Holding

Section 30(2) renders the amended provisions of Section 23(2) and Section 28 applicable to all compensation proceedings pending on 30 April 1982 or filed thereafter, irrespective of the date of the original award, thereby entitling the appellants to 30% solatium, 9% interest and permitting them to pay the deficit court fee to obtain the enhanced compensation.

Summary

The appellants' land was acquired for a cantonment under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and they received an award in 1975. Subsequent enhancements to compensation were ordered by the Additional District Judge and the High Court, but the Division Bench conditioned the enhanced award on payment of a deficit court fee, which the appellants had not paid. The appellants appealed, contending that under Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 they were entitled to the higher solatium of 30% and interest of 9% and should be allowed to pay the outstanding court fee to receive the enhanced compensation. The Supreme Court held that Section 30(2) makes the amended provisions applicable to all compensation proceedings pending on 30 April 1982 or filed thereafter, even if the original award was earlier, and therefore the appellants are entitled to the enhanced rates and may pay the deficit fee. The Court set aside the Division Bench order, directed payment of the enhanced compensation, 30% solatium, 9% interest, and allowed the appellants to pay the court‑fee shortfall.

Issues considered

The scope of Section 30(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 – whether it applies retrospectively to awards made before 30 April 1982 but with appeals pending after that date.
Whether the appellants are entitled to the enhanced solatium of 30% and interest of 9% under the amended provisions.
Whether the requirement of payment of the deficit court fee can be waived or the appellants allowed to pay it later to claim the enhanced compensation.
Whether the Division Bench erred in denying enhanced compensation solely on the ground of non‑payment of court fee.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 23(2), s. 28, s. 4, s. 54, s. 6, s. 9
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984s. 15(b), s. 18(a), s. 30(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationSolatiumInterestRetrospective legislationSection 30(2)Court feeEnhanced compensationSupreme Court interpretation

Judgment

949
BHAG SINGll & OBS.
A
v.
UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH, THROUGH
TIIE LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR, CHANDIGARH

AUGUST 14, 1985

B
[P.N. BHAGWATI, CJ . , A.N. SEN AND D . P . MADON, JJ . ]

Land Acquisition Act . 1894, Sections 23 and 28 & Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, Sections 15(b), 18(a) and
30(2) .

c
Land acquisition - Solatium and compensation - Enhanced
rates of 'thirty per centum' and 'nine per centum' - Entitlement
'• of - When arises - Awards made after April 30, 1982 - Appeals
arising from such awards - Whether covered.

Compensation - Determination of by courts - Market value of
the land acquired - Courts restricting compensation to amount of D

court-fee paid by claimants - Whether legal and valid.

The Land Acquisition (Amelldment) Act, 1984 by Section 15(b)
amended section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to
provide that in sub-section (2) of section 23 for the words
E
"fifteen per centum", the words "thirty per centum" shall be
substituted, and by Section 18(a) provided that in Section 28 of
the Principal Act for the words 'six per centum the words 'nine
per centum' shall be substituted. Section 30(2) of the Amendment
Act provided that the increased solatium was to be applicable "in
relation to any awatd made by the collector or Court or to any
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
any such award under the provisions of the Principal Act after F

the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land
Acquisition (Amelldment) Bill, 1982 in the House of the People)
and before the cOllln llenceme t of this Act.

The State Government issued a notification on 19th October
1974 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for
acquisition of land for the purpose of establishment of a
cantonment. The Land Acquisition Collector thereafter issued a
notice under section 9 and required persons interested in the
land to submit their claims for coinpensation. The claims
submitted by various claimants including the appellants , were
considered by the Land Acquisition Collector and an award made on
H
9th October 1975 dividing the land acquired into three belts and
.,,.
awarding compensation at varying rates. The appellants and other
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP. 2 s . c .R.
..
A
claimants being aggrieved by the aforesaid award sought
references under section 18 of the Act, and the Additional
District Judge, enhanced the rates of compensation. The
appellants who were still dissatisfied preferred appeals to the
High Court .
ll

A single Judge of the High Court enhanced the amount of
compensation, and directed that the claimants shall be entitled
to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and solatium at the rate
of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensation. This order
awarding enhanced compensation was, however, made subject to the
c claims put forward in the memoranda of appeal preferred by the
claimants and the Court fee paid on such claims. As the
appellants had not paid the requisite court fee on the enhanced r
amount of compensation they could not get the benefit of the said
order.

The appellants preferred Letters Patent Appeals . The
D Division Bench dismissed the appeals taking the view that the
appellants were entitled to the enhanced amount of compensation
for acquisition of their land, but restricting the benefits of
the enhanced compensation only to those claimants who had made
payment of proper court fee.

In the Appeals to this Court it was contended on behalf of
E the appellants: (1) that they should have been given an
opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee, so that like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation, and
(2) that by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act of 1984,
the claimants are entitled to be paid solatium at the rate of 30%
of the compensation ultimately awarded to them instead of 15%
F
awarded by the Division Bench as also interest at the rate of 9%
instead of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensation-.

Allowing the Appeals ,

llKLD: 1 . (i) The order passed by the Division Bench in so
G
far as it refused to grant enhanced compensation to the appel
lants on account of non-payment of deficit court fee is se.t
aside. It is directed that the appellants shall be paid enhanced
compensation at the rate determined by the Division Bench. They
.
shall also receive solatium calculated at the rate of 30% on the
amount of enhanced compensation under the amended Section 23
H
sub-section (2) as also interest at the rate of 9% per annum on Ir
the enhanced amount of compensation from the date on which
BHAG SINGH v. THE LAND ACQN. COLLECTOR 951

A
possession was taken up to the date of payment of such enbanced
compensation. The appellants will pay up the deficit amount of
court fee within two months . [963 A-CJ

(ii) The Division Bench and the single judge should not
have adopted a technical approach and denied the benefit of B
enhanced compensation to the appellants merely because they had
not initially paid the proper amount of court fee. They should
have allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and
awarded to them compensation at the higher rate or rates
determined by them. [956 BJ
c

(iii) In the instant case , a claim was made by the
-,
appellants against the State Government for compensation for
acquisition of their land and under the law, the State was bound
to pay to the appellants compensation on the basis of the market
value of the land acquired and if according to the judgments of
the single Judge and the Division Bench, the market value of the D
land acquired was higher than that awarded by the Land
Acquisition Collector or the Additional District Judge there is
no reason why the appellants should have been denied the benefit
of payment of the market value so determined. To deny this
benefit to the appellants would be tantamount to permitting the
State Government to acquire the land of the appellants on payment E
of less than the true market value. Under agrarian reform
legislation, the holder of land may legitimately, as a matter of
social justice, be deprived of land which is not being personally
cultivated by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with
payment of little compensation or no compensation at all , but
where land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it
would not be fair and just to deprive the holder of land without F
payment of the true market value when the law declares that he
shall be paid such market value. [955 E-H]

2. (i) Under Section 30 sub-section (2) the provisions of the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made
applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on
30th April 1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before G
the Collector or before the. Court or the High Court or the
Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the
enactment of the Amending Act. [961 HJ

(ii) The Amendment Act came into force with effect from
24th September 1984 but the Bill which ultimately became the H
'Ill Amending Act was introduced in Parliament on 30th April 1982.
952 SUPREME COUKT REPORTS [ 1985] SUPP.2 5.C.R.

A
Parliament desired that the amended provisions of Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 should be given effect from the
date of introduction of the Bill in Parliament and therefore
enacted Section 30 sub-section (2) making the provisions of the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 applicable to
B and in relation to "any award made by the Collector or Court or
to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award and before the comencement of this Act" ,
that is, the Amending Act after the 30th day of April 1982.
[959 F, 962 D-G]

c (iii) The intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30
aub-section (2), is brought out in no uncertain terms by the
express language of Section 30 sub-section (2) . The adverbial <
phrase "sfter the 30th day of April 1982 and before the c0111n
11e ce
ment of this Act· goveroa not only the words "any award made by
the Collector or Court" but also the words "any order passed by
the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such
o award" . The amended provisions of section 23 sub-section (2) and
Section 28 are applicable not only in relation to an award made
by the Collector or court sf ter 30th April 1982 and before the
COl!llleucement of the Amending Act but also in relation to an order
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal between 30th
April 1982 and the C0111Dencement of the Amending Act. [960 E-F ]

E (iv) Parliament deliberately and advisedly introduced the
adverbial phrase "sfter the 30th day of April, 1982 and before
the commencement of this Act " , so as to qualify both "any award
made by the Collector or Court" as also "any order passed by the
High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award. The
words "such award" in the context in which they occur mean only
F the award made by the Collector or court and do not import the
time element which finds place only at the end of the sentence
and not immediately following the words "any award made by the
Collector or Court". [961 F-G]

In the instant case, the award of the Collector was made on
G 9th October 1975 and the award of the court was made on 31st July
1979. The award of the Court as well as the award of the
Collector were thus made prior to 30th April 1982. So also was
the order passed by the single Judge of the High Court in appeal
against the award of the court made on 10th November 1981, that
is, before 30th April, 1982. But on 30th April, 1982 the Letters

H Patent Appeal preferred by the appellants was pending before the
,..
Division Bench of the High Court and that was disposed of on 8th
December 1982 and this was followed by the present appeal before
BHAG SINGH v. THE LAND ACQN. COLLECTOR [BHAGWATI, CJ. ] 953

A
this Court. The present appeal was pending at the date of
c"""'PT!cement of the Amending Act and therefore, this Court is
bound to given effect to the provisions of the amended Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 in determining the amount of
compensation. [962 JH;] I
B
State of Punjab v. llobillller Singh & another approved
Iallalajamannivani v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 1985 (1)
sec 582 disapproved.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 1519-23 of
c
1985.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22 . 9 . 1982 of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court in R.F.A. Nos . 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320 of
1980 and 331 of 1981.

D
A.K. Goel, for the Appellants.

Atul Jain and Raj Birbal, for the Respondent .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BHAGWATI, CJ. This appeal by special leave raises a short E
but interesting question of law relating to the interpretation of
Section JU sub-section (2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act) . There
are divergent views expressed by different Benches of this Court
in regard to the interpretation of this provision and hence it is
necessary to examine this question afresh in order to arrive at a
F
proper interpretation, particularly since the interpretation
placed by us will affect the determination of compensation in a
large number of cases .

The facts giving rise to this appeal are few and may be
briefly stated as follows . On 9th October 1974 a notification was
issued by the State of Punjab under Section 4 of the Land Acqui
G
sition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) stating
that a large chunk of land admeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was
likely to be needed for the purpose of establislnnent of a canton
ment within the revenue estate of Bhatinda. This notification
was followed by another notification issued by the State of
Punjab under-section b of the Act declaring that the entire area
a.dmeasuring 10768 Bighas 18 Biswas was needed for the establish-
1lent of a cantonment. The Land Acquisition Collector thereafter
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP. 2 s . c .R.�

A
issued a notice under-section 9 of the Act and required persons
interested in the land forming the subject matter of the declara
tion to submit their claims for compensation for acquisition of
their interest in the land . The claims submitted by various
claimants including the appellants in the present appeal were
B considered by the Land Acquisition Collector and he made an award •
on 11th June 1975 dividing the land acquired into three belts and
awarding compensation at varying rates according to the belt in
which a particular piece of land was situated. The appellants and
other claimants being aggreived by the award made by the Land
Acquisition Collector, sought references under-section 18 of the
c Act and the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda, hearing the
references , amalgamated belts 2 and 3 and enhanced the rates of
compensation for the two belts . The appellants and the other �
clai.nants were still dissatisfied with the award made by the
Additional District Judge and they thereupon preferred appeals to
the High Court . On appeal, the learned single Judge of the High
Court enhanced the amount of compensation by awarding the rate. of
D Rs . 72,600 per acre foe the first belt and l(s . 25000 per acre for
the second belt and in addition, directed that the claimants
shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum and
solatilUil at the rate of 15% on the enhanced amount of compensa
tion. This order awarding enhanced compensation was , however ,
"'
made subject to the claims put forward in the memoranda of appeal
preferred by the claimants and the court fee paid on such claims .
E It seems that the appellants had not paid the requisite court fee
on the enhanced amount of compensation and they , therefore, could
not get the benefit of the order of the learned single Judge.
They accordingly preferred a letters patent appeal to a division
Bench of the High Court and the other claimants also being
dissatisfied with the order ma.de by the learned single Judge
F preferred letters patent appeals to the Division Bench . The
Division Bench of the High Court, by an order dated 8th December
1982, affirmed the judgment ot the learned single Judge in regard
to the rate of compensation for the land situate in first belt
but so far as the land situate in the second belt was conr.erned ,
it enhanced the rate of compenstion to l{s . 38, 720 per acre. The
G Division Bench, however , restricted the benefit of the enhanced
compensation only to those claimants who had made payment of
proper court fee. The result was that the letters patent appeal
of the appellants was dismissed, though according to the view
taken by the Division Bench the appellants were entitled to the
enhanced amount of compensation for acquisition of their land .
H The appellants thereupon preferred the present appeal wit ""
special leave obtained from this Court .
llHAG SINGli v. TllE LAND ACQN . COLLECTOR (BHAGWATI, CJ . ] 955

A
We are of the view that when the learned single Judge and
the Division Bench took the view that the claimants whose land
was acquired by the State of Punjab under the notifications
issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, were entitled to
enhanced compensation and the case of the appellants stood on the
same footing, the appellants should have been given an B
opportunity of paying up the deficit court fee so that , like
other claimants, they could also get enhanced compensation at the
same rate as the others. The learned single Judge and the
Uivision Bench should not have, in our opinion, adopted a techni
cal approach and denied the benefit of enhanced compensation to
the appellants merely because they had not initially paid the c
proper amount of court fee. It must be remembered that this was
not a dispute between two private citizens where it would be
.- quite just and legi timate to confine the claimant to the claim
made by him and not to award him any higher amount than that
claimed though even in such a case there may be situations where
an amount higher than that claimed can be awarded to the claimant D
as for instance where an amount is claimed as due at the foot of
an account . Here was a claim made by the appellants against the
State Government for · compensation for acquisition of their land
and under the law, the State was bound to pay to the appellants
compensation on the basis of the mark.et value of the land acquir
ed and if according to the judgments of the learned single Judge E
�and the Division Bench , the market value of the land acquired was
higher than that awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector or the
Additional Oistrict Judge , there is no reason why the appellants
should have · been denied the benefit of payment of the market
value so determined. To deny this benefit to the appellants would
tantamount to permitting the State Goverrunent to acquire the land
of the appellants on payment of less than the true market value . F
Ther� may be cases where, as for instance, under • agrarian reform
legislation, the holder of land may , legitimately, as a matter of
social justice with a view to eliminating concentration of land
in the hands of a few and. bringing about its equitable distribu
.tion, be deprived of land which is not being personally cultiva
ted by him or which is in excess of the ceiling area with payment
of little compensation or no compensation a t all, but wht!re land
G
is acquired under the Land Ac quisition Ac t , 1894, it would not be
fair and just to deprive the holder of his land without payment
of the true market value when the law, in so many terms , declares
that he shall be paid such market value . The State Government
must do wha t is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as
far as possible, except in cases where t.ax: or revenue is received
H
Qlj recovered wittiout Drotest or where the State Goverrunent wou ld
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP. 2 s.c.R.

A
otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical
plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. We
are, therefore, of the view that, in the present case, the
Division Bench as well as the learned single Judge should have
allowed the appellants to pay up the deficit court fee and
a awarded to them compensation at the higher rate or rates
determined by them.

But this view taken by us does not an end to the present
appeal because another more important question has been raised
before us arising out of Section 30 sub-section (2) of the
C Amending Act. The appellants on the basis of this provision, have
contended that they are entitled to be paid solatium at the rate
of 30% of the compensation ultimately awarded to them instead of
15% awarded by the Division Bench as also interest at the rate of '
9% innte<>d of 6% per annum on the enhanced amount of compensa
tion. It is necessary, in order to adjudicate upon the validity
of this contention to ref er to a few relevant provisions of the
D Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amending Act.
Section 23 sub-section (2) of the unamended Act provided inter
alia as follows :-

"23 (2) In addition to the market value of the land as
above provided, the Court shall in every case award a .
sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in
E consideration of the compulsory nature of the
acquisition. "

Section 28 of the unamended Ac t provided for payment o f interest
on excess compensation in the following terms :

F "If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the
Collector ought to have, awarded as compensation is in
excess of the sum which the Collector did -�-�ard as
compensation, the a•ard of the Court 1UJ.y direct that.
the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the
rate of six per centum per annum frc..�.:,;. tn,_ C::ite on
G which he tool< possession of the land to the date of
payment of such excess into Court . "

The Act was amended by the Amending Act with effoct from 21<th
September 1984. Section 15 clause (b) of the Amending Act reads
as follows :
H
BHAG SINGH v. TllE LAND ACQN. COLLECTOR [BHAGWATI, CJ . ] 957

A
15. In section 23 of the Principal Act : -

(a) • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . • •

(b) in sub-section (2), for the words "fifteen per
centum" , the words "thirty per centum shall be ll
substituted. "

Section 18 clause (a) of the Amending Act provides that "in
Section 28 of the principal Act for the words 'six per centum' -
the words 'nine per centum' shall be substi.tuted. " Section 30
sub-section (2) is the material provision which falls to be C
construed and since the entire controversy between the parties
turns upon the true interpretation of this provision, we may
reproduce it in extenso. It runs as follows :

"30(2). The provisions of sub-section (2) of section
23 and section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by D
clause (b) of section 15 and section 18 of this Act
respectively , shall apply, and shall be deemed to have
applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made
by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by
the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any
such award under the provisions of the principal Act E
after 30th day of April, 1982 (the date Of
introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,
1982, in the House of People) and before the
commencement of this Ac t . "

The question i s as to what i s the extent to which retrospective
effect is given by the provision enacted in Section 30 F
sub--section (2) . Does it make the amended provisions in Section
23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 applicable only to cases where
an award is made by the Collector or Court after 30th April 1982
or does it make these amended provisions applicable also to cases
where an award may have been made by the Collector or Court prior
to 30th April 1982 but the proceedings by way of appeal were
pending in the High Court or the Supreme Court on 30th April 1982 G
and were disposed of subsequent to that date. The former view has
prevailed with Chinnappa Reddy , J . and Sabyasachi Mukharji , J . in
KamalajaDl!!Rn°tavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [1985] l
S . C . C . 582 while the latter view has found acceptance with S .
Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. , Varadarajan, J . and Ranganath Misra J . in
' .
Civil Appeal No. 3267 of 1979, State of Punjab v. lt>hindel" Singh
H
"" & Anr. decided on 1st May 1985. Since the latter decisio
n is one
958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP . 2 s . c . R .

A
given by a Bench o f three Judges , we would have ordinarily regar
ded it as over-ruling the earlier decision in Kamalajamnanniavaru
case which was a decision of only two Judges , but it seems that
the earlier decision was not cited before the Bench of three
Judges in Mohinder Singh's case and moreover there is no discus
B sion of the provision enacted in Section 30 sub-section (2) and
hence we have to consider for ourselves which decision, on a true
interpretation of the language of Section 30 sub-section (2)
represents the correct view.

We may first consider what would be the position if Section
c 30 sub-section (2) were not enacted and the amendments in Section
23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were effective only from the
date on which they were made, namely 24th September 1984 when the
Amending Act received the assent of the President and was brought
into force . If at the date of the cOIIlencement
ll of the Amending
Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation were
pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or
D before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the
amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would
admittedly be applicable to such proceedings. This n:uch indeed
was conceded by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents and even in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra) it was
accepted to be the correct position . Chinnappa Reddy , J . speaking
on behalf of the Court in Kamalajammanniavaru case (supra)
E observed : "The new Section 23 (2) , of course, necessarily
applies to award made by the Collector or court after the
commencement" of the Amending Act. But if an award were made by
the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the
conmencement of the Amending Act and an appeal against such award
were pending before the High Court under Section 54 at the date
F of the commencement of the Amending Act, which provisions would
the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and
determining the amount of compensation : the amended provisions
in section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended
provisions . The answer can only be that the High Court would have
to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2)
G and Section 28. The appeal agains t the award would be a
continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way
of reference under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the
appeal , it would be in effect and substance be hearing the
reference and while determining the amount of compensation, it
would have to give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them
H at the date of decision of the appeal. When Section 23
sub-section (l) provides that in determining the amount of ...-
BHAG SINGH v. THE LAND ACQN. COLLECTOR [BllAGWATI, CJ.] 959

A
compensation the court shall take into consideration matters
specified in the various sub-<:lauses of that sub-section and
sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that in addition to the
market value of the land the court shall ·in every case award a
sum of 15 per centum of such market value i.n consideration of the
compulsGry nature of the acquisition, the. mandate of these two B
i sub-section must· apply equally whether· the .. court is hearing a
reference or the High Court is hearing an appeal against an award
l_, made by the Court. The amended provisions in Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section .28 would therefore have to be applied
by the High Court in determining the amount of compensation. The
same position would obtain where an appeal against an award has c
been decided by the· High . Court prior to·. the c0mmencement of the
Amending Act and an appeal against the order of the High Court is
pending before . the Supreme Court at the date of commencement of
the Amending Act or is filed after such date. The Supreme Court
also while deciding the appeal. and determining the amount of
compensation would .have to take iilto account the· amended · D
provisions in Section 23 sub-:section · (2.) and .section 28; because
when the Supreme Court · decides the appeal and determines the
amount of compensation, it would have. to comply with the mandate
contained in Section 23. sub-section (2) and Section 28 and that
mandate would-be as foUnd. in the amended provisions of Section 23
Sub-Section (2) and·. Section 28. Thus the amended provisions of E
Section 23 sub-section (2) and . Section 28 would apply in
determination-" .of· the amount of compenSati6n Where proceeding's are
either pending at the date of commencement of the amending Act or
are filed subsequent to the date, whether before the Collector or
; before the Court or before the ·High Court or the Supreme Court.

Now, as we have already pointed out above, the Amending Act F
came into force with effect from.24th September 1984 but the Bill
which ultimately became the Amending Act was introduced in
Parliament on 30th .April 1982. Parliament obviously desired that
the amended provisions of Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section
28 should be given effect from the date of introduction of the
~ Bill in Parl_iam.ent and th~refore enacted Section 30 sub-section
(2) making the provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section G
(2) and Section 28 applicable to and in relation to "any award
made by the Collector or court or to any order passed by the High
Court or Sup~eme Court in appeal against any su_ch award ..... .
after the 30th day of April 1982 ••••• and before the commencement
of this Act", that is, the Amending Act. The object of Parliament
,·clearly was that the amended· provisions of Section 23 sub-section H
• (2) and Section 28 should be applicable in determination of
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] SUPP.2 S.C.R.

A
compensation where proceedings before· the c.ollector .or the court
or the High Court or the Supreme Court· were pendillg on 30th April
1982 or were commenced after that date, even if suc;h proceedings
had finally terminated before the enactment of the Amending Act
and no proceedings .were pending before the Collector or the court
or the High Court or the Supreme Court at the date of enactment
B
of the Amending Act. If the proceedings had not finally concluded
before the enactment of the Amending Act and were pending on that
date or. were started subsequently, whether before the Collector
or the COurt or the ·High Court or the Supreme Court, the amended
provisions of Section 23 sub-sectioa (2) and Section .za w-vuld ' ,
apply on their own terms in determining -_compensation. But by
c virtue of Section 30 sub-section (2), the amended provisions of
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were made 'applicable
also where the proceedings were pending 30th April 1982 or were
comnenced after that date even though they might have finally
come to an end before the enactment of the Amending Act· Of
course, i f the proceedings had finally terminated on or before
30th April 1982, the amended provisions of Sectfon·23 sub-section
D (2) and Section 28 could not possibly be intended to apply to the
determ.in)tion made in such proceedings. This was clearly the
intendment of Parliament in enacting Section 30 sub-section (2).

This intendment is brought out in no uncertain· terms by the
express language of Section 30 sub-section (2). It says that the
provisions of the· amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section
E 28 shall apply and shall be deemed to . have applied to and in
relation to any award made by the Collector or court or to any
order passed by the High Court or the Supreme court in appeal
against any such award after 3Uth April 1982 and .. before the •
collDilencem~nt of the Amending Act· It is significant that the
adverbial phrase "after the JOth day of April 1982--·-- and
F before the commencc.4ilent of this Act." governs not only the wOrds
"any award ma.de by the Collector or court" but also the words
"any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal
against any such award" The amended provisions of Section 23
sub-section (2) and Section 28 are applicable not only in
relation to an award made by the Collector or coutt after 30th ~·
G April 1982 and before the conmencement of the Amending Act but
also in relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal between 30th April 1982 and the comiiencement of
the Aineruling Act •. The appeal in wbich the order ls· passed by the
High Court or Supreme Court may be against an award made by the
Collector or court prior to 30th April 1982 or subsequent to that
H date. The only requirement is that the order must have been

'
BHAG SINGH v. THE LAND ACQN. COLLECTOR [BHAGWATI, .CJ.] 961

A
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal.against such
award, after 30th April 1982 but before the commencement of the
amending Act. If it was the illtentiou of P.arliamerit to confine
the applicability of the provisions of the amended section 23
sub-section (2) and Sect.ion 28 only· to an award made by the
sollector or Court after 30th April 1982 and before the commence- B
ment af the Amending Act and to an order made by the High Court
Or the Supreme Court in appeal only· against ~uch an award,
t'atliament would have inserted the adverbial phrase "after the
30th day of April 1982 •••••• and before the commencement of this
Act" immediately after the words "any award .made by the Collector.·
or coure·. so as to indicate clearly and beyond doubt that t.he c
adverbial phrase was intended to govern only award made by . the
Collector or court and in that event the words "such award" would
have carried only one meaning, namely, award made by the Collec-
tor or court after 30th Aptil 1982 and before the commencement of
the Amending Act. The words "any order passed by the High Court
or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award" would then D
have had a limited meaning, namely, order passed by the High
, Court or Supreme Court in an appeal preferred against an award
made by the Collector or court after 30th April 1982 and before
the commencement of the Amending Act. The words "any order passed
by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal agaiiist any such
award" would then have had a limited meaning, namely, order E
passed by the High Court or Supreme Court, in an appeal preferred
against an award made by the Collecto.r or' Court after 30th April,
1982 and before the commencement of the Amending Act. These words
would not in that event have comprehended order passed by the
• High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against ·an ;i.ward made by
the Collector or court on or before 30th April 1982: But Parlia-
ment deliberately and advisedly introduced the. adverbial phrase F
"after the 30th day of April 1982 ••••• and before the commence-
ment of this Act" at the end of the sentence, so as to quality
both "any award made by the Collector or court" as also ''.any
order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against
A any such award". ·nie words 'such award' in the context in which·
..

they occur mean only the award made by the Collector .or, court and.
do not import the time element which finds place only at the end G
of the sentence and not immediately following the, ,words "any
award made by the Collector.or court". It is therefore clear that
under Section JO sub-secti 0~_ (2) the provis.ions of the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 are made applicable to
all proceedings relating . to 'compensation pending on 30th April
t 1982 or filed subsequent to, that date, Whether. before the .Collec- H
. tor or before. the cour.t or. the High Court or_ the. $upr~ Court,
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the
Amending Act. It would .not be a correct·interpret•tiou of Section
30 sub-section (2) to say that the provisions of the amended
Section 23 sub-section (2) .and Section 28 ·would be .applicable in
relation to an order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court
JI only if the order is passed in appeal against an award made by
the Collector or Court between 30th April 1982 and the commence-
ment of the Amending Act. . Even if an . award is. made by the
Collector .or court on or before 30th April 1982 and an appeal
against such award is pending before the High Court or the ,
Supreme Court on 30th April 1982 or is filed subseq\l<!nt to that
c date,. the provisions of the amended Section .23 sub-section (2)
and Section 28 would be applicable in relation to an order paased
in. such. appeal by the High Court or the Supreme Court, . we
accordingly affirm the view taken by the Bench of three Judges in .
Mohind.er Singh's case. (surpa) and express our respectful
disagreement w1 th the vi.ew taken by the Bench of two Judges in
· Kame1Qmann1ayaru'.s ~ (supra). The latter decision cannot ·be
D regarded as laying do'wn the correct law in regard to the inter-
. pretation .of Section 30 sub-section (2).
,.
.llere in..the present case the award of the CciUector was made
on 11th June 1975 and the award of the court was made on 31st
July, 1979. The award of the court as well as the award of the
Collector were thus made prior to 30th April 1982. So also was
·r; the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in
appeal against the award of the Court made on 10th November 1981,
that is, before 30th April 1982. But on 30th April 1982, the
lette.rs patent· appeal preferred by the appellallts was pending
before the.Division Bench of the High Court and that was disposed •
.of on 8th December 1982 and this was followed by the present
I! appeal before t.his court. The oraer in the letters patent appeal
was thus .passed by the Division Bench after 30th April 1982 and
before the comnencement of the Amending Act and the provisions of
the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 were
therefore applicable fo relation to this order passed by the
Division l!ench, on. the interpretation placed by us on Section 30 ,
G sub-section (2); Moreover, the present appeal was pending at the
date of coomencement of the Amending Act and therefore, in any
view of the matter, this cour.t is bound to given effect to the
provisions of the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section
28"in determining the amount of compensation.

H We must therefore allow the present appeal and set aside the
order passed by the J;>ivision. Bench in so far as it refused to '
grant enhanced compensation to· the appellants on account of
BHAG SINGH v. THE LAND AfXlN. COLLEC'l'OR[BllAGIATI, CJ.) 963

non-payment of deficit court fee· and direct that the ·appellants A
shall be paid enhanc.ed.compensation at the rate determined by the
Division Bench,· according· as the land belonging to .them fell.
within one· or· the other belt, and they shall also receive
solatium calcuated at the rate of 30% on tile 8lOOUilt. to enhanced B
compensation tinder the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) as also
interest at the rate of 9% per annum on the enhanced . amiint of
compensation from the di.te on which possession of their. land was
' taken up to the expiration of a periOd of one ·year and thereafter
at the. rate of 15% per annum. The appellant .will pay up the · C
deficit amount of court ·fee .within two months from today and a
final order in the· above terms. will be drawn up fa f11vour of the ·
appellants only after payment of the deficit court ·fee is uiade
within the time stipulated by. us. We think that ehe fair 0rder of ·
costs in the present case would be .that. each party shall bear and D
pay its own costs throughout. · · · ·

N.V.K. Appeals .allowed •.

~· .. '

i.