BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.versusSHYAM KISHORE SINGH

                        [2020] 2 S.C.R. 597                              597


             BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS.                              A
                                  v.
                    SHYAM KISHORE SINGH
                   (Civil Appeal No. 1009 of 2020)
                                                                         B
                       FEBRUARY 05, 2020
         [R. BANUMATHI AND A.S. BOPANNA, JJ.]
       Service Law – Respondent was appointed as trainee in
appellant’s company – His date of birth in service record was
04.03.1950 – However, he claims that he had declared his date of         C
birth as 20.01.1955 in terms of entry contained in his matriculation
certificate – In 2009, just prior to his retirement he sought change
of date of birth in the records – Declined by the appellants –
Respondent retired on 31.03.2010 and after lapse of four years
from the retirement, he filed writ petition before High Court – High     D
Court directed the appellants to make appropriate corrections and
pass consequential orders – Division Bench limited the attendant
benefits payable to the respondent – Held: If a particular date of
birth is entered in the service register, a change sought cannot be
entertained at the fag end of service after accepting the same to be     E
correct during entire service – In the instant case, as on the date of
joining in 1982 and as also in 1987 when the respondent had an
opportunity to fill up the Nomination Form and rectify the defect if
any, he had indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950 – He reiterated
the same when Provident Fund Nomination Form was filled in 1998
                                                                         F
which corresponds to the date of birth entered in the service register
as on the date of commencement of the employment – Thus, merely
because a verification was made from the Bihar School Examination
Board and even if it was confirmed that the date of birth was
20.01.1955 such change at that stage was not permissible – It is
only after more than 30 years from the date of his joining service,      G
for the first time in 2009 he had made the representation –
Respondent also did not avail the judicial remedy immediately
thereafter, before retirement – Indulgence shown to the respondent
by the High Court was not justified – Impugned order set aside.
                                                                         H
                                 597
598            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A           Allowing the appeal, the Court
            HELD: 1.1 If a particular date of birth is entered in the
      service register, a change sought cannot be entertained at the
      fag end of service after accepting the same to be correct during
      entire service. The respondent entered service on 01.03.1982.
B     The date of birth entered as 04.03.1950 has remained on record
      from the said date. In the instant case, as on the date of joining
      and as also in the year 1987 when the respondent had an
      opportunity to fill up the Nomination Form and rectify the defect
      if any, he had indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950 and had
      further reiterated the same when Provident Fund Nomination
C     Form was filled in 1998. It is only after more than 30 years from
      the date of his joining service, for the first time in the year 2009
      he had made the representation. Further the respondent did not
      avail the judicial remedy immediately thereafter, before
      retirement. Instead, the respondent retired from service on
D     31.03.2010 and even thereafter the writ petition was filed only in
      the year 2014, after four years from the date of his retirement. In
      that circumstance, the indulgence shown to the respondent by
      the High Court was not justified. Hence, the order passed by the
      learned Single Judge in WP(S) No.6172 of 2014 and the order
      dated 19.02.2019 passed by the Division Bench in LPA No.115
E     of 2018 are not sustainable. The impugned order is set aside.
      [Paras 7, 12-14][606-B-C; 606-C-E]
            Kamta Pandey v. M/s BCCI & Ors. [2007] 3 JLJR 726;
            State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Gorakhnath Sitaram
            Kamble & Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 423 : [2010] 14 SCR
F           752; State of M.P. v. Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC
            664 : [2011] 11 SCR 444; Factory Manager Kirloskar
            Brothers Ltd. v. Laxman (2020) 3 SCC 419; M/s Eastern
            Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. Ram Samugh Yadav & Ors.
            (2020) 3 SCC 421 – referred to.
G
            Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. v. Chhota Birasa Uranw
            (2014) 12 SCC 570 : [2014] 4 SCR 887 – distinguished.



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             BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS. v.                              599
                  SHYAM KISHORE SINGH

                        Case Law Reference                                  A
[2007] 3 JLJR 726              referred to                Para 4
[2010] 14 SCR 752                referred to              Para 8
[2011] 11 SCR 444                referred to              Para 9
(2020) 3 SCC 419                 referred to              Para 10           B
(2020) 3 SCC 421                 referred to              Para 10
[2014] 4 SCR 887                 distinguished            Para 11
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1009
of 2020.                                                                    C
      From the Judgment and Order dated 19.02.2019 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in L.P.A. No. 115 of 2018.
      K.M. Natraj, ASG, Parijat Kishore, Nischal Gupta, Vatsab Joshi,
Advs. for the Appellants.
                                                                            D
     M. Shoeb Alam, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Santosh Kumar, Mojahed
Karim Khan, Advs. for the Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      A. S. BOPANNA, J.
      1. Leave granted.                                                     E

       2. The appellants are before this Court assailing the order dated
19.02.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Jharkhand
at Ranchi in LPA No.115 of 2018. Through the said order the Division
Bench though has modified the judgment and order dated 13.10.2017 of
the learned Single Judge insofar as the extent of relief granted, the       F
contention of the respondent herein relating to the change of date of
birth in the service records is accepted and a direction has been issued
to the appellants to pay the sum equivalent to salary of one year for the
period between the April, 2010 to March, 2011. The appellants thus being
aggrieved are before this Court in this appeal.                             G
       3. The brief facts are that the respondent herein was appointed
as a trainee in the appellants company. He was allotted Personnel No.
00473470 and joined service as Trainee Dozer Operator with effect
from 27.02.1982. Though the respondent claims that he had declared his
date of birth as 20.01.1955 in terms of the entry contained in his          H
600             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     matriculation certificate the fact remains that his date of birth entered in
      the service record was 04.03.1950 and had remained so from the date
      of his appointment on 27.02.1982 till his retirement on 31.03.2010. In the
      year 1998 the respondent has submitted the Provident Fund Nomination
      Form wherein he has indicted the details of his family and shown his
      wife as his nominee. In the relevant Form also, the respondent had
B
      indicated his date of birth as 04.03.1950. The respondent thus having
      continued in service till the age of superannuation had retired from service
      on 31.03.2010. Just prior to his retirement, in the year 2009, a
      representation had been made by the respondent seeking change of the
      date of birth entered in the records, which was declined by the appellants.
C     The respondent not having agitated the matter further at that point of
      time and having retired on 31.03.2010 has after the lapse of four years
      filed the W.P.(S) No.6172/2014 before the High Court of Jharkhand at
      Ranchi. The appellants herein having appeared, filed their objection
      statement. The learned Single Judge on taking into consideration the
      nature of the claim put forth was of the view that when the respondent
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      raised the issue regarding correction of the date of birth in the year 2009
      the appellants secured verification of the date of birth claimed by the
      respondent from the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna. On
      verification it was confirmed that the date of birth in the school records
      was 20.01.1955. The said verification made by the appellants herein has
E     been held against them by the learned Single Judge and it was observed
      that if the date 04.03.1950 as entered by the respondent in the service
      records was correct, there was no occasion for the appellants to verify
      the same from Bihar School Examination Board. In that circumstance
      the learned Single Judge being of the opinion that the respondent had
      passed the matriculation prior to joining the services and in that
F
      circumstance the entry of date of birth in the matriculation certificate
      being 20.01.1955 even before joining the service, has accepted the
      contention put forth by the respondent and in that background arrived at
      the conclusion that the appellants are to be directed to make appropriate
      corrections and pass consequential orders.
G            4. The Division Bench has in fact referred to the said reasoning
      adopted by the learned Single Judge relating to the verification made
      relating to correctness of the matriculation certificate from the Bihar
      School Examination Board and in that circumstance since the learned
      Single Judge had also relied on the Full Bench judgment of the Jharkhand
H     High Court in the case of Kamta Pandey vs. M/s BCCI & Ors. [2007
            BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS. v.                                   601
          SHYAM KISHORE SINGH [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

(3) JLJR 726] has upheld the said reasoning assigned by the Learned             A
Single Judge. However, the Division Bench had taken note that the
respondent herein had filed the writ petition four years after his retirement
for restoration of his employment. It has further taken note that the
respondent had filled up several forms in the course of his services where
the respondent had not disclosed his educational qualification. In that
                                                                                B
view, the Division Bench was of the opinion that the learned Single Judge
had not properly dealt with the aspect of delay in approaching the Court.
In that circumstance the Division Bench had limited the attendant benefits
payable to the respondent to the salary for one year between the period
April, 2010 to March, 2011 as prevailing at that point. It is in that
background the appellants being aggrieved both by the order passed by           C
the learned Single Judge as also the Division Bench are before this Court
in this appeal.
       5. Heard Mr. K.M. Natraj leaned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the appellants, Mr. M. Shoeb Alam learned counsel for
the respondent and perused the appeal papers.                                   D
        6. The fact that the respondent had joined the services of the
appellants on 01.03.1982 is the accepted position. Though the respondent
relies on the matriculation certificate to indicate that the date of birth
stated therein is 20.01.1955, there is no material on record to indicate
that the said document had been produced before the employer at the             E
time of joining employment. In that background, the service record
maintained by the appellants will disclose that the date of birth indicated
in the document is 04.03.1950 which had been furnished by the respondent
himself as the relevant forms under his signature contain the said date.
Though the learned counsel for the respondent contended that the High
Court had noticed certain alteration of the date of birth as indicated in       F
Form “B” the relevance of the said document cannot be considered
without reference to the other documents in the service records. The
very fact that the respondent through his representation made in the
year 2009 was seeking for change of the entry relating to date of birth
will indicate that what was contained in the service records is 04.03.1950,     G
which was the position from 27.02.1982.
       7. In the above background it is to be noticed as to whether the
consideration as made by the High Court is justified. The learned counsel
for the respondent with specific reference to para 10 in the order of the
learned Single Judge referred to the aspect wherein the learned Single          H
602             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     Judge has taken note of the representation made by the respondent in
      the year 2009 and the verification that was secured by the appellants
      from the Bihar School Examination Board. Though such reference is
      made, in our opinion, the same was not appropriate in the present facts
      when three decades had elapsed from the date of employment. The
      position is well established that if a particular date of birth is entered in
B
      the service register, a change sought cannot be entertained at the fag
      end of service after accepting the same to be correct during entire service.
      In the instant facts the position is that the respondent entered service on
      01.03.1982. The date of birth entered as 04.03.1950 has remained on
      record from the said date. The requirement to submit the nomination
C     form indicating the particulars of the family and the nominee was complied
      and it was submitted by the respondent on 25.05.1998. In the said
      Nomination Form the date of birth of the employee was required to be
      mentioned, wherein the respondent in his own handwriting has indicated
      the date of birth as 04.03.1950. Apart from that fact, the learned Additional
      Solicitor General would also point out that since there was a change in
D
      the method of maintaining the service register, all the employees were
      provided an opportunity to verify and seek for change in the service
      record in the year 1987. At that stage also the respondent did not seek
      for any change. Therefore, in that circumstance, when the opportunity
      available at the first instance in 1987 had not been availed and thereafter
E     on 25.05.1998 when the respondent himself in the Provident Fund
      Nomination Form had indicated the date of birth as 04.03.1950 which
      corresponds to the date of birth entered in the service register as on the
      date of commencement of the employment, merely because a verification
      was made from the Bihar School Examination Board and even if it was
      confirmed that the date of birth was 20.01.1955 such change at that
F
      stage was not permissible.
             8. This Court has consistently held that the request for change of
      the date of birth in the service records at the fag end of service is not
      sustainable. The learned Additional Solicitor General has in that regard
      relied on the decision in the case of State of Maharashtra and Anr. vs.
G     Gorakhnath Sitaram Kamble & Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 423 wherein a
      series of the earlier decisions of this Court were taken note and was
      held as hereunder:
              “16. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance
            on the judgment of this Court in U.P. Madhyamik Shiksha
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      BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS. v.                                   603
    SHYAM KISHORE SINGH [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

Parishad v. Raj Kumar Agnihotri [(2005) 11 SCC 465 : 2006                 A
SCC (L&S) 96] . In this case, this Court has considered a number
of judgments of this Court and observed that the grievance as to
the date of birth in the service record should not be permitted at
the fag end of the service career.
  17. In another judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Pitamber             B
Dutt Semwal [(2005) 11 SCC 477 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 106] relief
was denied to the government employee on the ground that he
sought correction in the service record after nearly 30 years of
service. While setting aside the judgment of the High Court, this
Court observed that the High Court ought not to have interfered
with the decision after almost three decades.                             C

19. These decisions lead to a different dimension of the case that
correction at the fag end would be at the cost of a large number
of employees, therefore, any correction at the fag end must be
discouraged by the court. The relevant portion of the judgment
in Home Deptt.v. R. Kirubakaran [1994 Supp (1) SCC 155 : 1994             D
SCC (L&S) 449 : (1994) 26 ATC 828] reads as under: (SCC pp.
158-59, para 7)
“7. An application for correction of the date of birth [by a public
servant cannot be entertained at the fag end of his service]. It
need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of         E
the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain
reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for
their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some
are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the
correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in      F
office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers
who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may
lose their promotion forever. … According to us, this is an important
aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the court or the tribunal
while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of
correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the      G
basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is
made out by the respondent, the court or the tribunal should not
issue a direction, on the basis of materials which make such claim
only plausible. Before any such direction is issued, the court or
the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice   H
604            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A           to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of
            birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed,
            and within the time fixed by any rule or order. … the onus is on
            the applicant to prove the wrong recording of his date of birth, in
            his service book.”
B           9. This Court in fact has also held that even if there is good
      evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is erroneous, the
      correction cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In that regard, in State
      of M.P. vs. Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664it is held as hereunder;
            “8. It needs to be emphasised that in matters involving correction
C           of date of birth of a government servant, particularly on the eve
            of his superannuation or at the fag end of his career, the court or
            the tribunal has to be circumspect, cautious and careful while
            issuing direction for correction of date of birth, recorded in the
            service book at the time of entry into any government service.
            Unless the court or the tribunal is fully satisfied on the basis of the
D           irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth and that such a claim
            is made in accordance with the procedure prescribed or as per
            the consistent procedure adopted by the department concerned,
            as the case may be, and a real injustice has been caused to the
            person concerned, the court or the tribunal should be loath to issue
E           a direction for correction of the service book. Time and again this
            Court has expressed the view that if a government servant makes
            a request for correction of the recorded date of birth after lapse
            of a long time of his induction into the service, particularly beyond
            the time fixed by his employer, he cannot claim, as a matter of
            right, the correction of his date of birth, even if he has good evidence
F           to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.
            No court or the tribunal can come to the aid of those who sleep
            over their rights (see Union of India v. Harnam Singh [(1993) 2
            SCC 162 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 375 : (1993) 24 ATC 92] ).
            12. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the delay of over two decades
G           in applying for the correction of date of birth is ex facie fatal to
            the case of the respondent, notwithstanding the fact that there
            was no specific rule or order, framed or made, prescribing the
            period within which such application could be filed. It is trite that
            even in such a situation such an application should be filed which
H           can be held to be reasonable. The application filed by the respondent
            BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. & ORS. v.                                  605
          SHYAM KISHORE SINGH [A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

      25 years after his induction into service, by no standards, can be       A
      held to be reasonable, more so when not a feeble attempt was
      made to explain the said delay. There is also no substance in the
      plea of the respondent that since Rule 84 of the M.P. Financial
      Code does not prescribe the time-limit within which an application
      is to be filed, the appellants were duty-bound to correct the clerical
                                                                               B
      error in recording of his date of birth in the service book.”
       10. The learned Additional Solicitor General has also relied upon
the decision of this Court in the case of Factory Manager Kirloskar
Brothers Ltd. vs. Laxman in SLP (C) Nos.2592-2593/2018 dated
25.04.2019 wherein the belated claim was not entertained. Further
reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of M/s       C
Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. vs. Ram Samugh Yadav & Ors. in
C.A.No.7724 of 2011 dated 27.05.2019 wherein this Court has held as
hereunder:
      “Nothing is on record that in the year 1987 when the opportunity
      was given to Respondent No.1, to raise any issue/dispute regarding       D
      the service record more particularly his date of birth in the service
      record, no such issue/dispute was raised. Only one year prior to
      his superannuation, Respondent No.1 raised the dispute which
      can be said to be belated dispute and therefore, the learned Single
      Judge as well as the employer was justified in refusing to accept        E
      such an issue.
            The Division Bench of the High Court has, therefore,
      committed a grave error in directing the appellant to correct the
      date of birth of Respondent No.1 in the service record after
      number of years and that too when the issue was raised only one          F
      year prior to his superannuation and as observed hereinabove no
      dispute was raised earlier.”
       11. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand,
has relied upon the decision of this Court relating the very same employer
namely, the appellants herein in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.           G
& Ors. vs. Chhota Birasa Uranw (2014) 12 SCC 570 wherein this
Court with reference to the earlier decisions of this Court has upheld the
order of the High Court wherein a direction had been issued to effect
the change in the date of birth. Having perused the same we are of the
opinion that the said decision cannot render assistance to the respondent
herein. This is for the reason that in the said case it was taken note that    H
606             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 2 S.C.R.


A     in 1987 on implementation of the National Coal Wage Agreement (iii)
      was put into operation for stabilising the service records of the employees
      and all its employees were provided a chance to identify and rectify the
      discrepancies in the service records by providing them a nomination
      form containing details of their service records. In the cited case the
      respondent (employee) therein had noticed the inconsistencies in the
B
      records regarding his date of birth, date of appointment, father’s name
      and permanent address and availed the opportunity to seek correction.
      Though he had sought for the correction of the errors, the other
      discrepancies were set right but the date of birth and the date of
      appointment had however remained unchanged and it is in that view the
C     employee had again raised a dispute regarding the same and the judicial
      remedy was sought wherein the benefit was extended to him.
              12. On the other hand, in the instant case, as on the date of joining
      and as also in the year 1987 when the respondent had an opportunity to
      fill up the Nomination Form and rectify the defect if any, he had indicated
D     the date of birth as 04.03.1950 and had further reiterated the same when
      Provident Fund Nomination Form was filled in 1998. It is only after
      more than 30 years from the date of his joining service, for the first time
      in the year 2009 he had made the representation. Further the respondent
      did not avail the judicial remedy immediately thereafter, before retirement.
      Instead, the respondent retired from service on 31.03.2010 and even
E     thereafter the writ petition was filed only in the year 2014, after four
      years from the date of his retirement. In that circumstance, the indulgence
      shown to the respondent by the High Court was not justified.
             13. Hence, the order dated 13.10.2017 passed by the learned Single
      Judge in WP(S) No.6172 of 2014 and the order dated 19.02.2019 passed
F     by the Division Bench in LPA No.115 of 2018 are not sustainable.
            14. In the result, the impugned order is set aside and the appeal is
      allowed with no order as to costs. Pending applications if any, shall also
      stand disposed of.

G
      Divya Pandey                                                   Appeal allowed.




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