Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court's refusal to grant the appellant leave to pursue his grievance before an appropriate forum was erroneous and that part of the order refusing such leave cannot be sustained.

Summary

Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi was detained under the COFEPOSA Act and his properties were forfeited under SAFEMA. After the forfeiture order was cancelled, the immovable property was not returned, and respondent No.4 claimed a sale deed in his favour. The Gujarat High Court dismissed Khalasi's writ petition under Article 226, holding that the dispute over the sale deed involved factual questions that could not be decided in a writ proceeding and directing him to approach the appropriate forum. An intra‑court appeal was filed, and the Division Bench allowed withdrawal of the appeal but refused to grant Khalasi leave to pursue his grievance elsewhere. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had erred in refusing such leave, emphasizing the doctrine of ubi jus, ibi remedium and the right of access to justice, and set aside that part of the order. The appeal was partly allowed, with no order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be entertained when it raises disputed questions of fact concerning the legality of a sale deed.
Whether the High Court erred in refusing to grant the appellant leave to ventilate his grievance before an appropriate forum, violating the principle of ubi jus, ibi remedium.
Whether the Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction by refusing permission to withdraw the appeal and thereby placing the appellant in a worse position.

Legislation cited

Subjects

preventive detentionforfeiture of propertywrit petitionArticle 226disputed factsjurisdictionaccess to justiceubi jus ibi remediumletters patent appealsale deedforgeryCivil AppealCOFEPOSASAFEMA

Judgment

BHAGUBHAI DHANABHAI KHALASI AND ANR. A
v.
THE STATE OF' GUJARAT AND ORS.

APRIL 5, 2007

[S.B. SINHA AND MARKANDEY KA TJU, JJ.] B

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974/Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulations
(Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976:
c
An order of preventive detention and forfeiture of property passed by
authority against appellant-Challenge to-Allowed by High Court-
Authority cancelled the order but not releasing the,property-Writ petition
dismissed by High Court observing that issues like legality of sale-deed, its
execution or whether it is false or fabricated, cannot be decided in the D
proceedings·under Article 226 of the Constitution of India-Petitioners were
directed to initiate appropriate proceedings before appropriate Court-
Letters Patent Appeal-Appellant admitting execution of sale deed by him in
favour of third party and praying for withdrawal of appeal reserving right
to agitate the grievance before appropriate forum-High Court. refusing to
grant such permission-On appeal, Held: High Court did not entertain the E
writ petition as it involved disputed question offact-An appeal thereagainst
filed by the appellant and not by the third party-High Court did not go into
the correctness/otherwise of allegations/counter allegations-Access to justice
is a human right-When there exists a ·right of a disputant, there must be a
remedy-Since, Division Bench of the High_ .Court allowed the appellants to F
'.
i withdraw the appeal they could not have been placed in a worse position-
Hence, part of order of the Division Bench ofthe High Court refusing to grant
leave to appellants to ventilate their grievance before an appropriate forum
cannot be sustained-Constitution of India-Article 226.

Doctrines: G
Doctrine of 'Ubi Jus ibi remedium '-Applicability of

An order of preventive detention was passed against the appellant under
the conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention c.f Smuggling Activities
899 H
)-----
'
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A Act, 1974. ~ properties were forfeited under the Smugglers and Foreign ~

Exchange 'anipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. He filed a Writ
Petition in the High Court questioning the order of detention as also the order
passed under SAFEMA, which was allowed by the High Court. Later, an order
was passed by the competent authority cancelling the Order whereby and
whereunder the properties were directed to be forfeited. Allegedly, the
B immovable properties so forfeited were not released. A writ petition was filed
by the appellant impleading respondent No.4 as a party thereto, who had
contended that the appellant had transferred the said property in his favour.
"
A Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that
whether the sale-deed is legal and the same has been executed by the
Petitioners or the same is false and fabricated, cannot be decided in
c proceedings initiated by the Petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. The petitioners were required to initiate appropriate proceedings
before appropriate Forum.

An intra-court appeal was preferred thereagainst under the Letters
Patent of the High Court by the appellant. He purportedly admitted that he
D had executed a deed of sale in favour of respondent No.4, and made a prayer
for withdrawal of the appeal reserving right to agitate the grievances before -~

an appropriate forum. The Division Bench of the High Court while granting "'
permission to withdraw the appeal refused to grant such permission. Hence
the present appeal.
E Appellant contended that the Division Bench of the High Court
committed a manifest error in passing the said order, insofar as it failed to
take into consideration that by preferring the appeal, the appellant could not
have been put in a worse condition.

Respondent submitted that the appellant was guilty of making a
FI misrepresentation before the Division Bench of the High Court and filed a ,r

large number of forged documents; and that the appellant having admitted
the execution.of the sale deed in favour of respondent No. 4, he cannot be
permitted to litigate before any other forum.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
G
HELD: 1.1. The Division Bench of the High Court as also the Single
Judge admittedly did not enter into the merit of the matter. Single Judge of
the High Court noticed the respective cases of the parties and refused to -\.
entertain the writ petition on the premise that the same involved disputed
questions of fact. [Para 9] [904-D]
H
BHAGUBHAI DHANABHAI KHALASI v. STATEOF GUJARAT [S.B. SINHA, J.] 901
1.2 A party having a grievance must have a remedy. Access to justice is A
a human right When there exists such a right, a disputant must have remedy
in terms of the doctrine ubijus ibi remedium. (Para 10) [904-F)

Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by Lrs. And Anr. v. Ramesh Chander
Agarwal and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 220; Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by Lrs.
and Anr. v. B. D. Agarwal and Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 230; Swamy Atmananda B
and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam and Ors., [2005) 10 SCC 51; Messrs.
Associated Tubewells Ltd v. R.B. Gujarmal Modi, A.I.R. (1957) SC 742; State
of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and Anr., AIR (1982) SC 1249
and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v. C. K. Rajan and
Ors., (2003). 7 SCC 546, relied on.
c
1.3. The Division Bench of the High Court did not go into the correctness
or otherwise of the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties
before it. Whether appellant was guilty of any forgery or not was not
determined. [Para 18) (906-E]

1.4. The Division Bench of the High Court did not intend to exercise D
larger jurisdiction. If it intended to do so, it could have taken recourse to
procedure known to law. It allowed the appellant to withdraw the appeal By
doing so, the parties were relegated to the same position to which they had
been viz. when the Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ
Petition. Appellant could not have been placed in a worse position. Hence, that E
part of the impugned order whereby and whereunder the Division Bench
refused to grant leave to the appellant to ventilate his grievances before ail
appropriate forum cannot be sustained. (Paras 19, 20 and 21) (906-E-G]

CIVIL APf.eLLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1818 of2007.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 06. l 0.2005 of the High Court F
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LPA No. 455 of2005 in SCA No. 7606of1999.

Ashok Desai and S.B. Sanjuanwala, and Rutwik Panda for the Appellants.

Sushil Kumar Jain, H.D. Thanvi, Sarad Singhania, Puneet Jain, Christi
Jain and Pratibha Jain for the Respondents. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
,....,
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. An order of preventive detention was passed against the appellant H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 (for short, "COFEPOSA Act"). He had properties at
Bhadarwal, in the district Jaipur and a fixed deposit receipt of Dena Bank. The
said properties were forfeited under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange
Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (for short, "SAFEMA"). He
filed a Writ Petition in the Gujarat High Court questioning the said order of
B detention as also the order passed under SAFEMA. The said Writ Petition
was allowed. A Special Leave Petition filed thereagainst by the competent
authority was also dismissed. Representations were made by him for return
of the said properties. An order was passed by the competent authority on
or about 30.1.1996 canceling the Order dated 24.9 .1979 whereby and whereunder
C the properties were directed to be forfeited. Allegedly, whereas the fixed
deposit receipt was returned to him, the immovable properties were not. A
Writ Petition was filed by the appellant. Alleg~tions made in the said writ
/
petition were denied and disputed. Respondent No. 4 who was implead('.d as '--

a party thereto contended that the appellant had transferred the said property
.. in his favour. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by a Judgment and
D Order dated 17 .1.2005 dismissed the said writ petition, holding;
"6. I have gone through the petition, documents annexed with the
memo of petition, affidavits and other documents which have been
shown to me by the learned counsel for the respective parties. The
facts of the present petition are peculiar as during the pendency of
the proceedings, certain changes have been taken place. It is the case
E
of the other side that the property in question has been sold by the
Petitioners to the. third party by way of registered sale deed, before
finalization of the proceedings, but the Petitioner has denied the same.
It is the case of the Petitioners that the Petitioners have not sold the
property in question, but some persons have forged and fabricated
F documents and the property has been transferred by way of registered
sale deed, behind the back of the Petitioners illegally and fraudulently.
It has also been established that during the course of the proceedings,
the property has been vested to the Jaipur Urban Development
Authority. Thus, the questions which arise for consideration of this
Court in this Petition is disputed questions of facts. It is the case of
G the Petitioners that they are owners of the property and it is .the duty
of the Respondent authorities to hand over the possession of the
property in question to them and on the other hand, it is prima facie
established that third party interest has created by way of sale deed

H
since long and same has not been challenged by the Petitioners on
anybody else and the said registered sale deed is in operation as on -
BHAGUBHAI DHANABHAI KHALASI v. STATE OF GUJARAT[S.B. SINHA, J.] 903
today. Therefore, whether the aforesaid sale-deed is legal and the A
same has been executed by the Petitioners or the same is false and
fabricated, cannot be decided in this proceedings initiated by the
Petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
Petitioners are required to initiate appropriate proceedings before
appropriate Court.
B
So far as the decisions, upon which the learned counsel for the
Petitioners has placed reliance, are concerned, I am in total agreement
with the ratio laid down in the said decisions. But as stated earlier, in
this petition disputed questions of facts have been arisen and therefore,
the Petitioners cannot get benefits of the said judgment."

3. The learned Single Judge, therefore, did not go into the question, as
c

- to whether the appellant had transferred the said property in favour of the
respondent No. 4 herein or not. An intra-court appeal preferred thereagainst
under the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court was preferred thereagainst
by the appellant. Apparently, a question was raised therein as to whether the
same in effect and substance was filed by the appellant or some other person. D

4. A handwriting expert opined that two signatures on the application
dated 4.4.1997 and two signatures on a certified Photostat copy of affidavit
dated 13.1.2003 were not that of the appellant. Appellant was directed to
appear before the Division Bench and he purportedly admitted that he had
executed a deed of sale in favour of the respondent No. 4. A prayer was made E
for withdrawal of the appeal by the learned counsel appearing on the behalf
of the appellant r~serving right to agitate the grievances before an appropriate
forum. The Division Bench while granting permission to withdraw the appeal
refused to grant such permission stating;

"At this juncture, Shri Sanjanwala submitted that his right to pursue F
other remedy be reserved. But, looking to the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case and the seriousness of the matter, we made
it clear to Shri Sanjanwala that we may not pass this order and may
not grant simple permission to withdraw the Appeal, but we may like
to decide this Appeal on merits and ultimately the person concerned
in the matter may have to even face the consequences. Thereupon, G
Shri Sanjanwala gave up his request."

5. Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
.r appellant would submit that the Division Bench of the High Court committed
a manifest error in passing the said order, insofar as it fafted to take into
H
"t---
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S.C.R.

A consideration that by preferring the appeal, the appettant could not have been
put in a worse condition. '"'

6. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, however, had drawn our attention to the counter affidavit affirmed
by respondent No. 4 to contend that the appellant was guilty of making a
B misrepresentation before the Division Bench of the High Court and filed a
large number of forged documents. In any event he, having admitted the
execution of the sale deed in favour of the respondent No. 4 herein cannot
be. permitted to litigate before any other forum.

7. Allegations made in the said counter affidavit are denied and disputed
c by the appellant in his rejoinder thereto.
8. It does not appear that in relation to the purported report of handwriting
expert, any order was passed upon taking cognizance thereof, even no
proceeding underSection 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated. --
D 9. The Division Bench of the High Court as also the learned Single
Judge admittedly did not enter into the merit of the matter. The learned Single
Judge noticed the respective cases of the parties and refused to entertain the \
writ petition on the premise that the same involved disputed questions of fact.
He, opined that the appellant may agitate his grievances before an appropriate
forum. An intra-court .appeal was filed thereagainst by the appellant alone.
E The respondent did not do so. The jurisdiction of the appellate court, thus
should have been kept confined only to the question as to whether the writ
petition should have been determined on merit by the learned Single Judge.

10. A party having a grievance must have a remedy. Access to justice
is a human right. When there exists such a right, a disputant must have a
F remedy in terms of the doctrine ubi jus ibi remedium.
r

11. In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by Lrs. and Anr. v. Ramesh Chander
Agarwal and Ors., (2003] 6 SCC 220], this Court held;

"22. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and
G not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 9
of the Code· of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil
courts to determine all qisputes of civil nature unless the same is
barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication.
,...
Bar of jurisdiction of a civil· court is not to be readily inferred. A --.
provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of a civil court requires strict
H interpretation. The court, it is well settled, would nonnally lean in
BHAGUBHAI DHANABHAI KHALASI v. STATE OF GUJARAT[S.B. SINHA, J.] 905
favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction A
of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the
party who asserts that the civil courts jurisdiction is ousted. (See
Sahebgouda v. Ogeppa) Even otherwise, the civil courts jurisdiction
is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956."

12. In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) by Lrs. and Anr. v. B.D. Agarwal B
and Ors., [2003] 6 SCC 230, this Court held;

"38. There is another aspect of the matter which must also be taken
notice of. A party cannot be made to suffer adversely either indirectly
or directly by reason of an order passed by any court of law which
is not binding on him. The very basis upon which a judicial process C
can be resorted to is reasonableness and fairness in a trial. Under our
Constitution as also the international treaties and conventions, the
right to get a fair trial is a basic fundamental/human right. Any
procedure which comes in the way of a party in getting,a fair trial
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Right to
a fair trial by an independent and impartial Tribunal is part of Article D
6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rigbts .
and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 [See Clark (Procurator Fiscal,
Kirkcaldy) v. Kelly]. Furthennore, even if the petitioner herein had
filed a writ petition before the High Court in terms of Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the same would not have been entertained
as the impugned order had been passed consequent to and in E
furtherance of the purported consent order passed by the High Court.
Ordinarily, the High Court would not have issued a writ of certiorari
for quashing its own order. Even in that view of the matter it is
apposite that this petition under Article 32 should be entertained."

F
13. See Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam
and Ors., [2005] I 0 SCC 51 ].

14. There is nothing on record to show that the Division Bench while
entertaining the Letters Patent Appeal intended to enter into any other
question. Judges' record as is well known is final and conclusive. Any G
dispute in relation thereto must be raised before the same Court.

15. In Messrs. Associated Tubewells Ltd v. R.B. Gujarmal Modi, A.LR.
(1957) SC 742, this Court deprecated the practice ofreferring to conversation
which tpok place in Court, stating;
H
~-
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 4 S~C.R.

A "4. We cannot, however, part from this matter without placing on
record our very strong disapproval of the course ~hat the Advocate ,..
a very senior counsel of this Court has adopted in making this
application. In the review application he has referred in detail as to
what, according to him, happened in Court on the prior occasion and
what each Judge said in the course of the arguments. The review
B application sets out at length what the presiding Judge said and
expressed in the course of the arguments and what his views were and
what the other Judges of the Bench said and expressed and what the
view of each was. These statements are followed by a confident
assertion how and why the application was dismissed." "
c 16. Yet again in State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas ShrinivasNayak and
Anr., AIR (1982) SC 1249, this Court opined;

"7. So the Judges' record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor-litigant
·'
may claim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere
r
else."
·n
17. See also Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Anr. v.
C.K. Rajan and Ors:, [2003] 7 SCC 546.

18. The Division Bench did not go into the correctness or .otherwise of
the ailegations and counter allegations made by the parties before it. Whether
appellant was guilty of any forgery or not was not determined. t:
E
19. It is therefore, difficult to accept the contention of Mr. Jain that the
Division Bench intended to exercise larger jurisdiction. If it intended to do so,
it could have taken recourse to procedure known to law.

20. It allowed the appellant to withdraw the appeal. By doing so, the
F
parties were relegated to the same position to which they had been viz. when
the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. Appellant, thus in our
view could not have been placed in a worse position.
.
.j
21. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the part of the impugned order ~-

G whereby and whereunder the Division Bench refused to grant leave to the
appellant to ventilate his grievances before an appropriate forum cannot be
sustained. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. We, however, ;-
make no order as to costs.

S.K.S. Appeal partly allowed. . .... .,._..,
H .... _..}