BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV & ORS.versusKARAMVEER KAKASAHEB WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY & ORS.

                     [2012] 11 S.C.R. 767

           BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV & ORS.                                 A
                                 v.
    KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB WAGH EDUCATION
                      SOCIETY & ORS.
(Petition for Special Leave To Appeal No. 30469 of 2009)
                     DECEMBER 11, 2012                                  B

 [SWATANTER KUMAR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

    Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950:
                                                                        c
      s. 36 - Agricultural land belonging to a public trust -
Alienation of by inviting bids - Transaction in favour of
petitioners (highest bidders of first bid) not finalized - Fresh
offers invited - Respondent no. 1 fumed to be highest bidder
in second bid - Petitioners and trustees entering into D
compromise and obtaining orders from High Court without
impleading respondent no. 1 in the proceedings - Meanwhile
another offer higher than that of respondent no. 1 also
received - High Court directing to implead all the bidders of
second bid in the proceedings before Charity Commissioner E
- Held: Keeping in view the language of s.36, the interest of
the trust would be in getting the maximum for its immovable
property - Charity Commissioner is directed to have a fresh
look at the sale of the subject land of the Trust in accordance
with the directions of the High Court - However, it would be
open to the Charity Commissioner to permit all the parties F
before it to submit fresh offers for the Trust land and if deemed
necessary, a fresh public notice for sale of the Trust land may
be issued, keeping the price offered by respondent no. 1 as
the reserve price.
                                                                        G
     Constitution ofJndia, 1950:
     Art. 136 - Petition for special leave to appeal - Conduct
of petitioners - Held: It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose
                                767                                     H
    768     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A a// the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the
   court - In the instant case, petitioners have not come up-front
   and clear with material facts - The Court declines to grant
   special leave to appeal to the petitioners for suppression of
   a material fact.
B
        In response to the offers for sale of 9 acres of
   agricultural land belonging to a public trust, the
   petitioners' bid being the highest (Rs. 22.5 lakh) was
   accepted and an agreement for sale/purchase was
   entered into on 18.2.1995. Since the transaction could not
C be finalized, the trustees moved an application before the
   Joint Charity Commissioner on 13.9.2001 to extend the
   time for completing the transaction, arid in January 2002
   they moved another application for revised permission.
  The JCC, by order dated 2.5.2003, rejected both the
D applications. On 15.8.2004 the petitioners and the trustees
  entered into a fresh agreement increasing the sale price
  of the subject land to Rs. 1 er. 25 lakhs. The trustees
   moved a second application for extension of time, which
  was rejected by JCC by his order dated 24.7.2006. On
E 19.2.2007, the trustees issued a public notice for sale of
  the subject land and respondent no. 1 offered the highest
  bid of Rs.43 lakhs per acre. Thereafter, the petitioners
  filed a writ petition (without impleading respondent no. 1)
  in the High Court challenging the order dated 24.7.2006
F passed by the JCC. On 28.8.2008, the petitioners and the
  trustees entered into a compromise that the order dated
  24.7.2006 be set aside and the second application for
  extension of time be remanded to JCC for hearing on
  merits impleading the petitioners also as parties to the
G proceedings. The High Court passed an order in terms
  of the compromise. When respondent no. 1 came to know
  of the proceeding before JCC, he applied for his
  impleadment and so also the other interested purchasers.
  JCC, by order dated 29.11.2008 rejected the applications.
H Respondent no. 1 filed a writ petition challenging the
 BHASKAR I.AXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB            769
            WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY
order of JCC with an alternate prayer for a direction to          A ·
the JCC to consider his bid. The High Court noticed that
another offer higher than that of respondent no. 1 had
been received. It, therefore, remanded the entire matter
for consideration by the Charity Commissioner with a
direction to consider all the bids received pursuant to           B
public notice dated 19.2.2007 including those of the
petitioners and respondent no. 1.

     In the instant petition for special leave, the petitioners
contended that the issue before the High Court pertained          C
to impleadment of respondent no.1 in the second
application for extension of time, but the High Court over-
stepped its jurisdiction in directing consideration of all
bids received pursuant to public notice dated 29.2.2007
and effectively rejected the second application itself,
virtually setting aside the order of the co-ordinate Bench        D
directing the JCC to hear the second application for
extension of time. On behalf of respondent no. 1, it was
submitted that the petitioners were guilty of suppression
of material facts in as much as they did not bring to the
notice of the Court that JCC had earlier on 2.5.2003              E
rejected their first app:ication for extension of time, which
had attained finality.

    Disposing of the petition, the Court

     HELD: 1.1. It is true that the question before the High
                                                                  F
Court was very limited, namely, whether respondent No.1
ought to have been impleaded by the JCC in the second
application for extension of time. However, on an overall
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court was perhaps left with no option but to pass        G
the order that it did and accept the alternative prayer of
respondent No.1, as the trustees and the petitioners were
  olluding and it was not possible to entirely rule out the
possibility that they would enter into yet another mutual
                                                                  H
    770     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A arrangement to wipe out whatever interest respondent
  No.1 had in the Trust land. Therefore, impleading
  respondent No.1 before the JCC could have been
  rendered into a mere formality. Additionally, the lack of
  bona fides of the trustees and the petitioners could not
B be overlooked by the High Court. Therefore, the safest
  course of action for the High Court was to require sale
  of the Trust laRd through auction. [para 50) [786-F-H; 787-
  A-B]

        1.2. The facts of the case show that the trustees and
C the petitioners have been indulging in a flip-flop and in a
  sense taking advantage of the absence of any clear-cut
  statutory measures to prevent an abuse of the process
  of law. The trustees and the petitioners entered into a total
  of three agreements from time to time. The trustees
D moved two applications for extension of time to complete
  the sale transaction with the petitioners. The trustees
  even sought to withdraw their first application for
  extension of time and to seek a revised sanction from the
  JCC to sell the Trust land to a third party apparently
E because they fell out with the petitioners. The JCC,
  therefore, rightly rejected the first application for
  extension of time on 2.5.2003. He gave two significant
  reasons for doing so, namely, that the trustees were not
  voluntarily selling the Trust land and secondly, given the
F circumstances, the sale transaction was not for the
  benefit and in the interest of the Trust. This order has
  attained finality, not having been challenged by anybody.
  It is this order that has been suppressed by the
  petitioners from this Court. [para 35-37] [782-F-H; 783-A-
G CJ
       1.3. While considering the second application for
  extension of time on 24.7.2006 the JCC observed that the
  trustees were "changing track from time to time and for
  the reasons best known to them are bowing before the
H proposed purchasers". The JCC doubted the bona firlP..<~
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB          771
           WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY

of the trustees and accordingly rejected their second          A
application for extension of time. [para 38] [783-D]

     1.4. After the second application for extension of time
was rejected, the trustees issued a public notice on
19.2.2007 for sale of the Trust land. When the trustees 8
received offers including the highest bid by respondent
No.1, the petitioners filed a writ petition in the High Court
challenging the order rejecting the second application for
extension of time. But respondent No.1 was not
impleaded in the writ petition either by the petitioners or C
at the instance of the trustees. The fact that third party
interests were in existence was definitely known to the
trustees, if not to the petitioners, and this should have
been brought to the notice of the High Court. In this
background, the compromise effected between the
trustees and the petitioners in the High Court on D
28.8.2008 appears rather suspicious. To this extent, it
may be correct to say that the order dated 28.8.2008
passed by the High Court was collusively obtained by the
parties. These facts clearly indicate that all through, the
conduct of the trustees and the petitioners leaves much E
to be desired. [para 39-42] [783-E-H; 784-A-B]

     1.5. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Court is of the view that the petitioners and the trustees
were trying to take advantage of, if not exploit, the          F
situation and the absence of any adverse consequences
under the Act for not complying with the terms of the
sanction originally granted. [para 43] [784-C-D]

     1.7. Another factor that weighed with the High Court
in this regard was the submission of the Assistant             G
Government Pleader that the Charity Commissioner had
received an offer higher than that given by respondent
No.1. Therefore, it is quite clear that due to the passage
of time, mainly because of the flip-flop of the trustees and
the petitioners, the value of the Trust land had increased     H
    772     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A considerably. In these circumstances, it would be in the
  best interest of the trust if the maximum price is available
  for the Trust land from the open market. While this may
  or may not have been a consideration before the High
  Court, it is certainly one of the considerations before this
B Court for not interfering with the order passed by the
  High Court, even though it may have, over-stepped its
  jurisdiction. [para 51] [787-C-E]

       1.8. Section 36 of the Act clearly provides that the
  trustees may be allowed by the Charity Commissioner to
C dispose of immoveable property of the trust, regard being
  had to the "interest, benefit or protection" of the trust. It
  cannot be doubted that the interest of the trust would be
  in getting the maximum for its immoveable property.
  Following the consistent view taken by this Court as well
D as the language of s.36 of the Act, this Court holds that
  the only course available to the High Court was to mould
  the relief and direct the Charity Commissioner to have a
  re-look at all bids received pursuant to the public notice
  dated 10.2.2007. [para 52 and 56] [787-F; 790-A-B]
E
       Chenchu Rami Reddy v. Government of Andhra
                                   =
  Pradesh, 1986 (1) SCR 989 1986 (3) sec 391; R.
  Venugopala Naidu v. Venkatarayu/u Naidu Charities, 1989
                          =
  (1) Suppl. SCR 760 1989 Suppl. (2) sec 356 and
F Mehrwan Homi Irani v. Charity Commissioner Bombay, 2001
  (5) sec 305 - relied on.

       2. It cannot be said that by the impugned order, the
  High Court has effectively set aside its earlier order dated
  28.8.2008 passed by a coordinate Bench. The
G circumstances under which the earlier order was passed
  and the significant developments that took place
  thereafter and made it necessary for the High Court to
  pass a different order. It is not as if both orders were
  passed by the High Court under similar circumstances.
H
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB            773
           WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY

                                                                 A
The circumstances had changed and the view of the High
Court on the changed circumstances could also be
different. [para 58] [790-F-G]

     3.1. The facts regarding rejection, on 2.5.2003, of the
first application for extension of time filed by the trustees    B
and the finality attached to it, have not been clearly
disclosed to this Court by the petitioners. It is the
obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case
and leave the decision making to the court. The
petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and             c
circumstances in which the order dated 2.5.2003 was
passed or that it has attained finality. A mere reference
to the order dated 2.5.2003, en passant, in the order dated
24.7.2006 does not serve the requirement of disclosure.
Unfortunately, the petitioners have not come up-front and        D
clean with all material facts.[para 44, 46 and 49] [784-E-F,
 H; 785-A-B; 786-C-D]

   Harl Narain v. Badri Das 1964 SCR 203 =AIR 1963 SC
1558; Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, 2010 (15)
SCR 364 = (2010) 14 SCC 38 - relied on.                          E

    3.2. Therefore, this Court declines to grant special
leave to appeal to the petitioners for suppression of a
material fact. The Charity Commissioner is directed to
have~_a fresh look at the sale of the subject land of the        F
Trus! in accordance with the directions of the High Court.
However, it would be open to the Charity Commissioner
to permit all the parties before it to submit fresh offers for
the Trust land and if deemed necessary, a fresh public
notice for sale of the Trust land may be issued. On the          G
basis of the bid given by respondent No.1 as disclosed
in Court, it is made clear that the price for the sale of the
Trust land shall not be less than Rs.3.87 crore. [para 59]
[790-H; 791-A-C]
                                                                 H
    774       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A                          Case Law Reference:
          1986 (1) SCR 989                relied on        para 32
          1989 (1) Suppl. SCR 760         relied on        para 32
          2001 (5) sec 305                relied on        para 32
B
          1964 SCR 203                    relied on        para 46
          2010 (15) SCR 364               relied on        para 48
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : SLP (Civil) No.
C 30469 of 2009.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 24.04.2009 of the High
    Court of Judicature of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 7863 of
    2008.
D
         C.A. Sundram, Jayant Bhushan, Anish R. Shah, Rishi Jain,
    Brij Kihor Sah, Shivaji M. Jadhav for the Petitioners.

      V.A. Mehta, R.K. Odhekar, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Nilkanth,
  Charudatta, Sanjay V. Kharde, Asha Gopalan Nair, Kumar
E Parimal, Praveena Gautam for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. The facts of this case are a little
  elaborate, spanning as they do more than a decade and a half.
F However, the issue raised is somewhat narrow and is, in a
  sense, limited to the question whether the High Court over-
  stepped its jurisdiction in issuing the directions that it did.
        2. The issue before the High Court was whether
G respondent No.1 should be impleaded as a party in the
  proceedings before the Charity Commissioner in an applioation
  filed by a trust for sanction to sell off some land belonging to it.
  The High Court obliquely decided the issue by directing the
  Charity Commissioner to go ahead with the advertised auction
H
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                775
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
of the trust land in which respondent No. 1 was the highest          A
bidder.
     3. While upholding the decision of the High Court, we feel
that it may have over-stepped in giving the direction that it did.
But, we are of the opinion that the learned judges had no option     B
but to mould the relief and give the direction that it did in the
best interest of the trust, in keeping with the provisions of
Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950.
Consequently, there is no reason to interfere with the direction
of the High Court.
                                                                     c
     4. We are also of the opinion that the petitioners have
suppressed a material fact from us and, therefore, special leave
to appeal ought not to be granted to the petitioners.

Facts:                                                               D
     5. On 29th November, 1994 the trustees of the Shri
Vyankatesh Mandir Trust at Panchavati, Nasik resolved to sell
9 (nine) acres of agricultural land belonging to the Trust in
Survey No. 275 situated at Aurangabad Road, Panchavati,
Nasik by calling tenders from the public at large. For               E
convenience the land resolved to be sold is hereinafter referred
to as the 'Trust land'.

     6. Pursuant to the resolution, the trustees issued a public
notice in the newspaper "Rambhoomi" inviting offers for              F
purchase of the Trust land. In response, they received four
offers, the highest being that of the petitioners for Rs.2.5 lakhs
per acre totaling Rs.22.5 lakhs.
     7. The petitioners' offer was accepted by the trustees and
on 1Bth February 1995 they entered into an agreement for the G
sale/purchase of the Trust land for a total consideration of
Rs.22.5 lakhs.
     8. As required by Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trust
Act, 1950 (for short the Act) the trustees moved an application      H
    776       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A on 5th February 1996 before the Charity Commissioner for
  sanction to sell the Trust land in terms of the agreement dated
  18th February 1995. Section 36 of the Act reads as follows:

          "36. Alienation of immovable property of public trust
          :(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument
B
          of trust-

          (a) no sale, exchange or gift of any immovable property,
          and

c         (b) no lease for a period exceeding ten years in the case
          of agricultural land or for a period exceeding three years
          in the case of non-agricultural land or a building, belonging
          to a public trust, shall be valid without the previous sanction
          of the Charity Commissioner. Sanction may be accorded
D         subject to such condition as the Charity Commissioner
          may think fit to impose, regard being had to the interest,
          benefit or protection of the trust;

          (c) if the Charity Commissioner is satisfied that in the
          interest of any public trust any immovable property thereof
E         should be disposed of, he may, on application, authorise
          any trustee to dispose of such property subject to such
          conditions as he may think fit to impose, regard being had
          to the interest or benefit or protection of the trust.

F         (2) The Charity Commissioner may revoke, the sanction
          given under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) on
          the ground that such sanction was obtained by fraud or
          misrepresentation made to him or by concealing from the
          Charity Commissioner, facts material for the purpose of
G         giving sanction; and direct the trustee to take such steps
          within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the
          date of revocation (or such further period not exceeding
          in the aggregate one year as the Charity Commissioner
          may from time to time determine) as may be specified in
          the direction for the recovery of the property.
H
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                777
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN 8. LOKUR, J.]

    (3) No sanction shall be revoked under this section unless       A
    the person in whose favour such sanction has been made
    has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause
    why the sanction should not be revoked.

    (4) If, in the opinion of the Charity Commissioner, the          8
    trustee has failed to take effective steps within the period
    specified in sub-section (2), or it is not possible to recover
    the property with reasonable effort or expense, the Charity
    Commissioner may assess any advantage received by the
    trustee and direct him to pay compensation to the trust          C
    equivalent to the advantage so assessed."

     9. On 6th February 1998 the Joint Charity Commissioner
(for short 'the JCC') Mumbai granted the sanction prayed for
by the trustees, subject to all laws applicable to the transaction
and on terms and conditions that were to follow.                     D

     10. On 19th June 1998 the sanction granted by the JCC
was partially modified and a condition imposed that the sale
shall be executed within a period of one year from the date of
the order that is 19th June 1998. However, for one reason or         E
another, the petitioners and the trustees were unable to
complete the sale transaction within this time.

      11. Much later, on 30th June 2001 the trustees and the
petitioners mutually agreed to extend the time for completing
formalities for execution of the transaction. They also agreed       F
that the sale price of the Trust land would now be increased to
Rs.75 lakhs. This was the second agreement between the
parties. Consequent upon this, the trustees moved an
application before the JCC on 13th September 2001 to extend
the time for completing the transaction.                             G

     12. Although it is not very clear, but it appears that
thereafter something seems to have gone wrong between the
parties because in January 2002 the trustees moved an
application before the JCC for revised permission since the          H
    778      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2012] 11 S.C.R


A petitioners had not complied with the terms of the agreement.
  The trustees therefore planned to sell the Trust land as per the
  sanction but apparently to persons other than the petitioners.
  This application was contested by the petitioners.

        13. During the pendency of the application for extension
8
  of time moved by the trustees on 13th September 2001 and
  the application for revised permission moved by the trustees
  in January 2002 the differences between the trustees and the
  petitioners could not to be resolved with the result that on 16th
C April 2002 the trustees sought to withdraw the application dated
  13th September 2001 for extension of time since the petitioners
  had not complied with the terms and conditions of the
  agreement entered into between the parties.

       14. Eventually, both the applications (for extension of time
D and for revised sanction} were heard by the JCC who passed
  an order on 2nd May 2003 rejecting them. This order was not
  challenged by any of the parties and it has attained finality.

        15. At this stage, it may be noted that according to
E respondent No. 1 the order dated 2nd May 2003 is an important
  order and it has been suppressed by the petitioners in this
  petition.

        16. Even after the order dated 2nd May 2003 it seems that
  the trustees and the petitioners continued to have discussions
F and eventually on 15th August 2004 they entered into a third
  agreement. By the third agreement, they agreed to extend the
  time for completing formalities for executing the transaction
  originally entered into between them. They also mutually agreed
  to increase the sale price of the Trust land to Rs. 125 lakhs.
G
        17. Pursuant to the third agreement the trustees once again
  decided to seek extension of time from the JCC for executing
  the transaction with the petitioners. Accordingly, they moved an
  application on 20th July 2005 for extension of time. This was
H the second application for extension of time. The-petitioners
 BHASKARLAXMANJADHAV~KARAMVEERKAKASAHEB                        779
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
were not parties before the JCC in this application nor were          A
they heard on this application.

     18. By an order dated 24th July 2006 the JCC rejected
the second application filed by the trustees for extension of time.

     19. Pursuant to the rejection, the trustees issued a public      B
notice in "Day View'' on 19th February 2007 for sale of the Trust
land. In response to the public notice, respondent No.1 gave
the highest bid on 23rd February 2007 at Rs.43 lakhs per acre.

      20. Significantly, on 26th February 2007 the petitioners        c
filed W.P. No.1502 of 2007 in the High Court challenging the
order dated 24th July 2006 passed by the JCC rejecting the
second application for extension of time. In this Writ Petition,
respondent No.1 was not made a party by the petitioners nor
did the trustees bring it to the notice of the High Court that        D
respondent No.1 had given the highest bid for purchase of the
Trust land pursuant to the public notice issued in "Day View".
      21. On 28th August 2008 the petitioners and the trustees
entered into a compromise as a result of which it was agreed
that the order dated 24th July 2006 be set aside and the second       E
application for extension of time be remanded to the JCC for
a fresh hearing on merits. It was also agreed that the petitioners
would be joined as parties in the proceedings before the JCC
and that the application be decided as expeditiously as
possible but not later than three months beyond the date of           F
presentation of the order of the High Court. On the basis of this
compromise between the parties (and without the knowledge
of respondent No.1 ), minutes of order were drawn up and the
High Court passed an order taking the minutes on record. An
order was then passed by the High Court in terms of the               G
minutes.
    22. Pursuant to the compromise order dated 28th August
2008 the JCC impleaded the petitioners as parties to the
second application for extension of time.
                                                                      H
    780      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A      23. When respondent No.1 learnt of the pendency of the
  proceedings before the JCC, it moved an application before
  the JCC for impleadment. In fact, other interested purchasers
  also moved applications for impleadment. The JCC heard all
  the applications and by an order dated 29th November 2008
B rejected them.

       24. Feeling aggrieved by the rejection of its impleadment
  application, respondent No.1 preferred W.P. No.7863 of 2008
  on 2nd December 2008 in the High Court challenging the order
C passed by the JCC. The trustees as well as the petitioners were
  arrayed as respondents. It was prayed that the order dated 29th
  November 2008 passed by the JCC be quashed and
  respondent No.1 be impleaded as a necessary party in the
  proceedings before the JCC. The alternative prayer was that •
  the JCC be directed to consider the bid of respondent No.1
D for sale of the Trust land.

        25. After hearing all the parties, the High Court passed the
  impugned order on 24th April 2009 in which it was noted, inter
  a/ia, that the Charity Commissioner had received another offer
E for the Trust land higher than the offer of respondent No.1. The
  Assistant Government Pleader accordingly submitted that the
  matter be remanded to the Charity Commissioner to decide
  in whose favour the Trust land should be sold, depending on
  the highest bid.
F      26. On deliberations of the submissions made by the
  parties, the High Court remanded the entire matter for
  consideration by the Charity Commissioner to decide who
  should be the purchaser for the Trust land. The Charitv
  Commissioner was directed to consider all bids receiveo
G pursuant to the public notice dated 19th February 2007
  including the bids given by the petitioners and respondent No.1.

        27. It is under these circumstances that the petitioners are
    now before us.
H
 BHASKAR 1JV<MAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                781
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)

Submissions:                                                          A

      28. The broad submission of learned counsel for the
petitioners was that the High Court had effectively over-stepped
its jurisdiction while deciding W.P. No.7863 of 2008. It was
submitted that the issue before the High Court was rather             B
limited, namely, whether respondent No.1 should be impleaded
before the JCC in the second application for extension of time.
Apart from adjudicating on the correctness or otherwise of the
decision rendered by the JCC rejecting the impleadment
application, the High Court effectively rejected the second           C
application for extension of time.

     29. It was submitted that the High Court went much further
than necessary in requiring the JCC to consider all bids
received by the trustees pursuant to the public notice dated 19th
February 2007. The right of the petitioners to seek specific          D
performance of the third agreement entered into between them
and the trustees on 15th August 2004 was thereby scuttled. To
make matters worse, the High Court virtually set aside an order
passed by the co-ordinate Bench in W.P. No.1502 of 2007
directing the JCC to hear the second application for extension        E
of time. It was submitted that this was clearly impermissible.

     30. It was finally submitted that under these circumstances
the impugned order could not be sustained and the only relief
that could have been granted by the High Court to respondent
No.1 was to implead it in the second application for extension        F
of time and to direct the JCC to decide the application at the
earliest.

      31. Contesting these submissions, learned counsel for
respondent No.1 submitted that the petitioners were guilty of         G
suppression of material facts inasmuch as it was not brought
to the notice of this Court that the JCC had earlier rejected the
first application for extension of time on 2nd May 2003 which
had attained finality. Since this fact is not disclosed, this Court
will not grant special leave to appeal.                               H
    782      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A      32. It was also submitted that since Shri Vyankatesh
  Mandir Trust is a charitable trust, it was expected of the High
  Court (as also this Court) to subseNe the larger interest of the
  charitable trust. In achieving this, necessary and appropriate
  orders can be passed for the ultimate benefit of the trust. In
B support of this submission learned counsel for respondent No.1
  relied on Chenchu Rami Reddy v. Government of Andhra
  Pradesh, 1986 (3) SCC 391, R. Venugopala Naidu v.
                        •
  Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities, 1989 Suppl. (2) SCC 356 and
  Mehrwan Homi Irani v. Charity Commissioner Bombay, 2001
c (5) sec 305.
        33. Finally it was submitted by learned counsel for
  respondent No.1 that the Charity Commissioner had received
  an offer higher than given by respondent No.1 and therefore the
  High Court was right in directing that appropriate steps be taken
D to receive the highest amount possible by sale of the Trust land.
  In this regard, the High Court had acted in the best interest of
  the charitable trust (and that is how it should be) and therefore
  we should not interfere with the impugned order.

E         34. Learned counsel for the trustees only submitted that
    the trust expects the highest amount possible for the sale of its
    land and that appropriate orders may be passed in this regard.

    Conduct of the petitioners and trustees:
F         35. The facts of the case show that the trustees and the
    petitioners have been indulging in a flip-flop and in a sense
    taking advantage of the absence of any clear-cut statutory
    measures to prevent an abuse of the process of law.

G        36. The trustees and the petitioners entered into a total of
    three agreements from time to time. The trustees moved two
    applications for extension of time to complete the sale
    transaction with the petitioners. The trustees even sought to
    withdraw their first application for extension of time and to seek
H
  BHASKAR UV<MAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                783
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
a revised sanction from the JCC to sell the Trust land to a third     A
party apparently because they fell out with the petitioners.

     37. Given this flip-flop, the JCC rightly rejected the first
application for extension of time on 2nd May 2003. He gave
two significant reasons for doing so, namely, that the trustees
                                                                      8
were not voluntarily selling the Trust land and secondly, given
the circumstances, the sale transaction was not for the benefit
and in the interest of the Trust. This order has attained finality,
not having been challenged by anybody. It is this order that has
been suppressed by the petitioners from this Court. We                C
propose to refer to this a little later.

      38. While considering the second application for extension
of time on 24th July 2006 the JCC observed that the trustees
are "changing track from time to time and for the reasons best
known to them are bowing before the proposed purchasers".             D
The JCC doubted the bona fides of the trustees and in fact
observed that there is obviously something fishy and suspicious
in the matter. Accordingly, the JCC rejected their second
application for extension of time.
                                                                      E
     39. After the second application for extension of time was
rejected, the trustees issued a public notice on 19th February,
2007 for sale of the Trust land.

      40. Soon after the trustees received offers including the
highest bid by respondent No.1 the petitioners filed a writ           F
petition in the High Court challenging the order rejecting the
second application for extension of time. It seems rather odd
that respondent No.1 was not impleaded in the writ petition
either by the petitioners or at the instance of the trustees. The
fact that third party interests were in existence was definitely      G
known to the trustees, if not to the petitioners, and this should
have been brought to the notice of the High Court.

      41. In this background, the compromise effected between
the trustees and the petitioners in the High Court on 28th August     H
    784      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A 2008 appears rather suspicious. To this extent, learned counsel
  for respondent No.1 may be correct in his submission that the
  order dated 28th August 2008 passed by the High Court was
  collusively obtained by the parties.

         42. These facts clearly indicate to us that all through, the
8
    conduct of the trustees and the petitioners leaves much to be
    desired.

        43. While it may be that no time limit is prescribed for
  seeking extension of time to complete the transaction for sale
C of the Trust land, yet the conduct of the parties certainly requires
  consideration. While so considering, we are of the view that the
  petitioners and the trustees were trying to take advantage of,
  if not exploit, the situation and the absence of any adverse
  consequences under the Act for not complying with the terms
D of the sanction originally granted.

    Suppression of fact:

        44. While dealing with the conduct of the parties, we may
  also notice the submission of learned counsel for respondent
E No.1 to the effect that the petitioners are guilty of suppression
  of a material fact from this Court, namely, the rejection on 2nd
  May 2003 of the first application for extension of time filed by
  the trustees and the finality attached to ii. These facts have not
  been clearly disclosed to this Court by the petitioners. It was
F submitted that in view of the suppression, special leave to
  appeal should not be granted to the petitioners.

      45. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no
  material facts have been withheld from this Court. It was
G submitted that while the order dated 2nd May 2003 was
  undoubtedly not filed, its existence was not material in view of
  subsequent developments that had taken place. We cannot
  agree.

      46. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for
H adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                 785
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the        A
decision making to the Court. True, there is a mention of the
order dated 2nd May 2003 in the order dated 24th July 2006
passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The
petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and
circumstances in which the order dated 2nd May 2003 was                B
passed or that it has attained finality.

      47. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari
Narain v. Badri Oas, AIR 1963 SC 1558 stress was laid on
litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements,       C
otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was
observed as follows:

     "It is of utmost importance that in making material
     statements and setting forth grounds in applications for
     special leave, care must be taken not to make any                 D
     statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In
     dealing with applications for special leave, the Court
     naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact
     containcti in the petitions at their face value and it would
     be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making         E
     state;nents which are untrue and misleading. That is why
     we have come to the conclusion that in the present case,
     special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked.
     Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is
     dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the                F
     respondent."

     48. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India,
(2010) 14 sec 38 the case law on the subject was discussed.
It was held that if a litigant does not come to the Court with
clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a         G
person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was
said:

     'The principle that a person who does not come to the
     co11rt with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the        H
    786       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2012] 11 S.C.R.


A          merits of his grievance and, in any case,·such person is
           not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the
          petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the
          Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts
          and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is
B         that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to
          protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have
          any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of
          justice by resorting to falsehood or by making
          misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a
c         bearing on adjudication of the issue(s} arising in the case."

       49. A mere reference to the order dated 2nd May 2003,
  en passant, in the order dated 24th July 2006 does not serve
  the requirement of disclosure. It is not for the Court to look into
  every word of the pleadings, documents and annexures to fish
D out a fact. It is for the litigant to come up-front and clean with
  all material facts and then, on the basis of the submissions
  made by learned counsel, leave it to the Court to determine
  whether or not a particular fact is relevant for arriving at a
  decision. Unfortunately, the petitioners have not done this and
E must suffer the consequence thereof.

    Validity of the High Court order:

        50. The next submission of learned counsel for the
  petitioners was that the High Court had over-stepped its
F jurisdiction in requiring the JCC to virtually go in for a fresh
  auction. While we agree that the question before the High Court
  was very limited, namely, whether respondent No.1 ought to
  have been impleaded by the JCC in the second application for
  extension of time, we are of the view that on an overall
G consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the
  High Court was perhaps left with no option but to pass the order
  that it did and accept the alternative prayer of respondent No.
  1. We say this because, as noticed above, the trustees and the
  petitioners were colluding and it was not possible to entirely rule
H out the possibility that they would enter into yet another mutual
                                                                     '
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                  787
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN 8. LOKUR, J.]
arrangement to wipe out whatever interest respondent No.1              A
had in the Trust land. Therefore, impleading respondent No.1
before the JCC could have been rendered into a mere formality.
Additionally, the lack of bona tides of the trustees and the
petitioners could not be overlooked by the High Court.
Therefore, the safest course of action for the High Court was          B
to require sale of the Trust land through auction.

     51. It appears to us that another factor that weighed with
the High Court in this regard was the submission of the learned
Assistant Government Pleader that the Charity Commissioner C
had received an offer higher than that given by respondent No.1.
Therefore, it is quite clear that due to the passage of time,
mainly because of the flip-flop of the trustees and the
petitioners, the value of the Trust land had increased
considerably. In these circumstances, it would be in the best
interest of the trust if the maximum price is available for the Trust D
 land from the open market. While this may or may not have
been a consideration before the High Court, it is certainly one
of the considerations before us for not interfering with the order
 passed by the High Court, even though it may have, in a loose
 sense, over-stepped its jurisdiction.                                E

      52. Section 36 of ihe Act clearly provides that the trustees
may be allowed by the Charity Commissioner to dispose of
immoveable property of the trust with regard being had to the
"interest, benefit or protection" of the trust. It cannot be doubted   F
that the interest of the trust would be in getting the maximum
for its immoveable property.
     53. In Chenchu Rami Reddy this Court frowned upon
private negotiations   for
                       the alienation of trust property and
encouraged public auction in such a case. It was held as               G
follows:-
     "We cannot conclude without observing that property of
     such institutions [religious or charitable institutions] or
     endowments must be jealously protected. It must be                H
    788       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A          protected, for, a large segment of the community has
           beneficial interest in it (that is the raison d'etre of the
           [Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious
           Institutions and Endowments] Act itself). The authorities
          exercising the powers under the Act must not only be most
B         alert and vigilant in such matters but also show awareness
          of the ways of the present day world as also the ugly
           realities of the world of today. They cannot afford to take
          things at their face value or make a less than the closest-
          and-best-attention approach to guard against all pitfalls.
c         The approving authority must be aware that in such matters
          the trustees, or persons authorised to sell by private
          negotiations, can, in a given case, enter into a secret or
          invisible underhand deal or understanding with the
          purchasers at the cost of the concerned institution: Those
          who are willing to purchase by private negotiations can
D
          also bid at a public auction. Why would they feel shy or be
          deterred from bidding at a public auction? Why then permit
          sale by private negotiations which will not be visible to the
          public eye and may even give rise to public suspicion
          unless there are special reasons to justify doing so? And
E         care must be taken to fix a reserve price after ascertaining
          the market value for the sake of safeguarding the interest
          of the endowment."

       54. Similarly, in R. Venugopa/a Naidu this Court followed
F the law laid down in Chenchu Rami Reddy and actually went
  a bit further and gave a direction for sale of the trust property
  by public auction. It was held as follows:-

               "The subordinate court and the High Court did not
        go into the merits of the case as the petitioners were non-
G
        suited on the ground of locus standi. We would have
        normally remanded the case for decision on merits but in
        the facts and circumstances of this case we are satisfied
        that the value of the property which the trust got was not
        the market value .....
H
 BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                  789
   WAGH EDUCATION SOClcTY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)
          ........ We direct that the properties in question may       A
    be sold by public auction by giving wide publicity regarding
    the date, time and place of public auction. The offer of Rs
    10 lakhs made in this Court will be treated as minimum
    bid of the person who has given the offer and deposited
    10 per cent of the amount in this Court. It will also be open      B
    to the respondents/purchasus to participate in the auction
    and compete with others for purchasing the properties."

     55. In Mehrwan Homi Irani it was categorically held that
the Charity Commissioner, while granting sanction under
Section 36 of the Act, must explore the possibility of getting the     C
best price for the trust properties. In keeping with this, the
Charity Commissioner was directed to issue a fresh
advertisement for leasing out the trust property and "formulate
and impose just and proper conditions so that it may r erve the
best interests of the Trust." The observations of this Court and       D
directions given are as follows :-

     "In the best interests of the Trust and its objects, we feel it
     appropriate that Respondents 2 to 4 should explore the
     further possibility of having agreements with better terms.       E
     The objects of the Trust should be accomplished in the best
     of its interests. Leasing out of a major portion of the land
     for other purposes may not be in the best interests of the
     Trust. The Charity Commissioner while granting
     permission under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts           F
     Act could have explored these possibilities. Therefore, we
     are constrained to remit the matter to the Charity
     Commissioner to take a fresh decision in the matter.
     There could be fresh advertisements inviting fresh
     proposals and the proposal of the 5th respondent could            G
     also be considered. Th·e Charity Commissioner may
     himself formulate and impose just and proper conditions
     so that it may serve the best interests of the Trust. We
     direct that the Charity Commissioner shall take a decision
     at the earliest."
                                                                       H
    790       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A      56. Following the consistent view taken by this Court as
  well as the language of Section 36 of the Act, we have no
  hesitation in concluding that the only course available to the High
  Court was to mould the relief and direct the Charity
  Commissioner to have a re-look at all bids received pursuant
B to the public notice dated 10th February 2007.

    Remaining contentions:

       57. We are not impressed with the submission of learned
  counsel for the petitioners that the right of the petitioners to
C obtain specific performance of the agreements with the trustees
  has now been obliterated. As far as the first agreement is
  concerned, permission was granted to the petitioners to
  purchase the Trust land subject to certain conditions and within
  a certain time frame. Those conditions were not met. As far as
D the other two agreements are concerned, the JCC did not grant
  sanction to the trustees to act on them. It seems to us, prima
  facie, that the petitioners could not have sought specific
  performance of any of these agreements, but we do not express
  any final opinion on this since the issue is not directly before
E us.
       58. We are also not impressed by the contention of
  learned counsel for the petitioners that by the impugned order,
  the High Court has effectively set aside its earlier order dated
  28th August 2008 passed by a coordinate Bench. The
F circumstances under which the earlier order was passed and
  the significant developments that took place thereafter changed
  the circumstances and made it necessary for the High Court
  to pass a different order. It is not as if both orders were passed
  by the High Court under similar circumstances. The
G circumstances had changed and the view of the High Court on
  the changed circumstances could also be different.
    Conclusion:

          59. For the reasons mentioned above, we decline to grant
H
  BHASKAR LAXMAN JADHAV v. KARAMVEER KAKASAHEB                  791
   WAGH EDUCATION SOCIETY [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)
special leave to appeal to the petitioners for suppression of a         A
material fact and direct the Charity Commissioner to have a
fresh look at the sale of the Trust land, subject matter of this
petition, in accordance with the directions of the High Court.
However, we leave it open to the Charity Commissioner to
permit all the parties before it to submit fresh offers for the Trust   B
land and if deemed necessary, a fresh public notice for sale of
the Trust land may be issued. On the basis of the bid given by
respondent No.1 as disclosed to us in Court, we make it clear
that the price for the sale of the Trust land shall not be less than
Rs.3.87 crore.                                                          c
    60. The petitioners will pay costs of Rs.15,000/- to the
Charity Commissioner within six weeks from today.

      61. The petition is disposed of accordingly.
                                                                        D
RP.                                             SLP Disposed of.