BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR.versusKOTHAKAPU MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS .

                              (2017] 9 S.C.R. 380


A                 BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR.
                                          v.
                KOTHAKAPU MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS .
                      . (Civil Appeal No. 11345of2017)
B                           SEPTEMBER 07, 2017
       [R. K. AGRAWAL AND ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
           Code of Civil Procedur~, 1908:
            Order VII r. JI (d) - Suit against award <d Lok Adalat -
C Application for rejection of plaint on the ground that the suit was
    not maintainable being barred by y_irtue of rigour contained in Or.
     VII 1: JI (d) - Trial court relying on the law laid down in *State of
    Punjab v. Jal our Singh case rejected the plaint holding that suit against
    award of Lok Ada/at was barred and reme({y there-against was writ
D petition u!Art. 2261227 of the Constitution - High Court set aside
   ·the order of'trial court holding that since the suit was founded on
    the allegations of misrepresentation and fraud, was capable of being
    tried by civil court - On appeal, held: The law laid down by Supreme
 ·. Court is binding on all the, courts by virtue of mandate of Art. 141
    of the Constitution - The expression 'Law' occurring in clause (d)
E of r. I 1 of Or. VII CPC. is not co11ftned to legislative enactments and
    would include 'Judicial decisions' - The deci.'iion since laid down
    that award of Lok Ada/at can be challenged only by filing writ
    petition, this law is binding - Therefore, in the present case, the
    only remedy available to the plaintiffs was writ petition he.fore High
F Court - Plaint 1rus right(v rejected by the trial court - Constitution
    of India -Art. 141 - Precedent.
           Words & Phrases:
           "Lcrw" - Meaning of in the context of Or. VII r. 11 (d) CPC.
           Allowing the appeal, the Court
G
           HELD: 1. The law laid down by this Court in *Ja/our Singh 's
    case is binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of mandate
    of Article 141 of the Constitution. This Court, in no .uncertain
    terms, has laid down that challenge to the award of Lok Adalat
    can be done only by filing a writ petition under Article 226 andlor
H
                                    380
   BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU                          381
         MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS. [387-E-F]

Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and         A
that too on very limited grounds. [Para 27][387-E-F]
       2. It is not cor~ect to say that the expression "law"
occurring in clause(d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC does not include
the "judicial decisions" ancl clause (d) applies only to bar which
is contained in "the Act" enacted by the Legislature. "Law"            B
includes the "judicial precedents". Law is derived from judicial
precedents, legislation .or from custom. When derived from
judicial precedents, it is called common law, equity, or admiralty,
probate or ecclesiastical law according to the nature of the Courts
by which it was originally enforced". Law includes not only
legislative enactments but also judicial precedents. An                C
authoritative judgment of the Courts including higher judiciary
is also law. [Paras 30, 31 and 32][388-C-G]
      Virender Kumar Dixit v. State of UP. 2014 (9) ADJ
      1506; Shahid s. Sarkar & Ors. v. U5ha Ramrao Bhojane
      2017 SCC OnLine Born 3440; Mira Sinha & Ors. v.                  D
      State ofJharkhand & Ors. 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar.4377
      - approved.                 ""·
      Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition); Jowett's.
      Dictionary of English Law (Third Edition) Volume-2
      - referred to.                                                   E

      3. *Jalour Singll's cal·e is binding on this Court. No efforts
were made that the said decision needed reconsideration on- the
issue in question. That apart, when this Court has laid down a
particular remedy to follow for challenging the award of LokAdalat
then the same is required to be followed by the litigant in letter     F
and spirit as provided therein for adjudication of his grievance in
the first instance. The reason being that it is a law of the land
under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 37][390-G-
H; 391-A]
      M Nagaraj & Ors. v. UO.l. & Ors. 2006 (8) SCC 212:               G
      [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336 - relied on.
     4. In the light of clear pronouncement of the law by this
Court, the only remedy available to the aggrieved
person(respondents herein/plaintiffs) was to file a writ petition
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382            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      (20 l7] 9 S.C.R.


A     under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India in the
      High Court for challenging the award dated 22.08.2007 passed
      by the Lok Adalat. It was then for the writ Court to decide as to
      whether any ground was made out by the writ petitioners for
      quashing the award and, if so, whether those grounds were
      sufficient for its quashing. [Para 28](387-G-H]
8
             5. The High Court was, therefore, not right in by-passing
      the law laid down by this Court on the ground that the suit can be
      filed to challenge. the. award, if the challenge is founded on the
      allegations of fraud. It was not correct approach of the High Court.
      (Para 29](388-A-BJ
c
            6. However, the respondents (plaintiffs) would be at liberty
      to challenge the legality and correctness of the award dated
      22.08.2007 passed by the Lok Adalat by filing the writ petition
      under Article 226 or/and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court
      in accordance with law. [Para 40](39.1-D]
D
            *State of Punjab & Am: v. Jalour Singh & Ors. (2008)
            2 SCC 660 : [2008 ] 1 SCR 922 - relied on.
                            Case Law Reference
      [2008] 1 SCR 922                  relied on           Para 13
E
      2014 (9) ADJ 1506                 approved            Para 32
      2017 SCC OnLine Born 3440         approved            Para 34
      2015 sec OnLine Jhar. 4377        approved            Para 35
      [2006] 7 Suppl. SCR 336           relied on           Para 37
F
                                               '
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 11345
      of2017.
         From the final Judgment dated 25.06.20 t 5 passed by the High
  Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the
G State of Andhra Pradesh in Appeal Suit No. 968 of 20 t 3.
             Dushyant Dave, Jayant Bhushan. Sr. Advs., S. Udaya Kumar
      Sagar, Bina Madhavan, H. Venugopal, Ms. Priyanka Galdson,Amir Nabi,
      Mis Lawyer S. Knit & Co., Advs. for the Appellants.
            B. Adinarayana, Sr.Adv.. R. Santhnan Krishnan, C. S. N. Mohan
H
    BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU                                     383
              MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS.

 Rao, D. Mahesh Babu, Ms. Suchitra H., T.V. Bhaskar Reddy, A
 B. Ramakrishna Rao, Pranab Kumar Mullick, Mrs. Soma Mullick, Sebat
 Kumar Deuria, Ejaz Maqbool, Advs. for the Respondents.
        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J, I. Leave granted.
                                                                            B
       2. This appeal is filed by the defendants against the final judgment
 and order dated 25.06.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
 Hyderabad for the State ofTelangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh
 in Appeal Suit No. 968 of 2013 whereby the High Court allowed the
 appeal filed by the r~spondents herein with costs and set aside the order
 dated 24.07.2013 passed by the second Additional District Judge, Ranga C
 Reddy District in I.A. No. 894 of2010 jn O.S. No. i 07 of2010.
         3. In order to appreciate the short legal controversy involved in
 the appeal, it may not be necessary to set out the factual controversy
 involved in the case iii detail and only narration offew facts to appreciate
 the legal question arising in the case would suffice for the disposal of D
 this. appeal.
         4. On 07.05.2007, T. Jagat Singh (respondent No. 5 herein) filed
· a civil suit being O.S. No. 48 I of2007 against respondent Nos. 1 to 34
  herein (defendant Nos. 1 to 33) in the Court of District Judge, Ranga
  Reddy District Court.                                                            E
       5. The suit was for specific performance of agreement of sale
 dated 28.12.1995 said to have been entered into between the parties in
 respect of agricultural land totally admeasuring AC. 5 J'.29 guntas in
 (Sy.Nos. 262-274) sifuated at Pappalguda village of Rajendranagar
 Manda!, Ranga Reddy District (hereinafter referred to as:the "suit land").        F
         6. Originally, the plaintiff had filed suit only against defendant Nos.
  l to 9 but later on defendant Nos. l0 to 33 made an application for being
 joined as defendant Nos. l 0 to 33 in the civil suit as according to them,
 they had an interest in the subject matter of the civil suit and also in its
 decision and, therefore, they were necessary parties to the suit. Their           G
 prayer was allowed. The defendants then contested the suit.
       7. During the pendency of civil suit, on 22.08.2007, the parties
 (plaintiff and defendants) settled the matter in relation to the suit land
 and accordingly entered into written compromise.
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384             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A            8.Ajoint compromise petition signed by all the parties to the suit
      was accordingly filed before the Lok Adalat, which held its Lok Adalat
      sitting in the Court on 22.08.2007.
         9. The members of the Lok Adalat before whom the suit was
  posted for its disposal in terms of the compromise petition filed by the
B parties perused the compromise petition and accepted the compromise
  petition finding it to be in order. An Award was accordingly passed on
  22.08.2007 under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987
  (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in terms of the compromise petition,
  which, in turn, disposed of the suit as having been compromised.
  (Annexure P-2).
c
             I 0. On 14. 11.2009, respondent Nos. I to 4 herein (who were
      original defendant Nos. 22 to25 in Suit No. 481 of2007) filed Civil Suit
      No. I 07 of 20 I0 against the plaintiff and the remaining defendants of
      Civil Suit No. 481 of2007. This suit was filed in the Court of II Additional
      District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar.
D
              11. This suit was for a declaration that the award dated 22.08.2007
      passed by the LokAdalat in Civil Suit No. 481 of2007 was obtained by
      the defendants of this suit by playing fraud/mis- representation on the
      plaintiffs and hence the Award dated 22.08.2007 be declared illegal, null
      and void and not binding on the plaintiffs.
E
             12. According to the plaintiffs, though they were parties to the
      award along with defendants in Civil Suit No. 481/2007 but since the
      award elated 22.08.2007 was obtained by the parties by misrepresenting
      the facts to the plaintiffs which was nothing short of fraud played by the
      defendants on them to grab their more land without their knowledge and
F     taking advantage of their illiteracy. the same is not a legal award and
      hence not binding on the plaintiffs. On these averments. the plaintiffs
      prayed that the award dated 22.08.2007 be declared illegal, void, in-
      operative and not binding on the plaintiffs.
         13. The defendants, on being served with the notice of the suit,
G filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code of Civil
  Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") and prayed for
  rejection of the plaint. According to the defendants, since the suit seeks
  to challenge the Award of LokAdalat, it is not maintainable being barred
  by virtue of rigour contained in Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of Code. It was
H contended thatthe remedy of the plaintiff was in filing writ petition under
   BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU                                     385
MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

Article 226 or/and 227 ofthe Constitution oflndia to challenge the award          A
dated 22.08.2007 as held by this Court in State of Punjab & Anr. Vs.
Jalour Singh & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 660 .
       14. The Trial Court, by order dated 24.07.2013 allowed the
application filed by the defendants and rejected the plaint by invoking
powers under clause (d) of Rule 11. It was held that the filing of the civil      B
suit to challenge the award of Lok Adalat is impliedly barred and the
remedy of the plaintiffs is to challenge the award by filing writ petition
under Article 226 or/and 227 of the Constitution in the High Court as
held by this Court in the case of State of Punjab (supra).
        15. The plaintiffs, felt aggrieved, filed an appeal before the High       c
Court. The High Court, by impugned order, allowed the appeal, set aside
the order of the Trial Court and restored the suit on its file for its disposal
on merits in accorda.nce with law. The High Court held that since the
suit is founded on the allegations of misrepresentation and fraud, it is
capable of being tried on its merits by the Civil Court.
                                                                                  D
        16. Against this order, the defendants have felt aggrieved and
filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court .
      . 17. Heard Mr. Dushyant Dave and Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned
senior counsel for the appellants and Mr. B. Adinarayana, learned senior
counsel, Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, Mr. Pranab Mullick, Mr. Ejaz Maqbool                 E
for the respondents.
       18. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel, appearing for the
appellants (defendants) while assailing the legality and correctness of
the impugned order argued only one legal point. He urged that the
reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court was right              F
whereas the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Cow1
was not so and hence ~he l_'rial Court's order deserves to be restored.
       19. Elaborating his submission, Mr. Dushyant Dave placed reliance
on the law laid down by this Court in State of Punjab (supra) and
contended that the issue urged by him no longer remains res integra
                                                                                  0
and stands answered by this Court in appellant's favour.
      20. It was his submission that the expression "barred by any law"
occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 not only includes any Act
enacted by the legislature creating a "bar" but the expression "law"
includes therein "judicial decision of the Supreme Court'' also, which are
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' 386             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017) 9 S.C.R.


  A binding on all the Courts in the Country by virtue of A11icle 141 of the
    Constitution of India.
           21. In other words, his submission was that the expression "law"
    occurring in clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 should be construed liberally
    so as to include therein not only any "Act" which is admittedly a "law"
  B made by the legislature but also include therein a "a decision of Supreme
    Court".
               22. Learned counsel urged that the appellants (defendants) were,
        therefore, fully justified in invoking the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 (d)
        of the Code praying for rejection of the plaint as being barred on the
  c     strength of law laid down by this Court in State of Punjab (supra).
               23. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents while supporting
        the impugned order contended that the reasoning and the conclusion
        arrived at by the High Court is just and proper and hence does not call
        for any interference.
  D            24. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
        of the record of the case, we find force in the submissions of the learned
        counsel for the appellants.
           25. The question arose before this Court (Three Judge Bench) in
    the case of State of Punjab (supra) as to what is the remedy available
  E to the person aggrieved of the award passed by the Lok Ada lat under
    Section 20 of the Act. In that case, the award was passed by the Lok
    Adalat which had resulted in disposal of the appeal pending before the
    High Court relating to a claim case arising out of Motor Vehicle Act.
    One party to the appeal felt aggrieved of the Award and, therefore,
  F questioned its legality and correctness by filing a writ petition under Article
    226/227 of the Constitution oflndia. The High Court dismissed the writ
    petition holding it to be not maintainable. The aggrieved party, therefore,
    filed an appeal by way of special leave before this Court. This Court,
    after examining the scheme of the Act allowed the appeal and set aside
    the order of the High Court. This Court held that the High Court was
  G not right in dismissing the writ petition as not maintainable. It was held
    that the only remedy available with the aggrieved person was to challenge
    the award of the Lok Adalat by filing a writ petition under Article 226 or/
    and 227 of the Constitution of India in the High Court and that too on
    very limited grounds. The case was accordingly remanded to the High
  H
  BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU.                                 387
 MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

Court for deciding the.writ.petition filed by the aggrieved person on its      A
merits in accordance. with law.                                   ·
      26. This is what Their Lordships held in Para 12:
      "12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok
      Adalnt in terms of a settlement arrived .at between the
      parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the 8
      award of the Lok Adalat); it becomes final and binding on
      the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if
      it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to
      any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award
      based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition c
      under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution,
      that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise
      or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the
      Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs
      the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the
      order, or approach 'the High Court for disposal of appeal on D
      merits, ifit does not agree, is not an award of the LokAdalat.
      The question of challenging such an order in a petition
      under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in
      such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and
      disposed of the appeal on merits."                                E
        27. In our considered view, the aforesaid law laid down by this
Court is binding on all the Courts in the country by virtue of mandate of
Article 14 l of the Constitution. This Court,_ in no uncertain terms, has
laid down that challenge to the award ofLokAdalat can be done only by
filing a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution F
of India in the High Court and that too on very limited grounds.·
       28. In the light of clear pronouncement of the law by this Court,
we are of the opinion that the only remedy available to the aggrieved
person(respondents herein/plaintiffs) was to file a writ petition under·
Article 226 and/or 2.27. of the Constitution oflndia in the High Court for G
challenging the award dated 22.08.2007 passed by the Lok Adalat. It
was then for the writ Court to decide as to whether any ground was
made out by the writ petitioners for quashing the award and, if so, whether
those grounds are sufficient for its quashing.

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388             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A            29. The High Court was, therefore. not right in by passing the law
      laid down by this Court on the ground thatthe suit can be tiled to challenge
      the award, if the challenge is founded on the allegations of fraud. In our
      opinion, it was not correct approach of the High Court to deal with the
      issue in question to which we do not concur.
B             30. We also do not agree with the submissions of Mr. Adinarayana
      Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondents when he urged that
      firstly, the expression ·•1aw" occurring in clause( d) of Rule 11 Order 7
      does not include the 'judicial decisions" and clause (d) applies only to
      bar which is contained in ''the Acf' enacted by the Legislature: and
      Secondly, even if it is held to include the "judicial decisions", yet the law
c     laid down in the case of State of Punjab (supra) cannot be read to hold
      that the suit is barred. Both these submissions, in our view. have no
      merit.
         31. Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition) defines the expression
  "law". It says that "Law" includes the "judicial precedents" (see at
D page 962). Similarly, the expression "law·' defined in Jowett's Dictionary
  of English Law (Third Edition Volume-2, (pages 1304/1305) says that
  "law is derived from judicial precedents, legislation or from custom. When
  derived from judicial precedents, it is called common law, equity, or
  admiralty. probate or ecclesiastical law according to the nature of the
E Courts by which it was originally enforced".
             32. The question as to whetherthe expression "law" occurring in
      clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code includes •judicial decisions
      of the Apex Court" came up for consideration before the Division Bench
      of the Allahabad High Court in Virender Kumar Dixit vs. State of
 F    U.P., 2014(9) ADJ I506. The Division Bench dealt with the issue in
      detail in the context of several decisions on the subject and held in para
      15 as under:
             "15. Law includes not only legislative enactments but also
             judicial precedents. An authoritative judgment of the Courts
G            including higher judiciary is also law."
         33. This very issue was again considered by the Gujarat High
  Court (Single Bench) in the case of Hermes Marines Limited vs.
  Capeshore Maritime Partners F.Z.C. & Anr. (unreported decision
  in Civil Application (OJ) No.144of2016 in Admiralty Suit No. I0of2016
H decided on 22.04.2016). The learned Single Judge examined the issue
 BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU                                389
MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

and relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court quoted supra     A
held in Para 53 as under:
      "53. In the light of the above discussion, in the considered
      view of this Court, it cannot be said that the term "barred
      by any law" occurring in clause(d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of
      the Code, ought to be read to mean only the law codified in B.
      a legislative enactment and not the law laid down by the
      Courts in judicial precedents. The judicial precedent of
      the Supreme Court in Liverpool & London Steamship
      Protection and Indemnity Association vs. M.V. Sea Success,
      2004(9) sec 512 has been followed by the decision of the
      Division Bench in Croft Sales & Distribution Ltd. vs. M.V. C
      Basil, 2011(2) GLR 1027. It is, therefore, the law as of
      today, which is that the Geneva Convention of 1999 cannot
      be made applicable to a contract that docs not involve public
      law character. Such a contract would not give rise to a
      maritime claim. As discussed earlier, the word 'law' as D
      occurring in Order 7 Rule ll(d) would also mean judicial
      precedent. If the judicial precedent bars any action that
      would be the law."
      34. Similarly, th.is very issue was again examined by the Bombay
High Comi (Single Judge) in Shahid s. Sarkar & Ors. Vs. Usha               E
Ramrao Bhojane, 2017 SCC OnLine Born 3440. The learned Judge
placed reliance on the decisions of the Allahabad High Comi in Vircnder
Kumar Dixit vs. State of U.P.(Supra) and the Gujarat High Court in
Hermes Marines Limited (supra) and held as under:
      "18 .....•. ; ....•... The law laid down by the highest court of a   F
       State as well as the Supreme Court, is the law. In fact,
       Article 141 of the Constitution of India categorically states
     · that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding
       on all Courts within the territories oflndia. There is uothing
       even in the C.P.C. to restrict the meaning of the words
       "barred by any law" to mean only codified law or statute            G
       law as sought to be contended by Mr. Patil. In the view
       that I have taken, I am supported by a decision of the Gujarat
       High Court in the· case of Hermes Marines
       Ltd ....•..•.......:..... :............... "
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                                           I
390             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 9 S.C.R.


A                  "19. One must also not lose sight of the purpose and
             Intention behind Order VII Rule ll(d). The Intention
             appears to be that when the suit appears from the statement
             In the plaint to be barred by any law, the Courts will not
             unnecessarily protract the litigation and proceed with the
             hearing of the suit. The purpose clearly appears to be to
B
             ensure that·where a Defendant is able to establish that the
             Plaint ought to be rejected on any of the grounds set out in
             the said Rule, the Court would be duty bound to do so, so
             as to save expenses, achieve expedition and avoid the
             court's resources being used up on cases which will serve
c            no useful purpose. A litigation, which in the opinion of the
             court, is doomed to fail would not further be allowed to be
             used as a device to harass a Defendant ....................... "
         35. Similarly, issue was again examined by the High Court of
  Jharkhand(Single Judge) in Mira Sinha & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand
D & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Jhar.4377. The learned Judge, in paragraph
  7 held as under:
            "7. In the background of the law laid down by the Hon'ble
            Supreme Court, it is apparent that Order VII Rule ll(d)
            C.P.C. application is maintainable only when the suit is
E           barred by a_ny law. The expression "law" included in Rule
            ll(d) includes Law of Limitation and, it would also include
            the Jaw declared by the Hon'blc Supreme Court ......... "
          36. We are in agreement with the view taken by Allahabad, Gujarat,
  Bombay and Jharkhand High Courts in the aforementioned four decisions
F which, in our opinion, is the proper interpretation ofthe expression "law''
  occurring in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Code. This answers
  the first submission of the learned counsel for the respondents against
  the respondents.
             37. So far as the second submission of learned counsel for the
0     respondents is concerned, it also has no merit. Jn our view, the decision
      rendered in the case of State of Punjab (supra) is by the larger Bench
      (Three Judge) and is, therefore, binding on us. No efforts were made
      and rightly to contend that the said decision needs reconsideration on the
      issue in question. That apart, when this Court has laid down a pa11icular
      remedy to follow for challenging the award of Lok Adalat then in our
H
  BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS & ANR. v. KOTHAKAPU ·                                  391
 MUTHYAM REDDY & ORS. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

view, the same is required to be followed by the litigant in letter and spirit A
as provided therein for adjudication of his grievance in the first instance.
The reason being that it is a law of the land under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India (see • M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
2006 ( 8) sec 212). It is then for the writ court to decide as to what
orders need to be passed on the facts arising in the case.
                                                                                B
      38. In the light.of foregoing discussion, we cannot concur with the
reasoning and the conclusipn arrived at by the High Court.
       39. As a result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. Impugned
order is set aside and that of the order passed by the Trial Court is
restored. As a consequence, the application filed by the appellants             c
(defendants) under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) of the Code is allowed resulting
in rejection of the plaint.
      40. We, however, make it clear that the respondents (plaintiffs)
would be at liberty to challenge the legality and correctness of the award
dated 22.08.2007 passed by the Lok Adalat by filing the writ petition           o
under Article 226 or/and 227ofthe Constitution in the High Court in
accordance with law.
       41. We also make it clear that we have not examined the merits
of case of either parties which is the subject matter of the suit and hence
the writ court, in the event of writ petition being filed, would decide the     E
writ petition strictly i.n accordance with law without being influenced by
any of our observation_s.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                           Appeal allowed.