnesses as well as medical evidence did not
support the prosecution case – Thus, chain of events cannot be
said to have been properly brought on record by the prosecution –
In view of the shortcomings and discrepancies in the prosecution
case, accused persons cannot be said to have formed unlawful E
assembly with a view to kill the deceased – Guilt of accused not
proved beyond reasonable doubt – Acquittal justified.
Criminal Law:
Motive – Evidentiary value – Held: In a case of circumstantial
evidence, motive has a role to play – But to dislodge prosecution’s F
case solely based on lack of motive would amount to giving credit
to this factor, where it is not due.
Appeal:
Appeal against acquittal – Interference with and G
reappreciation of evidence by appellate Court – Scope of – Held:
Appellate court is expected to be very cautious in interfering with
the order of acquittal – Its interference is called for, only when
there are compelling reasons and substantial grounds.

H
751
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A Evidence:
Circumstantial evidence – Value of circumstantial evidence
rests in its accumulative effect – When several such evidences are
taken together, they may carry enough probative force to justify the
conviction, if such evidence forms an unbroken chain of events
B resulting in only one hypothesis so canvassed.
Witness:
Related witness – Evidentiary value – Held: Interest of the
witness does affect his testimony – Under the influence of bias, a
man may not be in a position to judge correctly – Therefore, witness
C having interest in the result, if allowed to be weighed in the same
scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would
be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. In the present case, the trial court, followed by a
D full-fledged trial, comes to the conclusion and by cogent reasoning
acquits the accused. In such a case, the appellate Court is further
burdened with the task of reaffirming the innocence of the
accused. In such cases, the appellate Court is expected to be
very cautious and its interference with the order of acquittal is
called for only when there are compelling reasons and substantial
E
grounds. In other words, the High Court has full power to review
the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, yet the
presumption of innocence of the accused being further reinforced
by his acquittal by the trial Court, the findings of that Court which
had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their
F evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling
reasons. [Para 23] [768-F-H; 769-A]
Surajpal Singh & Ors. v. The State, 1952 CriLJ 331 –
relied on.
2. The prosecution relies on the circumstantial evidence
G to prove the case. The value of circumstantial evidence rests in
its accumulative effect, that is to say, while a single piece of
circumstantial evidence may only slightly increase the likelihood
that the accused is guilty, several such evidences taken together
may carry enough probative force to justify the conviction, if such
H circumstantial evidence forms an unbroken chain of events
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 753

resulting in only one hypothesis so canvassed. [Para 26] A
[769-D-E]
3. The witnesses in the present case were inter-related,
and this court should be cautious in accepting their statements.
Whoever has been a witness before the court of law, having a
strong interest in result, if allowed to be weighed in the same B
scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would
be to open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound
rule which remain the bulwark of this system, and which
determines the value of evidence derived from such sources,
needs to be cautiously and carefully observed and enforced. There
is no dispute about the fact that the interest of the witness must C
affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, under the
influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge correctly,
even if they earnestly desire to do so. Similarly, he may not be in
a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner, when it
involves his interest. Under such influences, man will, even D
though not consciously, suppress some facts, soften or modify
others, and provide favorable color. These are most controlling
considerations in respect to the credibility of human testimony,
and should never to be overlooked in applying the rules of
evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under
the facts and circumstances of each case. [Paras 27 and 31] E
[769-F; 771-F-H; 772-A]
Dalip Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1954] 1 SCR
145; Masalti v. State of U.P., [1964] 8 SCR 133; Darya
Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, [1964] 3 SCR 397;
Harbans Kaur & Anr. v. State of Haryana, 2005 CriLJ F
2199; Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 14 SCC
150 : [2007] 3 SCR 939 – relied on.
4. The prosecution has heavily relied on the statement of
PW1. The allegation particularly levelled by her was that the
accused carried the assault on the deceased at three places i.e., G
in front of the house of the deceased and near the house of PW3
and at the fields of ‘Y’. However, in their depositions PWs 2, 4
and 5 did not mention about such assault on the deceased in front
of PW3. It appears from the material that there are no
eyewitnesses who had seen the accused attacking the deceased H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A in the fields of ‘Y’. The statements of PW3 also appears to be not
consistent throughout. At one point of time, he deposed that the
deceased had died in front of his house. Altogether a different
statement was given to the investigating authorities and in the
Court. Similar is the case of PW4, who has made improvements
as regards to the assault on the deceased. Also there were varying
B
statements by the prosecution witnesses as regards PW4, on the
aspect of receiving the blow.Though she stated that she could
recognize the assailants by their face as she does not know their
names, yet test identification parade was not conducted which is
fatal to the case of prosecution. [Paras 32 and 33] [77-B, C-F]
C 5. PWs 2, 3 and 5 in their depositions gave contradictory
statements as to the involvement of number of accused persons
in the crime and also about noticing the accused who dragged
the deceased while assaulting him and dragging towards school
whereas PWs 1 and 4 were silent on this aspect. There were also
D contradictory statements by prosecution witnesses as regards
the availability of light at the time of occurrence. [Para 33] [772-G]
6. PW1 has not witnessed the chopping of the hand, which
resulted in the ultimate death of her husband. It is prudent for
this Court to not believe in absence of cogent evidence concerning
E the culpability of the accused, as her evidence is ridden with
apparent internal contradictions and inconsistencies. [Para 34]
[773-C-D]
7. In a case of circumstantial evidence, motive has a role to
play, but to dislodge prosecution’s case solely based on lack of
F motive would amount to giving credit to this factor, where it is
not due. The motive behind the accused assaulting the deceased
was said to be the quarrel during which the deceased had slapped
Accused No. 4 near a grocery shop in the village. Incidentally,
prosecution could also not prove the same by examining the
independent witness present at the grocery shop, though as many
G as 19 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. PW10, Head
Constable of the Police Station who reduced the oral complaint
of PW1 into writing, categorically stated that PW1 had also not
mentioned about previous quarrel at the time of lodging of
complaint. There were, undoubtedly lot of improvements in the
H statement of PW1 from the stage of complaint to her examination-
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 755

in-chief. Moreover, the evidence of PW1 concerning the quarrel A
is barred for being hearsay evidence. [Para 35] [773-F-G;
774-A-B]
Hari Shanker v. State of U.P. (1996) 9 SCC 40 : [1996]
2 Suppl. SCR 348; Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2007) 13 SCC 90 : [ 2007] 13 SCR 653; State of U.P. B
v. Kishanpal & Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73 : [2008]
11 SCR 1048; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West
Bengal, (2010) 12 SCC 91 : [2010] 8 SCR 1036 – relied
on.
Chandler v. DPP [1964] AC 763 – referred to. C
General Principles of Criminal Law by Jerome Hall
88 (2d ed. 1960) – referred to.
8. Alternatively, the prosecution has alleged that motive
for the crime was that the accused party belongs to non-SC/ST
community whereas the victim was belonging to SC community. D
The prosecution could not prove that the deceased belonged to
Scheduled Caste and accused were from non-Scheduled Caste
or Tribe and the prosecution has failed to prove any charge against
the accused including the charge under Section 3(i)(x) and 2(v)
of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of E
Atrocities) Act. As against that charge, the High Court also
confirmed the view taken by the trial Court, which in other words
proved the prosecution version to be wrong. [Para 36] [774-C-D]
9. An accused is, of course, vicariously guilty of the offence
even if he is not directly indulged in the commission of offence F
but committed by other accused, in case he is proved to be a
member of unlawful assembly sharing its common object. It is
evident that as per PW1-complainant, in the FIR the number of
persons mentioned by her, who have entered into their house
was four, while about 20 to 25 persons were assembled outside
the house and all of them assaulted the deceased. However, in G
the examination-in-chief she deposed that there were in all 15
assailants who attacked her husband. Though she failed to name
the assailants in her deposition she made out a point that she
knew all the assailants. According to PW10, the author of
complaint, PW1 did not state about entry of accused Nos. 13 and
H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A 15 into her house. There was also no mention by her at the time
of lodging of FIR about carrying an axe by A-11, a sword by A-13,
a pipe by A-15 and sticks by other accused. Going by the material
on record, it can be said that there was no satisfactory explanation
on the part of PW1 for omissions in the FIR and improvements
before the Court. [Para 37] [774-F-H; 775-A]
B
10. PW11, a panch witness of seizure of bloodstained clothes
of the accused Nos. 1 to 7, did not support the prosecution case.
Similarly, the seizure is doubtful in the case of clothes pertaining
to accused No. 11 to which PW13 was witness. Going by the
material on record, the correctness of seizure of clothes of other
C accused persons also do not inspire confidence.[Para 38]
[775-B-C]
11. PW6 who proved the recovery of weapons at the instance
of accused—appellants, could not point out his signature on the
respective disclosure statements and seizure panchnamas. He
D also admitted that Ext.72 (memorandum) and Ext. 73 (seizure
panchnama) does not bear his signature. PW9 deposed that after
recovering sticks from the houses of accused Nos. 1 to 7, they
returned to the village panchayat office where almost all the papers
were scribed. Based on the Chemical Analysis report, those sticks
E cannot be considered to be incriminating articles as there were
no blood stains on those sticks. In the same way, the sword and
axe allegedly recovered from Accused Nos. 13 and 11 respectively
also do not have bloodstains. In these circumstances, the
prosecution cannot be said to have proved the fact that the palm
of the deceased has been amputated by the accused with those
F weapons. [Para 39] [775-D-F]
12. In the opinion of the doctor-PW7, who conducted
postmortem on the body of the deceased, the cause of the death
was due to heavy loss of blood owing to the amputation of his
hand. However, his vital organs were found to be normal and
G there was no injury to the vital organs. PW7 has specifically
mentioned that there was no laceration or contusion sustained
by the deceased and opined that had there been timely medical
treatment, the deceased would have survived. At the same time
she made it clear that in case a person is beaten up with sticks
H and iron pipe, as alleged by the prosecution in the present case,
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 757

contusions and lacerations are possible. In her cross-examination, A
the Doctor also revealed that because of amputation of hand and
leg or both, a person may not die. Thus, in totality, the medical
evidence is not corroborating with the prosecution’s case. [Para
40] [775-G-H; 776-A-B]
13. Many persons, especially neighbours of the deceased, B
who witnessed the important circumstances and who could be
vital independent witnesses have not been examined by the
prosecution. There is no convincing explanation forthcoming from
the prosecution side. [Para 41] [776-F]
14. In the midst of several contradictory statements among
the prosecution witnesses, there is no proper explanation on C
record for PW1 and police searching for the deceased at the wells
and nullahs of the village, instead of searching around the school,
as per the prosecution story PWs 2, 3 and 5 were fully aware that
the deceased was dragged towards school. Moreover, looking at
the ambiguous narration of sequences described by the witnesses, D
the chain of events in the case cannot be said to have been
properly brought on record by the prosecution. [Para 42] [777-
B-C]
15. It is always the duty of the Court to separate chaff from
the husk and to dredge the truth from the pandemonium of E
Statements. It is but natural for human beings to state variant
statements due to time gap but if such statements go to defeat
the core of the prosecution then such contradictions are material
and the Court has to be mindful of such statements. [Para 42]
[777-C-D]
F
Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 –
relied on.
16. High Court has misconstrued certain aspects of the case.
According to PW2 the incident occurred at about 9 p.m. In the
FIR also the time was mentioned as 9 p.m. But the High Court in
G
its judgment observed that the incident took place at about 7.30
p.m. Thus, it is clear from the record that the alleged incident
has occurred at 9 p.m. and not at 7.30 p.m. as assumed by the
High Court, and there were also no eyewitnesses to the alleged
amputation of the hand of deceased and causing his death. [Para
43] [777-E-F, G] H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A 17. In view of the shortcomings and discrepancies in the
prosecution case coupled with the improvements and
contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, it
cannot be said that the accused persons had really formed into
an unlawful assembly and carried out an assault on the deceased
that too with a view to kill him, so as to attract the provisions of
B
criminal law. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is
abundantly clear that the guilt of the accused persons was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court had dealt with
the case in a fool-proof manner by drawing out 11 important
circumstances and delivered a well reasoned judgment thereby
C acquitting the accused, with which the High Court ought not to
have interfered. There were no compelling reasons and
substantial grounds for the High Court to interfere with the order
of acquittal passed by the trial Court. [Para 45] [778-B-D]
Mahavir Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2016) 10
D SCC 220 : [2016] 8 SCR 394; L.L. Kale v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors. (2000) 1 SCC 295; Joginder Singh
& Anr. v. State of Haryana (2010) 15 SCC 407;
Nankaunoo v. State of U.P. (2016) 3 SCC 317 : [2016]
4 SCR 627; Tota Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab,
1987 CriLJ 974; Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
E Gujarat, 1996 CriLJ 2867 – referred to.
Case Law Reference
[2016] 8 SCR 394 referred to Para 11
(2000) 1 SCC 295 referred to Para 11
F
(2010) 15 SCC 407 referred to Para 11
[2016] 4 SCR 627 referred to Para 11
1987 CriLJ 974 referred to Para 14

G 1996 CriLJ 2867 referred to Para 15
1952 CriLJ 331 relied on Para 23
[1954] 1 SCR 145 relied on Para 27
[1964] 8 SCR 133 relied on Para 28

H [1964] 3 SCR 397 relied on Para 29
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 759

2005 CriLJ 2199 relied on Para 29 A
[2007] 3 SCR 939 relied on Para 30
[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 348 relied on Para 35
[1964] AC 763 referred to Para 35
[2007] 13 SCR 653 relied on Para 35 B
[2008] 11 SCR 1048 relied on Para 35
[2010] 8 SCR 1036 relied on Para 35
AIR 1959 SC 1012 relied on Para 42
C
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
408 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2013 of the High Court
of Judicature at Bombay Bench at Nagpur in Criminal Appeal No. 290
of 1998.
D
WITH
Crl. A. Nos. 520, 1328, 1228, 1223, 1229, 1330 & 1578 of 2014.
V. V. S. Rao, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Varun Mathur,
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, Tadimalla Baskar Gowtham, Subodh K.
Pathan, Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, Advs. for the appearing E
parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
N. V. RAMANA, J. 1. These appeals arise out of the common
judgment and order, dated 21st December, 2013, passed by the High
F
Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Nagpur, in Criminal Appeal
No. 290 of 1998 whereby the High Court reversed the order of acquittal
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Amravati in Sessions Trial No.
40 of 1995 and convicted all the accused/appellants herein except accused
no. 6 (since dead) for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148,
452 read with Section 149, Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section G
506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
2. The prosecution story in short is that, on 19th June, 1995 at
about 7 pm, in the village Jalka Shahapur an altercation had taken place
between two villagers, namely Shamrao (deceased) and Balya (Accused
No. 4) on the road near a grocery shop over repayment of Rs.50/-. It H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A was alleged that Shamrao (deceased) had slapped Balya (Accused No.
4) during the scuffle. After sometime, all the sixteen accused persons
armed with weapons, while entering the house of Shamrao hurling abuses,
dragged him out of the house, assaulted on his hands and legs. They are
alleged to have continuously assaulted Shamrao while simultaneously
dragging him to a field where they finally cut his right palm and left the
B
place. During the course of assault by the accused, Chanda (PW1) [wife
of Shamrao] followed them pleading not to hurt her husband and out of
fear she took shelter in some cattle shed. Later on she went to the house
of one Harshawardhan Bhalekar and informed him about the incident.
Then Harshawardhan Bhalekar along with PW1 proceeded to Amravati
C and informed about the occurrence to the family members of Shamrao.
After that they went to the office of Superintendent of Police, Amravati
where they were advised to lodge a complaint at Nandgaon Peth police
station. Accordingly, a complaint (Ext. 55) was lodged on 20th June,
1995 being crime case No. 72 of 1995. It may be relevant to reduce a
part of the FIR as under-
D
Name and addresses : 1. Gajanan Chincholkar
of accused, if any 2. Bal ya Bhagat
3. Pramod Khedkar
4. Raj u Mohol
+ 20 to 25 persons
E Names and addresses :
of sus pects

Nature of offence with The incident is that on the above
penal section. Give dt. Time and place, when the
short descriptions of : husband of the complainant was
F stolen property with i n the home, when he went to the
its value if any. house of B alya Bhagat out of the
accused persons herein for
demanding the m oney of fi shes,
t he accused persons cam e to the
G house of the husband of the
accused and the accused persons
have beaten and pull ed from the
house and on account of the said
occurrence, the offence is
registered and taken for
H i nvestigation.
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 761
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

3. Dattatray Kulkarni, A.P.I. (PW17) took up the investigation A
and carried a search for missing Shamrao in the Jalka Shahapur village
and ultimately on 21st June, 1995 on the information of one Ananda
Bhurbhure, PW1 and PW17 found the dead body of Shamrao, in the
fields of one Yeshwant Thawale, without his right palm which they traced
at some distance. After conducting the panchanama of scene of
B
occurrence, inquest report was drawn, clothes of the deceased were
seized, statements of some witnesses were recorded and the dead body
was sent to the Civil Surgeon at Amravati for postmortem. All the accused,
except accused no. 16 who was stated to be absconding, were arrested
and at their instance, alleged weapons used for the crime were recovered,
disclosure statements recorded, seizure panchanama recorded and the C
accused were got medically examined. After completion of investigation,
charges were framed against accused nos. 1 to 15 to which the accused
pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
4. In its effort to prove the guilt of the accused, prosecution has
examined as many as 19 witnesses. Learned trial Judge after conducting D
a full fledged trial, came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore,
all the accused, against whom trial was conducted (accused nos. 1 to
15), were acquitted of the offences they were charged with. Accused
No. 16, who was absconding, came to be arrested at the end of trial.
Hence, the trial court directed separate trial against him. E

5. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by the trial court,
above the State of Maharashtra went in appeal before the High Court. During
n the the pendency of the appeal, before the High Court, Accused No. 6 expired.
nt was The High Court found fault with the acquittal order passed by the trial
to the court and by its judgment which is impugned herein, convicted all the F
of the accused before it except accused No. 6, for the offence punishable
for under Sections 147, 148, 452 read with Section 149, Section 302 read
fi shes, with Section 149 and Section 506, IPC. They were sentenced to undergo
to the imprisonment for a period of two years for the offence punishable under
f the Sections 147, 148 and 452, IPC. Whereas for the offence punishable G
ersons under Section 302 read with Section 149, IPC they were sentenced to
m the suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in
e said default, to further suffer imprisonment for one year. They were also
e is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay
for a fine of Rs. 500/- each, in default, to further suffer a period of one
H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A month imprisonment for the offence under Section 506, IPC. However,
all the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
6. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the High Court in reversing
the order of acquittal, the Accused Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 to 14 are before us
in these appeals assailing the judgment of the High Court. It appears
B that Accused No. 15, Gajanan Pandurang Chincholkar, has not preferred
an appeal against the judgment of the High Court.
7. It may be beneficial to note that the accused Nos. 1 (Motiram)
and 3 (Ravindra) have filed Criminal Appeal No. 1330 of 2014, Accused
Nos. 2 (Bhaskarrao), 9 (Maroti Bhaskarrao Bhagat) and 10 (Bhagwat
C Bhaurao Bhagat) have filed Criminal Appeal No. 408 of 2014, Accused
Nos. 4 (Balya) and 5 (Vishnu Bharao Bhagat) have filed Criminal Appeal
No. 1578 of 2014, Accused No. 7 (Maroti Mahadeorao Kosare) has
filed Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2014, Accused No. 8 (Laxman Bhaurao
Bhagat) has filed Criminal Appeal 1328 of 2014, Accused No. 11
(Prabhakar Narsaji Bhagat) has filed Criminal Appeal No. 1223 of 2014,
D Accused No. 12 (Babarao Laxmanrao Adhao) has filed Criminal Appeal
No. 1228 of 2014 and Accused Nos. 13 (Dilip Uttamrao Mankur) and
14 (Pramod Devidas Khedkar) have filed Criminal Appeal No. 520 of
2014.
8. On behalf of Accused No. 8, the arguments were advanced by
E Mr. V.V.S. Rao, learned senior counsel. Ms. Anagha S. Desai, learned
counsel has argued on behalf of Accused Nos. 2, 7, 9 and 10 to 14, while
Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha, learned counsel made submissions in
respect of Accused Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5. Having heard the arguments
advanced by the respective counsel, as the order impugned is one and
F the same, we proceed to deal with all these appeals by a common
judgment.
9. It is the case of the appellants—accused that the entire
prosecution story has been concocted to falsely implicate the innocent
appellants and is not based on the true facts and circumstances. That
G there were several lapses in the prosecution theory. That the dead body
of the deceased was found in a field which is about two kms away from
the house of the deceased, and there is no eyewitness to the factum of
accused committing the murder of deceased. His amputated palm was
found at some distance to his dead body, but there was no evidence on
record as to who cut the palm of the deceased. There were also no
H bloodstains on any weapon alleged to have been recovered by the
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 763
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

investigating authorities at the instance of accused. All the prosecution A
witnesses are inter-related and there was no independent witness to
support the prosecution case. The trial Court has rightly discarded the
evidence of interested witnesses.
10. It is also argued that the prosecution has improvised the
circumstances from the stage of lodging FIR to the conclusion of trial. B
In the FIR, there was no mention about the alleged quarrel that took
place between the deceased and Accused No. 4 over a matter of Rs.50/
- near a grocery shop. PW1 (wife of the deceased) introduced the story
later on. The owner of the grocery shop was not examined as a witness
whose evidence would be crucial to prove that a quarrel has taken place
which is the whole basis or provocation for the incident. It was also C
alleged that there were two other witnesses namely Charandas and Anant,
but they too were not examined by the prosecution. In the FIR, the
names of accused were specified as only four persons, but 16 persons
have been dragged into the case as accused. The statements of witnesses
varied as to the presence of the accused at the time of occurrence and D
their depositions are quite contradictory to the prosecution case. There
was also no test identification parade conducted and all the accused
persons are not familiar to the witnesses. The evidence of prosecution
witnesses is unbelievable inasmuch as the allegation was that the
deceased was dragged on the ground for about 2 kms from his house to
the place where his dead body was found, even then there were no E
injury marks on the body of the deceased.
11. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the High
Court failed to take into consideration the crucial facts that no test
identification parade was conducted, no motive was established, no injuries
on vital parts of the deceased were noted, and above all medical evidence F
did not corroborate with the alleged ocular evidence. The High Court
has also failed to take note of the fact that the trial Court has not committed
any legal error in appreciating the ocular and medical evidence to reach
at the conclusion that the accused are innocent. The law is well settled
by this Court with regard to fresh appreciation of evidence in an appeal G
against acquittal that even if on the basis of evidence, there is a possibility
of taking a different view than that of the trial Court, the appellate Court
should refrain from disturbing the findings and conclusion recorded by
the lower court. In view of the settled law, the High Court ought not
have interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. But
by setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, the High H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A Court has committed a gross illegality by convicted the appellants—
accused thereby causing miscarriage of justice which invites interference
of this Court. In support of their arguments learned counsel appearing
for the accused—appellants relied on the judgments of this Court in
Mahavir Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 10 SCC 220,
L.L. Kale Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2000) 1 SCC 295,
B
Joginder Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana (2010) 15 SCC 407 and
Nankaunoo Vs. State of U.P. (2016) 3 SCC 317.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State—
Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, supported the impugned
judgment and submitted that the learned trial Judge disbelieved the
C evidence of prosecution witnesses for no valid and reasonable cause.
The minor discrepancies in the depositions have been given undue
importance to pass the acquittal order against the accused, who in a
brutal manner dragged the deceased to the fields and assaulted him with
sticks, axe and sword. PW1—Chanda, wife of the deceased, tried her
D best to save her husband praying at the accused to show mercy, but all
the accused in pursuance of their common object, attacked the deceased
indiscriminately leading to his death. The High Court has correctly
assessed the facts and circumstances of the case and there was no
legal error in the impugned order seeking indulgence of this Court.
E 13. We have given our consideration to the material placed before
us and the arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side.
14. As the trial court and High Court, having appreciated the
evidence on record, has come to diametrically opposite conclusions,
mandating herein to observe certain witness statements which may have
F an important bearing in this case. In the processes of appreciating the
evidence at the appellate stage, we need to keep in mind the views of
this court as expressed in Tota Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1987
CriLJ 974 -
“The High Court has not found in its judgment that the reasons
G given by the learned Sessions Judge for discarding the testimony
of PW2 and PW6 were either unreasonable or perverse. What
the High Court has done is to make an independent reappraisal of
the evidence on its own and to set aside the acquittal merely on
the ground that as a result of such re-appreciation, the High Court
was inclined to reach a conclusion different from the one recorded
H by the learned Sessions Judge. This Court has repeatedly pointed
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 765
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

out that the mere fact that the Appellate Court is inclined on a A
re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a conclusion which
is at variance with the one recorded in the order of acquittal
passed by the Court below will not constitute a valid and
sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal. The jurisdiction
of the Appellate Court in dealing with an appeal against an order
B
of acquittal is circumscribed by the limitation that no interference
is to be made with the order of acquittal unless the approach
made by the lower Court to the consideration of the evidence
in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the
conclusion recorded by the Court below is such which could
not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably C
and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be characterised
as perverse. Where two views are possible on an appraisal of
the evidence adduced in the case and the court below has taken a
view which is plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot legally
interfere with an order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that
D
the view taken by the Court below on its consideration of the
evidence is erroneous.”
15. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, 1996 CriLJ
2867, this Court observed:
“This Court has repeatedly laid down that the mere fact that a E
view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately
arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence
cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere with an
order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire
approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. F
While sitting in judgment over an acquittal the appellate Court is
first required to seek an answer to the question whether the
findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong, manifestly erroneous
or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate court answers the
above question in the negative the order of acquittal is not to be G
disturbed.”
16. Keeping the aforesaid observations in mind, we may note
some statements of the witnesses, who have deposed before the trial
court concerning the incident. PW-1 [wife of the deceased], has deposed
that she came to know about the scuffle, from her husband, which took H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A place between her deceased husband and accused no. 4 prior to the
occurrence of the incident. She further stated that while she was cooking
the dinner for her husband, accused no. 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and absconding
accused (Raju) entered her house. The accused dragged her husband
outside onto the courtyard. She states that she saw accused no. 11 was
armed with an axe, accused no. 13 was armed with a sword and accused
B
no. 16 was holding an iron pipe. She further states that rest of the accused
were armed with sticks and in total there were 15 assailants. Her husband
was dragged to the courtyard of Vinayak Bhalekar, whose house is said
to be after three to four houses. At that spot, they again gave some
beating to the deceased. PW-1 states that she was continuously
C requesting the assailants to spare the life of her husband. At this instant,
accused no. 11 is said to have threatened PW-1 so that she may not
witness the incident. Accordingly, she ran to the cattle shed of one Sudha
Bhalekar, who was attacked by accused no. 14 in the meantime, and
remained hidden for about two hours out of fear. Thereafter, PW-1 went
to the house of Harshwardhan Balekar, who first accompanied her to
D
the district head-quarters at Amravati, wherein she informed the family
of the deceased (parents-in-law and the brother-in-law) and thereafter
went to the Amravati police station. As they were advised to register the
case in Nandgaon Police Station, they came back to Nandgaon police
station to register the complaint.
E 17. During the cross-examination she avers that PW-3, 4 and 5
were closely related to her and the accused were also related inter se.
Concerning the relationship between the accused no. 4 and the deceased,
she states that the relationship between them were cordial. Lastly, she
could not assign any reason as to why the earlier scuffle between her
F deceased husband and accused no. 4 was not written in the FIR registered
by her.
18. PW-2 avers that on the day of the incident, while he was
watching television from inside the house, he heard some commotion
taking place outside his house. When he went outside the house, he saw
G that the accused were beating the deceased with weapons such as axe,
pipe, swords and stick. he states that he saw accused no. 11 armed with
an axe, accused no. 4 armed with a bamboo stick, accused no. 13 armed
with a sword and accused no. 16 was holding an iron pipe. As he was
afraid, he did not go behind the assailants. During the cross examination,
he avers that there might have been more than twenty persons.
H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 767
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

19. PW-3, states that he saw the accused giving severe beating to A
the deceased with sticks, swords, iron pipes and axe. He states that he
saw accused no. 16, 15 and 11 dragging the deceased towards the school
and he did not follow the accused out of the fear and on the following
day, deceased body was found in the field of one Yeshwant Sawai. During
the cross examination, he states that the deceased died in front of his
B
house, due to severe beating given by the accused. Moreover, he admits
that the deceased is his relative.
20. It may be noted that PW-4 and 5 have deposed to the same
effect, concerning the incident. They have further admitted that they
were related to the deceased. At this point it may be relevant to notice
the witness statement of the doctor, who conducted the post-mortem C
[PW-7]. Concerning the stick blows on the body of the deceased, she
notes as under-
‘…Contusions and lacerations are possible in case a person
is beaten by sticks or from pipe. I did not find any lacerated wound
or contusion sustained by the deceased and as such I did not D
mention such injury in P.M. Note….’
Concerning the cause of death, PW-7 states as under-
‘The injury sternum as described in Column No. 20 is possible in
case a person fall down on hard surface. Because of loss of blood E
due to injury the deceased went into the shock and which resulted
in his death. The deceased died due to loss of blood. Because of
loss of blood the heart chambers were found empty and other
organs were found pale. Vital organs were intact. I did not
find any injury to any vital part of the body. Loss of blood is
gradually loss of blood and it may take some time. In case F
of timely medical treatment person may survive. Hands and
legs are non-vital part of the body. Because of the amputation of
hand and because of amputation of leg or both person may not
die. It is not always possible that a person may die because of
incised wounds No. 1, 2 & 5 as described in Coloum No. 17’ G
[sic.]
[emphasis supplied]
21. PW-10 was stationed as the head constable of Nandgaon
police station at the relevant time when PW-1 registered the complaint.
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768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A It may be beneficial for the discussion to observe the cross examination
of the aforesaid witness, as under-
…3. The complainant PW1-Chanda did not state in her
complaint the fact that Accused No.4 addressed abuses to her
husband when her husband demanded money to Accused No.4.
B The PW1-Chanda did not state in her complaint the fact that
Accused No.13 and Accused No.15 arrived and they entered into
her house. PW1-Chanda did not state in her complaint the fact
that she requested the assailants not to beat her husband. The
PW1-Chanda did not state in her report Exh. 55 the fact that
Accused No.11 was armed with an axe, PW1-Chanda did not
C state in her report Exh. 55 the fact that the Accused No.13 was
holding sword. The PW1-Chanda did not state in her report Exh.55
the fact that Accused No. 15 was holding a pipe. The PW1-Chanda
did not state in her report Exh.55 the fact that the rest of the
Assailants-Accused were holding sticks in their hands. PW1-
D Chanda did not state in her complaint Exh.55 the fact that the
Accused-Assailants had beaten to her husband shamrao in the
courtyard….
From the aforesaid witness, it is clear that the FIR did not consist of all
those facts which were subsequently deposed by PW-1 and others before
E the court.
22. It may not be out of context to mention that the formal witnesses
concerning seizure such as PW11 and 13 have not supported the case of
prosecution in entirety.
23. Before we proceed to analysis of the case, we must first
F focus on the aspect concerning the standard the High Court has to apply,
while hearing a case against an acquittal order of the trial court. In the
case on hand, the trial court, followed by a full-fledged trial, comes to
the conclusion and by cogent reasoning acquits the accused. In such a
case the appellate Court is further burdened with the task of reaffirming
G the innocence of the accused. In such cases, the appellate Court is
expected to be very cautious and its interference with the order of acquittal
is called for only when there are compelling reasons and substantial
grounds. In other words, the High Court has full power to review the
evidence upon which an order of acquittal is founded, yet the presumption
of innocence of the accused being further reinforced by his acquittal by
H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 769
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

the trial Court, the findings of that Court which had the advantage of A
seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only
for very substantial and compelling reasons [refer Surajpal Singh &
Ors. v. The State, 1952 CriLJ 331].
24. From the facts and circumstances of this case, we are called
upon to examine, whether the High Court was justified in upsetting the B
findings of the trial court and whether there were compelling reasons
for the High Court to set aside the order of acquittal and convict the
accused appellant of culpable homicide amounting to murder?
25. We may note that out of eleven circumstances which the trial
court has relied upon to find that the prosecution case was not proved C
beyond reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that we need to
concentrate on four of those circumstance, which may be sufficient, to
portray that the case at hand is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
26. There is no dispute as to the fact that the prosecution relies on
the circumstantial evidence to prove the case. It may be noted that, the D
value of circumstantial evidence rests in its accumulative effect, that is
to say, while a single piece of circumstantial evidence may only slightly
increase the likelihood that the accused is guilty, several such evidences
taken together may carry enough probative force to justify the conviction,
if such circumstantial evidence forms an unbroken chain of events
resulting in only one hypothesis so canvassed. E

27. Coming back to the appreciation of the evidence at hand, at
the outset, our attention is drawn to the fact that the witnesses were
inter-related, and this court should be cautious in accepting their
statements. It would be beneficial to recapitulate the law concerning the
appreciation of evidence of related witness. In Dalip Singh & Ors. v. F
State of Punjab, (1954) 1 SCR 145, J. Vivian Bose for the bench observed
the law as under-
A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or
she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that
usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against G
the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely.
Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real
culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when
feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that here
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770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness
has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for
such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a
foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.
However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation.
B Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are
only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before
us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule.
Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.
28. In Masalti v. State of U.P., (1964) 8 SCR 133, a five-Judge
C Bench of this Court has categorically observed as under-
There is no doubt that when a criminal Court has to
appreciate evidence given by witnesses who are partisan
or interested, it has to be very careful in weighing such
evidence. Whether or not there are discrepancies in the
D evidence; whether or not the evidence strikes the Court
as genuine; whether or not the story disclosed by the
evidence is probable, are all matters which must be taken
into account.
But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that
E evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on
the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested
witnesses. Often enough, where factions prevail in villages
and murders are committed as a result of enmity between
such factions, criminal Courts have to deal with evidence
of a partisan type.
F
The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole
ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of
justice.
No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to how much evidence
should be appreciated. Judicial approach has to be cautious in
G
dealing with such evidence; but the plea that such evidence should
be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.
(emphasis supplied)

H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 771
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

29. In Darya Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1964) 3 SCR A
397, this Court held that evidence of an eye witness who is a near relative
of the victim, should be closely scrutinized but no corroboration is
necessary for acceptance of his evidence. In Harbans Kaur & Anr. v.
State of Haryana, 2005 CriLJ 2199, this Court observed that-
There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as B
untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown
when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had
reason to shield actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.
30. The last case we need to concern ourselves is the case of
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150, wherein this C
Court after observing previous precedents has summarized the law in
the following manner-
It is clear that a close relative cannot be characterised as an
‘interested’ witness. He is a ‘natural’ witness. His evidence,
however, must be scrutinized carefully. If on such scrutiny, his D
evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable
and wholly trustworthy conviction can be based on the ‘sole’
testimony of such witness. Close relationship of witness with the
deceased or victim is no ground to reject his evidence. On the
contrary, close relative of the deceased would normally be most
reluctant to spare the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent E
one.
31. From the study of the aforesaid precedents of this court, we
may note that whoever has been a witness before the court of law,
having a strong interest in result, if allowed to be weighed in the same
scales with those who do not have any interest in the result, would be to F
open the doors of the court for perverted truth. This sound rule which
remain the bulwark of this system, and which determines the value of
evidence derived from such sources, needs to be cautiously and carefully
observed and enforced. There is no dispute about the fact that the interest
of the witness must affect his testimony is a universal truth. Moreover, G
under the influence of bias, a man may not be in a position to judge
correctly, even if they earnestly desire to do so. Similarly, he may not be
in a position to provide evidence in an impartial manner, when it involves
his interest. Under such influences, man will, even though not consciously,
suppress some facts, soften or modify others, and provide favorable
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772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A color. These are most controlling considerations in respect to the credibility
of human testimony, and should never to be overlooked in applying the
rules of evidence and determining its weight in the scale of truth under
the facts and circumstances of each case.
32. The prosecution has heavily relied on the statement of PW1
B that the accused—appellants assaulted her husband with deadly weapons
on his hands and legs while dragging him for about 2 kms from his house
to the fields, which led to his death. The weapons used in the crime
were stated to be sword, sticks, axe and pipe. Admittedly, there were no
bloodstains found on any of the weapons allegedly recovered from the
accused. The allegation particularly levelled was that the accused carried
C the assault on the deceased at three places i.e., in front of the house of
the deceased and near the house of PW3—Vinayak Bhalekar and at
the fields of Yeshwant Thawale. However, in their depositions PWs 2, 4
and 5 did not mention about such assault on the deceased in front of
Vinayak Bhalekar house. It appears from the material that there are no
D eyewitness who had seen the accused attacking the deceased in the
fields of Yashwant Thawale. The statements of PW3—Vinayak Bhalekar
also appears to be not consistent throughout. At one point of time, he
deposed that the deceased had died in front of his house. Altogether a
different statement was given to the investigating authorities and in the
Court. Similar is the case of PW4—Sudha, who has made improvements
E as regards to the assault on the deceased. Also there were varying
statements by the prosecution witnesses as regards PW4—Sudha on
the aspect of receiving the blow.
33. The deposition of PW4—Sudha Bhalekar shows that she had
seen the involvement of A-1, A-4, A-11, A-13, A-14 and A-16 in the
F crime. Though she stated that she could recognize the assailants by their
face as she does not know their names, yet test identification parade
was not conducted which is fatal to the case of prosecution. In their
depositions PWs 2, 3 and 5 gave contradictory statements as to the
involvement of number of accused persons in the crime and also about
G noticing the accused who dragged the deceased while assaulting him
and dragging towards school whereas PWs 1 and 4 were silent on this
aspect. There were also contradictory statements by prosecution
witnesses as regards the availability of light at the time of occurrence.
According to PW3—Vinayak, husband of PW4—Sudha, whose house
is the last in the mohalla and situated at a distance of four other houses
H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 773
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

from the house of deceased, the incident took place at 9 pm. The way A
behind his house goes to the school and there is a tamarind tree in front
of his house and the house of Shamrao is not visible by sitting in the
courtyard of his house. In his cross-examination, he denied to have
deposed to police that the house of deceased Shamrao is situated in the
rear side of his house. He further stated, there is ‘L’ type turn from his
B
house to the house of deceased which is not visible from his courtyard.
According to him, deceased Shamrao died in front of his house and on
the next day, he saw the dead body of Shamrao in the field.
34. Now coming to the facts of the case, PW1 (wife of the
deceased) has not witnessed the chopping of the hand, which resulted in
the ultimate death of her husband. It is prudent for this Court to not C
believe in absence of cogent evidence concerning the culpability of the
accused herein, as her evidence is ridden with apparent internal
contradictions and inconsistencies.
35. Due to the nature and quality of evidence involved in this
case, the prosecution relies on the motive to strengthen the case by D
bringing in the earlier scuffle, wherein the deceased had slapped the
Accused no. 4. This Court has on number of occasions has expressed a
general disdain towards motive in direct evidence cases1. On the other
hand this Court has never approved the extreme position as portrayed in
some English cases2 which is best explained by Jerome Hall, when he E
stated ‘[h]ardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled than
that motive is irrelevant’.3 We may note that the law in India is now
well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence, motive has a role
to play4, but to dislodge prosecution’s case solely based on lack of motive
would amount to giving credit to this factor, where it is not due.5 The
motive behind the accused assaulting the deceased was said to be the F
quarrel during which the deceased had slapped Accused No. 4 near a
grocery shop in the village. Incidentally, prosecution could also not prove
the same by examining the independent witness present at the grocery
1
Hari Shanker Vs. State of U.P., (1996) 9 SCC 40. G
2
Chandler v. DPP, [1964] AC 763
3
Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 88 (2d ed. 1960).
4
Ujjagar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2007) 13 SCC 90) and State of U.P. Vs. Kishanpal
& Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73.
5
Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, (2010) 12 SCC 91.

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774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A shop, though as many as 19 witnesses were examined by the prosecution.
PW10—Shrikrishna, Head Constable of the PS Nandgaon Peth who
reduced the oral complaint of PW1 into writing, categorically stated that
PW1 had also not mentioned about previous quarrel at the time of lodging
of complaint. There were, undoubtedly lot of improvements in the
statement of PW1 from the stage of complaint to her examination-in-
B
chief. Moreover, the evidence of PW1 concerning the quarrel is barred
for being hearsay evidence.
36. Alternatively, the prosecution has alleged that motive for the
crime was that the accused party belongs to non-SC/ST community
whereas the victim was belonging to SC community. But, in the opinion
C of the trial Court, the prosecution could not prove that the deceased
belong to Scheduled Caste and accused were from non-Scheduled Caste
or Tribe and the prosecution has failed to prove any charge against the
accused including the charge under Section 3(i)(x) and 2(v) of the
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
D As against that charge, the High Court also confirmed the view taken by
the trial Court, which in other words proved the prosecution version to
be wrong.
37. Now we need to concentrate on the other aspects of the case
such as the contradictions in the evidence of prosecution witnesses as to
E the number of accused persons involved in the alleged crime and also in
respect of their identification thereby the very purpose of the prosecution
in proving the common object of unlawful assembly gets defeated to
attract the provisions of Section 149, IPC. An accused is, of course,
vicariously guilty of the offence even if he is not directly indulged in the
commission of offence but committed by other accused, in case he is
F proved to be a member of unlawful assembly sharing its common object.
It is evident that as per PW1 (wife of the deceased)—complainant, in
the FIR (Ext. 55) the number of persons mentioned by her, who have
entered into their house was four, while about 20 to 25 persons were
assembled outside the house and all of them assaulted the deceased.
G However, in the examination-in-chief she deposed that there were in all
15 assailants who attacked her husband. Though she failed to name the
assailants in her deposition she made out a point that she knew all the
assailants. According to PW10—Shrikrishna, the author of complaint,
PW1 did not state about entry of accused Nos. 13 and 15 into her house.
There was also no mention by her at the time of lodging of FIR about
H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 775
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

carrying an axe by A-11, a sword by A-13, a pipe by A-15 and sticks by A
other accused. Going by the material on record, it can be said that there
was no satisfactory explanation on the part of PW1 for omissions in the
FIR and improvements before the Court.
38. PW11—Sagar, a panch witness of seizure of bloodstained
clothes of the accused Nos. 1 to 7, did not support the prosecution case. B
According to him, police called him to the police station and obtained his
signature. Similarly, the seizure is doubtful in the case of clothes pertaining
to accused No. 11 to which PW13—Gunwant was witness who stated
that he had seen those clothes for the first time in the village panchayat
office and he had signed the paper at the instance of police without
knowing the correctness of its contents. Going by the material on record, C
the correctness of seizure of clothes of other accused persons also do
not inspire confidence.
39. It is also clear from the record that PW6—Sukhdev who
proved the recovery of weapons at the instance of accused—appellants,
could not point out his signature on the respective disclosure statements D
and seizure panchnamas. He also admitted that Ext.72 (memorandum)
and Ext. 73 (seizure panchnama) does not bear his signature. PW9—
Ananda Ramteke deposed that after recovering sticks from the houses
of accused Nos. 1 to 7, they returned to the village panchayat office
where almost all the papers were scribed. It is also important to note E
that based on the Chemical Analysis report, those sticks cannot be
considered to be incriminating articles as there were no blood stains on
those sticks. In the same way, the sword and axe allegedly recovered
from Accused Nos. 13 and 11 respectively also do not have bloodstains.
In these circumstances, the prosecution cannot be said to have proved
the fact that the palm of the deceased has been amputated by the accused F
with those weapons.
40. In the opinion of Dr. Pushpa Sadhawani—PW7, who
conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased, the cause of the
death was due to heavy loss of blood owing to the amputation of his
hand. However, his vital organs were found to be normal and there was G
no injury to the vital organs. There were incised wounds over dorsal
aspect of right amputated wrist and forearm and lower part of the leg.
PW7 has specifically mentioned that there was no laceration or contusion
sustained by the deceased and opined that had there been timely medical
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776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A treatment, the deceased would have survived. At the same time she
made it clear that in case a person is beaten up with sticks and iron pipe,
as alleged by the prosecution in the present case, contusions and
lacerations are possible. In her cross-examination, the Doctor also
revealed that because of amputation of hand and leg or both, a person
may not die. Thus, in totality, the medical evidence is not corroborating
B
with the prosecution’s case.
41. It is quite surprising that PW1—Chanda who witnessed the
horrific assault on her husband, remained hidden in the cattle shed for
about two hours and then went to the house of Harshwardhan Bhalekar
to whom she had narrated the incident. After that, both of them, without
C searching for the deceased went to the house of PW1’s in-laws at
Amravati. Then they visited the office of Superintendent of Police and
then they went to the police station to lodge the complaint. Ironically, the
said Harshwardhan Bhalekar who could have been a prime witness has
not been examined. The conduct of PW1 and non-examination of such
D an important witness Harshwardhan Bhalekar, weakens the prosecution
case. At the same time, there was no proper explanation forthcoming
for what purpose they visited the office of Superintendent of Police,
instead of searching for the deceased or going to police station to lodge
complaint. As per the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 Laxman Bhalekar,
Bhaurao, Arun Bhalekar and Namdeo Bhalekar are neighbours of the
E deceased living in the same vicinity, but none of them was examined.
Another laches in the prosecution case is that in the FIR it was mentioned
that one Dhanjay Sontakke and Janardhan Alekar had also seen the
accused assaulting the deceased, but they too were not examined.
Similarly, one Anant Bhurbhure who first found the dead body of the
F deceased in the fields of Yashwantrao, was also not examined. It is
clear that all those persons, especially neighbours of the deceased, who
witnessed the important circumstances and who could be vital independent
witnesses have not been examined by the prosecution. There is no
convincing explanation forthcoming from the prosecution side.
G 42. Another facet that creates doubt on the prosecution story is
that PW5—Maroti, the real brother of PW2—Narendra and nephew of
PW4—Sudha, in his cross-examination (Ext.70) differed with the
statement recorded by police and marked ‘A’ that he and his brother
(PW2) saw the deceased lying in front of the door. According to him he
did not say that fact, police arrived in the village next day morning at 8
H
BHASKARRAO & ORS. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA 777
[N. V. RAMANA, J.]

am, and he went to the field along with police at 10 am. PW3—Vinayak A
husband of PW4—Sudha, made a statement that he had seen the dead
body in the field of Yashwant Thawale. PW2—Narendra has also stated
that at about 9.30 am on 20.6.1995, he along with other villagers found
the dead body of the deceased in the said field. We notice that in the
midst of several contradictory statements among the prosecution
B
witnesses, there is no proper explanation on record for PW1 and police
searching for the deceased at the wells and nullahs of the village, instead
of searching around the school, as per the prosecution story PWs 2, 3
and 5 were fully aware that the deceased was dragged towards school.
Moreover, looking at the ambiguous narration of sequences described
by the witnesses, the chain of events in the case cannot be said to have C
been properly brought on record by the prosecution. It is always the
duty of the Court to separate chaff from the husk and to dredge the truth
from the pandemonium of Statements. It is but natural for human beings
to state variant statements due to time gap but if such statements go to
defeat the core of the prosecution then such contradictions are material
D
and the Court has to be mindful of such statements [See: Tahsildar
Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012].
43. We have also found from the impugned judgment that the
High Court has misconstrued certain aspects of the case. According to
PW2—Narendra the incident occurred at about 9 p.m. on 19.6.1995. In
the FIR also the time was mentioned as 9 p.m. But the High Court in its E
judgment observed “insofar as the submissions regarding the availability
of light is concerned, we find that the incident took place at about 7.30
p.m. in the village in the month of June and looking to the availability of
light in the month of June in Vidarbha region, we have no hesitation in
holding that the eyewitnesses had sufficient light to identify the accused F
persons”. It is clear from the record that the alleged incident has occurred
at 9 p.m. and not at 7.30 p.m. as assumed by the High Court, and there
were also no eyewitnesses to the alleged amputation of the hand of
deceased and causing his death.
44. At the conclusion of arguments, it is informed at the Bar that G
the trial Court had conducted separate trial in respect of Raju—Accused
No. 16, who was earlier absconding, and acquitted him of all the charges
and the State has not preferred any appeal against his acquittal. We
have also noticed that PWs 1, 2 and 3 have given contrary statements at
the subsequent trial in Special (Atrocities) Case No. 12 of 2008 held
H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.

A against Raju—Accused No. 16, deviating from what they deposed in
the present case.
45. Taking note of the foregoing shortcomings and discrepancies
in the prosecution case coupled with the improvements and contradictions
in the statements of prosecution witnesses, it cannot be said that the
B accused persons had really formed into an unlawful assembly and carried
out an assault on the deceased that too with a view to kill him, so as to
attract the provisions of criminal law. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, it is abundantly clear that the guilt of the accused persons was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. We are of the considered view
that the trial Court had dealt with the case in a fool-proof manner by
C drawing out 11 important circumstances and delivered a well reasoned
judgment thereby acquitting the accused, with which the High Court
ought not to have interfered. In our view, there are no compelling reasons
and substantial grounds for the High Court to interfere with the order of
acquittal passed by the trial Court. Added to the above, we are informed
D that the accused have already undergone about three years’ of
imprisonment before they were enlarged on bail.
46. Keeping in view the substratum of the prosecution case and
the material available on record, we are of the considered opinion that
the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of accused beyond
E reasonable doubt. In the aforementioned circumstances, we allow these
appeals, set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and
restore the judgment and order passed by the trial Court in respect of
the appellants before us. Resultantly, their bail bonds stand discharged.
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

F
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.

G

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