Holding

A concurrent finding of fact cannot be reopened on special leave unless it is unsupported by evidence, perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or overlooks vital evidence; corroboration is not mandatory for a rape conviction if the victim’s testimony is credible.

Summary

The appellant, a government servant, was convicted by the Sessions Court of rape, outraging modesty and wrongful confinement of two minor girls aged about 10‑12, and the High Court affirmed the convictions for confinement and outraging modesty while reducing the rape conviction to an attempt. He appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave, raising the question whether the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts could be reopened and whether the lack of corroboration of the victims’ testimony warranted reversal. The Court held that a concurrent finding of fact can be revisited on special leave only if it is unsupported by any evidence, perverse, based on inadmissible evidence, or ignores a vital piece of evidence – none of which applied here. It further ruled that corroboration is not a sine qua non for a rape conviction; a credible victim’s testimony is sufficient unless undermined by basic infirmities. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the convictions, reduced the sentence for the attempt to commit rape from 2½ years to 15 months, and left the other sentences unchanged.

Issues considered

Whether a concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court can be reopened on appeal by special leave.
Whether minor discrepancies in witness testimony justify overturning a conviction.
Whether corroboration of a victim’s testimony is essential for a conviction in rape cases.
Whether the sentence for the offence of attempt to commit rape should be modified.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 342, s. 354, s. 376, s. 511
Supreme Court Ruless. Order XXf of 1966

Subjects

rapecorroborationvictim testimonyspecial leaveconcurrent finding of factevidentiary discrepanciessentencingIndian Penal Codesexual assaultcriminal appeal

Judgment

BHARWADA BHOGJNBHAI HIR]IBHAt
A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT

May 24, 1983
B
[A.P. SEN AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.]

A. Constitution of India, 1~50, Article 136 read with Order XXf of the
Suprenre Court Rules, 1966-Concurrent finding of fact, when can be reopened by
the Supre111e Court in an appeal by Special Leave, explained.
c
B. Evidence-.Reappreciation of evidence in the context of 111inor dis-
crePancies, explained.

C. Evidence-Corroborative e1•ide11ce in rape cases-Whether, when and
to wi1at extent corroboration to tire testilnony of a .victi111 of rape is essential to
D establish the charge.
The appc1lant, a government servant en1ploycd jn thC Sacl1ivalaya at
- Gandhinagar was found guilty, by the Sessions Judge, Mehsna, of serious
charges of sexual misbehaviour with two young girls (aged about 10-or 12 and
was convicte.d for the offence of rape, outraging the modesty of women, and
wrongful confinement The appeal carried to the High Court substantially
failed. The High Court affinned the orders of conviction under. section 342

·-·
E
T.P C. for wrongfully confining ·the giils and conviction under Section 354
I.P.C. for outraging the modesty of the two girls. With regard to the more
serious charge of rape on one of the girls, the High Court ca1ne to the con-
clusion that what was established by evidence was an _offence of attempt to
comffiit rape and not of rape. Accordingly, the conviction under Section 376
was altered into one under Section 376 read with Section 511 l.P.C. '
F
~ Disn1issing 1he appeal , and maintaining the ~onviction on all counts,
Court
HELD : 1:1. A concurrent finding of fact as recorded by the Sessions
Couit and affirmed by the High Court, cannot be reopened in an appeal by
Special Leave unless it is established (1) that the finding is based on no evidence
G or (2) that the fin~ing is perverse, it being such as no reasonable person collld
have arrived at even if the evidence was taken at its face value or
(3) the finding is based and built on inadmissibl_e evidence, which evidence,
if exi;:luded from vision, would negate the prosecution case or substantially
discredit or in1pair it or (4) some vital piece of evidence which would tilt the
balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked, disregarded, or \Vrongly
H discarded. The present ~s not a case of such a nature. [285 G-lJ, 286 A] -!----
•
1:2. Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and shake
the basic version of the witnes,es therefore cannot be annexed with undue
illiARWADA v. GUJARAT 281
importance. More s_o when the- all imporlant ''probabilities-factor" echoes
in favour of the version narrated by the witnesses. The reasons are : (1) By A
and large a \.Y_itness cannot be expected fo possess a photographic memory and
to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on
the mental screen ; (2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by
events. The witness could not hive anticipated the occurrence which so often
has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected
to be attuned to absorb the details;;,_ (3) The powers of observation differ from
Person to person. What one 1nay notic~, another may not. An object or B
movement might en1boss its in1age on one person's mind whereas it might. go
unnoticed_ on the part of another; (4) By and large people cannot accurately
recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by
them. They can only recall the n1ain purport of the conversation. It is
unrealistic to exp·ect a \Vitness to be a human tape recorder; (5) 111 regard to
exact time of an incident, or ·the time duration of an occurrance, usual.ly,
people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of_the 1non1ent at the c
time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very_ precise
or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the 'timesensc'
of individuals which varies from person to person. (6) Ordinarily a witness
cannot be expecled to recall accurately the sequence of events· which take
place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get
confused, or mixed up, when interrogated later on; (7) A witness, though D
wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed ·by the court atmosphere and the
, piercing cross examination made by counsel and out of nervousness n1ix up
facts; get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from

-
imagination On the spur of moment. The subconscious mind of the witne·ss
sometimes so Operates on account of the fear of looking foolish, or being dis-
believed, though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the

-- occurrence witnessed by him-Perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence
mechanism activated on the spur of the n1oment. "[286 B-H, 287 A-E]

2:1. Corroboration is not the sine-quo-non for a conviction in a rape
case. In the Indian.setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victum of
sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to
injury. Viewing the evidence of the girl or the women ,.who complains of rape
or sexual molestation with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with
F
- __.,._.
doubt, disbelief or suspicion, is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a
male dominated society. [287 F, 288 C-D]

Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, [1952] S.C.R. 377 @ 386
followed.
G
2:2. Corroboration may be considered essential to establish a sexual
offence in the backdrop of the social ecology cif the Western World. It is
wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turn-key basis and to
transplant it on the Indian soil regardless of the altogether different atmos-
phere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian Society, ani;l its profile. The
identities of the two worlds are different. The solution of problems H
cannot therefore be idential. It is conceivable in the Western Society
that a female may level false accusation as regards sexual molestation
asainst a male for several reasons such as ;-(1) The female may be a •gold
282 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS (1~8311 ~ s.c.k.

digger' and may well have an economic motive-to extract money by holding
A out the gun of pr_osecution or public exposure; (2) She may be suffe1ring from
psychological neurosis and 111ay seek an escape from the neurotic prison by
phantasizing or imagining a situation where she is desired, wanted and
chased, by males. (3) She n1ay want to wreak vengence on the male for real
or imaginary wrongs. She may have a grudge against a particular male, or
males in general, and may have the design to square the account; (4) She may
have been induced to do so in consideration of economic rewards, by a person
B interested in placing the accused in a comprOmising or embarassing position, on
account of personal or political vendetta; (5) She may do so to gain notoriety or
publicity or to appease her own egoT or to satisfy her feeling of self-irrtportartce
in the context of her inferiority complex; (6) She may do so on a~count of
jealousy; (7) She may do so to win sympathy of others; (8) She ma.y 'do so
upon being repulsed. By and large these factors are not relevant to India,
and the Indian Conditions. (288 F-H, 289 A-BJ
c
2:3. Rarely will a girl or a woman in India make such false allegations
of sexual assault, whether she .belongs to the'. urban or rural soc:iety, or,
sophisticated, or, not-~o solphisticated, or, unsophisticated society. «)nly very
rerely. can one conceivably come accross an exception or tw'b ancl that too
D possibilyJrom ainougst the urban elites. Because :-(1) A girl or a w·oman in
the tradition bound non-permissive Society of India would be ~:x.tremely
reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her
chastity had ever occurred ; (2) She would be conscious of the dangeir of bein2
ostracised by the Society Or being.looked down by the Society including by her
own family men1bcrs, relatives, friends, and neighbours; (3) She would have to
brave the whole world; (4) S)le would face the risk of losing the Jove and respect
E of her own husband and near· relative:;, and of her matrimonial home and happi·
ness being shattered; (5) If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would·
be,.difticult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an
acceptable family; (6) lt would almost inevitably and almost invariably result in
mental torture and suffering to herself; (7) The fear of being taunted by others
will always h~unt her; (8) She would feel extremely embarassed in relating the
incident to others being over powered by feding of shame on account of· the
F upbringing in a tradition bound society where by and large sex is taboo ;
(9) The natural inclination would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident
lest the family name and family honour is brougl1t into controversy; (10) The
parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of the husband's
family of a married woman, would also more often than not, want to avoid
publicity on accOunt of the fear of social stigma on the family name and
G family honour; (11) The fear of the victim herself being considered to be
promiscuous or in some way responsible for the incident regardless of her
innocence; (12) The reluctance to face interrogation by the investigatins
· agency, to face the court, to face the cross examination by Couns€:l for the )-
culprit, and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent. In view
of these factors the victims and their re]atives are not too keen to brina: the
H culprit to books. And when in the face of these factors the crime fa brought
to light there is a built in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than
fabricated. [289 F-H, 290 A-BJ
2:4. On principle the evidence of a victim of sexual assaullt stands on
par with evidence of an injured witness.. Just as a witness who has sustained A
an injury (which is not shOWn or believed to be self-inflicted) is the best witness
in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence
of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corrobo-
ration notwithstanding.' And while corroboration in the form of eye witness
account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical
'assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard
to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to B
injury to insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised by
the courts in the Western World. [290 E·G]

2:5. Therefore, if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any
basic infirn1ity, and the 'probabilities-factor" does not render it unworth of
credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration
except from the medical evidence, where, having regart to the circumstances
c
of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to
the following qualification: Corroboration may be insisted upon when a
woman having attained majodty is surprised in a compromising position and
there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of
the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the 'probabilities-factor' is found
to be out of tune. [290 G-H. 291 A·B] D
2:6. To countenance the suggestion, in the instant case, that the

-.
appellant has been falsely roped in at the installce of the father of P.W. 2
who was supposed to have some enmity against the appellant would be wrong.
Ordinarily no parents would do- so in Indian Society as at present and thereby
bring down their oWn social status and spoil their reputation in Society, not
to speak of the danger of traumatic effect on the psychology of their daughter. E
- Having regard to the prevailing mores of the Indian Society,· it is inconceivable
that a girl of IO or 12 would invent on her own a false story of sexual moles-
tation. Moreover, the medical· evidence fully supports the finding of the
High Court that there was an attempt to commit rape on P.W. 1 by the
appellant. (291 G-H, 292 A-DJ
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 68 of
1977.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
15th November, 1976 of the Gujarat High Court in Criminal. Appeal G
No. 832 of 1976.

R.H. Dhebar and B. V. Desai for the Appellant.

R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.
,.
The Judgment of-the Court was delivered by
284 SUPREME. COUR'r REPORTS t198l) ~ S.C.R.
THAKKAR, J. To say at the beginning what we cannot help
A saying at the end : human goodness has limits-human depravity· has
none. The need of the hour however, is not exasperation.

The need of the hour is to mould and evolve the law so as to
make· it more sensitive and responsive to· the demands of the time
8 in order to resolve the basic problem : "Whether, when; and to what
extent corr.oboration to the testimony of a victim of rape is essential
to establish the charge." And the problem has special significance
for the women in India, for, while they have often been idolized,
adored, and even worshipped, for ages they have also been exploited
and denied even handed justice-Sixty crores anxious eyes of Indian
Cl women are therefore focussed on ibis problem. And to that problem
we will presently address ourselves.

The learned Sessions Judge Mehsana found the appellant, a_
Government servant employed in the Sachivalaya at Gandhinagar,
D guilty of serious charges of sexual misbenaviour with two young girls
(aged about 10 or i2) and convicted the appellant for the offence of
rape, outraging the modesty of women, and wrongful confinement.
The appeal carried to the Hig)l Court substantially failed. The 'High
Court affirmed the order of conviction under Sec. 342 of the Indian

E
Penal Code for wrongfully confining the· girls. The High Court also
sustained the order of conviction under Sec. 354 9f the Indian Penal
Code for outraging the modesty of the two girls. With regard to the
---
more ~erious charge of rape on one of the girls, the High Court came
to the conclusion that what was established by evidence was an
·offence of attempt to commit rape and not of rape. Accordingly the
F conviction under Sec._ 376 was altered into one under Sec. 376 read
with Sec. 511 of the Indian.Penal Code. The appellant has preferred
the present appeal with special leave.

The incident occurred on Sunday, September 7, 1975, at about
5·~0 p.m. at the house of the appellant. The evidence of P. W. I
G and P.W. 2 shows that they went to the house. of the appellant in
order to meet his daughter (belonging to their own age group of
10 or 12) who happened to be their friend.· The appellant induced
them to enter his house by creating an impression that she was at
home, though, in fact she was not. Once they were inside, the
H·
appellant closed the door, undressed himself in the presence of both
the girls, and exposed himeelf. He asked P.W . .2 to indulge in an
indecent act. P.W. 2 started crying and fled from there. P.W. ·I
BHARWADA v. GUJARAT (Thakkar, J.) 285

however could not escape. She was pushed into a cot, and was made
to undress. The appellant sexually assaulted her. P.W. 1 was in A
distress and was weeping as she went out. She however could not
apprise her parents about what had transpired because both of them
were out of Gandhinagar (they returned after 4 or 5 days).

It appears that the parents of P.W. 1 as well as parents of B
P.W: 2 wanted to hush up the matter. Some unexpected develop-
ments however forced the issue. The residents of the locality some-
how came to know about the incident. And an alert Woman Social
Worker, P.W. 5 Kundanben, President of the Mahi!a Manda! in
.sector 17, Gandhinagar, took up the cause. She felt indignant at
the way in which the appellant had misbehaved with two girls of the
c
~ge of his own daughter, who also happened to be friends of his
daughter, taking advantage of their helplessness, when no one else
was present. Having ascertained from P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 as to what
had transpired, she felt that the appellant should atone for his
infamous conduct. She therefore called on the appellant at his D
house.· It appears that about 500 women of the locality had also
-· gathered near the house of the appellant. Kundanben requested the
appellant to apologjze publicly in the presence of the woman who had
assembled there. If the appellant had acceded to this request
possibly the matter might have rested there and might not have come
· to the court. The appellant, however, made it a prestige issue and E
refused to apologize. Thereupon the police was contacted and a
complaint was lodged by P.W. 1oa19 Sept. 1975. P.W. 1 was then
sent to the Medical Officer for medical examination. The medical
examination disclosed that there was evidence to show that an
attempt to commit rape on her had been made a few days. back. The F
Sessions Court as well as the High Court have accepted· the evidence
and concluded that the appellant was guilty of sexual misbehaviour
with P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 in the manner alleged by the prosecution and
established by the evidence of P.W. I and P.W. 2. Their evidence
has been considered to be worthy of acceptance. It is a pure finding
of fact recorded by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High G
Court. Such a concurrent finding of fact cannot be. reopened in an
appeal by special leave unless it is established: (I) that the finding
is based on no evidence or (2) that the finding is perverse, it being
such as no reasonable person could have arrived at even if the
evidence was taken at its face value or (3) the finding is based and H
built on inadmissible evidence, which evidence, if excluded from
vision, wo.uld ne~ate the prosecutioq cas~ or sul;>stantially discredit
/

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] 3 s.c.R.
or impair it or (4) some vital.piece of evidence which would tilt the
A balance in favour of the convict has been overlooked, disregarded,
or wrongly discarded. The present is not a case of such a nature.
The finding of guilt recorded by the Sessions Court as affirmed by
the High Court has been challenged mainly OJ) the basis of minor
discrepancies in the evidence. We do not consider it appropriate or
B permissible to enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the
ev,idence in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly
highlighted by learned counsel for the appellant. Over much
importance cannot be attached to minor discrepancies. The reasons
are obvious:-

c (1) By and large.a witness cannot be expected to possess
a photographic memory and to recall the details of
an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed
on the mental screen.

(2) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken
D by events. The witness could nol have anticipated the
occurrence which so often has an element of surprise.
The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to
be attuned to absorb the details.

E (3) The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not.
An object or mov~ment might emboss its image on
one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on
the part of another.
F ( 4) By and large people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by .them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to ·
expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
)

(5) In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time
durarion of an occurrence, usually, people mak,e their
estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment
at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expe.ct
people to make very precise or reliable estimates in
such matters. Again, it depends on tbe time-sense
of individuals which varies frpm person.to person.
BHA RWADA v. GUJARAT (Thakkar.'!.) 287

(6) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which take place
A
in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness
is liable to get confused, or mixed up when
interrogated later on;

(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be B
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross examination made by counsel and out of
nervousness mix up facts, get · confused regarding
sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination
on the spur of the moment. The sub-conscious mind
of the witness sometimes so operates on account of
c
the fear of looking foolish or being dis-believed
though the witness is giving a truthful and honest
account of the occurrence witnessed by him-Perhaps
it is a. sort of a psychological defence mechanism
activated on the spur of the moment. D

Discrepancies which do not go to the root of the matter and
shake the basic version of the witnesses therefore cannot be annexed 1
with undue importance. More so when the all important
"probabilities-factor" echoes in favour of the version narrated by the E
witnesses.

It is now time to tackle the pivotal issue as regards the need
for insisting on corroboration to the testimony of the prosecutrix in
sex-offences. This Court, in Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan,(1)
has declared that corroboration is not the sine que-non for a convic- F
tion in a rape case. The utterance of the Court in Rameshwar may
be replayed, across the time-gap of three decades which have
whistled past, in the inimitable "voice of Vivian Bose, J. who spoke for
the Court -

The rule, which according to the cases has hardened
G
into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential
before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of
corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the'
circumstances make it safe to dispense with it, must be H
present to the mind of the judge

(I) (1952) S.C.R. 377 at p. 386,
I
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] 3 s.c.R
The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be
A present to the mind of the Judge or the jury as the case
may be and be understood and appreciated by him or
them. There is no rule of practice that there must:, in
every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be
allowed to stand."
B
And whilst the sands were running out in the time-glass, the
crime graph of offences against women in India has been ~caling
new peaks from day to day. That is why an elaborate res,:anning
of the jurisprudential sky through the lenses of 'logos' and 'ethos',
C has been necessitated.

In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim
of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding
insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman
D who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid
of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelie:f or sus-
picion 1 To do so.is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a
. male dominated society. We must analyze the argument in support
of the need for corroboration and subject it to relentless and remorse-
less cross-examination. And we must do so with a logical, and not
E an opiniated, eye in the light of probabilities with our feet firmly
planted on the soil of India and with our eyes focussed on the Indian
horizon. We must not be swept off the feet by the approach made
in the Western World which has its own social mileu, its own social
mores, its own permissive values, and its own code of life. c'orro-
F boration may be considered essential to establish a sexual offence in
the backdrop of the social ecology of the Western World. It is
wholly unnecessary to import the said concept on a turn-key basis
and to transplate it on the Ind;an soil regardless of the altogether
different atmosphere, attitudes, mores, responses of the Indian ·
Society, and its profile. The identities of the two worlds are different.
G The solution of problems cannot therefore be identical. It is con-
ceivable in the Western Society that a female may level false accusa"
· tion as regards sexual molestation against a male for several reasons
such as:

H
·(!) · The female may be a 'gold digger' and may well have
an economic motive to extract money by holding out
the gun of iirosecution or iiublic exiiosure.
illlARwAi>A v. GUJARAT (Thakkar, J.) 289
(2) She may be suffering from psychological neurosis
and may seek an escape from the neurotic prison by A
phantasizing or imagining a situation- where she is
desired, wanted, and chased by males.

(3) She may want to wreak vengence on the male for
real or imaginary wrongs. She may have a grudge
against a particular male, or males in general, and B
may have the design to square the account.

(4) She may have been induced to do So in consideration
of economic rewards, by a person interested in
placing the accused in a compromising or embarass- C
ing position, on account of personal or political
vendatta.

(5) She may do so to gain notoriety or publicity or to
appease· her own ego or to satisfy her feeling of
self-importance in the context of her inferiority ·D
complex.

(6) She may do so on account of jealousy.
•
/
(7) She may do so to win sympathy of others.
E
(8) She may do so upon being repulsed.

By and large these factors are not relevant to India, and the
Indian conditions. Without the fear of making too wide a statement,
·Or of overstating the case, it can be said that rarely wiU a girl or a F
y;oman in India make false allegations of sexual assualt on account
of any such factor as has been just enlisted. The statement is
generally true in the context of the urban as also rural Society. It
is also by and largo true in the context of. the sophisticated, not so
sophisticated, and unsophisticated society. Only very rarely can
one conceivably come across an exception or two and that too G
possibly from amongst the urban elites. Because: ·(!) A girl or a
woman in the traditio,\ bound non-permissive Society of Iridia would
be extremely reluctant even to adm~ that any incident which is likely
·to re~ect on her chastity had ever occurred. (2) She would be
conscious of the danger _of b~ing ostracised by the Society or being H
looked down by the Society mclud1ng by her own family members
relatives, friends and neighbours. (3) She would have to brave th~
Mo SUPREME COURT l\EPORTS (1~)83] J s.c.R.

wh-Ole world. (4) She would face the risk of losing the love and
A respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her ·matri-
monial home and happiness being shattered. (5) If she is unmarried,
she would apprehend that it would .be difficult to secure an alliance
with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family.
(6} It would almost inevitably and almost invariably resu:it in mental
torture and suffering to herself. (7) The fear of being taunted by
B others will always haunt her. (8) She would feel extremely
. embarasstd in relating the incident to others being over powered by
a feeling of shame on account of the upbringing in a tradition bound
society where by and large sex is taboo. (9) The natural inclination
would be to avoid giving publicity to the incident lest the family
c name and family honour is brought into controversy. (IO) The
parents of an unmarried girl as also the husband and members of
the husband's family of a married woman would also more often
than not, want to avoid publicity on account of the fear of social
stigma on the family. name and.family honour. (11) The fear of the
victim herself being considered to be promiscuous or in some way
D "responsible for the incident regardless of her innocence .. (121 The
reluctance to face interrogation by the investigating agency, to face
· the court, to face the cross examination by Counsel for· the culprit,
and the risk of being disbelieved, acts as a deterrent .
•
E In view of these factors the victims and their relatives are not
too keen to bring the ·culprit to books. And when in the face of
these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance
that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. On principle the
evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands on par with evidence of
an injured witness. Just as a witness who has sustained an injury
F (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness
in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the
evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight,
absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corrobora-
tion in the form of eye witn.ess account of an independent witness
may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases,. such evidence
G
cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature
of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to
insist on corroboration drawing inspiration from the rules devised
by the courts in the Western World. lobseisance to which has
perh~ps become a habit presumably on ·account of the colonial
H
hangover. We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of
the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the proba-
bilities-factor' does not render it unworthy of credence, ~ts a gene~al
BHARWADA v. GUJARAT (Thakkar, J.) 291

rule, .there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the
medical evidence, where, having regard to. the circumstances of the A
case, medical evidence can be expected to. be forthcoming, subject
to the following qualification : Corroboration may be insisted upon
when a woma·n having attained majority is fonnd in a compromising
position and there is a likelihood of her having levelled such an
accusation on account of the Instinct of self-preservation. Or when
B
the 'probabi!ities-fc•.ctor' is found to be out of tune.

Now we return to the facts·. of the present case: Testing the
evidence from this perspective, the evidence of P.\:\i. land P.W. 2
inspires confidence. The only motive suggested by defence was that
there was some history of past trade union rivalry between the father
c
of P.W. 2 and the appellant. It must be realized that having regard
to the prevailing mores of the Indian Society, it is inconceivable that
a girl of 10 or 12 would invent on her own .a false story of sexual
molestation. Even at the age of 10 or 12 a girl in India can be
trusted to be aware of the fact that ihe reputation of the entire. D
family would be jeopardised upon such a story being spread. She
·can be trusted to know that in the Indian Society her own future
chances of getting married and settling down in a respectable or
acceptable family would be greatly marred if any such story calling
• into question her chastity were to gain circulation in the Society.
It is also unthinkable that the parents would tutor their minor
E
daughter to invent such· a story in order to wreak vengence on
someone. They would not do so for the simple reason that it would
bring down their own social status in the Society apart from ruining
the future prospects of their own child. They would also be expected
to be conscious of the traumatic effect on the pyschology of the F
child and the disastrous consequences likely to ensue when she grows
up. She herself. would prefer to suffer the injury and the harass-
ment, rather than to undergo the harrowing experience of lodging a
compiaint in regard to a charge reflecting on her own chastity,
We therefore refuse to countenance the suggestion made by the
defence that the appellant has been falsely roped in at the instance G
of the father of P.W. 2 who was supposed to have some enmity
against the appellant. It is unthinkable that the parents of P. W. 2 1
would tutor her to invent a story of sexual misbehaviour on the part
of the appellant merely in order to implicate him on account of past
H
trade union rivalry. The parents would have also realized the
danger of traumatic effect on the psychology of their daughter. In
fBct it would have been. considered to be extremely distasteful to
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) 3S.C.R.
\
broach the subject. It is unthinkable that the parents would go to
A the length of inventing a story of sexual assault on their own daughter
and tutor her to narrate such a version which would bring down
their owu social status and spoil their reputation in Society. Ordi-
narily no parents would do so in Indian society as at present. Under
the circumstances the defence version that the father of P.W. 2 had
tutored her to concoct a false versian in order to falsely im1ilicate
B the appellant must be unceremoniously thrown overboard. Besides,
· why should the parents of P.W. l mar the future prospects of their
own daughter? It is not alleged thal P.W. I bad any motive to
falsely implicate the appellant. So also ihs not even suggested why
P.W. 1 should falsely implicate the appellant. From the stand point
c of probabilities it is not possible to countenance the suggestion that
a false story bas been concocted in order to falsely implicate the
appellant. The medical evidence provided by P.W 6, Dr. Hemangini
Desai, fully supports the finding of the High Court that there was an
attempt to commit rape on P.W. I. Under the circumstanc:es the
conclusion reached by the High Court cannot be successfully
D assailed.

The only question that now remains to be considered is as
regards the sentence. The appellant has behaved in a ·shockingly •:11
indecent manner. The magnitude of his. offence cannot be. over- •
E emphasised m the context of the fact that he misused his position as a
father of a girl friend of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2. P. W, 1 and P.W. 2 were
visiting his house unhestitatingly. because of the fact that his daughter
was their friend. To have misused this position and to hive tricked
them into cnteri1ig the house, and to have taken undue advantage of
F the situation by subjecting them to sexual harassment, is a crime of
which a serious view must be taken. But for the following facts and
circumstances, we would not- have ·countenanced the prayer for
leniency addressed to us on behalf of the appellant. The special
circumstances are these. The appellant has lost bis job in view of
the conviction recorded by the High \:ourt. The incident occurred
G some 7 years back. The appeal preferred to the High Court was
dismissed in November 15, 1976. About 6-1/2 years have elapsed
thereafter. In the view that we are taking the appellant will have
to be sent back to jail after an interval of about 6-1 /2 years. The
appellant must have suffered great humiliation in the Society. 'The
H
prospects of getting a suitable match for his own daughte,r have
perhaps been marred in view of the stigma in the wake of the finding
of guilt recorded against him in the context of such an olfence.
BHARWADA v. GUJARAT (Thakkar, J.) 293

Taking into account · the cumulative effect of. these circumstances,
and an overall view of the matter, we are· of the opinion that the A
ends of Justice will be satisfied if the substantive sentence imposed
by the Higb Court for the the offence under Sec. 376 read with
Sec. 511 is reduced from one of 2-1/2 years' R. I.; to one of 15-
months' R.I. The sentence of fine, and in. default of fine, will be
course remain undiSturbed. So also the sentence imposed in the
context of the offence under Sec. 342 and Sec 354 of the Indian B
Penal Code will remain intact. Subject to the modification in the
sentence to- the aforesaid extent the appeal fails and is· dismissed
The appellant shall surrender in order to undergo the sentence. The
bail bonds will stand cancelled.
c
S.R. Appeal dismissed.

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