Supreme Court of India
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC.versusSTATE OF UP & ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 127
- Decided
- 26 February 2010
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
The Collector’s order refusing reference is not appealable under Section 54, the Collector cannot condone delay, the six‑month period is measured from the date of actual or constructive knowledge of the award, and the appellants’ application was timely, requiring the Collector to refer the matter to a civil court.
Summary
The appellants' land was acquired for a market yard and an award was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 14 March 2007, but they were not served notice of the award until 25 October 2007 and only became aware of its contents on 16 November 2007. They filed an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act seeking a reference to a civil court for determination of compensation, which the Collector rejected on the ground that the application was filed beyond six months from the date of the award. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that an appeal under Section 54 was available, and also rejected a review petition on the basis that the appellants could have sought condonation of delay. The Supreme Court held that Section 54 does not provide for appeals against the Collector’s order refusing reference, that the Collector cannot condone delay, and that the six‑month period in the proviso to Section 18 must be measured from the date the landowner actually or constructively knew the contents of the award. Since the appellants proved they only learned of the award on 16 November 2007, their application was timely, and the Collector was directed to make a reference to the civil court. The appeals were allowed and the writ petition was granted.
Issues considered
- Whether an appeal lies under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act against the Collector’s order refusing to make a reference to a civil court.
- Whether the Land Acquisition Collector can condone delay in filing an application for reference under Section 18 when sufficient cause is shown.
- Whether the six‑month period in the proviso to Section 18 is to be reckoned from the date of the Collector’s award or from the date of knowledge of the award.
- Whether the appellants were entitled to relief in the present facts.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12, s. 18, s. 26, s. 28A, s. 30, s. 54
- Limitation Act, 1963s. 29(2), s. 5
Subjects
Land acquisitionReference to courtCompensationSection 18Section 54Limitation periodCondonation of delayAward of CollectorKnowledge of award
Judgment
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 1145
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. A
v.
STATE OF UP & ORS.
(Civil Appeal Nos. 2069-2070 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 26, 2010
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
ss. 18(2) and 54 - Reference to Court - Acquisition of c
land - Award passed by Land Acquisition Collector -
Application seeking reference uls. 18 to civil court for
determination of compensation - Rejection of, by Collector
since it was made beyond a period of six months from the
date of award - Writ petition dismissed on the ground that 0
appeal was maintainable uls. 54 - Review petition also
dismissed since land owners should have filed application for
coniionation of delay before Collector - On appeal, held:
Award was not made in the presence of the land owners -
Notice of award was issued but was not sent by post nor served E
on land owners - No evidence placed by Collector to show
knowledge on the part of land owners - Thus, claim of land
owners that they became aware that award was made only
when notice was received by them calling upon them to
receive the compensation, is correct and application was filed F
in time - Orders of High Court set aside - Collector directed
to make reference uls. 18.
ss. 54 and 18 - Appeals in proceedings before court -
Order of Land Acquisition Collector refusing to. make a
referenc~ to civil court for determination of compensation - G
Appeal thereagainst uls 54 - Maintainability of - Held: Not
maintainable since s. 54 does not provide for appeals against
the awards or orders of Land Acquisition Collector.
1145 H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
I.
' i
A s. 18 - Application seeking reference under - Delay in
filing of - Condonation of delay by Land Acquisition Collector
- Held: Collector is not a civil court, provisions of s. 5 of the
1963 Act are not applicable to proceedings before the,
Collector under the Act and there is no provision enabling the
B Collector to extend the time for making application for
reference - Thus, Collector cannot entertain any application
for extension, nor extend the time for seeking reference, even
if there are genuine and bonafide grounds for condoning
delay - Limitation Act, 1963 - s. 5.
c s. 18 (2) proviso (b) - Reference to court - Period of six
months under clause (b) of proviso to s. 18 - Reckoning of,
from the date of knowledge of the award of Collector or from
the date of award itself - Held:· Words 'date of the collector's
award' in proviso (b) to s. 18 is to be read as referring to the
D date of knowledge of the essential contents of the award, and
not the actual date of the Collector's award.
s. 18 (2) proviso (b) - Interpretation of -Explained.
E The appellants' lands were acquired under the
notifications for public purpose. The Land Acquisition
Collector passed an award but served notice to the
appellant after seven months to receive the compensation
from the Collector's office. The appellants filed an
application seeking a reference uls. 18 of the Land
F Acquisition Act, 1894 for determination of compensation.
The Collector rejected the application since it was made
beyond a period of six months from the date of the award.
The appellants filed writ petition but the same was
dismissed on the ground that the appeal uls. 54 was
G available against the order of the Collector. The review
petition was also dismissed on the ground that the
appellant should have filed application for condonation
of delay along with the application for reference. Hence
the present appeal.
H
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1147
ORS.
The questions which arose for consideration in these A
appeals are (a) whether an appeal would lie u/s. 54 of the
Act against the order of the Collector refusing to make a
reference; (b) whether the Collector can condone the
delay in filing an application seeking reference, if
sufficient cause is shown; (c) whether the period of six B
months under clause (b) of proviso to s. 18 should be
reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the
Collector or from the date of award itself; and (d) whether
the appellants were entitled to relief?
Allowing the appeals, the Court
c
HELD:
On Question (a)
1. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 D
provides for an appeal from the award of the court in any
proceedings under the Act to the High Court, and from
the decree of the High Court to the Supreme Court. The
decision of the Collector made after an enquiry under
section 11 with the previous approval of the appropriate E
Government or its authorized officer is termed as the
'award of the Collector'. The determination by a court u/
s. 26 of the Act in a reference by the Collector is termed
as an 'award of the court' which shall be deemed to be a
decree. Thus, there is a difference between an 'award of F
the Collector' which is an offer of compensation by the
Collector as the agent of the Government, and 'an award
of the court' which is a determination of the
compensation by a civil court on a reference by the
Collector. Further, the Collector can either make a G
reference or refuse to make a reference to the court
under section 18 of the Act or under section 30 of the Act,
and such orders of the Collector are merely acts of a
Statutory Authority in exercise of statutory functions and
H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
\
A are not adjudicatory in nature. Such orders are not
awards. The Land Acquisition Collector is not a Court,
nor his award or order, an award of the Court. While the
proceedings of a court resulting in an award of the court
are judicial proceedings, neither the proceedings of the
B Collector u/s. 11 of the Act resulting in an award of the
Collector, nor the proceedings relating to an application
seeking reference, are judicial proceedings. Section 54
does not provide for appeals against the awards or
orders of La~d Acquisition Collector. Hence the
c assumption of the High Court that an order of the
Collector refusing to refer a claim for increase in
compensation to the civil court u/s. 18(1) of the Act, is an
'award of the court' appealable u/s. 54 of the Act, is wholly
erroneous. [Para 5] [1157-A-H; 1158-A-B]
D On question (b) :
2.1. The proviso to section 18 requires that an
application by a person interested, to the Collector,
seeking reference of his claim for higher compensation
! E for determination by the Court, shall be made within six
' weeks from the date of the Collector's award, if such
person was present or represented before the Collector,
fl, at the time when the award was made. If not, the
application for reference shall have to be made within six
F weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector u/s.
12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's
award, whichever period shall first expire. [Para 6] [1158-
C-D]
2.2. As the Collector is not a civil court and as the
G provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have
not been made applicable to proceedings before the
Collector under the Act, and as there is no provision in
the Act enabling the Land Acquisition Collector to extend
the time for making an application for reference, the
H Collector cannot entertain any application for extension,
\
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1149
ORS.
nor extend the time for seeking reference, even if there A
are genuine and bonafide grounds for condoning delay.
Therefore, the observation of the High Court that an
application for condonation of delay could have been
made by the person interested, is incorrect. [Para 7]
(1158-G-H; 1159-A-B] B
Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. S.U. T.N.I. Sangam and
Ors. 2009 (16) SCC 1, distinguished.
Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and Anr. v.
Shah Manila/ Chandu/al and Ors. 199.6 (9) SCC 414, relied -C
en.
On Question (c) :
3.1. Clause (b) of the proviso to section 18 requires
a person interested who has not accepted the award, to 0
make an application to the Collector requiring him to refer
the matter for determination of the court, within six weeks
of the receipt of the notice from the Collector u/s. 12(2)
or within six months from the date of the Collector's
award whichever period first expires, if he or his E
representative was not present before the Collector at the
time of making of the award. [Para 8] [1159-F]
3.2. The reason for providing six months from the
date of the award for making an application seeking F
reference, where the applicant did not receive a notice u/
s 12(2) of the Act, while providing only six weeks from
the date of receipt of notice u/s. 12(2) of the Act for
making an application for reference where the applicant
has received a notice u/s. 12(2) of the Act is obvious. G
When a notice u/s. 12(2) of the Act is received, the land
owner or person interested is made aware of all relevant
particulars of the award which enables him to decide
whether he should seek reference or not. On the other
hand, if he only comes to know that an award has been H
\
1150 '·~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
...,.,
A made, he would require further time to make enquiries or
secure copies so that he can ascertain the relevant
particulars of the award. [Para 9) [1159-G-H; 1160-A-B]
Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition
Officer AIR 1961 SC 1500; State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar
B Jehan Begum and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 1604; Parsottambhai
Maganbhai Patel and Ors. vs. State of 'Gujarat through Dy.
Collector Modasa and Anr. 2005 (7) SCC 431; Steel Authority
of India Ltd. vs. S. U. T. N. I Sangam 2009 (16) SCC 1, referred
to.
c
3.3. When a land is acquired and an award is made
u/s. 11 of the Act, the Collector becomes entitled to take
possession of the acquired land. The award being only
an offer on behalf of the Government, there is always a
tendency on the part of the Collector to be conservative
0
in making the award, which results in less than the
market value being offered. Invariably the land loser is
required to make an application u/s. 18 of the Act to get
the market value as compensation. The. land loser does
E not get a right to seek reference to the civil court unless
the award is made. This means that he can make an
application seeking reference only when he knows that
an award has been made. If the words six months from
the 'date of the Collector's award' should be literally
interpreted as referring to the date of the award and not
F the date of knowledge of the award, it will lead to unjust
and absurd resu.lts. If the words 'date of the Collector's
award' are literally interpreted, the effect would be that on
the expiry of six months from the date of award, even
though the claimant had no notice of the award, he would
G lose the right to seek a reference. That will lead to
arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between those
who are notified of the award and those who are not
notified of the award. Unless the procedure under the Act
is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, it will run the
H risk of being branded as being violative of Article 14 as
I
·. '•.
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1151
ORS. .
also Article 300A of the Constitution of India. To avoid A
such consequences, the words 'date of the collector's
award' occurring in proviso (b) to s. 18 requires to be
read as referri~g to the date of knowledge of the
essehtial contents of the award, and not the actual date
of the Collector's award. [Para 11] [1162-F-H; 1163-A-E] B
3.4. When a person interested makes an application
~ for reference seeking the benefit of six months period
from the date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to
prove that he (or his representative) was not present
when the award was made, that he did not receive •ny C
notice u/s. 12(2) of the Act, and that he did not have the
knowledge of the contents of the award during a period
of six months prior to the filing the application for
reference. This onus is discharged by asserting these
facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative. D
Once the initial onus is discharged by the claimant/
person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector
to establish that the person interested was present either
in person or through his representative when the award
was made, or that he had received a notice u/s. 12(2) of E
the Act, or that he had knowledge of the contents of the
award. Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents
of the award can be established by the Collector by
proving that the person interested had received or drawn
the compensation amount for the acquired land, or had F
attested the Mahazar/ Panchnama/proceedings delivering
possession of the acquired land in pursuance of the
acquisition, or had filed a case challenging the award or
had acknowledged the making of the award in any
.document or in statement on oath or evidence. The G
person interested, not being in possession of the
acquired land and the name of the state or its transferee
being entered in the revenue municipal records coupled
with delay, can also lead to an inference of constructive
H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A knowledge. In the absence of any such evidence by the
Collector, the claim of the person interested that he did
not have knowlddge earlier will be accepted, unless there
are compellin9 circumstances to not to do so. [Para 13]
[1164-F-H; 1165-A-D]
8
On Question (d):
4. In the instant case, the award was not made in the
.presence of the claimant-land owner. The claimant
asserted that the award was not made in the presence
c of either himself or his representative, and no notice of
. the award u/s. 12(2) of the Act was tendered to him. He
also asserted that he became aware of the award only
when he received the notice dated 25.10.2007 calling
upon him to receive the payment of the award. The
O respondents contend that a notice dated 30.3.2007 ~as
issued u/s. 12(2) of the Act, to all the interested land-
owners including the appellants. But it is admitted that
the said notice was not sent by post nor served on the
land-owners. There is also no evidence that the said
E notice was tendered personally to them or that they
refused to accept it. Thu respondent has produced a
copy of a notice dated 30.3.2007 with an endorsement of
the person who was sent to serve the notice. A vague
endorsement that the person who had to serve the notice
F went to village and informed the farmers, is not the same
as notice being specifically tendered to the person
concerned. The endorsement-cum-report does not
mention or identify the farmers to whom he spoke or
which of them refused to put their signatures. In the
G absence of any evidence placed by the Collector to show
knowledge on the part of the appellants, the claim of the
appellants that they became aware that an award was
made only when the notice dated 25.10.2007 was
tendered to them and they became aware of the contents
H
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1153
ORS.
of the award only on 16.11.2007 has to be accepted. In A
the circumstances, the date of the award should be
taken as 16.11.2007. The application filed on 16.11.2007
was therefore in time. The Land Acquisition Collector
ought to have entertained the application seeking
reference. The High Court, instead of directing the B
Collector to make a reference, wrongly rejected the writ
petition on the ground that an appeal is maintainable u/
s. 54 of the Act and also wrongly rejected the review
petition on the ground that they could have made an
application for condonation of delay before the Land c
Acquisition Collector. The orders of the High Court are
set aside. The writ petition is allowed and the Collector
is directed to make a reference to the civil court u/s. 18
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, without any delay, not
later than two months. [Paras 14 and 15] [1165-E-H; 1166- 0
A-F]
Case Law Reference:
1996 (9) sec 414 Relied on. Para 7
E
2009 (16) sec 1 Distinguished. Para 7
AIR 1961 SC 1500 Referred to Para 10.1
AIR 1963 SC 1604 Referred to Para 10.2
F
2005 (7) sec 431 Referred to Para 10.3
2009 (16) sec 1 Referred to. Para 10.3
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
2069-2070 of 201 O. G
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.1.2008 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad, U.P. in Writ petition No. 3022
pf 2008 and dated 5.5.2008 in Civil Misc. Review Application
No. 47303 of 2008 in Writ Petition No. 3022 of 2008.
H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A WITH
C.A. No. 2071-2072 of 2010.
K.K. Rai, Anant K. Vatsya, Awanish Kumar, Garima
Prashad for the Appellants.
B
Pramod Swarup, Shobha Dikshit, Vandana Mishra, C.P.
Pandey, Daleep Kumar Dhyani, Pradeep Misra for the ,.
Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The lands of appellants within the municipal limits of
Bisanda were acquired for establishing a Upmandi by Krishi
o Utpadan Mandi Samiti under preliminary notification dated
31.01.2004 and final notification dated 20.03.2006. An award
was made by the Land Acquisition Collector on 14.03.2007.
The appellants were served a notice on 25.10.2007 by the
office of the Collector to appear and receive the compensation.
E The respondents made enquiries and en 16.11.2007 learnt that
an award had been made on 14.3.2007. Immediately they
made an application seeking a reference under section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('Act' for short) to the civil court
for determination of compensation. The Collector, Banda vide
his order dated 19.12.2007 rejected the application seeking
F · reference, on the ground that it was made beyond a period of
six months from the date of the award, prescribed under
Sectior; 18(2) of the Act. The appellants filed a writ petition for
quashing the said order dated 19.12.2007 and seeking a
direction to the Land Acquisition Collector to refer their claim
G for increase in compensation to the civil court. The writ petition
was dismissed on 17.01.2008 as not maintainable, on the
ground that an alternative remedy, by way of an appeal under
section 54 of the Act, was available against the order dated
19.12.2007 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The
H
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1155
ORS. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
appellants filed a review petition pointing out that Section 54 A
of the Act was inapplicable as it only provides for appeals
against awards of courts. The review petition was dismissed
by order dated 5.5.2008, on the ground that the appellants ought
to have filed an application for condonation of delay along with
the application for reference, before the Land Acquisition B
Collector. The appellants have challenged the said orders dated
17.01.2008 and 05.05.2008 in these appeals by special leave.
~-
3. The following questions arise for consideration, on the
contentions urged :
c
(a) Whether an appeal would lie under Section 54 of
the Act against the order of the Collector refusing
to make a reference?
(b) Whether the Collector can condone the delay in 0
filing an application seeking reference, if sufficient
cause is shown? ·
(c) Whether the period of six months under clause (b)
of the proviso to section 18 of the Act should be
reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award E
of the Collector or from the date of award itself?
(d) Whether the appellants were entitled to relief?
4. We may, to begin with, refer to the provisions of the Act F
which are relevant for considering these questions. Section 11
of the Act provides for an enquiry into objections and making
of an award by the Collector. Sub-Section (2) of Section 12
requires the Collector shall give immediate notice of his award
to such of the persons interested as were not present personally
or by their representatives when the award was made. Section G
18 providing for Reference to Court is extracted below:-
"18. Reference to Court -
(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A may, by written application to the Collector, require that the
matter be referred by the Collector for the determination
of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement
of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons
to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the
B compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which
objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,-
c
(a) if the person making it was present or represented
before the Collector at the time when he made his award,
within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the
D notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2),
or within six months from the date of the Collector's award,
whichever period shall first expire".
(emphasis supplied)
E
Section 54 of the Act providing for appeals. The said
section reads:
"54. Appeals in proceedings before court -
F Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, applicable to appeals from original decrees, and
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment
fo:- the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any
proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the
G award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from
any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as
aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject
to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLIV thereof'.
H
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1157
ORS. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Re : Question (a) A
5. Section 54 of the Act provides for an appeal from the
award of the court in any proceedings under the Act to the High
Court, and from the decree of the High Court to the Supreme
Court. Section 3(d) of the Act defines the expression "court" to
8
mean a principal civil court of original jurisdiction, unless the
appropriate Government has appointed a special officer within
any specified local limits to perform functions of the court under
the Act. On the other hand, the expression "Collector" is defined
in section 2(c) of the Act as the Collector of a district, and C
includes a Deputy Commissioner and any officer specially
appointed by the appropriate Government to perform the
functions of a Collector under the Act. The decision of the
Collector made after an enquiry under section 11 with the
previous approval of the appropriate Government or its
authorized officer is termed as the 'award of the Collector'. The D
determination by a court under section 26 of the Act in a
reference by the Collector is termed as an 'award of the court'
which shall be deemed to be a decree. Thus there is a
difference between an 'award of the Collector' which is an offer
of compensation by the Collector as the agent of the E
Government, and 'an award of the court' which is a
determination of the compensation by a civil court on a
reference by the Collector. Further, the Collector can either
make a reference or refuse to make a reference to the court
under section 18 of the Act or under section 30 of the Act, and F
such orders of the Collector are merely acts of a Statutory
Authority in exercise of statutory functions and are not
adjudicatory in nature. Such orders are not awards. The Land
Acquisition Collector is not a Court, nor his award or order, an
award of the Court. While the proceedings of a court resulting G
in an award of the court are judicial proceedings, neither the
proceedings of the Collector under section 11 of the Act
resulting in an award of the Collector, nor the proceedings
relating to an application seeking reference, are judicial
proceedings. Section 54 does not provide for appeals against H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A the awards or orders of Land Acquisition Collector. Hence the
assumption of the High Court that an order of the Collector
refusing to refer a claim for increase in compensation to the
civil court under section 18(1) of the Act, is an 'award of the
court' appealable under section 54 of the Act, is wholly
B erroneous.
Re : Question (b)
6. The proviso to section 18 requires that an application
C by a person interested, to the Collector, seeking reference of
his claim for higher compensation for determination by the
Court, shall be made within six weeks from the date of the
Collector's award, if such person was present or represented
before the Collector, at the time when the award was made. If
not, the application for reference shall have to be made within
D six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under.
Section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the
Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
7. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v.
E Shah Manila/ Chandu/al & Ors. [1996 (9) SCC 414], this
Court held that in view of the special limitation provided under
the proviso to section 18 of the Act, section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, cannot be applied to the proviso to section 18
of the Act; and therefore, the benefit of sections 4 to 24 of
F Limitation Act 1963, will not be available in regard to
applications under section 18(1) of the Act. It was also held that
as the Collector is not a court when he discharges his functions
as a statutory authority under seption 18(1) of the Act, section
5 of the Limitation Act 1963 cannot be invoked for extension
G of the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to
section 18(2) of the Act. As the Collector is not a civil court and
as the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have
not been made applicable to proceedings before the Collector
under the Act, and as there is no provision in the Act enabling
H the Land Acquisition Collector to extend the time for making
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1159
ORS. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
an application for reference, the Collector cannot entertain any A
application for extension, nor extend the time for seeking
reference, even if there are genuine and bonafide grounds for
condoning delay. This view was reiterated in Steel Authority
of India Ltd. vs. S.U. T.N.I. Sangam and others [2009 (16) SCC
1]. Therefore, the observation of the High Court that an B
application for condonation of delay could have been made by
the person interested, is incorrect.
We should however notice that there is an apparent
inconsistency in two observations of this Court in S.U. T.N.I. C
Sangam (supra). In the earlier part of the decision, this Court
observed : "The proceedings under the Land Acqwsition
Collector is of an administrative nature and not of a judicial
or quasi judicial character." However, in a latter part of the said
decision (at para 75 of the report), this Court observed : "Land
Acquisition Collector is a statutory authority. The proceeding D
before the Land Acquisition Collector is a quasi-judicial
proceeding." As the said inconsistency has no bearing upon
the issue on hand, we do not propose to consider it in this case,
but leave the clarification to be done in an appropriate decision.
E
Re : Question (c)
8. Clause (b) of the proviso to section 18 requires a person
interested who has not accepted the award, to make an
application to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter for
F
determination of the court, within six weeks of the receipt of the
notice from the Collector under section 12(2) or within six
months from the date of the Collector's award whichever period
first expires, if he or his representative was not present before
the Collector at the time of making of the award.
G
9. The reason for providing six months from the date of the
award for making an application seeking reference, where the
applicant did not receive a notice under section 12(2) of the
Act,, while providing only six weeks from the date of receipt of
notice under section 12(2) of the Act for makir.g an application H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A for reference where the applicant has received a notice under
section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a notice under section
12(2) of the Act is received, the land owner or person interested
is made aware of all relevant particulars of the award which
enables him to decide whether he should seek reference or
B not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know that an award
has been made, he would require further time to make enquiries
or secure copies so that he can ascertain the relevant
particulars of the award.
10. The term 'date of the Collector's award' occurring in
C C?lause (b) of the proviso, has been interpreted by this Court in
several cases. We may refer to a few of them.
(10.1.) In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land
Acquisition Officer [AIR 1961 SC 1500], this Court held :
D
"Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in laVll no
more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to
the owner of the property then the making of the award as
properly understood must involve the communication of the
offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement
E
under the contract law and its applicability to cases of
award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded.
Thus considered the date of the award cannot be
determined solely by reference to the time when the
award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in
F his office; it must involve the consideration of the question
as to when it was known to the party concerned either
actually or constructively. If that be the true position then
the literal and mechanical construction of the words 'the
date of the award' occurring in the relevant section would
G not be appropriate.
There is yet another point which leads to the same
conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative
decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation
H of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1161
ORS. [R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of A
the property and in that sense, like all decisions which
affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said
decision should be communicated to the said party. The
knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either
actual or constructive, is an essential element which must B
. be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force.
Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist
merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing
it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must
involve the communication of the said award to the party c
concerned either actually or constructively, If the award
is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights
are affected by it it can be said to be made when
pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award
is communicated to the party and it is accordingly
pronounced on the date previously announced the award
0
is said to be communicated to the said party even if the
said party is not actually present on the date of its
pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its
pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not E
present, the award can be said to be made when it is
communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the
party affected by the award, either actual or constructive,
being an essential requirement of fair play and natural
justice the expression 'the date of the award' used in the
proviso must mean the date when the award is either F
communicated to the party or is known by him either
.actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would
be unreasonable to construe the words 'from the date of
. the Collector's award' used in the proviso to Section 18
in a literal or mechanical way." G
(emphasis supplied)
(10.2.) In State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum &
Anr. [AIR 1963 SC 1604], this Court reiterated the principles H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A stated in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) and further
held as follows :
"It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish
Chandra's case (supra) is that the party affected by the award
must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six
8
months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now,
knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of
the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must
relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents
C may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is
communicated to a party under S. 12(2) of the Act, the party
must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the
award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is
present in court either personally or through his representative
when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed
D that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the
scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must
mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award."
(emphasis supplied)
E
(10.3.) In Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel & Ors. vs.
State of Gujarat through Dy. Collector Modasa & Anr. [2005
(7) SCC 431] and in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. S.U. T.N.I
Sangam [2009 (16) SCC 1], the aforesaid principles were
followed and reiterated by this Court.
F
11. When a land is acquired and an award is made under
section 11 of the Act, the Collector becomes entitled to take
possession of the acquired land. The award being only an offer
on behalf of the Government, there is always a tendency on the
G part of the Collector to be conservative in making the award,
which results in less than the market value being offered.
Invariably the land loser is required to make an application
under section 18 of the Act to get the market value as
compensation. The land loser does not get a right to seek
H reference to the civil court unless the award is made .. This
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1163
ORS. [RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
means that he can make an application seeking reference only A
when he knows that an award has been made. If the words six
months from the 'date of the Collector's award' should be
literally interpreted as referring to the date of the award and not
the date of knowledge of the award, it will lead to unjust and
absurd results. For example, the Collector may choose to make B
an award but not to issue any notice under section 12(2) of the
Act, either due to negligence or oversight or due to any ulterior
reasons. Or he may send a notice but may not bother to ensure .
that it is served on the land owner as required under section
45 of the Act. If the words 'date of the Collector's award' are c
literally interpreted, the effect would be that on the expiry of six
months from the date of award, even though the claimant had
no notice of the award, he would lose the right to seek a
reference. That will lead to arbitrary and unreasonable
discrimination between those who are notified of the award and
0
those who are not notified of the award. Unless the procedure
under the Act is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, it will
run the risk of being branded as being violative of Article 14
as also Article 300A of the Constitution of India. To avoid such
consequences, the words 'date of the collector's award'
I occurring in proviso (b) to section 18 requires to be read as E
referring to the date of knowledge of the essential contents of
the ·award, and not the actual date of the Collector's award.
12. The following position therefore emerges from the
interpretation of the proviso to section 18 of the Act : F
(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to
make the application within six weeks from the date of the
'collector's award itself.
G
(ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person
interested (or his authorised representative), he has to
make the application seeking reference within six weeks
of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section
H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 2 S.C.R.
A 12(2).
(iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not
present when the· award is made, and if he does not
receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector,
he has to make the application within six months of the
B
date on which he actually or constructively came to know
about the contents of the award.
(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under section
12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date
c of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the
provision for six months for making the application on the
ground that the date of receipt of notice under section
12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents
of the award.
D
A person who fails to make an application for reference within
the time prescribed is not without remedy. It is open to him to
make an application under section 28A of the Act, on the basis
of an award of the court in respect of the other lands covered
E · by the same acquisition notification, if there is an increase. Be
that as it may.
13. When a person interested makes an application for
reference seeking the benefit of six months period from the
date of knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he
F (or his representative) was not present when the award was
made, that he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2)
of the Act, and that he did not have the knowledge of the
contents of the award during a period of six months prior to the
filing the application for reference. This onus is discharged by
G asserting these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the
negative. Once th~ initial onus is discharged by the claimant/
person interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to
establish that the person interested was present either in person
or through his representative when the award was made, or that
H he had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that
BHAGWAN DAS & ORS. ETC. v. STATE OF UP & 1165
ORS. [RV. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
he had knowledge of the contents of the award. Actual or A
constructive knowledge of the contents of the award can be
established by the Collector by proving that the person
interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for
the acquired land, or had attested the Mahazar/ Panchnama/
. proceedings delivering possession of the acquired land in B
pursuance of the acquisition, or had filed a case challenging
the award or had acknowledged the making of the award in any
document or in statement on oath or evidence. The person
interested, not being in possession of the acquired land and
the name of the state or its transferee being entered in the c
revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead
to an inference of constructive knowledge. In the absence of
.any such evidence by the Collector, the claim of the person
interested that he did not have knowledge earlier will be
accepted, ·unless there are compelling circumstances to not to 0
do so.
-------
Re : Question (d)
14. In this case, it is not in qispute that the award was not
made in the presence of the claimant-land owner. The claimant E
has asserted that the award was not made in the presence of
either himself or his representative, and no notice of the award
· under section 12(2) of the Act was tendered to him. He has also
asserted that he became aware of the award only when he
received the notice dated 25.10.2007 calling upon him to F
receive the payment of the award. The respondents contend
that a notice dated 30.3.2007 was issued under section 12(2)
of the Act, to all the interested land-owners including the
appellants. But it is admitted that the said notice was not sent
by post nor served on the land-owners. There is also no G
evidence that the said notice was tendered personally to them
or that they refused to accept it. The respondent has produced
a copy of a notice dated 30.3.2007 with an endorsement of the
·person who was sent to serve the notice which reads as under
: "As per your order I went to village Bishanda and informed H
'· ..
"" .......
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) ,f S.C.R.
A tntnarmers but they refused to put their signatures. Report is
submitted." A vague endorsement that the person who had to
serve the notice went to village and informed the farmers, is
not the same as notice being specifically tendered to the
person concerned. The endorsement-cum-report does not
B mention or identify the farmers ~o whom he spoke or which of
them refused to put their signatures. In the absence of any
evidence placed by the Collector to show knowledge on the part
of the appellants, the claim of the appellants that they became
aware that an award was made only when the notice dated
c 25.10.2007 was tendered to them and they became aware of
the contents of the award only on 16.11.2007 has to be
accepted. In the circumstances, the date of the award should
be taken as 16.11.2007. The application filed on 16.11.2007
was therefore in time. The Land Acquisition Collector ought to
have entertained the application seeking reference. The High
0
Court, instead of directing the Collector to make a reference,
wrongly rejected the writ petition on the ground that an appeal
is maintainable under section 54 of the Act and also wrongly
rejected the review petition on the ground that they could have
made an application for condonation of delay before the Land
E Acquisition Collector.
15. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed, the
orders of the High Court dated 17.1.2008 and 5.5.2008 are set
aside, the writ petition is allowed and the Collector is directed
F to make a reference to the civil court under section 18 of the
Act, without any delay, not later than two months.
N.J. Appeals allowed.
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